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The Battle of Passchendaele also known as the Third Battle of Ypres, Third Flanders Battle ( ) and Second Battle of Flanders ( ) was one of the major battles of the First World War. The battle consisted of a series of operations starting in June 1917 and finally dissipating in November 1917 in which Entente troops under British command attacked the Imperial Germanmarker Army. The battle was fought for control of the village of Passchendaelemarker near the town of Ypresmarker in West Flanders, Belgiummarker. The objective of the offensive was to achieve a breakthrough between the River Lysmarker and the North Seamarker in the hopes of outflanking the German Fourth Army’s defensive system from the north. The British believed the manoeuvre would cripple the German U-boat campaign by depriving Germany of the use of the Belgian ports. Germany inflicted increasingly heavy losses on British shipping following its resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917 and the British mistakenly believed the Germans were using Belgian ports for U-boat operations. The offensive also served the dual purpose of diverting German attention away from the French in the Aisne, who were suffering from widespread mutiny.

The British launched several massive attacks, heavily supported by artillery and aircraft. The British never managed to make a decisive breakthrough against well-entrenched German lines. The battle consisted of a series of 'Bite and Hold' attacks to capture critical terrain and wear down the German army, lasting until the Canadian Corps took Passchendaele on 6 November 1917, ending the battle. Although inflicting irreplaceable casualties on the Germans, the Allies had captured a mere 5 miles (8 km) of new territory at a cost of 140,000 combat deaths, a ratio of roughly 2 inches (5 cm) gained per dead soldier. The Germans recaptured their lost ground, without resistance, 5 months later during the Battle of the Lys.

Passchendaele has become synonymous with the misery of grinding attrition warfare fought in thick mud. Most of the battle took place on reclaimed marshland, swampy even without rain. 1917 had an unusually cold and wet summer, and heavy artillery bombardment destroyed the surface of the land. Though there were dry periods, mud was nevertheless a constant feature of the landscape; newly-developed tanks bogged down in mud, and soldiers often drowned in it. The battle is a subject of fierce debate among historians, particularly in Britain. The volume of the British Official History of the War which covered Passchendaele was the last to be published, and there is evidence it was biased to reflect well on Field Marshal Douglas Haig and badly on General Hubert Gough, the commander of the Fifth Army. The heavy casualties suffered by the British Army in return for slender territorial gains have led many historians to follow the example of David Lloyd George, the Prime Minister of the time, and use it as an example of senseless waste and poor generalship. There is also a revisionist school of thought which seeks to emphasise the achievements of the British Army in the battle, in inflicting great damage on the German Army, relieving pressure on the distressed French, and developing offensive tactics capable of dealing with German defensive positions, which were significant in winning the war in 1918.

Casualty figures for the battle are still a matter of some controversy. Some accounts suggest that the Allies suffered significantly heavier losses than the Germans, while others offer more even figures. However, no-one disputes that hundreds of thousands of soldiers on both sides were killed or crippled. The last surviving veteran of the battle, Private Harry Patch died 25 July 2009.

Background

The Entente grand strategy for 1917 was agreed at a conference in Chantilly in November 1916, and a series of subsequent meetings. The Entente would overwhelm the Central Powers by means of attacks on the Western, Eastern and Italian Fronts. Early in the New Year, the Prime Minister David Lloyd George proposed at a conference in Rome that British and French artillery should be transferred to the Italian front to add weight to the offensive there.Winter, Haig's Command, p.73 This suggestion was opposed by the French and Italian delegations, as well as the covert opposition of the British officers and was discarded. The new French Commander-in-Chief, Robert Nivelle, believed that a concentrated attack by French forces on the Western Front in Spring 1917 could break the German front and lead to a quick victory. Nivelle's plan was welcomed by the British; while many were sceptical that the French would deliver a breakthrough, a French attack would nonetheless mean less of the burden of the war in 1917 falling on the British. Nonetheless, Haig was ordered to prepare a major British offensive.

