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Andreas Fritz Hillgruber (January 18, 1925 - May 8, 1989) was a conservative West German historian.

Hillgruber was, for most of his life, widely influential within historical circles as a military and diplomatic historian. At his death in 1989, the American historian Francis L. Loewenheim said: "Andreas Hillgruber was probably the leading West German historian of his generation - a scholar of indefatigable energy and fierce independence, a scholar of weighty judgment even if one did not always agree with him". Other historians were more hostile, with the British historian Richard J. Evans taking the view that Hillgruber was a great historian whose once-sterling reputation as a historian was in ruins.

Biography

Hillgruber was born in Angerburgmarker, Germany (modern Wegorzewomarker, Poland) near the then East Prussian city of Königsbergmarker (modern Kaliningradmarker, Russia). Hillgruber's father lost his job as a teacher under the Third Reich. Hillgruber served in the German Army from 1943 to 1945 and spent the years 1945-1948 as a POW in France. During World War II, Hillgruber fought on the Eastern Front, an experience that was later to play a role in his evaluation and writing about the period. In 1945, Hillgruber fled west to escape the Red Army, another experience that was to have much influence on him. After his release he studied at the University of Göttingenmarker, where he received a PhD in 1952. As a student, Hillgruber was a leading protégée of the medievalist Percy Ernst Schramm, an academic who, as Eberhard Jäckel commented, regarded World War II as a normal war that regrettably the Nazis were not as skilled at waging as they should have been. Much of Hillgruber's early work reflected Schramm's influence. He spent the decade 1954-1964 working as school teacher. In 1960 he married Karin Zieran, with whom he had three children. Hillgruber worked as a professor at the University of Marburgmarker (1965-1968), the University of Freiburg (1968-1972) and the University of Colognemarker (1972-1989). In the late 1960s he was a target of radical student protesters. He died in Cologne of throat cancer.

Early Historical Work



Hillgruber's area of expertise was German history from 1871 to 1945, especially its political, diplomatic and military aspects. He argued for understanding this period as one of continuities. In his first address as a professor at Freiburg in 1969, Hillgruber argued for understanding the entire "Bismarck Reich" as one of continuities between 1871-1945. For Hillgruber, the continuities of the "Bismarck Reich" were a certain mentalité amongst German elites, namely a Weltanschuauung (world view) that emphasized an "either-or" outlook on international relations, Social Darwinism, a deterministic understanding of history, and dreams of worldwide expansionism. However, though Hillgruber paid attention to structural factors, in his opinion it was the actions of individuals that made the difference. As a member of the "Hitler Youth" generation and a World War II veteran, Hillgruber's major interest was why and how Germany failed as a great power. These interests were reflected in the title of one of Hillgruber's better-known books, Die gescheiterte Grossmacht (The Failed Great Power) (1980), in which he examined German power politics from 1871 to 1945.

In the early 1950s Hillgruber still saw World War II as a conventional war, but by 1965 he was arguing that the war was for Hitler a vicious, ideological war in which no mercy was to be given to one's enemies. In his first book, Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu (Hitler, King Carol and Marshal Antonescu) (1953), a study of relations between Germany and Romaniamarker from 1938 to 1944 with a focus on the personalities of Adolf Hitler, King Carol II and Marshal Ion Antonescu, Hillgruber argued for the fundamental normality of German foreign policy, with the foreign policy of the Reich being no different from that of any other power. By contrast, in his 1965 book Hitlers Strategie (Hitler's Strategy), Hillgruber examined the grand strategic decision-making progress in 1940-1941 and concluded that, while Hitler had to adjust to diplomatic, economic, strategic and operational military realities, whenever possible his decisions were influenced by his racist, anti-Semitic and Social Darwinist beliefs. Hillgruber's work on German foreign policy made him one of the leading players in the debates about National Socialist foreign policy.

Hillgruber's writings on the Soviet Unionmarker show certain constancies as well as changes over the years. He always argued that the Soviet Union was a brutal, expansionary, totalitarian power, in many ways similar to Nazi Germany. But, on the other hand, he argued that Moscow's foreign policy was conducted in a way that was rational and realistic, while the foreign policy of Berlin during the Nazi era was completely irrational and unrealistic. The turning point in Hillgruber's attitude came in 1953-1954 when he was in involved in a celebrated debate with Gerhard Weinberg and Hans Rothfels on the pages of the Vierteljahrshefte fĂĽr Zeitgeschichte. Together with Hans-GĂĽnther Seraphim, Hillgruber had argued that Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, had been a "preventive war", forced on Hitler to prevent an imminent Soviet attack on Germany. So effectively did Weinberg and Rothfels demolish Hillgruber's arguments that he repudiated his previous views. Thereafter, he maintained that Operation Barbarossa had been prompted solely by Hitler's ideological belief in the need for Lebensraum (living space) in Russia, where a massive German colonization effort was planned and the entire Russian people were to be reduced to slave status. In the 1970s and 1980s Hillgruber often attacked historians such as David Irving and Viktor Suvorov for putting forward the same arguments as he had done in 1954. Along the same lines, he criticized the American neo-Nazi historian David Hoggan, who argued that the British had provoked World War II in 1939. Hillgruber contended that there was a "kernel of truth" in Hoggan's claims in that Hitler had believed that he could invade Poland in 1939 without provoking a war with Britain, and was most unpleasantly surprised by the British declaration of war, but that, overall, Hoggan's view of Germany as the victim of an Anglo-Polish conspiracy was simply "preposterous".



The exchange between Hillgruber and Weinberg on the pages of Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte in 1953-54 marked the beginning of a long series of clashes between the two historians over interprations of German foreign policy. In a 1956 book review of Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu, Weinberg criticized Hillgruber for engaging in what Weinberg considered an apologia for Germany in World War Two. Weinberg took issue with Hillgruber's claim that World War II began with the Anglo-French declarations of war on Germany on September 3, 1939 rather with the German attack on Poland on September 1, 1939.

Historical perspective

The Intentionalist Historian

Hillgruber was an Intentionist on the origins of the Holocaust debate, arguing that Adolf Hitler was the driving force behind the Holocaust. This set Hillgruber against Functionalist historians such as Hans Mommsen and Martin Broszat, whose "revisionist" claims on the origins of the Holocaust Hillgruber found distasteful. Hillgruber was well known for arguing that there was a close connection between Hitler's foreign policy and anti-Semitic policies and that Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union in 1941 was linked to the decision to initiate the Holocaust. Hillgruber argued that the KernstĂĽck (Nucleus) of Hitler's racist Weltanschauung (world view) was to be found in Mein Kampf. He believed that the Holocaust was meant to be launched only with the invasion of the Soviet Union. In Hillgruber's view, Hitler's frequent references to "Judaeo-Bolshevism", to describe both Jews and Communism, betrayed his desire to destroy both simultaneously. In Hillgruber's opinion, Operation Barbarossa had been conceived as, and was, a war of total extermination against what Hitler saw as "Judaeo-Bolshevik" system in the Soviet Union. Hillgruber was noteworthy as the first historian to argue for the connection between Operation Barbarossa and the decision to begin the Holocaust. In Hillgruber's opinion, for Hitler:
"The conquest of European Russia, the cornerstone of the continental European phase of his program, was thus for Hitler inextricably linked with the extermination of these "bacilli", the Jews.
In his conception they had gained dominance over Russia with the Bolshevik Revolution.
Russia thereby became the center from which a global danger radiated, particularly threatening to the Aryan race and its German core.
To Hitler, Bolshevism meant the consummate rule of Jewry, while democracy - as it had developed in Western Europe and Weimar Germany - represented a preliminary stage of Bolshevism, since the Jews there won a leading, if not yet a dominant influence.
This racist component of Hitler's thought was so closely interwoven with the central political element of his program, the conquest of European Russia, that Russia's defeat and the extermination of the Jews were - in theory as later in practice - inseparable for him.
To the aim of expansion per se, however, Hitler gave not racial, but political, strategic, economic and demographic underpinnings".


Hillgruber took a rather extreme "No Hitler, no Holocaust" position. He believed it was Hitler alone who made the Holocaust possible. He argued that, even if the Nazis had come to power under some other leader such as Hermann Göring or Joseph Goebbels, for example, the Jews would have suffered persecution and discrimination, but not genocide. Hillgruber once presented a counter-factual scenario whereby, had it been a coalition the German National People's Party and the Stahlhelm that took power in 1933, all the anti-Semitic laws in Germany that were passed between 1933 and 1938 would still have been passed, but there would had been no Holocaust. He maintained that the other Nazi leaders such as Göring, Goebbels and Heinrich Himmler willingly participated in the Holocaust, as did many other Germans in the ever-widening "rings of responsibility" for the Holocaust, but that without Hitler's decisive role there would have been no Holocaust.

Continuities and Discontinuties of German History

For Hillgruber, there were many elements of continuity in German foreign policy in the 1871-1945 period, especially with regard to Eastern Europe. Hans Mommsen wrote that the "...ground-laying works of Andreas Hillgruber, ... suggested the view for the continuities of German policy from the late Wilhelminian period up to the capitulation".

To some extent he agreed with Fritz Fischer's assessment that the differences between Imperialmarker, Weimarmarker and Nazi foreign policy were of degree rather than kind. Moreover, he accepted Fischer's argument that Germany was primarily responsible for World War I, but as a follower of the Primat der Aussenpolitik ("primacy of foreign policy") school, Hillgruber rejected Fischer's Primat der Innenpolitik ("primacy of domestic policy") argument as to why Germany started the First World War. During the so-called "Fischer Controversy" which coalesced the German historical profession in the early 1960s, Hillgruber stood apart from the various right-wing historians who attempted to rebut Fischer, such as Gerhard Ritter, Hans Herzfeld, Egmont Zechlin, and Karl Dietrich Erdmann, by accepting Fischer's arguments in part instead of attempting to rebut Fischer in toto.

Hillgruber argued in the aftermath of Fischer's 1961 book Griff nach der Weltmacht (Grasping at World Power) that the old distinction made by the Swiss historian Walter Hofer between the "outbreak" of World War I in 1914, in which all of the Great Powers were equally at fault, and the "unleashing" of World War II in 1939, in which Germany was exclusively responsible, was no longer acceptable. Hillgruber commented that Fischer had established that Germany was indeed responsible for both world wars, and Hofer's formula had to be disregarded by all serious historians. Having conceded that much to Fischer, Hillgruber went on to challenge Fischer's argument that Germany had started a premeditated war of aggression in 1914.

Hillgruber believed that what had happened in 1914 was a "calculated risk" on the part of the Imperial German governmentmarker that had gone horribly wrong. Germany had encouraged Austria-Hungary to attack Serbiamarker in an attempt to break the informal Triple Entente alliance between the United Kingdom, France and Russia by provoking a crisis that would concern Russia only, the so-called "calculated risk". Hillgruber maintained that Germany did not want to cause a world war in 1914, but, by pursuing a high-risk diplomatic strategy of provoking what was supposed to be only a limited war in the Balkans, had inadvertently caused the wider conflict. Hillgruber argued that, long before 1914, the leaders of Germany had been increasingly influenced by Social Darwinism and völkisch ideology, and had become obsessed with Russian industrial and military growth, leading to the view that Germany was in an untenable position that required drastic measures. Hillgruber argued that, when the Austrian attack on Serbia caused Russia to mobilize instead of backing down and seeking an accommodation with Germany as expected, the German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, under strong pressure from a hawkish General Staff led by General Motke the Younger, panicked and ordered the Schlieffen Plan to be activated, thus leading to a German attack on France. In Hillgruber's opinion, the "calculated risk" gambit was a highly dangerous and foolish one, as Bethmann Hollweg and the rest of the German leadership gratuitously failed to anticipate what the most likely Russian reaction to an Austro-Serbian war would be, and that therefore the German leadership of 1914 was extremely irresponsible in trying to use the "calculated risk" of an Austro-Serbian war as a diplomatic device to break the Triple Entente. The German historian Annelise Thimme commented that Hillgruber's "calcuated risk" theory to explain World War I was little more than putting "new wine into old wine skins". Thimme noted that Hillgruber relied almost entirely upon the diary of Bethmann Hollweg's aide and friend, Kurt Riezler, to support his "calculated risk" thesis, which was a dubious source because portions of Riezler's diary had been forged after the war to make German foreign policy appear less aggressive then it was in 1914. The German-Canadian historian Holger Herwig commented that Hillgruber's "calculated risk" theory was the most intellectually sophisticated and ingenious attempt to rebut Fischer's claim of a premeditated war of aggression in 1914, but suffered from his heavy reliance on passages in Riezler's diary likely to have been forged.

