The
Battle of the Yalu River (黃海海戰, lit.
Battle of the Yellow Sea), also called simply 'The Battle
of Yalu' took place on
September 17
1894.
It involved the Japanese
and the
Chinese
navies, and was the largest
naval engagement of the First
Sino-Japanese War. The Yalu River
forms the border between China and Korea
; despite its
name, the battle was actually fought at the mouth of this river, in
the Yellow
Sea
. A Japanese fleet under Admiral
Sukeyuki Ito was attempting to disrupt the
landing of Chinese troops protected by a fleet under Admiral
Ding Ruchang.
The engagement continued for most of the day.
While it was not the
first battle involving pre-dreadnought technology on a wide scale
(the Battle of Foochow in 1884
between the French
and Chinese predated
it), there were significant lessons for naval observers to
consider.
Background
On paper,
the Chinese had the
superior ships, and included numerous ten-inch and eight-inch (203
mm) gun mounts. However, the Chinese had not engaged in
gunnery practice for months beforehand, and the Chinese gun crews
were unprepared for the stress of gunnery under fire. Corruption
seems also to have played a major role; many Chinese shells appear
to have been filled with sawdust or water, some Chinese officers
fled the engagement area, one vessel appears to have used its guns
to store pickles , and in at least one case, a pair of guns seem to
have been sold for cash on the black market.
At this time, the Japanese were confident in their own abilities.
The Chinese, however, still had a number of foreign advisers and
instructors.
In particular, the German
Major
von Hanneken, recently from Korea, was
appointed as the naval adviser to Admiral Ting Ju ch'ang.
W. F. Tyler, a sub-lieutenant in the
Royal Navy Reserve and an Imperial
Maritime Customs officer was appointed as von Hanneken's assistant.
Philo McGiffen, formerly an ensign in
the
US Navy and an instructor at the Chinese
Wei-Hai-Wei naval academy was appointed
to
Chen Yuen as an adviser or
co-commander.
Prior to the battle with the Japanese, the vessels and armaments of
the Chinese fleet were examined, and the ships were repainted.
Philo McGiffin noted, at the time, that the Chinese vessels had
been painted in 'invisible grey,' although contemporary photographs
indicate a dark hull and a light superstructure, so perhaps only
the white superstructures and the buff funnels were repainted gray,
with the hulls remaining black. McGiffen also noted that many of
the charges were 'thirteen years old and condemned.' The thin
shields that had been covering the
barbettes on some of the vessels were removed, as
these had been found to splinter when hit by shells. The
Tsi Yuen's return to port after recent
action with the Japanese highlighted some of these problems.
The Battle
Admiral
Sukeyuki Ito had his flag
aboard the cruiser
Matsushima with two
dispatch vessels as escort; the converted-liner
Sei-kyo or
Saikyo,
British Captain
John Wilson commanding; and the
gunboat
Akagi. The
Japanese Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral
Kabayama Sukenori was on a tour of
inspection and aboard the
Saikyo. The rest of the main
body consisted of the cruisers
Chiyoda,
Itsukushima,
Hashidate,
Fusō and
Hiei. A
flying squadron, composed of the cruisers
Yoshino,
Takachiho,
Akitsushima and
Naniwa, led the
Japanese vessels.
The Japanese advanced on the Chinese with the flying squadron
leading in line astern formation with the dispatch vessels off to
the port of the second squadron where the flagship was sailing. The
Chinese were in two squadrons and in line abreast with the majority
of the ships in a squadron, the "First Flying Squadron," consisting
of
Tsi Yuen,
Kuang
Chia,
Chih Yuen,
King Yuen,
Dingyuan,
Chen
Yuen,
Lai Yuen,
Ching Yuen,
Chao Yung and
Yang Wei. A second squadron, the
"Principal Squadron", consisted of the
Kuang Ping and
Ping Yuen, with a couple of gunboats or
torpedo boats.
