Culture (from the
Latin
cultura stemming from
colere, meaning "to
cultivate") is a term that has different meanings. For example, in
1952,
Alfred Kroeber and
Clyde Kluckhohn compiled a list of 164
definitions of "culture" in
Culture: A Critical Review of
Concepts and Definitions. However, the word "culture" is most
commonly used in three basic senses:
- Excellence of taste in the fine arts
and humanities, also known as high culture
- An integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior
that depends upon the capacity for symbolic thought and social
learning
- The set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that
characterizes an institution, organization or group
When the concept first emerged in eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century Europe, it connoted a process of cultivation or
improvement, as in
agriculture or
horticulture. In the nineteenth
century, it came to refer first to the betterment or refinement of
the individual, especially through
education, and then to the fulfillment of
national aspirations or ideals. In the
mid-nineteenth century, some scientists used the term "culture" to
refer to a universal human capacity.
In the twentieth century, "culture" emerged as a concept central to
anthropology, encompassing all human
phenomena that are not purely results of human genetics.
Specifically, the term "culture" in American anthropology had two
meanings: (1) the evolved human capacity to classify and represent
experiences with
symbols, and to act
imaginatively and creatively; and (2) the distinct ways that people
living in different parts of the world classified and represented
their experiences, and acted creatively. Following
World War II, the term became important, albeit
with different meanings, in other disciplines such as
sociology,
cultural
studies,
organizational
psychology and
management
studies.
19th century discourses
English Romanticism
In the nineteenth century, humanists such as
English poet and essayist
Matthew Arnold (1822-1888) used the word
"culture" to refer to an ideal of individual human refinement, of
"the best that has been thought and said in the world." This
concept of culture is comparable to the
German concept of
bildung:
"...culture being a pursuit of our total
perfection by means of getting to know, on all
the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought
and said in the world."
In practice,
culture referred to an
élite ideal and was associated with such activities as
art,
classical music, and
haute cuisine. As these forms were associated
with urbane life, "culture" was identified with "civilization"
(from lat.
civitas, city). Another facet of the
Romantic movement was an interest in
folklore, which led to identifying a "culture"
among non-elites. This distinction is often characterized as that
between "
high culture", namely that of
the
ruling social group, and "
low
culture." In other words, the idea of "culture" that developed
in Europe during the 18th and early 19th centuries reflected
inequalities within European societies.
Matthew Arnold contrasted "culture" with "anarchy;" other
Europeans, following
philosophers
Thomas Hobbes and
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, contrasted
"culture" with "the state of nature." According to Hobbes and
Rousseau, the
Native
Americans who were being conquered by Europeans from the 16th
centuries on were living in a state of nature; this opposition was
expressed through the contrast between "civilized" and
"uncivilized." According to this way of thinking, one could
classify some countries and nations as more civilized than others
and some people as more cultured than others. This contrast led to
Herbert Spencer's theory of
Social Darwinism and
Lewis Henry Morgan's theory of
cultural evolution. Just as some critics
have argued that the distinction between high and low cultures is
really an expression of the conflict between European elites and
non-elites, some critics have argued that the distinction between
civilized and uncivilized people is really an expression of the
conflict between European colonial powers and their colonial
subjects.
Other 19th century critics, following Rousseau, have accepted this
differentiation between higher and lower culture, but have seen the
refinement and sophistication of high culture as corrupting and
unnatural developments that obscure and distort people's essential
nature. These critics considered
folk
music (as produced by working-class people) to honestly express
a natural way of life, while classical music seemed superficial and
decadent. Equally, this view often portrayed
indigenous peoples as "
noble savages" living
authentic and unblemished lives,
uncomplicated and uncorrupted by the highly stratified
capitalist systems of
the West.
In 1870
Edward Tylor (1832-1917)
applied these ideas of higher versus lower culture to propose a
theory of the evolution of religion. According to this theory,
religion evolves from more polytheistic to more monotheistic forms.
In the process, he redefined culture as a diverse set of activities
characteristic of all human societies. This view paved the way for
the modern understanding of culture.
German Romanticism
The German philosopher
Immanuel Kant
(1724–1804) formulated an individualist definition of
"enlightenment" similar to the concept of
bildung:
"Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred
immaturity." He argued that this immaturity comes not from a lack
of understanding, but from a lack of courage to think
independently. Against this intellectual cowardice, Kant urged:
Sapere aude, "Dare to be wise!" In reaction to Kant,
German scholars such as
Johann
Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) argued that human creativity,
which necessarily takes unpredictable and highly diverse forms, is
as important as human rationality. Moreover, Herder proposed a
collective form of
bildung: "For Herder, Bildung was the
totality of experiences that provide a coherent identity, and sense
of common destiny, to a people."
In 1795, the great linguist and philosopher
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) called
for an anthropology that would synthesize Kant's and Herder's
interests.