In Hillgruber's opinion, after the war had begun, a split occurred within the German leadership between the moderate imperialism of the Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, who wished for territorial gains if they could be obtained, but was prepared to settle for a peace based on the pre-1914 status quo, and a more radical group centered around General Erich Ludendorff who wanted total victory over all of Germany's enemies, no matter what the cost, and very wide-ranging annexations in Europe, Asia and Africa. In this way, Hillgruber largely followed the distinction first made by Gerhard Ritter between a moderate civilian group in the German leadership centred around Bethmann Hollweg who, while not eschewing territorial expansionism, did not insist on it as a precondition for making peace, and the more radical group in the military centered around Ludendorff, who would settle for nothing less than a war ending in making Germany the world's greatest power. Hillgruber argued that Ludendorff's foreign policy, with its demand for extensive territorial gains together with plans for obtaining lebensraum in Eastern Europe through a program of ethnic cleasing and German colonization, was in many ways the prototype of National Socialist foreign policy. Hillgruber argued that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the empire it created for Germany in Eastern Europe was the prototype for Hitler's vision of a great empire for Germany in Eastern Europe. Hillgruber wrote:
"To understand later German history one must pay special attention to a consquence of the Eastern situation in the autumn of 1918 that has often been overlooked: the widely shared and strangely irrational misconceptions concerning the end of the war that found such currency in the Weimar period.
These ideas were not informed, as they should have been, by an appreciation of the enemy's superiority in the West and the inevitable step-by-step retreat of the German Western Front before the massive influx of the Americans.
Nor did they indicate any understanding of the catastrophic consequences for the Central Powers following the collapse of the Balkan front after Bulgaria's withdrawal from the war.
They were instead largely determined by the fact that German troops, as "victors" held vast strategically and economically important areas of Russia.


At the moment of the November 1918 ceasefire in the West, newspaper maps of the military situation showed German troops in Finland, holding a line from the Finnish fjords near Narva, down through Pskov-Orsha-Mogilev and the area south of Kursk, to the Don east of Rostov.



Germnay had thus secured the Ukraine.



The Russian recognition of the Ukraine's separation exacted at Brest-Litovsk repesented the key element in German efforts to keep Russia perpetually subservient.



In addition, German troops held the Crimea and were stationed in smaller numbers in Transcaucasia.



Even the unoccupied "rump" Russia appeared-with the conclusion of the German-Soviet Supplementary Treaty on August 28, 1918-to be in firm though indirect dependency on the Reich.



Thus, Hitler's long-range aim, fixed in the 1920s, of erecting a German Eastern Imperium on the ruins of the Soviet Union was not simply a vision emanating from an abstract wish.



In the Eastern sphere established in 1918, this goal had a concrete point of departure.



The German Eastern Imperium had already been - if only for a short time - a reality".


Despite the example provided by Ludendorff and his circle, for Hillgruber, the changes in German foreign policy introduced by National Socialist Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) were so radical as to be almost differences of kind rather than degree.

He argued that Nazi foreign policy was an extremely radical version of traditional German foreign policy.

Furthermore, he argued that what during the Weimar era had been the end became, for the Nazis, just the means.

He set out a thesis that goals such as the Remilitarization of the Rhineland and the Anschluss with Austria, which had been the end-goals during the Weimar period, were just the beginning for the Nazis.

Unlike the Weimar government, the Nazis' desire to re-militarize was only a step on the road to the complete domination of all Europe, and eventual world domination.


The Stufenplan concept



From the 1960s on, Hillgruber was regarded as one of the world's foremost authorities on German military-diplomatic history, his theory about Hitler having a Stufenplan (stage-by-stage plan) being especially influential. In 1989 the American historian Jerry Z. Muller called Hillgruber "the most distinguished German diplomatic historian of his generation". Hillgruber argued that Adolf Hitler had a Stufenplan (stage-by-stage plan) for conquest and genocide in Eastern Europe, and then the world. According to this argument, the first stage of Hitler's plan consisted of the military build-up of German strength and the achievement of the Weimar Republic's traditional foreign policy goals. The second stage was to be a series of swift regional wars to destroy such states as Poland, Czechoslovakiamarker and France. The third stage was to be a war to liquidate the Soviet Unionmarker and what Hitler regarded as its "Judaeo-Bolshevik" regime. The fourth stage was to be a war against the United States by the now Greater Germany in alliance with the British Empire and Japan. Hillgruber argued that after the conquest of the Soviet Unionmarker, Hitler wanted to seize most of Africa, to build a huge navy and in alliance with both the Japanese and the British to engage with the United States in a "War of the Continents" for world domination. Hillgruber maintained that the strategy of Blitzkrieg was based largely on economic factors, namely, that for the earlier stages of the stufenplan, Germany did not have the economic resources for a long war, and that therefore a military programme based upon quality, not quantity, was the most rational use of German economic capacity. Hillgruber argued that Hitler's desire to postpone the final struggle with the United States to the last stage of the stufenplan was likewise determined by economic considerations, namely that only a Germany with sufficient lebensraum ruling most of Eurasia and Africa would be immune to the effects of blockade, and have the necessary economic resources to match the enormous economic capacity of the United States. In the debate between the "Continentists" such as Hugh Trevor-Roper, Axel Kuhn, and Eberhard Jäckel, who argued that Hitler wanted only to seize Europe, and the "Globalists", who argued that Hitler wanted to conquer the entire world, Hillgruber was definitely in the latter camp.

Hillgruber regarded Hitler as a fanatical ideologue with a firmly fixed programme, and criticized the view of him as a grasping opportunist with no real beliefs other than the pursuit of power — a thesis promoted by such British historians as A.J.P. Taylor and Alan Bullock, which he thought profoundly shallow and facile. Moreover, he categorically rejected Taylor's contention that the German invasion of Poland was an "accident" precipitated by diplomatic blunders. Hillgruber argued adamantly that the German invasion of Poland was a war of aggression caused by Hitler's ideological belief in war and the need for Lebensraum (living space). World War II, for Hillgruber, really consisted of two wars. One was an europäisches Normalkrieg ("normal European war") between the Western powers and Germany, a conflict which Hitler caused but did not really want. The other war — which Hitler both caused and most decidedly did want (as evidenced in part by Mein Kampf) - was the German-Soviet one, a savage, merciless and brutal all-out struggle of racial and ideological extermination between German National Socialism and Soviet Communism.

In Hillgruber's opinion, Hitler's foreign policy program was totally unrealistic and incapable of being realized. Hillgruber argued that Hitler's assumption that a German "renunciation" of naval and colonial claims, in exchange for British recognition of all of Europe as lying within the German sphere of influence, was based on an unviable notion that British interests were limited only to the naval and colonial spheres. Hillgruber noted that Britain was just as much a European as a world power, and would never accept so far-reaching a disruption of the balance of power as Hitler proposed in the 1920s in Mein Kampf. Likewise, Hillgruber argued that Hitler's contempt for the Soviet Unionmarker, especially the fighting power of the Red Army, was a dangerous illusion.

In his 1974 article "England's Place In Hitler's Plans for World Dominion", Hillgruber argued that, during the Nazi period, German foreign policy went through ten different phases. Hillgruber contended that, during the early phases, Hitler was intent on having the anti-Soviet alliance with Britain he had written of in Mein Kampf and Zweites Buch. By the time of the Hossbach Memorandum of 1937, Hillgruber argued, Hitler was undertaking a course of expansion either "without Britain" or, preferably, "with Britain", but if necessary "against Britain". By the late 1930s, when it became clear that Britain had no interest in his overtures, German foreign policy turned anti-British as reflected in the Z Plan of January 1939 for a gigantic German fleet that would crush the Royal Navy by 1944.

Hillgruber noted that in 1939, when war threatened over Poland, unlike in 1938 when war threatened to occur over Czechoslovakiamarker, Hitler received overwhelming support from the Wehrmacht leadership. The reason for this difference, in Hillgruber's opinion, was the rampant anti-Polish feelings in the German Army. In support of this argument, Hillgruber quoted from a letter written by one of the officers involved in the abortive putsch of 1938, who wrote to his wife just before the invasion of Poland, "We believe we will make quick work of the Poles, and in truth, we are delighted at the prospect. That business must be cleared up" (emphasis in the original). Hillgruber noted because of anti-Polish prejudices that in 1939 Fall Weiss served to unite Hitler and the German military in a way that Fall GrĂĽn had failed to do in 1938.

Hillgruber argued that Hitler's decision to declare war on the United States before he had defeated the Soviet Union was due to Hitler's belief that the United States might quickly defeat Japan, and hence it was better to engage the Americans while they were still involved in a two-front war. Likewise, Hillgruber argued that Hitler's decision to take on the United States in December 1941 was influenced by his belief that the Soviet Union would be defeated by no later than the summer of 1942.

In his 1965 book Hitlers Strategie, Hillgruber caused some controversy with his argument that the French attack on the Siegfried Line in autumn 1939 would have resulted in a swift German defeat. In 1969, the French historian Albert Merglen expanded on Hillgruber's suggestion by writing a PhD thesis depicting a counter-factual successful French offensive against the Siegfried Line. However, many historians have criticized both Hillgruber and Merglen for ignoring the realities of the time, and for using the advantage of historical hindsight too much in making these judgements.

The Hungarian-American historian John Lukacs criticized Hillgruber's portrayal of Hitler following a Stufenplan, arguing that there was much opportunism and contingency in Hitler's strategy, with little sign of a masterplan. In Lukacs's opinion, Operation Barbarossa was primarily an anti-British move intended to force Britain to surrender by defeating the Soviet Union. Likewise, Lukacs argued that Hitler's statement to the League of Nations High Commissioner for Danzig, Carl Burckhardt, in August 1939, stating that "Everything I undertake is directed against Russia…", which Hillgruber cited as evidence of Hitler's ultimate anti-Soviet intentions, was merely an effort to intimidate Britain and France into abandoning Poland. In the same way, Lukacs took issue with Hillgruber's claim that the war against Britain was of only "secondary" importance to Hitler compared to the war against the Soviet Union.

As a conservative historian

In the 1970s, Hillgruber, together with Klaus Hildebrand, was involved in a very acrimonious debate with Hans-Ulrich Wehler over the merits of the Primat der Aussenpolitik ("primacy of foreign politics") and Primat der Innenpolitik ("primacy of domestic politics") schools. Hillgruber and Hildebrand made a case for the traditional Primat der Aussenpolitik approach to diplomatic history with the stress on examining the records of the relevant foreign ministry and studies of the foreign policy decision-making elite. Wehler, who favored the Primat der Innenpolitik, for his part contended that diplomatic history should be treated as a sub-branch of social history, calling for theoretically-based research, and argued that the real focus should be on the study of the society in question.