The line abreast formation prevented the Chinese
battleships in the center from firing because
their smaller companions were between them and their opponents
during this period. Simultaneously, the smaller, more lightly
armored ships were exposed to prolonged fire from the larger
Japanese warships. Also, when the Japanese squadrons split, with
the First Flying Squadron turning to the south of the Beiyang fleet
while the slower Principal Squadron remained ahead of the Chinese,
the main Chinese battleships were forced to divide their fire
between the two groups.
Several different explanations have been put forward as to why the
Beiyang fleet did not change their formation to react to the
Japanese tactics more effectively. The account of Royal Navy
Lieutenant
William Ferdinand
Tyler, an advisor on the
Dingyuan, seems the
best-qualified and corroborated. It states that “
Admiral Ting Ju ch'ang ordered his
ships to change course in such a way that would have exposed his
ship, the flagship, but put the rest of the squadron in a good
position to fire on the Japanese fleet.” Tyler reported, however,
that
Dingyuan’s captain
deliberately did not acknowledge this order or pass it on to the
rest of the fleet.
Dingyuan opened fire on the
Japanese when the range between the vessels was about 6000 yards
(5,500 m). This turned out to be a disastrous (and unnecessary)
salvo from the Chinese flagship.
When the German Navy took Dingyuan out for gun trials in 1883
(Dingyuan had been built in
Germany) they noted that the main armament should not be
fired on an ahead bearing. Firing on an ahead bearing
resulted in the destruction of the
flying
bridge, and Admiral
Ting Ju
ch'ang became a casualty from the opening shot of his own
vessel, along with a number of other officers on the bridge.
The Chinese fleet all opened fire on the Japanese fleet as they
passed from port to starboard across the bows of the Chinese
vessels. They failed to score any significantly damaging hits on
the Japanese from their 12 inch (305 mm) and 8.2 inch (208 mm)
guns. At about 3000 yards (2700 m) (the Chinese had been steadily
closing the range), the Japanese concentrated their fire on the
right hand end of the Chinese line, with devastating barrages
poured into first
Chao Yung and
then
Yang Wei.
Both those vessels burst into flames, which some has been
attributed to too much paint and varnish applied over the years. In
any case, these obsolete vessels were wooden hull ships covered
with just a layer of metal. They were no match for the modern
Japanese gunnery. The Japanese had intended on swinging the flying
division around the right flank of the Chinese line in an
encirclement but the timely arrival of the
Kuang Ping and
Ping Yuen along with the two
'alphabetical' gunboats and torpedo boats
Fu
Lung (built at
Schichau) and the
Choi Ti, a
Yarrow built vessel diverted this
maneuver.
The Japanese fast cruisers veered to port and were then dispatched
by
Ito to go to the assistance of the
Hiei,
Saikyo and
Akagi which had been
unable to keep up with the main line and had then been engaged by
the left-hand vessels of the Chinese line. Early in the battle the
Dingyuan had lost her signaling mast as well, which helped
to cause more confusion with the Chinese vessels. The Chinese
fleet, with some foresight, had anticipated something like this
happening and formed into three pairs of mutually supporting
vessels to carry the fight on.
The Japanese fleet, for its part, ravaged the Chinese despite a
higher hit rate by Chinese gunnery, but with inferior shells.
Japanese shells set many Chinese ships aflame, and were responsible
for sinking or seriously damaging eight of them, either during the
battle or during later mopping up operations.
The Aftermath
The Japanese sank five Chinese warships, severely damaged three
more and killed about 850 Chinese sailors with 500 wounded. The
Ting Yuen had most casualties of the Chinese vessels still
afloat with 14 dead and 25 wounded.
The Chinese seriously damaged four Japanese warships — the flagship
Matsushima suffered the worst single-ship loss with more
than 100 dead or wounded after being hit by a heavy Chinese round;
Hiei being severely damaged and retired from the conflict;
Akagi suffering from heavy fire and with great loss of
life;
Saikyo, the converted liner,
urged on by Admiral
Kabayama
Sukenori had been hit by four 12 inch (305 mm) shells and was
sailing virtually out of control as a result — did cosmetic damage
to two more, and killed about 180 Japanese sailors and wounded 200
more.
