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The Beagle Conflict was a border dispute between Chilemarker and Argentinamarker over the possession of Picton, Lennox and Nuevamarker islands and the scope of the maritime jurisdiction associated with those islands that bought the countries to the brink of war in 1978.

The islands are strategically located off the south edge of Tierra del Fuegomarker and at the east end of the Beagle Channelmarker. The Beagle channel, the Straits of Magellanmarker and the Drake Passagemarker are the only three waterways between the Pacific Oceanmarker and the Atlantic Oceanmarker in the southern hemispheremarker.

After refusing a binding international award giving the islands to Chile, the Argentine junta pushed the controversy to the brink of war in 1978 in order to produce a maritime boundary consistent with Argentine claims.

The Beagle conflict is seen as the main reason for Chilean support to the United Kingdom during the Falklands War of 1982.

The conflict began in 1904 with the first official Argentine claims over the islands that have been always under Chilean control. The conflict passed through several status: unknown territories, since 1881 Chilean islands, since 1904 disputed islands, direct negotiations, submitted to a binding international tribunal, direct negotiations again, brinkmanship.

The conflict was resolved through papal mediation and since 1984 Argentina recognizes the islands as Chilean territory. The 1984 treaty resolves also several collateral issues of great importance, including navigation rights, sovereignty over other islands in the Fuegian Archipelago, delimitation of the Straits of Magellan, and maritime boundaries south to Cape Horn and beyond.

The conflict zone


For a long time after its first exploration by Europeans, the zone of Patagonia and the Tierra del Fuego-archipelago remained free from colonial settlements because of its inhospitable climate, harsh conditions and sparse local vegetation. After the disaster of Puerto Hambremarker (1584) during the regency of Philip II of Spain no other attempts of settlements were made in the zone.

On the year 1843 the Chilean government sent an expedition with the appointed task of establishing a permanent settlement on the shores of the Straits of Magellan. The founding act of the settlement of Fuerte Bulnesmarker took place on 21 September 1843. Few years later, 1848, the settlement moved to Punta Arenasmarker.

Argentine Ushuaiamarker was founded by English born Thomas Bridges in 1869.

In 1881, Chile and Argentina attempted to definitively resolve their territorial disputes through a comprehensive agreement known as the Boundary treaty of 1881 between Chile and Argentina. This agreement provided that the border between the two countries would follow:
  • (Article I, from north to parallel 52¬įS) the highest peaks and Drainage divide,
  • (Article II, from 52¬įS to the Straits of Magellan) mainly the parallel 52¬įS and
  • (Article III, south of Straits of Magellan) mainly the meridian 68¬į34 W and the Beagle channel.

Until 1887 there was no doubt in Argentina and Chile that the islands Picton, Nueva and Lennox belong to Chile:

Also the chief of the Argentine exploring commission of the southern territories, Francisco P. Moreno in a memorandum to the British Embassador in Buenos Airesmarker, 1918, saw the Argentine claim as baseless:

In 1904 the Argentine government solicited Chile to define jointly which was the deepest arm of the Beagle channel in the zone in order to find the demarcation of the border. On the basis of the international cartography of the zone, the descriptions of the discoverer of the channel, and the discourse of the signer of the 1881 Treaty, Chile initially did not attach importance to the note.

The unresolved conflict continued to simmer. During the Snipe incident, Argentine forces destroyed a Chilean lighthouse on the Snipe islet at the entry of the Beagle Channel installed on 1. May 1958, put up their own and landed marines on the islet, provoking a dangerous build up. Later both countries agreed to pull back military forces and dismantle the lighthouses.

Interests of the parties

Over the years the growing importance of the Antarctic, the navigation routes between the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean, the expectancy of Oil fields in the zone, fishing right led both countries to become hardened in their positions and the conflict was extended to other issues regarding the zone.