The idea of a Flanders offensive had been in Haig's mind for some time. In January 1916, Haig had ordered plans to be drawn up for an attack there. The attack might well have happened in 1916 had the Germans not launched the Battle of Verdunmarker. In December 1916, Haig identified Flanders as the most promising theatre for a British offensive of 1917 and by January 1917 the idea of a Flanders offensive had met with the approval of the British Cabinet. Ypresmarker was the only major Belgian city not in German hands and had become an important political symbol; if the Germans ever captured Ypres, they would be able to threaten the Channel ports and thus British supply lines. Driving the Germans away from Ypres would be a valuable objective. Roughly one-third of the U-boats which had recently begun unrestricted submarine warfare against Britain were based in occupied Belgian ports. They assumed great importance in spring 1917 as shipping losses mounted. Taking Passchendaele and Roulers behind it would threaten the Belgian ports. If the attack went very well it would be possible to outflank the German position in Belgium and threaten the German industrial heartland on the Ruhrmarker, which might win the war quickly.

For the British generals, it was also considered valuable that the German Army would fight hard to retain its positions in Flanders. In the Somme sector, which had seen the major British attack of 1916, German troops could withdraw up to 15 miles without affecting their strategic position which they did in March 1917. By contrast the strategic importance of Flanders meant German troops would be loath to withdraw. Haig was optimistic that the German Army would soon run out of manpower because of the heavy losses suffered on the Somme and at Verdun.

In April 1917, the French attack—the "Nivelle Offensive"—took place, with the main effort by the French on the Aisne while British and Empire forces undertook a preliminary, secondary attack at Arrasmarker. The French attack secured valuable territorial gains but failed to obtain a breakthrough. Nivelle was relieved and replaced by Philippe Petain. Over the course of the summer it became clear that the failure of the offensive had caused a collapse in morale amongst French troops. The failure of the French attack reinforced the importance of the British offensive as the French were exhausted and Lloyd George had no option but to support Haig's attack. Through May, the plans for the Flanders offensive were worked out in more detail and on 7 June 1917 the first stage of the attack began.

Geography

The progression of the battle and the general disposition of troops.
The situation around Ypres had changed relatively little since the end of the First Battle of Ypresmarker in October 1914. The British held the town of Ypres itself, while the Germans held the high ground of the Messines-Wytschaete ridge to the south of the town, the lower ridges the east and the flat ground to the north.
 Ypres was therefore in a salient sticking out into German positions and overlooked by German artillery on higher ground. The geography of the Salient also meant that it was difficult for the British forces to gain any observation of the German rear areas east of the ridges. The high ground would, indeed, prove crucial to the British offensive.


The Germans were aware that an attack in the Flanders sector was very likely, and had prepared extensive positions. German experience during 1916 indicated that it was relatively easy for a British assault to take over the first line of defence supported by heavy artillery. Furthermore, the terrain in most of the Salient was muddy and not good for digging trenches. Therefore, the Germans controlled the forward area with mutually supporting positions, generally based on concrete pillboxes or blockhouses protected by barbed wire, making use of existing buildings or vegetation where possible. To the rear of this zone were a series of five reserve lines of defence.

The other principal feature of the Ypres salient was mud. Apart from the 'ridges', the battlefield was very low-lying, almost no higher than sea level. Naturally swampy, these plains were only viable farmland thanks to a dense drainage system. After several years of fighting in the area, this was largely destroyed. 1917 was also a year of particularly foul weather, with a very late spring and not much summer to speak of. There were thunderstorms in July and August, and while September was dry, October and onwards were wet. The mud was to become one of the defining features of the battle for soldiers on both sides, and did a great deal to hamper British operations. Haig was certainly aware of the nature of the ground he was launching his attack over, and was closely monitoring the weather conditions faced by his troops. However, what he knew, or ought to have known, about the likely weather conditions is one of the many controversies about the battle.

