Attrition warfare is a
military strategy in which a belligerent
attempts to win a
war by wearing down its enemy
to the point of collapse through continuous losses in personnel and
matériel.
The war will usually be won by the side with greater such
resources. A good example of this was during
World War I when Russia, France, Britain, Italy
and eventually the United States wore down Germany to the point of
capitulation.
Strategic considerations
Most military theorists and strategists like
Sun
Tzu have viewed attrition warfare as something to be avoided.
In the sense that attrition warfare represents an attempt to grind
down an opponent through superior numbers, it represents the
opposite of the usual principles of war, where one attempts to
achieve decisive victories through
maneuver,
concentration of force,
surprise, and the like.
On the other hand, a side which perceives itself to be at a marked
disadvantage in maneuver warfare or unit tactics may deliberately
seek out attrition warfare to neutralize its opponent's advantages.
If the sides are nearly evenly matched, the outcome of a war of
attrition is likely to be a
Pyrrhic
victory.
The difference between war of attrition and other forms of war is
somewhat artificial, since war always contains an element of
attrition. However, one can be said to pursue a strategy of
attrition when one makes it the main goal to cause gradual
attrition to the opponent, as opposed to trying to conquer terrain
or to isolate large sections of the enemy through maneuver.
Historically, attritional methods are tried when other methods have
failed or are obviously not feasible. Typically, when attritional
methods have worn down the enemy sufficiently to make other methods
feasible, attritional methods are abandoned in favor of other
strategies.
Attritional methods are in themselves usually sufficient to cause a
nation to give up a non-vital ambition, but other methods are
generally necessary to achieve unconditional surrender.
History
It is often argued that the best-known example of attrition warfare
was during
World War I on the
Western Front.
Both military forces
found themselves in static defensive positions in trench running from Switzerland
to the English Channel
.
For years, without any opportunity for maneuvers, the only way the
commanders thought they could defeat the enemy was to repeatedly
attack head on, to grind the other down.
Attritional warfare in World War I has been shown by historians
such as
Hew Strachan to have been used
as a subsequent excuse for failed offensives.
Erich von Falkenhayn later claimed that
his tactics at Verdun
were
designed not to take the city, but rather to destroy the French Army in its defense.
In practice the German Offensive was intended to go as far as
possible and had no obvious design to minimize German casualties
and maximize French casualties. Attrition was therefore used later
in the battle to shift the focus away from Falkenhayn's tactical
failure, rather than a goal of the battle itself.
Attrition to the enemy was easy to assert and difficult to refute,
and thus may have been a convenient face-saving exercise in the
wake of many indecisive battles. It is in many cases hard to see
the logic of warfare by attrition because of the obvious
uncertainty of the level of damage to the enemy, and of the damage
that the attacking force may sustain to its own limited and
expensive resources, while trying to achieve that damage.
That is not to say that a General will not be prepared to sustain
high casualties while trying to reach an objective. An example in
which one side used attrition warfare to neutralize the other
side's advantage in maneuverability and unit tactics occurred
during the latter part of the
American Civil War, where
Ulysses S. Grant pushed the
Confederate Army continually, in spite of
losses, confident that the
Union's supplies and manpower
would overwhelm the
Confederacy even if the
casualty ratio was unfavorable, which indeed proved to be the
case.
Further examples
See also
References