Two visions of the maritime boundaries at the eastern entrance to the Strait of Magellan

There was a controversy about the east end of the Straits of Magellan. Both countries agreed about the boundary line, but not about the end of the Straits. The Chilean view was that the Straits ended at the boundary line and eastward continued the Atlantic Ocean and therefore Chile had a "beach" at (and its projection over) the Atlantic Ocean and it enjoyed sole control of the Straits themselves. The Argentine view was that the Straits continued eastward of the border and that the east end of the Straits of Magallan belonged to Argentina. Under this view, it was coproprietor with the right to co-regulate the navigation through the Straits and Chile had no border with the Atlantic Ocean.

Two visions of the west mouth of the Straits of Magellan.
The black line is the Chilean view, the yellow line represented the Argentine view

The west end of the Straits of Magellan was also a cause of conflict. Argentina considered the channel and bays part of the straits and demanded free navigation through all waters as stipulated in the Boundary Treaty of 1881 for the Straits.

The map shows the overlapping projection of the countries over the Antarctic

On 14 June 1977 the Chilean Government issued the decree n¬į416 over the baselines (See Chilean Baselines Map). The decree had two main implications for the controversy. First, it extended the range from which Chile might attempt to project its 12-mile territorial sea and 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone along a continued line from Picton, Nueva, and Lennox Islands as far south as Cape Horn, thus greatly increasing its potential maritime jurisdiction to the east and southeast. Second, it effectively converted all waters enclosed by the baselines into Chilean internal waters where navigational rights for Argentina would exist only through explicit agreements with Chile. The Argentine port of Ushuaiamarker, located on the north shore of the east Beagle Channel, had no direct free way to the Pacific Ocean. Argentina has so far considered its unfettered use of the waters surrounding the Fuegian Archipelago to be a matter of critical importance for its commercial and military navigation.

The two countries have always linked their Antarctic claims to their continental possessions because the nearness and the projection of the countries over the Antarctic can substantiate a claim over territories.

Beagle Channel Arbitration 1971-1977

In 1971 Chile and Argentina signed an agreement formally submitting the Beagle Channel issue to binding arbitration under auspices of Britain'smarker Queen Elizabeth II. The court that was to decide the controversy was composed of five judges selected by Chile and Argentina from the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The court of arbitration's final decision would be submitted to the British Crown, which was then to recommend acceptance or rejection of the award of the court but not to modify it. On May 2, 1977 the court ruled that the islands and all adjacent formations belonged to Chile. See the Report and decision of the Court of Arbitration.

On 25 January 1978 Argentina rejected the ruling, and attempted via military force to challenge the Chilean commitment to defend the territory, and to coerce Chile into negotiating a division of the islands that would produce a maritime boundary consistent with Argentine claims.

Direct negotiations 1977-1978

Direct negotiations between Chile and Argentina began after the announcement of the binding arbitration ruling, on 2 May 1977, and ended with the Act of Montevideo, Uruguaymarker, on 9 January 1979, where both countries accepted papal mediation after Argentina aborted Operation Soberanía.

In the interim, both countries deployed military forces, moving to the brink of open warfare in tandem with a frenzy of diplomatic activity. This was the most dangerous phase of the Beagle Conflict; open warfare seemed a real possibility

Operation Soberania 1978

On 22 December 1978 Argentina initiated Operation Soberanía, an attempt to occupy the islands around Cape Horn, intending to judge from Chile's response whether to advance further. However, the operation was aborted within a few hours. Instead of renewing the operation at the next window of opportunity, the junta in Buenos Aires decided to allow the Pope to mediate the dispute through the offices of Cardinal Antonio Samoré, his special envoy.

Papal Mediation 1979-1984

On January 9, 1979, the Act of Montevideo was signed pledging both sides to a peaceful solution and a return to the military situation of early 1977.

1980 Argentina rejected the Pope's proposal (already accepted by Chile).

The detention of prisoners on both sides of the border, the following border closing by Argentina on 28 April 1981, and the Argentine repudiation of the General Treaty on the Judicial Settlement of Disputes in January 1982 maintained the danger of war. Six weeks before the Falklands War, Argentina provoked the ARA Gurruchaga incident with Chile at Deceit Islandmarker.

The Falklands War 1982

In 1982, Argentina went to war against the United Kingdommarker in the Falklands War and again both Chile and Argentina deployed their respective militaries to the border.