German defences

The German defensive lines near the town of Poelcappelle in late 1917
The six week delay after the Battle of Messines allowed the Germans ample time to prepare for the next British attack. The Germans transferred defensive expert Colonel Fritz von Lossberg to the German 4th Army and immediately put to work improving the defences in the area. Four lines of defence existed before the attack; the German first, second and third line of defences, plus the Flandern I strategic defensive line. The Germans constructed two additional strategic defensive line to supplement those already in place. The Germans constructed the Flandern II Line behind the newly won territory to the south of Ypres, while the Flandern III Line was located along the reverse slope of the Passchendaele Ridge.

Numerous concrete machine gun emplacements were constructed between the German first line of defence, through to the Flandern I strategic defensive line. The purpose of these machine guns positions was to break up (i.e. disrupt and confuse) and slow an allied attack which had breached the defensive lines, allowing the German counter-attacking troops time to attack before the Allied troops had re-organised themselves after breaching the main defensive lines. In addition to this, the number of German troops defending the front line had been reduced (both to man the machinegun emplacements between the defensive lines, as well to reduce the number of soldiers vulnerable to Allied artillery fire). Into these defences, the Germans had put 13 divisions (5 on the front line, 4 in close reserve and another 4 in strategic reserve) and 1150 pieces of artillery.

Preliminary phase

Messines Ridge: 7 - 17 June

The first stage in the British plan was a preparatory attack on the German positions south of Ypres at Messines Ridge. These German positions dominated Ypres and, unless neutralised, would be able to enfilade any British attack eastwards from the Salient. Messines and Wytschaete were exposed as well as powerful, and their defence was a preoccupation of the German troops in the sector. Both villages had been heavily fortified, and the area was littered with pillboxes, blockhouses and dugouts. In accordance with the German Army's newly-developed defensive methods, the forward area was lightly held, with counter-attack formations held in reserve.

The attack on Messines was the responsibility of General Sir Herbert Plumer and the British Second Army. Plumer's plan called on nine infantry divisions from X, IX and II Anzac Corps to advance 1,500 yards and take the first line of German defences on the front line of the ridge. This plan was extended by Haig to require the capture of the second line of defences on the rear crest of the ridge, including Wytschate itself, and also to move down the reverse slope to take a further line of defences. This would mean an advance of about 3,000 yards.. A preparatory bombardment for the attack began on 21 May Plumer deployed a total of 2,266 artillery pieces, of which 757 were heavy-calibre.. A particular role of the bombardment was counter-battery fire against German artillery positions. In spite of the Germans bringing 630 guns to bear, this was largely successful.

German trench destroyed by a mine explosion.
The British advance began on 7 June, and was preceded by a unique display of military pyrotechnics. Since mid-1915, the British had been constructing mines under the German positions on the Messines Ridge. By June 1917, a total of 21 mines had been dug, filled with nearly of high explosive between them.. The Germans were aware of British mining efforts, and had taken some countermeasures, but the scale of the mines came as a total surprise to them. Two of the British mines failed to detonate, but the remaining 19 were fired simultaneously at 03.10 GMT.. The impact was immense, destroying a large part of the German front line and support positions. The sound was audible 200 km away.

As soon as the mines exploded, the British guns sprang back into life, providing a heavy creeping barrage which was closely followed by assaulting infantry and tanks. Messines itself was taken at around 05.00. The second phase of the attack began at 07.00 and by 09.00 the British had taken Wytschaete. German resistance was scant and German positions were overwhelmed. At 15.10 the attack was as fresh troops, supported by tanks, pressed down the ridge to the final objectives, which were largely gained before dark on the 7th. British losses in the morning were light, although the plan had expected casualties of up to 50% in the initial attack. As the advance continued over the ridge, British supporting artillery was less able to provide supporting fire, while giving easier opportunities to German artillery fire. Fighting continued around Messines Ridge until 12 June. The attack was generally considered a success. It demonstrated that, by bringing overwhelming firepower to bear and resisting the temptation to set over-ambitious goals, it was possible for the attacking side to prevail, even against fortified positions. Over 7,000 German prisoners were taken, along with 48 artillery pieces.