As a right-wing historian, Hillgruber often felt uncomfortable with the increasing left-wing influence in German academia from the late 1960s onwards. In his 1974 textbook, Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1972 (German History 1945-1972), Hillgruber complained that radicals influenced by "the forces of doctrinaire Marxism-Leninism", and leaning towards East Germanymarker, were having too much influence in West German higher education. In the same book, Hillgruber attacked the New Left for lacking the proper methodological tools for the understanding of German history. In particular, Hillgruber argued that the Primat der Innenpolitik thesis employed by historians such as Wehler was not a proper scholarly device, but was instead "an apparent scholarly legitimation" for the New Left to advance its agenda in the present. Hillgruber accused Wehler of "quasi-totalitarian" goals for the German historical profession, and called for conservative historians to make a sustained offensive to defeat Wehler and his "cultural revolutionaries" for the sake of saving history as a profession in Germany. Likewise, despite his partial agreement with Fischer about the origins of the First World War, Hillgruber frequently fought against Fischer's interpretation of the Second Reich as a uniquely aggressive power threatening its neighbours throughout its existence. Hillgruber expressed considerable disappointment with the republication of the once-banned work by Eckart Kehr, which Hillgruber dismissed as merely "trendy Marxisants" typical of the intellectual environment of the 1960s-70s. In a book review published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on June 18, 1979, Hillgruber for the most part offered a highly unfavorable judgment of David Irving's work. Despite his criticism, Hillgruber ended his review with the comment that Irving's work "amounts to an indubitable and in no way small merit of Irving". The American historian John Lukacs thought it a sign of Hillgruber's general right-wing biases that he attached no such qualifying words of praise like those he gave to Irving during any of his attacks on left-wing historians like Eberhard Jäckel. As part of his criticism of the left-wing social historians, Hillgruber affirmed what he considered the primacy of traditional diplomatic-military history by writing: "Despite the significance of all long-term developments, the great differences between the great world powers have basically determined the course of general history, even in the nineteenth and twenthieth centuries"

A self-proclaimed conservative and nationalist, Hillgruber never denied nor downplayed the crimes committed in Germany's name and in no way can he be considered a Holocaust denier; but he argued that Germany as a great power had the potential to do much good for Europe. For Hillgruber, the tragedy was that this potential was never fulfilled. In his view, the problem did not lie with Germany's domination of Eastern and Central Europe, but rather with the particular way this domination was exercised by the Nazis. He argued that German-Russian, German-Polish, German-Czech, German-Hungarian and German-Jewish relations were traditionally friendly, and lamented that the Nazis had shattered these friendly ties. Others contended that these bonds of friendship had never existed except as figments of Hillgruber's imagination. For Hillgruber, Germany's defeat in 1945 was a catastrophe that ended both the ethnic German presence in Eastern Europe and Germany as a great power in Europe. As someone from the "Germanic East", Hillgruber wrote nostalgically of the lost Heimat of East Prussia where he had grown up. Left-wing West German historians, together with their East Germanmarker, Sovietmarker, Polish, Hungarian and Czechoslovak counterparts, denounced him as a German chauvinist, racist and imperialist, and accused him of glorifying the Drang nach Osten concept.

However, Hillgruber was prepared to accept, albeit grudgingly, what he often called Germany's "Yalta frontiers" after the Yalta Conferencemarker of 1945. What he was not prepared to accept was the partition of Germany. He often complained that the West German government was not doing enough to re-unite Germany. In a 1981 speech, he called on Bonnmarker to create a new German nationalism based on respect for human rights that would ensure that future generations would not lose sight of the dream of re-unification.

The Historikerstreit

Zweierlei Untergang

Hillgruber was one of the protagonists in the so-called Historikerstreit, the Historians' Dispute (or Historians' Controversy). Hillgruber felt that the Holocaust was a horrific tragedy, but just one of many that occurred in the 20th century. In a 1986 interview, Hillgruber stated there was no moral difference between the Soviet regime and the Nazi regime, and that the Holocaust was not unique. In his highly controversial 1986 essay "Der Zusammenbruch im Osten 1944/45" ("The Collapse in the East 1944/45") from his book Zweierlei Untergang (Two Kinds of Ruin), Hillgruber highlighted the sufferings of Germans in what was then eastern Germany, who had to flee or were expelled or killed by the Red Army. He documented the mass gang-rape of German women and girls, and widespread looting and massacres of German civilians by the Soviet army. He paid homage to those who had had to evacuate the German population and to those soldiers who did their best to stem the Sovietmarker advance. Hillgruber described the efforts to evacuate the German population, much of which was hopelessly bungled by corrupt and incompetent Nazi Party officials, and the savage and desperate fighting which marked the bloody climax of the war on the Eastern Front.



For Hillgruber, the end of the "German East", in which he had been born and grew up, was just as tragic as the Holocaust and marked the end of what he considered to be Eastern Europe's best chance for progress. Hillgruber's intention in Zweierlei Untergang was to show the "obscure intertwinement" between the Shoah and the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe. Hillgruber described it as "a tragedy for all of Europe" that World War II ended with Eastern Europe brought into the Soviet sphere of influence, with the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe (which, Hillgruber pointed out, included his family) and with Germany reduced from a great power to a Cold War battlefield between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two kinds of ruin in the title were the Holocaust and the expulsion of Reichsdeutsche (Reich Germans; those Germans living in Germany) and Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans living outside of Germany). For Hillgruber, both events, or "national catastrophes" as he preferred to call them, were equally tragic. He blamed both ultimately on the Nazis and their ideologically driven and inhuman expansionism. The subtitle of Zweierlei Untergang, Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europäischen Judentums (The Smashing of the German Reich and the End of European Jewry), reflected his controversial view of the moral equivalence of the ending of Germany as a great power and the Holocaust. In the same essay, Hillgruber attacked American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill for supporting at various war-time conferences the expansion of Poland and the Soviet Union at the expense of Germany. Hillgruber asserted that Germany had every moral right to keep all the territory that had belonged to the Reich in 1914, plus Austria and the Sudetenland, and that any effort to take land away from Germany was profoundly wrong. Hillgruber wrote that the doomed German defence in the East was "justified" as every city, every town and every village in eastern Germany the Soviets took was "lost forever for Germany and its German inhabitants".In Hillgruber's opinion, what he considered to be the great wrong that Germany was to lose some of its eastern territories after losing the war could only be explained by anti-German prejudices that he accused American and especially British leaders of holding.

In an apparent disavowal of his own criticism of the Anglophobic American historical writer David Hoggan in his 1967 book Germany and the Two World Wars, Hillgruber claimed in his 1986 essay that it had been British policy to seek the destruction of Germany since 1907 due to what Hillgruber claimed were irrational anti-German prejudices within the British elite, and that what happened to Germany in 1945 was merely the culmination of a long-term British policy to destroy Germany as a nation, which every British government had pursued since 1907. According to Hillgruber: "Anti-Prussianism was the basis of the British war policy against Germany". Hillgruber accused the British of holding to "a negative image of Prussia, exaggerated to the point of becoming a myth", which led them to seek the utter destruction of the Prussian-German state in World War II, and blinded them to the fact that a strong Central European state led by Prussia was the only thing that prevented the "flooding" of Central Europe by the Red Army. In this way, Hillgruber argued "that the amputation of the Reich in favor of a greater Poland was a war aim of the Allies long before Auschwitz", and asserted that the loss of the German eastern territories was due to anti-German prejudices. Hillgruber claimed that the Anglo-American strategic bombing offensive against Germany was just as much a policy of Anglo-American genocide for the Germans as the policy of genocide that Germans were waging against European Jews at the same time. Perhaps most controversially, Hillgruber described how the German Wehrmacht acted in what he regarded as a "heroic" and "self-sacrificing" way in defending the German population against the Red Army and the "orgy of revenge" that they perpetrated in 1944-1945. Hillgruber wrote that it was time to start celebrating what he regarded as the Wehrmacht's "heroic" last stand on the Eastern Front.



Hillgruber ended his essay "Der Zusammenbruch im Osten 1944/45" with a call for a history that would take account of what Hillgruber considered the decisive events on the Eastern Front. Hillgruber wrote that:
"The mighty happenings between the autumn of 1944 and the spring of 1945 still demand a description and treatment which keeps in view the events on the world historical stage, and yet illustrates the sufferings, deeds, ambitions and failings of men as individuals.
This must be one of the most difficult tasks which lie before historians.
With stupendous effort historians have researched the decline of the democratic Republic, the rise of the National Socialist movement and its FĂĽhrer, and the foundation of the Third Reich and its structures.
Perhaps the last great demand on this historiography will be to form a comprehensive picture of the collapse of the battle fronts, the conquest of eastern Central Europe, and the shattering of the Third Reich and the fall of the Germanic East, together with all the things that these developments mean".
The British military historian Christopher Duffy was to write in the preface to his 1991 book Red Storm on the Reich that his book was meant to answer the call for the sort of history that Hillgruber wanted to see written about the final days of the Eastern Front.

Hillgruber praised those German generals who had stayed loyal to Hitler during the 20 July plot as making the right moral decision. Hillgruber called the leaders of the putsch attempt of July 20, 1944 Gesinnungsethiker (sentimental moralists) and those who stayed loyal to Hitler Veranthworthungsethiker (responsible moralists). Hillgruber argued that if Hitler had been killed, the Eastern Front would had collapsed faster than it did, thereby endangering the lives of millions of German civilians, and he therefore condemned the July plot as irresponsible. John Lukacs commented that Hillgruber appeared to be saying here that, in light of the Soviet threat in 1944, the right and moral thing for a German to do was to rally around the FĂĽhrer. In addition, Hillgruber claimed falsely that Himmler had ordered the death camps to cease operating in September 1944, and argued that after January 1945 all the death camps were in Soviet hands anyhow. Thus, in Hillgruber's opinion, the only moral question in 1945 was whether the German Army could hold out long enough to allow as many German civilians as possible to escape westwards. In his essay, Hillgruber raised the "problem of identification" for the historian when writing about the last days of World War II. Hillgruber wrote that, as a German historian, he could not "identify" with those in the German death and concentration camps, for whom the defeat of Germany meant liberation. Hilgruber wrote that, although the term "liberation" was "completely justified for the victims of the National Socialist regime freed from the concentration camps and goals", it was "inappropriate" as concerns "the fate of the German nation". Hillgruber wrote that the Allies, especially the Red Army, came as conquerors, not liberators, to Germany, and that no German could "identify" with them. Hillgruber wrote:
"If the historian gazes on the winter catastrophe of 1944-45, only one position is possible...he must identify himself with the concrete fate of the German population in the East and with the desperate and sacrificial exertions of the German Army of the East and the German Baltic navy, which sought to defend the population from the orgy of revenge of the Red Army, the mass rapine, the arbitrary killing, and the compulsory deportations".
The American historian Charles Maier summarized Hillgruber's thesis in "Der Zusammenbruch im Osten 1944/45" as:
"Evoking the Wehrmacht's terrible mission in the winter of 1945, Hillgruber has written, is among the most difficult challenges a historian can face.
He refers to to the hallowing winter flight before the Russians.
Hitler had given orders for impossible defenses of fortress cities; Soviet troops had arrived with apparent license to rape and assault.
Millions of German civilians and soldiers waited for occasional trains in bombed out stations, caravanned through the Prussian forests, or precariously sailed through the Baltic to Jutland, often harassed by their own fanatic Nazi officials"
Hillgruber saw the explusion of the Germans as the culmiation of a half century of horror. Hillgruber wrote:
"The mass expulsion of the Germans from a quarter of the territory of the 1937 Reich was a provisional end station on the journey that had began with the spread of the idea of a rationalization of territory according to national allegiance and that had led to the nationality struggles on the European periphery during the First World War.
These struggles were followed by the first genocide-that of the Armenians in Turkey-and the mass explusions of Greeks from Asia Minor.
The extermination and resettlement practices of Hitler and Stalin in their respective "spheres of influence" in the period of their partnership in 1939-41 had continued such "exchanges of populations", and mass murder had reached an extreme degree in Hitler's "Eastern War" from June 1941 onward; first the Jews in Poland and in the entire East were to be exterminated, then those in the whole of German-occupied Continental Europe.
The idea of mass resettlement in East-Central Europe won ever more support-first in Great Britain and then in the United States, in a complete departure from their humanitarian traditions-as victory became more certain and as the aim of the destruction of Prussia as the allegedly permanent hard core of the German Reich became more and more clearly an actual war aim".