In 1982 Argentina still officially considered Chile an enemy. One of the reasons given for the absence of the Argentine Navy and higher numbers of soldiers during the Falklands War was that these forces had to be kept in reserve in case they were needed against Chile. Chile argued that it was not bound to support Argentina against Britain under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance because that treaty was defensive in nature, while Argentina was the aggressor in this case.. In any event, Anglo-Chilean relations had already deteriorated due to the Sheila Cassidy Affair, the use of British made Hawker Hunter aircraft during the 1973 Chilean coup d'√©tat, and the violations of human rights by the Pinochet regime. During the war Chile provided the UK with ‚Äėlimited, but significant information‚Äô.

In a interview with the argentine magazin Perfil Basilio Lami Dozo, chief of the Argentine Air Force during the Falklands war, stated that Argentina purposed to attack Chile after the Falklands war:
On top of that Leopoldo Galtieri said in a speech: "[Chile] have to know that what we are doing now, because they will be the next in turn.

Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1984 between Chile and Argentina

Tensions between Argentina and Chile did not subside until the democratic government of Ra√ļl Alfons√≠n took office in Argentina in December 1983. Still isolated diplomatically due to the War, the Alfons√≠n administration made great efforts to stabilize the border situation. Without the support of the opposition, Alfons√≠n called for a national plebiscite on 25 November 1984, and some 80 percent of the Argentine electorate voted to accept the Vatican-mediated compromise::
| Alternative ||  Percent|| Absolute
Yes to compromise 82% 10,391,019
No to compromise 16% 2,105,663
blank or null ballots 1,1%  
The voting was close only in the territory of Tierra del Fuegomarker, which includes the Argentine sector of the disputed Beagle Channel and many military personnel. The vote there was narrowly in favor of the treaty. On 29 November 1984 Argentina and Chile signed a protocol of agreement to a treaty at Vatican Citymarker giving the islands to Chile but maritime rights to Argentina.

Cultural impact

The mountain pass of Puyehue was renamed Cardenal Antonio Samoré Passmarker for Antonio Samoré, one of the mediators from the Vatican state in the conflict.

Leon Gieco created the song "Sólo le pido a Dios" ("I only Ask of God") in 1978 as a response to the warmongering in Argentina. Three years later, during the Falklands War, the Argentine junta used the song against the Falklands War after the invasion.

In 2005 the Chilean movie Mi Mejor Enemigo ( ) was released. The film recreates the story of a simple recruit in late 1978 when both countries were on the brink of war.

Three TV productions about the conflict (in Spanish) focus on Operation Soberanía:

Economic impact

The arms race at both sides of the border after the Argentine refusal of the decision of the Court of Arbitration caused huge costs for the economy of the countries, until after the Falklands War:
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
defense spending* 487 566 713 951 1.128 949
percentage of the GNP 3.5 3.5 4.1 4.6 5.2
defense spending* 2.702 2.225 2.339 2.641 2.126 2.241
percentage of the GNP 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.0

* Costs in Millions of USAmarker Dollars 1979.


The Beagle conflict was argued in legal and juridical terms, although it was eventually resolved as a political compromise.

During the 1990s, under the presidency of Carlos Menem in Argentina and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle in Chile, they resolved almost all of their disputes, e.g. Laguna del Desierto and both countries began to work together both economically and militarily.

A number of prominent public officials in Chile still point to past Argentine treaty repudiations when referring to relations between the two neighbors.