First phase

As a second stage of the action, General Sir Hubert Gough was put in charge of the attacks to secure the Gheluvelt Plateau which overlooked Ypres. Many field guns were moved into the area and started a four-day bombardment, but the Germans recognized the sign of an impending offensive, and moved more troops in to reinforce the defences. In July, the Germans used mustard gas for the first time. It attacked sensitive parts of the body, caused blistering, damage to the lungs and inflammation of the eyes, causing blindness (sometimes temporary) and great pain. One problem in carrying the offensive forward was the Yser Canalmarker, but this was taken on 27 July when the Allies found the German trenches empty.

Battle of Pilckem Ridge: 31 July

Four days later, the main offensive opened with a major assault at Pilckem ridge, when the Allies gained about . The Allies suffered about thirty-two thousand casualties — killed, wounded or missing — in this one action. This was another example of the new 'bite-and-hold' tactics that were proving successful in clearing German defences. German casualties were also substantial, not least because Allied artillery had learned to anticipate the usual German counterattack and were ready for it. The war poets Hedd Wyn and Francis Ledwidge were both killed during this offensive.

Battle of Langemarck: 16 - 18 August

Ground conditions during the whole Ypres-Passchendaele action were bad because the ground was already fought-over and was partially flooded. Continuous shelling had destroyed drainage canals in the area, and unseasonable heavy rain turned the whole area into a sea of mud and water-filled shell-craters. The troops walked up to the front over paths made of duckboards laid across the mud, often carrying up to one hundred pounds (45 kg) of equipment. It was possible for them to slip off the path into the craters and drown before they could be rescued. The trees were reduced to blunted trunks, the branches and leaves torn away, and the bodies of men buried after previous actions were often uncovered by the rain or later shelling.

Second phase

In view of the failure of the British Fifth Army to make any appreciable headway, Haig decided to transfer the weight of the offensive towards the south-east along the southern half of Passchendaele Ridge. The main offensive was therefore switched to British Second Army under command of General Herbert Plumer. Plumer abandoned tactics focused on achieving a major break-through and instead intended to launch a succession of attacks, each with strictly limited objectives, in a strategy known as bite and hold.

Battle of Menin Road: 20 - 25 September

Australian troops amidst the devastation of war in Ypres, ca. 1917
By now, 1,295 guns were concentrated in the area, approximately one for every five yards of attack front. On 20 September at the battle of Menin Road, after a massive bombardment, the Allies attacked and managed to hold their objective of about gained, despite heavy counterattacks, suffering twenty-one thousand casualties. The Germans by this time had a semi-permanent front line, with very deep dugouts and concrete pillboxes, supported by artillery accurately ranged on no man's land.

The attack was a major success and caused no small panic to German commanders; proving quite clearly to them that well-prepared defences could no longer fend off a well-prepared attack under good conditions. It convinced them that the standard defences of lines of trenches that had served so well up until now was obsolete, and that a more elastic defence system would have to be put in place.

Changes to German Defences

After the Battle of Menin Road, the German defensive policy was changed. Convinced that the thinly held front lines were allowing the Allies to advance, the policy was changed to increase the number of troops on the front line. In addition, the counter-attacking forces were often arriving late in the afternoon, resulting in the counter-attacks being hurriedly carried out in fading light while under the Allied standing defensive artillery barrage. The German defensive policy was changed to hold the counter-attacking troops back, and initiate the counter-attacks early the next morning.

These changes resulted in the Germans sustaining higher casualties - both before and during a battle. The increased numbers on the front line, while increasing the defensive strength, also increased the German casualties from the Allied preparatory artillery fire. And the decision to delay the counter-attacking troops resulted in counter-attacks taking place against troops that had additional time to resolve the confusion created during an attack and to organise defences.

Battle of Polygon Wood: 26 September

Further advances at Polygon Wood and Broodseinde on the southwestern edge of the salient accounted for another two thousand yards and thirty thousand Allied casualties. The British line was now overlooked by the Passchendaele ridge, which therefore became an important objective and made the capture of the high ground even more of an imperative.