The
Chinese fleet retired into Port Arthur
and then to Weihaiwei,
where it was finally destroyed by a combined land and naval
attack. The Japanese withdrew possibly due to fear of a
torpedo boat attack from the Chinese at night and also from a lack
of ammunition.
While the Japanese certainly did far more damage to the Chinese
fleet, many foreigners at the time credited China with the victory.
The Chinese had successfully carried out their troop landing, and
the Japanese, for their part, had withdrawn after running low on
ammunition. Many credit the prompt action of foreign advisers in
the Chinese fleet (most notably McGiffin) for keeping even the most
heavily damaged Chinese ships fighting till the very end of the
engagement. Later research suggests that the Chinese ships fighting
in pairs was something that had been planned ahead of time to cover
the eventuality of communications being lost in the smoke and
confusion of battle. At the same time, it is fair to note that the
Chinese suffered more from poor quality munitions — some of the
shells fired by the
Ping Yuen,
for example, hit the Japanese
Matsushima but failed
to explode, being filled with cement rather than high explosives, a
result of corrupt officials embezzling naval funds.
These were made at the
Tientsin
factories.
The Chinese Government laid the blame for the Chinese defeat
squarely on the shoulders of Viceroy
Li
Hung-chang and Admiral Ting Ju ch'ang. However, on
27 October 1894, Admiral
Freemantle, the British Commander-in-Chief met Ting in
Wei-Hai-Wei with Ting "still lame from the burns
received in the Yalu action" and described him as a "brave and
patriotic man".
Despite these assessments, the Battle of the Yalu River is
remembered by the Chinese as a humiliating loss. The Beiyang Fleet
ceased to exist as an effective combat unit, and the Japanese
eventually defeated China during the
Sino-Japanese War.
Ships involved
Japan
Flying Squadron:
- Yoshino (4150
t, , 4-6, 8-4.7) (Kawara, RA Tsuboi)
- Takachiho
(3650t, , 2-10.2, 6-6) (Nomura)
- Naniwa (3650 t,
, 2-10.2, 6-6) (Togo)
- Akitsushima (3150 t, ,
4-6, 6-4.7) (Kamimura)
Main Fleet:
- Matsushima
(4277 t, , 1-12.6, 12-4.7) (Omoto and Dewa, VA Ito) - Damaged
- Chiyoda (2450
t, ?kts, 10-4.7) (Uchida)
- Itsukushima (4277t, ,
1-12.6, 11-4.7) (Yoko-o)
- Hashidate
(as Itsukushima) (Hidaka)
- Fusō (3718t, ,
4-9.4, 2-6) (Arai)
- Hiei
(2200t, , 9-6) (Sakurai) - Damaged
Others:
- Akagi (615t, ,
2-4.7) (Sakamoto)
- Saikyo (merchantman, 2913, ,
small guns) (Kano)
|
China
- Yangwei (1350t, , 2-10.2,
4-4.7)
- Chaoyong
- Ching Yuen (2850 t, , 3-8.2,
2-6)
- Lai Yuen (2830 t, , 2-8.2,
2-6) - Damaged
- Zhenyuan
(7430t, , 4-12, 2-5.9) (Lin-Thai-Zeng)
- Dingyuan
(flag, 7355t, , 4-12, 2-5.9) (Ding-Ru-Chang, Liu-Bu-Chan)
- King Yuen (2850 t, , 2-8.2,
2-6)
- Chih Yuen (2300 t, , 3-8.2,
2-6) (Tang) - Sunk
- Kwan Chia (1290 t, ,
3-4.7)
- Jiyuan (2355t, ,
2-8.2, 1-6) (Fang-Bo-Qian)
- Pingyuan (2100
t, 6/7 knots, 1-10.2, 2-6)
- Kuang Ping (1000 t, 3-4.7)
- ? (torpedo-boat, 128 t, , 3TT)
- ? (torpedo-boat, 69 t, , 3TT)
|
|
See also
References
- The Imperial Japanese Navy (1904) - Fred T. Jane
- Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 - Bruce A. Elleman,
Routledge, London, 2001
External links
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