Of the two essays in Zweierlei Untergang, one was a well-regarded summary (at least by those who take an Intentionalist position such as John Lukacs) of the history of the Holocaust. In his essay about the Holocaust, Hillgruber admitted there had been much anti-Semitism in the Second Reich, but argued that anti-Semitism was more much prevalent and worse in France, Russia and Austria-Hungary before 1914. Hillgruber believed that, with the appearance of the government sponsored and avowedly anti-Semitic Fatherland Party led by Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz in 1917, anti-Semitism become for the first time sanctioned by the German state. Hillgruber argued that, due to Austrian and Russian influences, anti-Semitism become more common in the Weimar Republic than it had been during the Kaiserreich. Finally, Hillgruber ended his essay by claiming that the Holocaust was Hitler's personal pet project and nobody else's, and that without him there would had been no Holocaust. The other essay concerned the ending of the "Germanic East".

Other historians react, and Hillgruber's defence

With his favorable description of Wehrmacht activities, Hillgruber drew the anger of the philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who attacked Hillgruber for allegedly praising the "tested senior officials" in the Nazi Party in the East in Zweierlei Untergang. In fact, Hillgruber had written no such sentence. What Hillgruber had written was a lengthy sentence in which he had commented that different officials of the Nazi Party in eastern Germany evacuated the German public with varying degrees of success. What Habermas had done was to edit Hillgruber's sentence selectively and remove the customary "…"'s that indicate a space, to produce the sentence about the Nazi Party's "tested senior officials". Hillgruber was enraged at what he considered to be a fabricated quote being attributed to him, which he called a "scandal". Many, such as the British historian Richard J. Evans (who was otherwise highly critical of Hillgruber's historical work), felt that this was an intellectually disreputable method of attacking Hillgruber.

It was Habermas's attack in Die Zeit in July 1986 that first drew attention to Zweierlei Untergang, which had until then been an obscure book published in the spring of 1986 by the Siedler press of Berlin. Habermas wrote in an essay first published in Die Zeit newspaper on July 11, 1986 that the work of Hillgruber in glorifying the last days of the German Army on the Eastern Front was, together with the work of Michael Stürmer and Ernst Nolte, intended to serve as a "...kind of NATO philosophy colored with German nationalism". Habermas argued that Hillgruber's claims that Allied plans for the borders of a post-war Germany were due to anti-German prejudices and a "cliché-image of Prussia" was absurd, and that "it does not occur to Hillgruber that the structure of power in the Reich could actually have had something to do, as the Allies had assumed, with the social structure especially well-preserved in Prussia". Writing of Hillgruber's intentionist theories about the Holocaust, Habermas claimed that Hillgruber wrote in such a way as to imply that even top Nazis were opposed to the Shoah, and were only reluctantly forced to participate in the "Final Solution" by Hitler. Apart from philosopher Habermas, numerous historians took issue with Hillgruber's essay, including Hans Mommsen, Eberhard Jäckel, Heinrich August Winkler, Martin Broszat, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Karl Dietrich Bracher, and Wolfgang Mommsen.Criticism centered around a number of areas. The following points were raised against Hillgruber:
  • Those historians who take a functionalist line on the origins of the Shoah like Richard J. Evans felt that Hillgruber attributed too much responsibility for the Shoah to Hitler. Evans went on to write that Hillgruber had down-played both the level and the virulence of anti-Semitism in pre-1914 Germany, writing that Wilhelm II and his Court were a center of a vicious anti-Semitism that Hitler could have easily approved of.
  • Hillgruber largely ignored the fact that the reason why Soviet troops were in Germany in 1945 was because Germany had attacked the Soviet Union in 1941.
  • Hillgruber mostly ignored the fact that the same troops fighting to save German civilians from the Soviets were also allowing the Nazis to continue the Holocaust. The Israeli historian Omer Bartov commented that it was simply disgusting on the part of Hillgruber to call upon historians to "identify" with German troops fighting to extend the Holocaust. Furthermore, it was noted that Hillgruber's call for "empathy" for the German troops fighting on the Eastern Front implicitly devalued the lives of those held in the German death camps or forced to walk in the death marches. Critics of Hillgruber such as Bartov noted that his call for historians to have "empathy" with German soldiers placed a higher value on the lives of German civilians protected by the Wehrmacht then on those dying in the Holocaust.
  • That the expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe (which today might come under the rubric of "ethnic cleansing") cannot be equated with the racially-based extermination of European Jewry.
  • The sufferings of Germans were presented in isolation, with little reference to the sufferings of Jews, Poles, Russians, Czechs, etc. The impression given is that Germans were the primary victims of the war.
  • That Hillgruber asked his readers to sympathize with the officers and men of the German Wehrmacht and Kriegsmarine who fought to protect and evacuate the German population is morally indefensible/


The sub-title of Hillgruber's book drew controversy with the Swiss historian Micha Brumlik in an essay entitled "New Myth of State" first published in Die Tagezeitung newspaper on July 12, 1986, commenting that the use of the word Zerschlagung (destruction) for the Germans indicated that an act of extreme violence was committed against the Germans while the Jews were assigned only the neutral term Ende (end) to describe the Holocaust Brumlik argued that in his view, Hillgruber by his use of the word "End" to label the Holocaust implied that the Shoah was just something terrible that happened to the Jews of Europe, but it was not anybody's fault. Brumlik accused Hillgruber of reducing German history down to the level of Landserheft (a type of comics in Germany glorifying war). Brumlik argued that Hillgruber's thesis about the Holocaust as one of many genocides, instead of a unique event, was a form of "psychological repression". Klaus Hildebrand defended Hillgruber in an essay first published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper on July 31, 1986, by attacking Habermas over the "tried and true higher-ups of the NSDAP" line created by Habermas, which Hildebrand considered a highly dishonest method of attack. Hildebrand argued that Hillgruber was merely trying to show the "tragedy" of the Eastern Front, and was not engaging in moral equivalence between the German and Soviet sides. Responding to the defence of Hillgruber by his close associate Klaus Hildebrand in his essay "The Age of the Tyrants", Habermas argued in a letter to the editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on August 11, 1986 that Hillgruber's approach of "identifying" with German soldiers fighting on the Eastern Front "...would perhaps be a legitimate point of view for the memoirs of a veteran - but not for a historian writing from the distance of four decades". Habermas went to warn of the "apologetic effect" of the sub-title of Hillgruber's book. Habermas stated that:
"A German reader would have to bring along a healthy portion of linguistic insensitivity in order not to let himself be influenced by the juxtaposition of an aggressive 'destruction of the German Reich' by its external enemies and an almost automatic following 'end of European Jewry'.
This first impression justifes itself above all through the compilation of two parts so unlike in their style of presentation and declared partisanship".
Joachim Fest defended Hillgruber in an essay entitled "Encumbered Remembrance", first published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on August 16, 1986, by arguing that Habermas himself was guilty of euphemistic language such as labelling dekulakization as "the expulsion of the kulaks". The philosopher Helmut Fleischer, in an essay first published in the NĂĽrnberger Zeitung newspaper on September 20, 1986, asserted that there was nothing morally objectionable in Hillgruber's argument for the morality of historians siding with German troops on the Eastern Front.Hans Mommsen in an essay first published for Blatter fur deutsche und internationale Politik magazine in October 1986 wrote of Hillgruber that: "His historiographic association of resettlement and the Holocaust indirectly supports the plan, so aggressively posited by StĂĽrmer, of relativizing the crimes of the Third Reich. It allows for revisionist misunderstandings by its demand for "a reconstruction of the destroyed European Middle". Martin Broszat, in an essay first published in Die Zeit on October 3, 1986, wrote that Hillgruber had come very close to being a Nazi apologist, and his book Zweierlei Untergang was simply not very good. The German publisher Rudolf Augstein, in an essay entitled "The New Auschwitz Lie" first published in Der Spiegel on October 6, 1986, called Hillgruber "a constitutional Nazi". Augstein went on to call for Hillgruber to be fired from his post at the University of Cologne for being a "constitutional Nazi", and argued that there was no moral difference between Hillgruber and Hans Globke. The classicist Christian Meier, who was president of the German Historical Association at the time, in a speech given on October 8, 1986 called the allegations that Hillgruber was a Nazi apologist "nonsensical", but argued that Hillgruber was guilty of "methodological dubiousness" in Zweierlei Untergang. Imanuel Geiss wrote in defence of Hillgruber that Augstein's calling him a "constitutional Nazi" was way over the top; that together with Habermas, Augstein was guilty of slandering Hillgruber; that Hillgruber's views deserved consideration; and that Hillgruber was no Nazi apologist. Hagen Schulze wrote in defense of Hillgruber: "For the discipline of history, singularity and comparability of historical events are thus not mutually exclusive alternatives. They are complmentary concepts. A claim that historians such as Ernst Nolte or Andreas Hillgruber deny the uniqueness of Auschwitz because they are looking for comparisons stems from incorrect presuppositions. Of course, Nolte and Hillgruber can be refuted if their comparisons rests on empirically or logically false assumptions. But Habermas never provided such proof"..

Hillgruber defended his call for the identification with the German troops fighting on the Eastern Front in a interview with the Rheinischer Merkur newspaper on October 31, 1986, on the ground that he was only trying "…to experience things from the perspective of the main body of the population". In the same 1986 interview, Hillgruber said it was necessary for a more nationalistic version of German history to be written because the East German government was embarking upon a more nationalist history, and if West German historians did not keep up with their East German counterparts in terms of German nationalism, it was inevitable that Germans would come to see the East German regime as the legitimate German state. Repying to the interviewer's question about whether he thought the Holocaust was unique, Hillgruber stated:
"...that the mass murder of the kulaks in the early 1930s, the mass murder of the leadership cadre of the Red Army in 1937-38, and the mass murder of the Polish officers who in September 1939 fell into Soviet hands are not qualitatively different in evaluation from the mass murder in the Third Reich".
In response to the interviewer's question about whatever he was a "revisionist", Hillgruber stated that:
"Revision of the results of scholarship is, as I said, in itself the most natural thing in the world.
The discipline of history lives, like every discipline, on the revision through research of previous conceptualizations...Here I would like to say that in principle since the mid-1960s substantial revisions of various kinds have taken place and have rendered absurd the clichéd "image" that Habermas as a nonhistorian obviously possesses".
Repying to the interviewer's question about whether he wanted to see the revival of the original concept of the Sonderweg, that is of the idea of Germany as a great Central European power equally opposed to both the West and the East, Hillgruber denied that German history since 1945 had been that "golden", and claimed that his conception of the Central European identity he wanted to see revived was cultural, not political. Hillgruber called the idea of Germany as great power that would take on and destroy both the United States and the Soviet Unionmarker as:
"...historically hopeless because of the way the Second World War ended.
To want to develop such a projection now would mean to bring the powers in the East and the West together against the Germans.
I cannot imagine that anyone is earnestly striving for that.
Reminiscences of good cooperation between the Germans and Slavic peoples in the middle of Europe before the First World War, and in part also still between the wars, are awakened whenever journalists or historians travel to Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary.
In that atmosphere it seems imperative to express how closely one feels connected to representatives of these nations.
This is understandable, but it cannot all merge into a notion of "Central Europe" that could be misunderstood as taking up the old concept again, which is, as I have said, no longer realizable.
In a word, I think the effort to latch on to the connections torn apart in 1945, because of the outcome of the war, and then in turn because of the Cold War, is a sensible political task, especially for West Germans".