Battle of Broodseinde: 4 October

British soldiers moving forward during the Battle of Broodseinde.
The Battle of Broodseinde was the last assault launched by Plumer to successfully employ the bite and hold strategy. The operation aimed to complete the capture the Gheluvelt Plateau and the occupation of Broodseinde Ridge. This would protect the southern flank of the British line and permit future attacks on the Passchendaele Ridge to the east. The attack was originally planned for 6 October to permit II Anzac Corps time to prepare. However, Haig was anxious about the possibility of deteriorating weather, so he pushed to have the assault advanced by two days. The Germans were equally concerned about the amount of ridge-line the British held near Zonnebeke, and sought to recapture as much as possible in a local attack on 4 October.

In response to the bite and hold tactic employed in the two previous battles, the Germans reinforced their front line to prevent the British from capturing their forward positions. This change failed as it left an increased number of German troops vulnerable to British artillery fire. On 4 October, 12 divisions from the British Fifth and Second Armies attacked German positions along a front. In a bizarre incident, Australian troops from I ANZAC Corps met troops for the German 45th Reserve Division in no man's land when the two assaults commenced simultaneously. The success of the British assault was varied, the southern most corps achieved limited success while attacks between Menin Road and Polygon generated moderate gains. As a whole, the British assault advanced an average , the Australian 3rd Division advancing up to .

After the British attacking units reached their final positions, their artillery fired an interdiction barrage for an additional two and a half hours, allowing the troops to consolidate their positions and establish defences. the British captured 5,000 prisoners during the battle. The British high command mistakenly concluded that the number of enemy casualties meant that resistance was faltering and resolved to make another attack immediately.

Battle of Poelcappelle: 9 October

An advance on 9 October by over 10 divisions of the French First Army, and British 2nd and 5th Armies at Poelkapellemarker (or Poelcappelle to the British) was a dismal failure for the Allies, with only minor advances by exhausted troops, at a cost of 13,000 casualties.

First Battle of Passchendaele: 12 October

Aerial view of Passchendaele village before and after the battle.
Aerial view of Passchendaele village before and after the battle.
The First Battle of Passchendaele, on 12 October 1917, began with a further Allied attempt by 5 British and 3 ANZAC divisions (the New Zealand Division and the Australian 3rd and 4th Divisions) to gain ground around Poelcappelle. The heavy rain again made movement difficult, and artillery could not be brought closer to the front owing to the mud. The Allied troops were fought-out, and morale was suffering. Against the well-prepared German defences, the gains were minimal and there were 13,000 Allied casualties.

On this day there were more than 2,700 New Zealand casualties, of which 45 officers and 800 men were either dead or lying mortally wounded between the lines. In terms of lives lost in a single day, this remains the blackest day in New Zealand’s recorded history. By this point there had been 100,000 Allied casualties, with only limited gains and no breakthrough.

Attack on 22 October

The British 5th Army undertook 2 small operations on the 22nd, one with the French First Army at Houthulst Forest, the other east of Poelcappelle. The objective of the attack was to maintain pressure on the Germans while the Canadians were getting ready for the Second Battle of Passchendaelemarker, as well as supporting the French attack on Malmaison. The attack consisted of units from XVIII Corps (18th Division) and XIV Corps (34th and 35th Divisions), as well as units from the French I Corp (1st Division).

The attack commenced at 5:35 am, with the French 1st Division and the British 35th Division attacking north/northeast towards the Houthulst Forest, and the British 34th and 18th Divisions attacking northeast/east from Poelcappelle. The French 1st Division successfully covered the left flank of the attack towards the Houthulst Forest, while the British 35th Division initially managed to seize its first objectives, but was forced back to its starting line by German counter-attacks. The left flank of the attack by the British 34th Division was unsuccessful, while the right flank managed to keep up with the attacking forces of the British 18th Division. The British 5th Army sustained 478 casualties during the attack

Second Battle of Passchendaele: 26 October - 10 November

The four divisions of the Canadian Corps were transferred to the Ypres Salient and tasked with making additional advances on Passchendaele. The Canadian Corps relieved II Anzac Corps on 18 October from their positions along the valley between Gravenstafel Ridge and the heights at Passchendaele. The front line was mostly the same as the one occupied by the 1st Canadian Division in April 1915. The Canadian Corps operation was to be executed in a series of three attacks each with limited objectives, delivered at intervals of three or more days. As the Canadian Corps position was directly south of the inter-army boundary between the British Fifth and Second Armies, the British Fifth Army would mount subsidiary operations on the Canadian Corps' left flank while the I Anzac Corps would advance to protect the right flank. The execution dates of the phases were tentatively given as 26 October, 30 October and 6 November.