See also


  1. See David R. Mares, Natural Gas Pipelines in the Southern Cone, May 2004, Working Paper #29, page 9, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Energy Forum, retrieved on 26 August 2008
  2. See Alejandro Luis Corbacho, Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts, page 6, retrieved 26 August 2008: When it became clear that the Chileans wanted full acceptance of the [Court of Arbitration] resolution, the Argentine position hardened, and Argentina began to challenge the Chilean commitment to defend the territory
  3. See The Chilean connection, retrieved on 26 August 2008: :When the Falklands War broke out, Chile still had a long-standing dispute with Argentina over access to the Beagle Channel, making the chance of military co-operation between Britain and Chile a distinct possibility
  4. See Sergio Gutiérrez Olivos, "Comentarios sobre el tratado de paz y amistad con Argentina", page 155.
  5. See Algunas cuestiones con los pa√≠ses vecinos in "Historia general de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Rep√ļblica Argentina", retrieved 24 May 2008, in Spanish language:¬ęLas balizas fueron desmanteladas, estableci√©ndose que √©stas en el futuro no ser√≠an de ninguno de los dos pa√≠ses, y se retiraron los infantes de marina.¬Ľ
  6. See also El Mercurio de Valparaíso, on 17 August 2008, retrieved on 24 September 2008, in Spanish language
  7. See Michael A.Morrs,"The Strait of Magallan", Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,ISBN 07923-0181-1, page 84: : "[in September 1980] Chile objected to an off-shore oil rig authorized by Argentina in an area near the strait, since it allegedlly obstructed navigation and encroached on Chilean souvereignty. Chile first coveyed a warning via warship and then by military helicopter that landed in the heliport of the plattform. A some what similar incident occurred when Argentine militar aircraft warned and then buzzed a Chilean warship proceeding toward the Strait of Magellan from the Falklands islands, because of the lack of prior notification and refusal of the vessel to identify itself once discovered. Chile, for its part , mantained that no advance notification was required, since his warship was navigating within Chile's 200 sea miles zone fronting the strait"
  8. See David R. Mares, Natural Gas Pipelines in the Southern Cone, May 2004, Working Paper #29, page 9, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Energy Forum, retrieved on 26 August 2008
  9. See page 7 of Alejandro Luis Corbacho: Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts, Universidad del CEMA, Argentina, Documento de Trabajo No. 244, September 2003, retrieved 23 September 2008: ¬ę‚ĶThere was a real possibility of open warfare‚Ķ¬Ľ
  10. See Newspaper "Convicción", Buenos Aires, 24 February 1982,pages 12 and 13. (Cited in Historia general de las Relaciones Exteriores Argentinas, note 57.)
  11. See also the article Pinochet ordena el acuartelamiento de las tropas chilenas por el conflicto con Argentina sobre el canal de Beagle in Spanish newspaper El Pa√≠s on 06 March 1982, written by J. L. Fermosel in Buenos Aires, retrieved on 26 August 2008: :Los observadores, con quienes coinciden los medios de comunicaci√≥n social, estiman que la movilizaci√≥n armada se realiz√≥ tras comprobarse que la nave de la Armada argentina Francisco de Gurruchaga viol√≥ de nuevo la soberan√≠a chilena, desplaz√°ndose por el sector de la isla Picton -una de las tres, junto a Nueva y Lennox, que se disputan los dos pa√≠ses en el litigio del Beagle-. En esta oportunidad acompa√Īaban al Gurruchaga otras cuatro embarcaciones.
  12. See article Chile teme que Argentina pueda repetir una acción de fuerza en el canal de Beagle in the spanish newspaper "El Pais" on 11 April 1982 written by Rafael Urbina in Santiago de Chile, retrieved on 26 August 2008
  13. The Informe Rattenbach, an Argentine official investigation over the war, confirms that. See §718 part "a" in Informe Rattenbach
  14. See √ďscar Camili√≥n, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina from 29 March 1981 to 11 December 1981, in his "Memorias Pol√≠ticas", Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1999, page. 281: :¬ęLos planes militares eran, en la hip√≥tesis de resolver el caso Malvinas, invadir las islas en disputa en el Beagle. Esa era la decisi√≥n de la Armada‚Ķ¬Ľ :(transl.:¬ęThe military planning was, with the Falklands in Argentine hand, to invade the disputed islands in the Beagle Channel. That was the determination of the (Argentine) navy‚Ķ¬Ľ