In another essay first published in the Die Zeit newspaper on November 7, 1986, Habermas wrote that: "This longing for the unframed memories from the perspective of the veterans can now be satisfied by reading Andreas Hillgruber's presentation of the events on the Eastern Front in 1944-45. The 'problem of identification', something that is unusual for an historian, poses itself to the author only because he wants to incorporate the perspective of the fighting troops and the affected civilian population". In a newspaper feuilleton, first published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on November 20, 1986, Meier wrote that:
"What moved Hillgruber to "identify" with the defenders of the front in East Prussia will probably have to remain a mystery…But however that my be, and whatever other weaknesses his book contains, it cannot be accused of trivializing National Socialism.
In this respect, Habermas's concerns are certainly without foundation".
The political scientist Kurt Sontheimer, in an essay entitled "Makeup Artists Are Creating a New Identity" first published in Rheinischer Merkur newspaper on November 21, 1986, accused Hillgruber of being guilty of "revisionism" in his writings on German history. In another essay entitled "He Who Wants to Escape the Abyss" first published in Die Welt on November 22, 1986, Hildebrand accused Habermas of engaging in "scandalous" attacks on Hillgruber. Hildebrand claimed that "Habermas's criticism is based in no small part on quotations that unambiguously falsify the matter". Responding to Meier's comment about what why he chose to "identify" with German troops in a letter to the editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on November 29, 1986, Hillgruber wrote:
"Is it really so difficult for a German historian (even if he is, like Meier, a specialist in ancient history) to realize why the author of an essay about the collapse in the East in 1944-45 identifies with the efforts of the German populace?
I identified with the German efforts not only in East Prussia, but also in Silesia, East Brandenburg and Pomerania (Meier's homeland) to protect themselves from what threatened them and to save as many people as possible".
The German historian Wolfgang Mommsen, in an essay entitled "Neither Denial nor Forgetfulness Will Free Us" first published in Frankfurter Rundscahu newspaper on December 1, 1986, wrote about Hillgruber's demands that historians identified with the "justified" German defence of the Eastern Front that:
"Andreas Hillgruber recently attempted to accord a relative historical justification to the Wehrmacht campaign in the East and the desperate resistance of the army in the East after the summer of 1944.
He argued that the goal was to prevent the German civilian population from falling into the hands of the Red Army.
However, the chief reason, he argued, was that the defense of German cities in the East had become tantamount to defending Western civilization.
In light of the Allied war goals, which, independent of Stalin's final plans, envisioned breaking up Prussia and destroying the defensive position of a strong, Prussian-led Central European state that could serve as a bulwark against Bolshevism, the continuation of the war in the East was justified from the viewpoint of those involved.
It was, as Hillgruber's argument would have it, also justified even from today's standpoint, despite the fact that prolonging the war in the East meant that the gigantic murder machinery of the Holocaust would be allowed to continue to run.
All this, the essay argued, was justified as long as the fronts held.
Hillgruber's essay is extremely problematic when viewed from the perspective of a democratically constituted community that orients itself towards Western moral and political standards.

There is no getting around the bitter truth that the defeat of National Socialist Germany was not only in the interest of the peoples who were bulldozed by Hitler's war and of the peoples who were selected by his henchmen for annihilation or oppression or exploitation - it was also in the interest of the Germans.



Accordingly, parts of the gigantic scenery of the Second World War were, at least as far as we were concerned, totally senseless, even self-destructive.



We cannot escape this bitter truth by assigning partial responsibility to other partners who took part in the war".



In an essay published in the December 1, 1986 edition of the New Republic, the American historian Charles S. Maier criticized Hillgruber for engaging in "vulgar Historismus" in Zweierlei Untergang. Maier wrote the historian is supposed to examine all sides of historical occurrences, and not serve as the advocate of one side. Maier wrote:
"Hillgruber goes on to claim, moreover, that Stalin, Roosevelt, and above all Churchill had long harbored designs to dismember Germany.
It does not seem relevant to Hillgruber's way of thinking that German aggression might indeed have led the Allies to contemplate partition; in any case the notion was rejected in theory, and partition came about only as a result of circumstances when the war ended.
Hillgruber's historical contribution to "winning the future" thus amounts to the old Prusso-German lament, dusted off and refurbished, that the Machiavellian British were always conspiring to encircle the Reich.
Predictably enough, the essay closes with a lament that after 1945, Prussia and Germany would not longer be able to fulfill their mediating role between East and West.
But precisely what sort of "mediating role" had brought all those German soldiers to Stalingrad in the first place?"
Maier noted that in marked contrast to the way Hillgruber highlighted the suffering of German civilians on the Eastern Front in dramatic and emotionally charged language in the first essay, in the second essay:
"...that Hillgruber's second and (brief) chapter on the extermination of the Jews might seem pallid after the emotional exercise in "identification" that precedes it.
No depiction of sealed freight cars, purposeful starvation, degradation, and the final herding to the gas chambers parallels Hillgruber's vivid evocation of the East Prussian collapse.
Not that Hillgruber minimizes he crimes of the SS (through he ignores the massacres of Red Army prisoners by his heroic Wehrmacht)".
Maier called Zweierlei Untergang not an "evil book", but one that was "...baldy balanced; and its particular imbalance opens the way to apologia". Finally, Maier rejected Hillgruber's claim of moral equivalence between the actions of the Soviet Communists and German Nazis under the grounds that while the former were extremely brutal, the latter sought the total extermination of a people, namely the Jews.

The German historian Horst Möller defended Hillgruber in an essay first published in late 1986 in the Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung magazine by arguing that that:
"Hillgruber comes to the conclusion, on the basis of British files that have come to light in the meantime, that the destruction of the German Reich was planned before the mass murder of the Jews became known-and that the mass murder does not explain the end of the Reich…It is hardly disputable that the attempt to hold the Eastern Front as long as possible against the Red Army meant protection for the German civilian populace in the eastern provinces against murders, rapes, plundering and expulsions by Soviet troops.
It was not simply Nazi propaganda against these "Asiatic hordes" that caused this climate of fear.
It was the concrete examples of Nemmersdorf in October 1944, mentioned by Hillgruber, that had brought the horror of the future occupation into view".
The journalist Joachim Perels, in an essay first published in the Frankfurter Rundscahu newspaper on December 27, 1986, thought it was outrageous for Hillgruber to praise those German officers who stayed loyal to Hitler during the July 20th putsch as making the right moral choice, and felt that Hillgruber had slandered those Germans who chose to resist the Nazi regime as traitors who left down their country in its hour of need. .In an essay meant to reply to Habermas's criticism entitled "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" first published in the right-wing Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht magazine in December 1986, Hillgruber accused Habermas of engaging in "scandalous" methods of attack. In answer to Habermas's criticism of the sub-title of his book, Hillgruber argued that the title of his Holocaust essay, "Der geschichtliche Ort der Judenverhnichtung" (The historical locus of the annihilation of the Jews) and the first sentence of his book, in which he spoke of the "murder of the Jews in the territory controlled by National Socialist Germany", disproved Habermas's point. In particular, Hillgruber was furious over the sentence about "tried and true higher-ups of the NSDAP" that Habermas had created by selective editing of Hillgruber's book. Hillgruber claimed that Habermas was waging a "campaign of character assassination against Michael StĂĽrmer, Ernst Nolte, Klaus Hildebrand and me in the style of the all-too-familiar APO pamphets of the late 1960s" [Hillgruber was attempting to associate Habermas with the APO here]. Hillgruber described Habermas as a kind of left-wing literary hit-man who had asked to "take apart" Zweierlei Untergang by Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, the editor of the culture section of the Die Zeit newspaper. Reacting to Habermas's criticism that the two essays in Zweierlei Untergang were not connected, Hillgruber claimed that they were connected. According to Hillgruber, the German leadership in 1939 was divided into three factions. One, centred on the Nazi Party and the SS, saw the war as a chance to carry out the "racial reorganization" of Europe via mass expulsions and German colonization, whose roots Hillgruber traced to the war aims of the Pan-German League in the First World War. Another faction comprised the traditional German elites in the military, the diplomatic service and the bureaucracy, who saw the war as a chance to destroy the settlement established by the Treaty of Versailles and to establish the world dominance that Germany had sought in the First World War. And finally, there was Hitler's "race" program, which sought the genocide of the Jews as the only way to ensure that Germany would be a world power. Hillgruber insisted that only by reading his second essay about the Holocaust in Zweierlei Untergang could one understand the first essay about the "collapse" on the Eastern Front. Hillgruber compared the feelings of Germans about the lost eastern territories to the feelings of the French about their lost colonies in Indochina. Hillgruber claimed that, when writing about the end of the "German East" in 1945, to understand the "sense of tragedy" that surrounded the matter one had to take the side of the German civilians who were menaced by the Red Army, and the German soldiers fighting to protect them. Hillgruber went on to write that Habermas was seeking to censor him by criticizing him for taking the German side when discussing the last days of the Eastern Front. Replying to Habermas's charge that he was a "neo-conservative", Hillgruber wrote:
"How does he come to come categorize my work as having so-called neoconservative tendencies?
For decades I have never made any bones about my basic conservative position.
Deeply suspicious as I am of all "leftist" and other world-improving utopias, I will gladly let the label "conservative" apply to me, meant through it is as a defamation.
But what is the meaning of the prefix "neo"?
No one "challenges" this new "battle" label, so often seen these days, in order to turn this APO jargon against the inventor of the label".
Hillgruber argued that there was a contradiction in Habermas's claim that he was seeking to revive the original concept of the Sonderweg, that is, the ideology of Germany as a great Central European power that was neither of the West or the East which would mean closing Germany off to the culture of the West while at the same time accusing him of trying to create a "NATO philosophy". Hillgruber took the opportunity to once more restate his belief that there was no moral difference between the actions of the German Nazis and the Soviet Communists, and questioned whether the Holocaust was a "singular" event. Finally, Hillgruber accused Habermas of being behind the "agitation and psychic terror" suffered by non-Marxist professors in the late 1960s, and warned him that if he was trying to bring back "...that unbearable atmosphere that ruled in those years at West German universities, then he is deluding himself".

Imanuel Geiss wrote in an essay first published in the Evangelische Kommentare magazine in February 1987 that both the essays in Zweierlei Untergang were "respectable", but that it was "irritating" and ill-advised on the part of Hillgruber to publish them together, with the implied moral equivalence between the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe, and the genocide of the Jews. Geiss accused Habermas of engaging in a "malicious insinuation" in his attacks on Hillgruber. Geiss wrote that Hillgruber's demand that historians had to side with German troops fighting on the Eastern Front was problematic, but it did "...not justify the merciless severity, almost in the tone of an Old Testament prophet with which Habermas goes after this dissident historian".

Responding to Hillgruber in his "Note" of February 23, 1987, Habermas argued that Hillgruber's approach to history "justifies" the use of the line "tried and true higher-ups of the Nazi Party". Habermas went to argue that: "And in any case, this ridiculous dispute about words and secondary virtues just confirms Hillgruber's lack of objectivity about this entire sphere. This a case of praising the fire department that set the fire". Habermas ended his article with the remark that Hillgruber was an extremely shoddy historian, claiming that Hillgruber's charge that he was a leading 60s radical who was behind "...the agitation unleased by exteme leftists at West German universities and on the psychic terror aimed at individual non-Marxist colleagues" was simply not supported by the facts, and told Hillgruber to read one of his own books about his actions in the late 1960s before making such claims. In response to Habermas, Hillgruber in "Concluding Remarks" of May 12, 1987, wrote of "...the peculiar way this philosopher deals with texts", and of Habermas engaging in "...evasion, diversion, sophist hair-splitting and - once again - by misrepresenting my statements". Hillgruber went on to state that in his opinion:
"Habermas, and this is evident from a large number of reviews of his works by authors of varying political affiliations, tends to descend upon these texts, even if they are philisophical texts (even classics such as the works of Kant and Hegel are not excepted) in a way that is no different than what he did to my historical essay.
He does this with more or less grotesque distortions of quotations, excerpts that twist meaning, and quotations transplanted out of their context in order to provide the kind of confusion that causes the reader to be blinded and dazzled".


In his 1988 book, Entsorgung der deutschen Vergangenheit?: ein polemischer Essay zum "Historikerstreit" (Exoneration of the German past?: A polemical essay about the 'Historikerstreit'), Hillgruber's old enemy Hans-Ulrich Wehler wrote about Hillgruber's intentionist theories about the Holocaust that:
"This survey is directed - among other matters - against the apologetic effect of the tendency of interpretations that once more blame Hitler alone for the 'Holocaust' - thereby exonerating the older power elites and the Army, the executive bureaucracy, and the judiciary ...and the silent majority who knew".
In another essay, Wehler wrote:
"An even closer connection between academic and political interests is apparent in Andreas Hillgruber's Zweierlei Untergang, where the plight of the German Army on the Eastern Front and the civilian population of eastern Germany is treated without any countervailing consideration for the fate of the Jewish and Slavic "subhumans", the members of the German opposition, and incarcerated groups, or indeed for the Europeans subject to German occupation, and the German people themselves, all caught up in a senselessly prolonged "total war".
Such a position unavoidably carries immensely oppressive political implications.
His laments over the destruction of the "European center", Germany's intermediary position between East and West, and her loss of great power status is shot through with countless political value judgments.
His guiding position (later admitted openly), according to which the loss of the eastern provinces and the expulsion of the German population westward represented "probably the most burdensome consequence of the war", is in itself a matter for political discussion.