Terrain through which the Canadian Corps advanced at Passchendaele in late 1917
first stage began on the morning of 26 October. The 3rd Canadian Division was assigned the northern flank which included the sharply rising ground of the Bellevue spur. South of the Ravebeek creek, the 4th Canadian Division would take the Decline Copse which straddled the Ypres-Roulers railway. The 3rd Canadian Division captured the Wolf Copse and secured its objective line but was ultimately forced to drop a defensive flank to link up with the flanking division of the British Fifth Army. The 4th Canadian Division initially captured all its objectives, but gradually retreated from the Decline Copse due to German counterattacks and mis-communications between the Canadian and Australian units to the south.

The second stage began on 30 October and was intended to capture the position not captured during the previous stage and gain a base for the final assault on Passchendaele. The southern flank was to capture the strongly held Crest Farm while the northern flank was to capture the hamlet of Meetcheele as well as the Goudberg area near the Canadian Corps' northern boundary. The southern flank quickly captured Crest Farm and begun sending patrols beyond its objective line and into Passchendaele itself. The northern flank was again met with exceptional German resistance. The 3rd Canadian Division captured Vapour Farm at the corps' boundary, Furst Farm to the west of Meetcheele and the crossroads at Meetcheele, but remained short of its objective line.

To permit time to facilitate inter-divisional reliefs, there was a planned seven day pause between the second and third stage. The British Second Army was ordered to take over a section of the British Fifth Army front adjoining the Canadian Corps, so that the central portion of the assault could proceed under a single command. Three consecutive rainless days between 3 and 5 November aided logistical preparations and reorganization of the troops for the next stage. The third stage began on the morning of 6 November with the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions having taken over the front, relieving the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions respectively. Less than three hours after the start of the assault, many units had reached their final objective lines and the town of Passchendaele had been captured. The Canadian Corps launched a final action on 10 November to gain control of the remaining high ground north of the village, in the vicinity of Hill 52. This attack on 10 November brought to an end the long drawn-out battle.

Aftermath

On 24 October, The Austro-German 14th Army, under General der Infanterie Otto von Below, achieved a significant victory against the Italian Army at the Battle of Caporettomarker. In fear that Italy might be put out of the war, the French and British Governments each promised to send six divisions of men to the Italian Front. All troops were rapidly and efficiently transferred between 10 November and 12 December, due to good administrative preparations made by the French Commander-in-Chief Ferdinand Foch, who had been sent to Italy in April 1917 to plan for just such an emergency. The decrease in available resources forced Haig to conclude the offensive, much to his dissatisfaction, just short of Westrozebekemarker. To the south, the British Third Army collected sufficient resources over the preceding months to permit the execution of a surprise attack near Cambrai. The Battle of Cambrai began on 20 November and the British initially breached the German Hindenburg Line in the first successful use of tanks in a combined arms operation. The German Operation Michael began on 21 March 1918 and the supporting Battle of the Lys on 9 April. In the space of three days, the German quickly regained almost all of the ground taken by the Allies during the Battle of Passchendaele. The Germans were easily pushed away from Ypres once more in the fifth and final battle around the city in September and October 1918.

Casualties

Altogether, the four years of fighting around Ypres claimed the lives of some 300,000 soldiers of the British Empire; of whom 90,000 have no known graves. These battles, and those British and Commonwealth soldiers who gave their lives, are commemorated at the Menin Gate Memorialmarker in Ypres, the Tyne Cot Cemetery and Memorial to the Missingmarker, the largest Commonwealth War Graves Commission cemetery in the world with nearly 12,000 graves. The German cemetery in the region is also a massive one, as a sizeable proportion of their casualties on the Western Front also fell around Ypres. Passchendaele has come to symbolise the horrific nature of the great battles of the First World War. In terms of the dead, the Germans lost approximately 260,000 men, while the British Empire forces lost about 300,000, including approximately 36,500 Australians, 3,596 New Zealanders and some 15,654 Canadians from 1915 to 1917. 90,000 British and Dominion bodies were never identified, and 42,000 never recovered.