  15. Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 1996, 271 pages, ISBN 052157790X. See also here On page 160: :Displaying the mentality of the Argentine military regime in the 1970s, as another example, there was "Plan Rosario" accordingto which Argentina would attack the Malvinas and then turn to settle the Beagle Channel problem by force. The sequence, according to the plan, could also be reversed.
  16. See Editorial of Argentine newspaper Rio Negro En su l√≥gica by Carlos Torrengo on 01 September 2005 in Spanish Language, retrieved 05 September 2005: :Chile no ignora que la historia suele pegar brincos ins√≥litos. Argentina -por caso- pod√≠a salir airosa del conflicto. Ya por una negociaci√≥n exitosa para sus intereses, ya por derrotar a los brit√°nicos. Si esto suced√≠a, ¬Ņqu√© le impedir√≠a a Leopoldo Galtieri y compa√Ī√≠a apoderarse de las islas del Beagle? ¬ŅO qu√© los condicionar√≠a a tomar iniciativas de esa naturaleza sobre espacios que, en aquel entonces, eran materia de disputa entre Argentina y Chile?
  17. See article of Manfred Schönfeld in La Prensa on 2. Juni 1982 about the Argentine Course of Action after the War: :Para nosotros no lo estará [terminada la guerra], porque, inmediatamente después de barrido el enemigo de las Malvinas, debe serlo de las Georgias, Sandwich del Sur y de todos los demás archipiélagos australes argentinos, ... All articles of M. Schönfeld in "La Prensa" from 10. January 1982 to 2. August 1982 are in "La Guerra Austral", Manfred Schönfeld, Desafío Editores S.A., 1982, ISBN 950-0205-00-9
  18. See Chilean connection, retrieved on 26 August 2008
  19. Argentine magazine Perfil on 22 November 2009, retrieved on 22 November 2009: : Para colmo, Galtieri dijo en un discurso: ‚ÄúQue saquen el ejemplo de lo que estamos haciendo ahora porque despu√©s les toca a ellos‚ÄĚ.
  20. See article Beagle Channel Treaty Approved in Argentina in USA newspaper The New York Times, written by United Press International, on 26 November 1984, retrieved on 26 August 2008
  21. See youtube
  22. See article in La Nación, Argentina, 18 September 2006
  23. Distribución de capacidades en el Cono Sur, Sabrina Melidoni, Buenos Aires, 2006 (p. 45), retrieved on 26 August 2008.
  24. Notes of the Chilean Foreign Minister Jose Miguel Insulza, in La Tercera de Santiago de Chile vom 13. Juli 1998, retrieved on 26 August 2008: "Enfatiz√≥ que, si bien la situaci√≥n es diferente, lo que hoy est√° ocurriendo con el Tratado de Campo de Hielo Sur hace recordar a la opini√≥n p√ļblica lo sucedido en 1977, durante la disputa territorial por el Canal de Beagle."
  25. See notes of Senator (not elected but named by the Armed Forces) Jorge Martínez Bush im La Tercera de Santiago de Chile vom 26 Juli 1998, retrieved on 26 August 2008: "El legislador expuso que los chilenos mantienen "muy fresca" en la memoria la situación creada cuando Argentina declaró nulo el arbitraje sobre el canal del Beagle, en 1978."
  26. See notes of the Chilean Foreign Minister Ignacio Walker Clarin de B.A., 22 July 2005, retrieved on 26 August 2008: "Y está en la retina de los chilenos el laudo de Su Majestad Británica, en el Beagle, que fue declarado insanablemente nulo por la Argentina. Esa impresión todavía está instalada en la sociedad chilena."
  27. See also "Reciprocidad en las Relaciones Chile - Argentina" of Andrés Fabio Oelckers Sainz in PDF, retrieved on 26 August 2008: "También en Chile, todavía genera un gran rechazo el hecho que Argentina declarase nulo el fallo arbitral británico y además en una primera instancia postergara la firma del laudo papal por el diferendo del Beagle"
  28. See notes of Director académico de la Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales Flacso, Francisco Rojas, in Santiago de Chile, in La Nación de Buenos Aires vom 26 September 1997, retrieved on 26 August 2008: "Desde la Argentina, cuesta entender el nivel de desconfianza que hoy existe en Chile a propósito de la decisión que tomó en 1978 de declarar nulo el laudo arbitral"
  29. Notes of Chilean Defense Minister Edmundo P√©rez Yoma in "Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional del Reino de Espa√Īa", apperead in Argentine newspaper El Cronista Comercial, 5 Mai 1997, retrieved on 26 August 2008: ...Y que la Argentina estuvo a punto de llevar a cabo una invasi√≥n sobre territorio de Chile en 1978.... These notes were later relativized by the Chilean Government (See [1] and [2]).