Such political implications can only lead us down the wrong path-not to mention a scientific dead-end.



In all likelihood it was Hillgruber's aversion to methodological and theoretical reflection that was largely responsible for this wrong turn.



Be that as it may, the political effect of Zweierlei Untergang has been downright fatal.



It has led to the return of an unreflecting nationalism, in which sympathetic identification with the German Army on the Eastern Front and with the German civilian population has become dogma.



Such a worldview has led an otherwise extremely knowledgeable historian to extrude and exclude the victims of National Socialism from his narrative, an omission that would once have been unimaginable but that we now see in black and white.



The consequences of a naive attempt to identify with the subjects of historical writing could hardly be demonstrated more drastically".



The American historian Anson Rachinbach wrote against Hillgruber that:
"Hillgruber never explicitly relates the two essays, which with the collapse of the German Army on the Eastern Front and with the "Final Solution" in the East.
Nevertheless, the effect of their juxtaposition is strikingly clear: the first essay laments the final days of the German Army and the consequences of the Russian conquest of Germany as a German "national catastrophe", the second is a dry and ascetic account of the Nazi crime against the Jews in light of recent historical works on anti-Semitism.
Placed together, it is difficult to escape the conclusion which appears on the book jacket, "that the amputation of the Reich in favor of a greater Poland was a war aim of the Allies long before Auschwitz".
The destruction of the German Army, the terror unleashed by the Soviet Army, and the complicity of the Allies in dismembering the eastern part of Germany are all tragic consequences of the blind anti-Prussianism of the Allies, independent of Hitler's crimes...Hillgruber argues that the division of Germany and its loss of global political status as a "failed world power" (gescheiterte Grossmacht) was a consequence of anti-Prussian (not expressely anti-Hitler) war aims of the Allies.
In World War II, the legitimate "core" of the desire for revision (of Germany's eastern borders and its Untertan role in world affairs) in the Weimar Republic was perverted by the "Hitler Reich".
The German catastrophe is the end of a "power politically fully sovereign great power German Reich" and the "unconscious retreat of the majority of Germans in the postwar years from their nation".
The "German Question", in short, has to be separated from its subversion by Hitler.
The defense of the nation is divorced from the catastrophic policies of the leader".


The American historian Jerry Muller wrote that the best "antidote" to the version of Anglo-German relations presented in Zweierlei Untergang and the "pseudo-history" of Ernst Nolte were Hillgruber's own writings prior to 1986 Muller wrote that Hillgruber himself had noted in Zweierlei Untergang that every day the Wehrmacht held out meant that the Holocaust continued for one more day, but then criticized Hillgruber for having ducked this issue by claiming that one had to understand and "identify" with the concerns and fears of German civilians threatened by the Red Army. Muller complained about the "arbitrariness" of Hillgruber's demand that historians should "identify" with the people of East Prussia instead of the Jews suffering and dying in the death camps. But Muller went to defend Hillgruber from Habermas. Muller wrote:
"But Habermas went further-much further.
Quoting Hillgruber's statement that Hitler sought the physical extermination of all Jews "because only through such a "racial revolution" could he secure the "world-power status" for which he strove", Habermas claimed that the world "could" in this sentence makes it unclear whether or not Hillgruber shares Hitler's perspective.
Here was an insinuation that would recur two years later, when Philipp Jenninger would similarly be accused of holding views he was only describing" (Philipp Jenninger was a German politician forced to resigned as the speaker of the Bundstag in November 1988 after giving a speech that through meant to condemn Nazi crimes erroneously gave the impression that he shared the Nazi perspective).
Muller further argued that it was unjust for Habermas to lump Hillgruber and Nolte together, accusing Habermas of making a guilt by association attack.

The Israeli historian Dan Diner wrote:
"Andreas Hillgruber-sought-and this is why his approach is problematic-to realize a nationalistic perspective capable of eliciting sympathetic identification.
Such a perspective claims to be inimical to the Nazi regime; yet is still seeks to preserve national identification (and thus national continuity) in spite of National Socialism.
Thus Hillgruber considers the defense of the German Reich, and its territorial integrity in the East during the final phrase of the war, to have been justified.
Moreover, Hillgruber evaluates the bitter defensive battle against the Soviet army on the Eastern Front as a tragic historical dilemma even through he recognizes its connection to the machinery of death at Auschwitz.
In this way he affirms the ready nationalism of his own subjective perspective on the era.
The choice of such a perspective contains, whether explicitly or not, a clear historiographic judgment: for the sake of the nation, the historian takes sides in a "dilemma"-against the victims of National Socialism.

By proceeding from the experiences and subjective feelings of the greater part of the German populace to arrive at his paradigm of national identification, Hillgruber necessarily ignores the centrality of the phenomenon "Auschwitz" in his evaluation of National Socialism.



Paradoxically, the conservative Hillgruber justifies his approach with what is usually considered a left-wing concern: the history of everyday life, or what might be called a locally oriented, close-up of National Socialism.



This might seem surprising; but when applied to Nazism, a close-up perspective oriented towards the everyday experiences brings with it a depoliticizing, desubstantiating, structurally desubjectivizing effect"



The American historian Charles S. Maier continued his criticism in his 1988 book The Unmasterable Past wrote that Hillgruber in Zweierlei Untergang had made some of the ideas of the German far-right "...presentable with footnotes". Maier wrote that Hillgruber's point about the death camps ceasing to operate in the winter of 1944-45 was irrelevant as he ignored the concentration camps and the death marches. Maier wrote:
""Life" in the concentration camps within greater Germany did grow crueler as deportations ceased: Anne Frank, like so many others, perished inside Germany only a couple of months before she might have been liberated.
Moreover, forced marches of surviving Jews from camps shut down in the East to those still functioning in the West took the lives of tens of thousands, as did deporations among what remained of Hungary's Jewish population in the last winter of the war.
German courts sentenced 5, 764 countrymen to death for crimes of opposition during 1944 and at least 800 from January to May 1945.
Buckled to the guillotine or dangling in slow nooses, the victims probably identified less with the Reichswehr than has the historian"
. Maier went on to write that the historian has to understand the people whom he or she is writing about, and understanding does not necessarily mean "identification" as Hillgruber claimed, and that the historian has to understand a plurality of viewpoints, not just one as Hillgruber was trying to claim. Maier wrote about the cool, detached way Hillgruber described the Holocaust as compared to his anger about the explusion of the Germans, and argued that Hillgruber's choice of the word Judentum (Jewry) instead of Juden (Jews) indicated a certain aloofness on his part about the Holocaust. Maier argued that through there was no "anti-Semitic agenda" in Zweierlei Untergang, that Hillgruber's book reflected his conservative politics and was intended to create a positive German national identity by restoring what Hillgruber considered the honour of the German Army on the Eastern Front. Maier concluded that through Hillgruber believed Hitler to have "maniacal" views, his Germany as the threatened "land in the middle" geopolitics-Primat der Aussenpolitik approach to history meant the last stand of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front was still "sub specie necessitatis" (under the sight of necessity).

The British historian Richard J. Evans in his 1989 book In Hitler's Shadow attacked Hillgruber for taking the Eastern Front out of context, arguing that the Wehrmacht had been guilty of far worse crimes in the occupied areas of the Soviet Union than the Red Army was in the occupied areas of Germany. Evans wrote that "it was not the Soviet Army which adhered to a fundamentally barbarous concept of war, but the German Army". Evans went on to argue that:
"None of this of course excuses the conduct of the Soviet troops, the mass rape of German women, the looting and the plundering, the deportation and lengthy imprisonment in Russia of many German troops, or the unauthorized killing of many German civilians.
But it has to be said that the conduct of the Red Army in Germany was by no means as barbarous as that of the German Army in Russia.
The Russians did not deliberately lay waste whole towns and villages in Germany, nor did they systematically destroy whole communities during their occupation of German territory".
Evans took the view that Hillgruber had totally discredited himself in the Historikerstreit, and that his reputation as a scholar was in tatters. The American historian Peter Baldwin commented on the cold and clinical way in which Hillgruber spoke of the Holocaust in contrast to his passionate anger about the fate of the Germans killed or expelled in 1945-46. Baldwin went on to note that, although Hillgruber claimed that both the Holocaust and the explusion of the Germans were equally tragic events, his tone betrayed which one he really regarded as the greater tragedy. The American historian Deborah Lipstadt accused Hillgruber of being a grossly offensive German apologist with his claim that the Holocaust and the end of Germany as a great power were equally great tragedies that "belonged together". Lipstadt wrote that she regarded Hillgruber as guilty of a moral relativism with his call for historians to "identify" with German soldiers on the Eastern Front that consciously down-played Jewish suffering and the Jewish dead of the Holocaust while falsely elevating German suffering and the German dead to the same level. In his 1994 book A World At Arms, Hillgruber's old adversary Gerhard Weinberg called Hillgruber's thesis in Zweierlei Untergang "...a preposterous reversal of the realities".Weinberg, Gerhad A World At Arms Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994, 2005, p. 1124. Weinberg sarcastically commented that if the German Army had held out longer against the Red Army in 1945 as Hillgruber had wished, the result would not have been the saving of more German lives as Hillgruber had claimed, but rather an American atomic bombing of Germany.



In 1998, the Israeli historian Yehuda Bauer called Hillgruber as a "great German historian" who "unfortunately" in the 1980s "unwittingly" and "unwillingly" allowed himself to be associated with the fraction of German historians centered around Ernst Nolte. Bauer went to praise Hillgruber as a way of rebutting Arno J. Mayer as the historian who proved in his 1972 essay "`Die Endlösung' und das deutsche Ostimperium als Kernstück des rassenideologische Programms des Nationsozialismus" that in National Socialism Communism was viewed as an instrument of the Jews, and thus anti-Communism was subordinated to anti-Semitism.

The American historian Donald McKale accused Hillgruber of writing the sort of nonsense one would expect from a German apologist with his claim that the Anglo-American strategic bombing offensive was an act of "genocide" against the German people, and thought especially offensive Hillgruber's comparison of the strategic bombing offensive with the Holocaust. Ian Kershaw argued that Hillgruber's approach was flawed as it was based on the assumption that to "understand" a period in history required one to "identify" with one side or the other. Kershaw wrote:
"It was precisely the claim that the historians' only valid position is one of identification with the German troops fighting on the Eastern Front which invoked such widespread and vehement criticism of Hillgruber's essay.
The critical method, which in his other work-not excluding his essay on "The Historical Place of the Extermination of the Jews" in the same volume as the controversial treatment of the Eastern Front-made him a formidable historian whose strength lay in the careful and measured treatment of empirical data, entirely deserted him here and was wholly lacking in this one-sided, uncritical, empathizing with the German troops".
The British historian Norman Davies in his 2006 book No Simple Victory appeared to lend Hillgruber some support by writing:
"...Andreas Hillgruber published a book provocatively entitled Zweirelei Untergang or 'Double Ruin' (1986).
The subject was the expulsion of Germans from the east in 1945-47.
But the clear implication was that Germany had been victimized twice over-once by the military defeat and again by the explusions.
The explosion was immediate.
Habermas and other left-wingers went into action with a flurry of articles and of letter-writing.
They claimed that the uniqueness of the Holocaust was under attack.
They disliked comparisons, particulary between the tragedy of the Jews and the misfortunes of the Germans."
Davies went to argue that revealations made after the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989-91 supported Hillgruber's moral equating of National Socialism and Communism.