Commemoration

Tyne Cot Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery and Memorial to the Missing.
Tyne Cot Cemeterymarker its graves, memorial wall and blockhouses is seen by many to be a testament to the ANZAC contribution to the Battle of Passchendaele as the ANZAC forces were the troops who wrested the stronghold from the German defenders. There are of course numerous tributes and memorials all over Australia and New Zealand like the plaques at the Christchurchmarker and Dunedinmarker railway stations to the men of the NZ railway who fell at Passchendaele and in the Great War.

One of the newest memorials to be dedicated to the fighting contribution of a group is the Celtic Cross memorial commemorating the Scottish contribution and efforts to the fighting in Flanders during the Great War. The memorial is located on the Frezenberg Ridge where Scotlands 9th and 15th Divisions, as part of the British Army, fought during the Battle of Passchendaele. The monument was dedicated by the Scottish Parliament'smarker Minister for Europe Linda Fabiani during the late summer of 2007, the 90th anniversary of the battle.

Notes

  1. Hart & Steel pp. 211–212
  2. Travers, The Killing Ground p.215–7
  3. Terraine pp. 336–342
  4. Travers, The Killing Ground, p.xxi
  5. Terraine pp. 342–347
  6. Hart & Steel p. 30
  7. Terraine pp. 28–29
  8. Hart & Steel pp. 31–32
  9. Terraine p. 29
  10. Terraine pp. 24–25
  11. Terraine p. 14
  12. Terraine p. 15
  13. Winter, Haig's Command, p.78
  14. Hart & Steel p. 28
  15. Hart & Steel p. 29
  16. Terraine pp. 3, 17–24
  17. Terraine p. 32
  18. Winter, Haig's Command, p.88
  19. Terraine p. 336
  20. Keegan pp. 348–349
  21. Terraine pp. 87-89
  22. Hart & Steel p. 36
  23. Hart & Steel pp. 18–19
  24. Hart & Steel p. 42
  25. Sheldon p. xi
  26. Sheldon p. x
  27. Terraine p. 21
  28. Winter, Haig's Command, p.92
  29. Terraine p. 206
  30. Sheldon p. 1
  31. Terraine p. 118
  32. Hart & Steel pp. 42–43
  33. Hart & Steel pp. 41–42
  34. Hart & Steel p. 44
  35. Hart & Steel pp. 41, 44
  36. Sheldon p. 23
  37. Hart & Steel pp. 50–54
  38. Terraine p. 120
  39. Hart & Steel p. 55
  40. Sheldon p 28
  41. Hart & Steel p. 56
  42. Sheldon pp. 28-29
  43. Nicholson 308
  44. Robbins p. 128
  45. Bean p. 837
  46. Prior & Wilson p. 133
  47. Groom p. 207
  48. Prior & Wilson p. 135
  49. Malkasian p. 41
  50. Malkasian p. 42
  51. Bean p. 847
  52. Carlyon p. 485
  53. Pedersen p. 257
  54. Bean p. 866
  55. Groom p. 208
  56. Bean p. 930
  57. Bean p. 929
  58. Edmonds p. 347
  59. Edmonds p. 348
  60. Evans p. 133
  61. Evans p. 134
  62. Edmonds p. 348n
  63. Bean 929
  64. Nicholson 312
  65. Nicholson 314
  66. Wolff 246
  67. Nicholson 318
  68. Nicholson 320
  69. Nicholson 321
  70. Nicholson 323
  71. Nicholson 325
  72. Bean pp. 935–936
  73. Nicholson p. 331
  74. Bean p. 936
  75. Harris pp. 107, 111
  76. Harris pp. 124–125
  77. New Zealand History


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