  • Beagle Channel Arbitration between the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile, Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration
  • Mark Laudy: The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building in Words Over War of Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.
  • Alejandro Luis Corbacho: Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts, Universidad del CEMA, Argentina, Documento de Trabajo No. 244, September 2003
  • Rub√©n Madrid Mur√ļa: Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planific√≥ Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el a√Īo 1978", Memorial del Ej√©rcito de Chile, Edici√≥n N¬ļ 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, Spanish Language
  • Karin Oellers-Frahm: Der Schiedsspruch in der Beagle-Kanal-Streitigkeit, Berichte und Urkunden: Max-Planck-Institut f√ľr ausl√§ndisches √∂ffentliches Recht und V√∂lkerrecht, German Language
  • Sergio Guti√©rrez Olivos, Comentarios sobre el tratado de paz y amistad con Argentina, Academia Chilena de Ciencias Sociales, 1985, in Spanish language
  • Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile: Relaciones Chileno-Argentinas, La controversia del Beagle. Genf 1979, English and Spanish Language
  • Andrea Wagner: Der argentinisch-chilenische Konflikt um den Beagle-Kanal. Ein Beitrag zu den Methoden friedlicher Streiterledigung. Verlag Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M. 1992, ISBN 3-631-43590-8, German Language
  • Karl Hernekamp: Der argentinisch-chilenisch Grenzstreit am Beagle-Kanal. Institut f√ľr Iberoamerika-Kunde, Hamburg 1980, German Language
  • Andr√©s Cisneros y Carlos Escud√©, "Historia general de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Rep√ļblica Argentina", Las relaciones con Chile, Cema, Argentina, Buenos Aires. Spanish Language
  • Annegret I. Haffa: Beagle-Konflikt und Falkland (Malwinen)-Krieg. Zur Au√üenpolitik der Argentinischen Militarregierung 1976-1983. Weltforum Verlag, M√ľnchen/K√∂ln/London 1987, ISBN 3-8039-0348-3, German Language
  • Isaac F. Rojas und Arturo Medrano: Argentina en el Atl√°ntico Chile en el Pac√≠fico. Editorial Nemont, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1979, in spanischer Sprache.
  • Isaac F. Rojas, La Argentina en el Beagle y Atl√°ntico sur 1. Parte. Editorial Diagraf, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Spanish Language
  • Carlos Escud√© und Andr√©s Cisneros: Historia general de las relaciones exteriores de la Rep√ļblica Argentina ( here), in spanischer Sprache.
  • Fabio Vio Valdivieso: La mediaci√≥n de su S.S. el Papa Juan Pablo II, Editorial Aconcagua, Santiago de Chile, 1984, Spanish Language
  • Alberto Mar√≠n Madrid: El arbitraje del Beagle y la actitud argentina. 1984, Editorial Mois√©s Garrido Urrea, id = A-1374-84 XIII, Spanisch Language
  • Luis Alberto Romero, Argentina in the twentieth Century. Pennsylvania State University Press, translated by James P. Brennan, 1994, ISBN 0-271-02191-8
  • Divisionsgeneral (a.D.) Juan E. Gugliamelli: Cuesti√≥n del Beagle. Negociaci√≥n directa o di√°logo de armas (Trans.:The Beagle-Question, direct Negotiations or Dialog of the Weapons), in Spanish Language. (Book compiled from articles of Argentine Magazin "Estrategia", Buenos Aires Nr:49/50, enero-febrero 1978, erschienen sind.
  • General Mart√≠n Antonio Balza und Mariano Grondona: Dejo Constancia: memorias de un general argentino. Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires 2001, ISBN 9504908136, Spanish Language
  • Francisco Bulnes Serrano und Patricia Arancibia Clavel: La Escuadra En Acci√≥n. Chile, Editorial Grijalbo, 2004, ISBN 9562582116, Spanish Language

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