His defenders have argued that his work shows that World War II is more morally complex than it is usually presented, and that he was merely highlighting a little known chapter of history. More importantly however, Hillgruber's historical method of "comparing" was considered by many to be "equating". This is the same criticism Ernst Nolte had faced, during the Historians' Debate.

Works

  • Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonesu: die deutsch-rumänischen Beziehungen, 1938-1944, 1954.
  • co-written with Hans-GĂĽnther Seraphim "Hitlers Entschluss zum Angriff auf Russland (Eine Entgegnung)" pp. 240-254 from Vieteljahrshefte fĂĽr Zeitgeschichte, Volume 2, 1954.
  • Hitlers Strategie: Politik und KriegsfĂĽhrung, 1940-1941, 1965.
  • "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulierten Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914" pp. 333-351 from Historische Zeitschrift, Volume 202, 1966.
  • Deutschlands Rolle in der Vorgeschichte der beiden Weltkriege, 1967; translated into English by William C. Kirby as Germany And The Two World Wars, Harvard University Press, 1981. ISBN 978-0-674-35321-3
  • Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der deutschen Aussenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler, 1969.
  • Bismarcks Aussenpolitik, 1972.
  • "`Die Endlösung' und das deutsche Ostimperium als KernstĂĽck des rassenideologische Programms des Nationsozialismus" pp. 133-153 from Vieteljahrshefte fĂĽr Zeitgeschichte, Volume 20, 1972.
  • Deutsche Geschichte, 1945-1972: Die "Deutsche Frage" in der Weltpolitik, 1974.
  • "England's Place In Hitler's Plans for World Dominion" pp. 5–22 from Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 9, 1974.
  • Deutsche Grossmacht-und Weltpolitik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, 1977.
  • Otto von Bismarck: GrĂĽnder der europäischen Grossmacht Deutsches Reich, 1978.
  • "Tendenzen, Ergebnisse und Perspektiven der gegenwärtigen Hitler-Forschung" pp. 600-621 from Historische Zeitschrift, Volume 226, 1978.
  • Europa in der Weltpolitik der Nachkriegszeit (1945-1963), 1979.
  • Sowjetische Aussenpolitik im Zweten Weltkrieg, 1979.
  • Die gescheiterte Grossmacht: Eine Skizze des Deutschen Reiches, 1871-1945, 1980.
  • co-written with Klaus Hildebrand KalkĂĽl zwischen Macht und Ideologie. Der Hitler- Stalin- Pakt: Parallelen bis heute?, 1980, ISBN 3720151255.
  • Der Zweite Weltkriege, 1939-1945: Kriegsziele und Strategie der grossen Mächte, 1982.
  • Die Last der Nation: FĂĽnf Beiträge ĂĽber Deutschland und die Deutschen, 1984.
  • "The Extermination of the European Jews in Its Historical Context—a Recapitulation," pp. 1–15 from Yad Vashem Studies Volume 17, 1986.
  • Zweierlei Untergang: Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europäischen Judentums, 1986.
  • Die Zerstörung Europas: Beiträge zur Weltkriegsepoche 1914 bis 1945, 1988.
  • "No Questions are Forbidden To Research" pp. 155-161; "Letter to the Editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 29, 1986" p. 198; "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" pp. 222-236 & "My Concluding Remarks on the So-Called Historikerstreit, May 12, 1987" pp. 268-269 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler?: Original Documents Of the Historikerstreit, The Controversy Concerning The Singularity Of The Holocaust edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993, ISBN 0391037846.


Notes

  1. .
  2. Evans (1989), p. 123.
  3. "Hillgruber, Andreas" pp. 297-298 from The Annual Obituary 1989, Chicago: St James Press, 1990 p. 297.
  4. Dijk, Ruun van (1999), p. 534.
  5. Bosworth, Richard J. B., Explaining Auschwitz And Hiroshima History Writing and the Second World War 1945-1990, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 84. ISBN 978-0-415-10923-9
  6. Dijk, Ruun van (1999), p. 533.
  7. Lukacs (1997), p. 35.
  8. Herwig (1982), p. 195.
  9. Herwig (1982), p. 196.
  10. .
  11. Evans (1989), p. 44.
  12. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), pp. 74 & 77.
  13. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), p. 74.
  14. Weinberg, Gerhard, "Review of Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu: die deutsch-rumänischen Beziehungen, 1938-1944 by Andreas Hillgruber", The Journal of Modern History, Volume 28, Issue # 1, March 1956, p. 81.
  15. Hillgruber, Andreas, "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986", pp. 222-236, from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993, p. 233.
  16. Herwig (1982), p. 192.
  17. Marrus, Michael, The Holocaust In History, Toronto: KeyPorter, 2000, p. 39.
  18. Evans (1989), p. 58.
  19. Muller, Jerry, "German Historians At War" pp. 33–42, in Commentary, Volume 87, Issue #5, May 1989, p. 38.
  20. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), p. 51.
  21. Evans (1989), p. 71.
  22. Evans (1989), p. 75.
  23. Hillgruber, Andreas, "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" pp. 222-236 from Piper, Ernst (Ed.), Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler?, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993, p. 225.
  24. "The Search for the 'Lost History' Observation on the Historical Self-Evidence of the Federal Republic", pp. 101-113 in Piper, Ernst (Ed.), Forever In The Shadow of Hitler?, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993, p. 107.
  25. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), p. 38.
  26. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), page v.
  27. Herwig, Holger, "Suggestions for Further Reading", pp. 160-165 in Herwig, Holger (Ed.), Outbreak of World War I, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997, p. 163.
  28. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), pp. 26 & 30-31.
  29. Herwig (1982), p. 190.
  30. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), p. 14.
  31. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), pp. 36-37.
  32. Herwig, Holger, "Introduction" pp. 1-11 in Herwig, Holger (Ed.), The Outbreak of World War I, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997 p. 9.
  33. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), pp. 41-45.
  34. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), pp. 42-43.
  35. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), pp. 41-47.
  36. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), p. 46-47.
  37. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), p. 53-54.
  38. Lukacs (1997), pp. 16-17.
  39. Muller, Jerry, "German Historians At War", pp. 33–42 in Commentary, vol. 87, issue 5, May 1989, p. 38.
  40. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), pp. 52-53.
  41. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), p. 54.
  42. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), p. 50.
  43. Hillgruber, "Hitler's Program", p. 73.
  44. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), pp. 49-50 & 77.
  45. Lukacs (1997), p. 134.
  46. Hillgruber, "Hitler's Program", pp. 74-75.
  47. Hillgruber, "Hitler's Program", p. 74.
  48. Hillgruber, Andreas, "England's Place In Hitler's Plans for World Dominion", pp. 5-22, in Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 9, 1974, pp. 13-14.
  49. Hillgruber, Germany And The Two World Wars (1981), p. 77.
  50. Herwig (1982), pp. 192-193.
  51. May, Ernest, Strange Victory, New York: Hill & Wang, 2000, p. 277.
  52. Lukacs (1997), p. 133.
  53. Lukacs (1997), pp. 149-150.
  54. Lukacs (1997), p. 147.
  55. Lukacs (1997), p. 149.
  56. Kershaw (2000), pp. 9-11.
  57. Kershaw (2000), pp. 9-10.
  58. Kershaw (2000), pp. 14-15.
  59. Kershaw (2000), p. 15.
  60. Lukacs (1997), p. 236.
  61. Maier, Charles The Unmasterable Past, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988 page 140.
  62. Hillgruber, Andreas, "No Questions are Forbidden to Research", pp. 155-161 in Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 pp. 159-160.
  63. Muller, Jerry, "German Historians At War", pp. 33–42, in Commentary, vol. 87, Issue 5, May 1989, p. 39.
  64. Evans (1989), p. 160.
  65. Hillgruber, Andreas, "No Questions are Forbidden to Research" pp. 155-161 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993, p. 157.
  66. Muller, Jerry "German Historians At War" pp. 33–42 from Commentary, Volume 87, Issue #5, May 1989 page 39
  67. Hirschfeld, Gerhard, "Erasing the Past?", pp. 8-10 in History Today, vol. 37, August 1987, p. 8.
  68. McKale, Donald, Hitler's Shadow War, New York: CooperSquare Press, 2002, p. 445.
  69. Low, Alfred, "Historikerstreit" p. 474 in Buse, Dieter; Doerr, JĂĽrgen (Eds.), Modern Germany, Volume 1 A-K, New York: Garland Publishing, 1998.
  70. Evans (1989), pp. 50-51.
  71. Evans, Richard In Hitler's Shadow New York: Pantheon, 1989 page 53.
  72. Lukacs (1997), p. 235.
  73. Rabinbach, Anson, "The Jewish Question in the German Question", pp. 45-73 in Baldwin, Peter (ed.), Reworking the Past, Boston: Beacon Press, 1990, p. 64.
  74. Hillgruber, Andreas, Zweierlei Untergang, Berlin: Siedler, p. 36.
  75. Lukacs (1997), p. 34.
  76. Duffy, Christopher, Red Storm on the Reich The Soviet March on Germany, 1945, Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 1991, 2002 page x.
  77. Lukacs (1997), pp. 235-236.
  78. "Hillgruber, Andreas" pp. 297-298 from The Annual Obituary 1989, Chicago: St James Press, 1990 p. 298.
  79. Hirschfeld, Gerhard, "Erasing the Past?" pages 8-10 from History Today, Volume 37, August 1987 page 8.
  80. Hirschfeld, Gerhard "Erasing the Past?" pages 8-10 from History Today, Volume 37, August 1987 page 8.
  81. Maier, Charles The Unmasterable Past, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988 page 21.
  82. Maier, Charles "Immoral Equivalence" pages 36-41 from The New Republic, Volume 195, Issue #2, 750, December 1, 1986 page 37.
  83. Evans (1989), pp. 66-68.
  84. Evans (1989), p. 68.
  85. Evans (1989), pp. 68-69.
  86. Evans (1989), p. 159.
  87. Evans (1989), pp. 159-160.
  88. Hillgruber, Andreas "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" pp. 222-236 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 223.
  89. Habermas,JĂĽrgen "A Kind of Settlement of Damages" pp. 34-44 from Forever In The Shadow of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, 1993 pp. 42-43.
  90. Habermas,JĂĽrgen "A Kind of Settlement of Damages" pp. 34-44 from Forever In The Shadow of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, 1993 p. 36.
  91. Habermas,JĂĽrgen "A Kind of Settlement of Damages" page 34-44 from Forever In The Shadow of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, 1993 p. 38.
  92. Evans (1989), pp. 68-72.
  93. Evans (1989), pp. 58-61.
  94. Bosworth, R. J. B Explaining Auschwitz And Hiroshima History Writing and the Second World War 1945-1990, London: Routledge, 1994 p. 85.
  95. Bartov, Omer "Time Present and Time Past: The Historikerstreit and German Reunification" pp. 173-190 from New German Critique, Volume 55, Winter 1992 p. 175.
  96. Bartov, Omer, Germany's War And The Holocaust, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003 pp. 234-235.
  97. Evans (1989), p. 54.
  98. Evans (1989), p. 95.
  99. Evans (1989), p. 62.
  100. Brumlik, Micha, "New Myth of State" pp. 45-49 from Forever In The Shadow of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1993 p. 48.
  101. Brumlik, Micha, "New Myth of State" pp. 45-49 from Forever In The Shadow of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1993 p. 45.
  102. Brumlik, Micha, "New Myth of State" pp. 45-49 from Forever In The Shadow of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1993 p. 46.
  103. Hildebrand, Klaus "The Age of Tyrants: History and Politics" pp. 50-55 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 51.
  104. Hildebrand, Klaus "The Age of Tyrants: History and Politics" pp. 50-55 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 52.
  105. Habermas, JĂĽrgen "Letter to the Editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 11, 1986" pp. 58-60 from Forever In The Shadow of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, 1993 p. 59.
  106. Fest, Joachim, "Encumbered Remembrance: The Controversy about the Incomparability of National-Socialist Mass Crimes" pp. 63-71 from Forever In The Shadow of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1993 p. 65.
  107. Fleischer, Helmut "The Morality of History" pp. 79-84 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 80.
  108. Mommsen, Hans, "Search for the 'Lost History'? Observations on the Historical Self-Evidence of the Federal Republic" pp. 101-113 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 109.
  109. Broszat, Martin "Where the Roads Part" pp. 125-129 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 126.
  110. Augstein, Rudolf "The New Auschwitz Lie" pp. 131-134 from Forever In The Shadow of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1993 p. 131.
  111. Meier, Christian "Keynote Address" pp. 135-142 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 138.
  112. Geiss, Imanuel "Letter to the Editor of Der Spiegel, October 20, 1986" pp. 147-148 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 pp. 147-148.
  113. Schulze, Hagen "Questions We Have To Face: No Historical Stance without National Identity" pp. 93-97 from In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 94.
  114. Hillgruber, Andreas, "No Questions are Forbidden to Research" pp. 155-161 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 157.
  115. Hillgruber, Andreas "No Questions are Forbidden to Research" pp. 155-161 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 160.
  116. Hillgruber, Andreas "No Questions are Forbidden to Research" pp. 155-161 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 156.
  117. Habermas, Jurgen "On the Public Use of History: The Official Self-Understanding of the Federal Republic Is Breaking Up" pp. 162-170 from Forever In The Shadow of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, 1993 p. 164.
  118. Meier, Christian "Not a Concluding Remark" pp. 177-183 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 180.
  119. Sontheimer, Kurt, "Makeup Artists Are Creating a New Identity" pp. 184-187 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 184.
  120. Hildebrand, Klaus "He Who Wants to Escape the Abyss" pp. 188-195 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 191.
  121. Hillgruber, Andreas "Letter to the Editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 29, 1986" p. 198 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 198.
  122. Mommsen, Wolfgang "Neither Denial nor Forgetfulness Will Free Us" pp. 202-215 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 212.
  123. Maier, Charles "Immoral Equivalence" pages 36-41 from The New Republic, Volume 195, Issue #2, 750, December 1, 1986 page 38.
  124. Maier, Charles "Immoral Equivalence" pages 36-41 from The New Republic, Volume 195, Issue #2, 750, December 1, 1986 page 38.
  125. Maier, Charles "Immoral Equivalence" pages 36-41 from The New Republic, Volume 195, Issue #2, 750, December 1, 1986 page 38.
  126. Maier, Charles "Immoral Equivalence" pages 36-41 from The New Republic, Volume 195, Issue #2, 750, December 1, 1986 page 38.
  127. Maier, Charles "Immoral Equivalence" pages 36-41 from The New Republic, Volume 195, Issue #2, 750, December 1, 1986 page 38.
  128. Maier, Charles "Immoral Equivalence" pages 36-41 from The New Republic, Volume 195, Issue #2, 750, December 1, 1986 page 40.
  129. Möller, Horst "What May Not Be, Cannot Be" pp. 216-221 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 pp. 218-219.
  130. Perels, Joachim "Those Who Refused to Go Along" pp. 249-253 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 pp. 250-251.
  131. Hillgruber, Andreas "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" pp. 222-236 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 224.
  132. Hillgruber, Andreas "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" pp. 222-236 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 pp. 228-229.
  133. Hillgruber, Andreas "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" pp. 222-236 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 222.
  134. Hillgruber, Andreas "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" pp. 222-236 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 pp. 222-223.
  135. Hillgruber, Andreas "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" pp. 222-236 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 237.
  136. Hillgruber, Andreas "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" pp. 222-236 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 pp. 237-238.
  137. Hillgruber, Andreas "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" pp. 222-236 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 238.
  138. Hillgruber, Andreas "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" pp. 222-236 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 230.
  139. Hillgruber, Andreas "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" pp. 222-236 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 pp. 230-231.
  140. Hillgruber, Andreas "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" pp. 222-236 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 pp. 232-233.
  141. Hillgruber, Andreas "JĂĽrgen Habermas, Karl-Heinz JanĂźen, and the Enlightenment in the Year 1986" pp. 222-236 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 234.
  142. Geiss, Imanuel "On the Historikerstreit" pp. 254-258 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 256.
  143. Habermas, JĂĽrgen "Note, February 23, 1987 pp. 260-262 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 261.
  144. Habermas, JĂĽrgen "Note, February 23, 1987 pp. 260-262 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 262.
  145. Hillgruber, Andreas "My Concluding Remarks on the So-Called Historikerstreit, May 12, 1987" pp. 268-269 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 p. 268.
  146. Hillgruber, Andreas "My Concluding Remarks on the So-Called Historikerstreit, May 12, 1987" pp. 268-269 from Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler? edited by Ernst Piper, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993 pp. 268-269.
  147. Wehler, Hans-Ulrich "Unburdening the German Past?" pages 214-223 from Reworking the Past edited by Peter Baldwin, Beacon Press: Boston, 1990 pages 219-220.
  148. Rabinback, Anson "The Jewish Question in the German Question" pages 45-73 from Reworking the Past edited by Peter Baldwin, Beacon Press: Boston, 1990, pages 64-65.
  149. Muller, Jerry "German Historians At War" pp. 33–42 from Commentary, Volume 87, Issue #5, May 1989 page 40.
  150. Muller, Jerry "German Historians At War" pp. 33–42 from Commentary, Volume 87, Issue #5, May 1989 page 39.
  151. Diner, Dan "Between Aporia and Apology" pages 133-145 from Reworking the Past edited by Peter Baldwin, Beacon Press: Boston, 1990 page 138.
  152. Maier, Charles The Unmasterable Past, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988 page 148.
  153. Maier, Charles The Unmasterable Past, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988 page 22.
  154. Maier, Charles The Unmasterable Past, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988 page 23.
  155. Maier, Charles The Unmasterable Past, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988 page 25.
  156. Baldwin, Peter "The Historikerstreit in Context" pp. 3-37 from Reworking the Past edited by Peter Baldwin, Boston: Beacon Press, 1990 p. 4.
  157. Lipstadt, Deborah Denying the Holocaust, New York: Free Press; Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada; New York; Oxford: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1993 p. 211.
  158. Bauer, Yehuda "A Past That Will Not Go Away" pages 12-22 from The Holocaust and History edited by Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998 page 15.
  159. Kershaw (2000), p. 232.
  160. Davies, Norman No Simple Victory, Penguin Books: London, 2006 pages 469-470
  161. Davies, Norman No Simple Victory, Penguin Books: London, 2006 page 470


References

  • Anderson, Perry A Zone of Engagement, London: Verso, 1992, ISBN 0860913775.
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    • Baldwin, Peter "The Historikerstreit in Context" pages 3–37.
    • Diner, Dan "Between Aporia and Apology: On the Limits of Historicizing National Socialism" pages 133-145.
    • Rabinback, Anson "The Jewish Question in the German Question" pages 45–73.
    • Wehler, Hans-Ulrich "Unburdening the German Past? A Preliminary Assessment" pages 214-223.
  • Bartov, Omer, "Historians on the Eastern Front Andreas Hillgruber and Germany's Tragedy" pp. 325-345 from Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fĂĽr deutsche Geschichte, Volume 16, 1987.
  • Bartov, Omer, Germany's War And The Holocaust Disputed Histories, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, ISBN 0801486815.
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  • Bosworth, R.J.B., Explaining Auschwitz And Hiroshima History Writing and the Second World War 1945-1990, London: Routledge, 1994, ISBN 041510923X.
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  • DĂĽlffer, Jost (ed.), Deutschland in Europa: Kontinuität und Bruch: Gedenkschrift fĂĽr Andreas Hillgruber (Germany in Europe: Continuity and Break; Commemorative Volume for Andreas Hillgruber), Frankfurt: Propyläen, 1990, ISBN 3549076541.
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  • Herwig, Holger H., "Andreas Hillgruber: Historian of 'GroĂźmachtpolitik' 1871-1945," pp. 186-198 from Central European History Volume, XV 1982.
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  • Hillgruber, Andreas, Germany And The Two World Wars, Harvard University Press, 1981. ISBN 978-0-674-35321-3.
  • Hirschfeld, Gerhard "Erasing the Past?" pages 8–10 from History Today, Volume 37, August 1987.
  • Kershaw, Sir Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems And Perspectives Of Interpretation, London: Arnold; New York: Co-published in the USA by Oxford University Press, 2000, ISBN 0340760281.
  • Lipstadt, Deborah, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory, New York: Free Press; Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada; New York; Oxford: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1993, ISBN 0-02-919235-8.
  • Lukacs, John The Hitler of History, New York: A. A. Knopf, 1997, ISBN 0-679-44649-4.
  • Maier, Charles "Immoral Equivalence" pages 36–41 from The New Republic, Volume 195, Issue #2, 750, December 1, 1986.
  • Maier, Charles The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and German National Identity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988, ISBN 0674929764.
  • Marrus, Michael The Holocaust in History, Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1987, ISBN 0-88619-155-6.
  • Muller, Jerry "German Historians At War" pp. 33–42 from Commentary Volume 87, Issue #5, May 1989.
  • Piper, Ernst (editor) "Historikerstreit": Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistschen Judenvernichtung, Munich: Piper, 1987 translated into English by James Knowlton and Truett Cates as Forever In The Shadow Of Hitler?: Original Documents Of the Historikerstreit, The Controversy Concerning The Singularity Of The Holocaust, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993, ISBN 0391037846.
    • Augstein, Rudolf, "The New Auschwitz Lie" pp. 131-134.
    • Brumlik, Micha, "The New Myth of State: The Eastern Front The Most Recent Development in the Discipline of History in the Federal Republic of Germany" pp. 45–49.
    • Fest, Joachim, "Encumbered Remembrance: The Controversy about the Incomparability of National-Socialist Mass Crimes" pp. 63–71.
    • Fleischer, Helmut, "The Morality of History: On the Dispute About the Past That Will Not Pass" pp. 79–84.
    • Habermas, JĂĽrgen, "A Kind of Settlement of Damages: The Apologetic Tendencies in German History Writing" page 34-44; "Letter to the Editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 11, 1986" pp. 58–60; "On the Public Use of History: The Official Self-Understanding of the Federal Republic Is Breaking Up" pp. 162-170 & "Note, February 23, 1987" pp. 260-262.
    • Hildebrand, Klaus "The Age of Tyrants: History and Politics: The Administrators of the Enlightenment, the Risk of Scholarship and the Preservation of a Worldview A Reply to JĂĽrgen Habermas" pp. 50–55 & "He Who Wants To Escape the Abyss Will Have Sound It Very Precisely: Is the New German History Writing Revisionist?" pp. 188-195.
    • Geiss, Imanuel "Letter to the Editor of Der Spiegel, October 20, 1986" pp. 147-148 & "On the Historikerstreit" pp. 254-258.
    • Meier, Christian "Keynote Address on the Occasion of the Opening of the Thirty-Sixth Conference of German Historians in Trier, October 8, 1986" pp. 135-142 & "Not a Concluding Remark" pp. 177-183.
    • Möller, Horst "What May Not Be, Cannot Be: A Plea for Rendering Factual the Controversy about Recent History" pp. 216-221.
    • Mommsen, Hans "Search for the 'Lost History'? Observations on the Historical Self-Evidence of the Federal Republic" pp. 101-113.
    • Mommsen, Wolfgang "Neither Denial nor Forgetfulness Will Free Us From the Past: Harmonzing Our Understanding of History Endangers Freedom" pp. 202-215
    • Perels, Joachim "Those Who Refused To Go Along Left Their Country In The Lurch: The Resistance Is Also Being Reassessed in the Historikerstreit" pp. 249-253.
    • Schulze, Hagen "Questions We Have To Face: No Historical Stance without National Identity" pp. 93–97.
    • Sontheimer, Kurt "Makeup Artists Are Creating a New Identity" pp. 184-187.
  • "Hillgruber, Andreas" pp. 297-298 from The Annual Obituary 1989 edited by Deborah Andrews, Chicago: St James Press, 1990, ISBN 1-55862-056-7.


See also




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