During the Romantic
era, scholars in Germany
, especially
those concerned with nationalist
movements—such as the nationalist struggle to create a "Germany"
out of diverse principalities, and the nationalist struggles by
ethnic minorities against the Austro-Hungarian Empire—developed a
more inclusive notion of culture as "worldview." According to this school of
thought, each ethnic group has a distinct worldview that is
incommensurable with the worldviews of other groups. Although more
inclusive than earlier views, this approach to culture still
allowed for distinctions between "civilized" and "primitive" or
"tribal" cultures.
In 1860,
Adolf Bastian (1826–1905)
argued for "the psychic unity of mankind". He proposed that a
scientific comparison of all human societies would reveal that
distinct worldviews consisted of the same basic elements. According
to Bastian, all human societies share a set of "elementary ideas"
(
Elementargedanken); different cultures, or different
"folk ideas" (
Volkergedanken), are local modifications of
the elementary ideas. This view paved the way for the modern
understanding of culture.
Franz Boas
(1858–1942) was trained in this tradition, and he brought it with
him when he left Germany for the United States.
20th century discourses
American anthropology
Although anthropologists worldwide refer to Tylor's definition of
culture, in the 20th century "culture" emerged as the central and
unifying concept of American
anthropology, where it most commonly refers to
the universal human capacity to classify and encode their
experiences
symbolically, and communicate
symbolically encoded experiences socially. American anthropology is
organized into four fields, each of which plays an important role
in research on culture:
biological anthropology,
linguistics,
cultural anthropology and
archeology. Research in these fields have
influenced anthropologists working in other countries to different
degrees.
Biological anthropology: the evolution of culture
Discussion concerning culture among
biological anthropologists centers
around two debates. First, is culture uniquely human or shared by
other species (most notably, other primates)? This is an important
question, as the theory of
evolution holds
that humans are descended from (now extinct) non-human primates.
Second, how did culture evolve among human beings?
Gerald Weiss noted that although Tylor's classic definition of
culture was restricted to humans, many anthropologists take this
for granted and thus elide that important qualification from later
definitions, merely equating culture with any learned behavior.
This slippage is a problem because during the formative years of
modern primatology, some primatologists were trained in
anthropology (and understood that culture refers to learned
behavior among humans), and others were not. Notable
non-anthropologists, like
Robert
Yerkes and
Jane Goodall thus argued
that since chimpanzees have learned behaviors, they have culture.
Today, anthropological primatologists are divided, several arguing
that non-human primates have culture, others arguing that they do
not.
This scientific debate is complicated by ethical concerns. The
subjects of primatology are non-human primates, and whatever
culture these primates have is threatened by human activity. After
reviewing the research on primate culture, W.C. McGrew concluded,
"[a] discipline requires subjects, and most species of nonhuman
primates are endangered by their human cousins. Ultimately,
whatever its merit, cultural primatology must be committed to
cultural survival [i.e. to the survival of primate
cultures]."
McGrew suggests a definition of culture that he finds
scientifically useful for studying primate culture. He points out
that scientists do not have access to the subjective thoughts or
knowledge of non-human primates. Thus, if culture is defined in
terms of knowledge, then scientists are severely limited in their
attempts to study primate culture. Instead of defining culture as a
kind of knowledge, McGrew suggests that we view culture as a
process. He lists six steps in the process:
- A new pattern of behavior is invented, or an existing one is
modified.
- The innovator transmits this pattern to another.
- The form of the pattern is consistent within and across
performers, perhaps even in terms of recognizable stylistic
features.
- The one who acquires the pattern retains the ability to perform
it long after having acquired it.
- The pattern spreads across social units in a population. These
social units may be families, clans, troops, or bands.
- The pattern endures across generations.
McGrew admits that all six criteria may be strict, given the
difficulties in observing primate behavior in the wild. But he also
insists on the need to be as inclusive as possible, on the need for
a definition of culture that "casts the net widely":
Culture is considered to be group-specific behavior
that is acquired, at least in part, from social
influences.
Here, group is considered to be the species-typical
unit, whether it be a troop, lineage, subgroup, or so
on.
Prima facia evidence of culture comes from
within-species but across-group variation in behavior, as when a
pattern is persistent in one community of chimpanzees but is absent
from another, or when different communities perform different
versions of the same pattern.
The suggestion of culture in action is stronger when
the difference across the groups cannot be explained solely by
ecological factors ....
As Charles Frederick Voegelin pointed out, if "culture" is reduced
to "learned behavior," then all animals have culture. Certainly all
specialists agree that all primate species evidence common
cognitive skills: knowledge of object-permanence, cognitive
mapping, the ability to categorize objects, and creative problem
solving. Moreover, all primate species show evidence of shared
social skills: they recognize members of their social group; they
form direct relationships based on degrees of kinship and rank;
they recognize third-party social relationships; they predict
future behavior; and they cooperate in problem-solving.


Nevertheless, the term "culture" applies to non-human animals only
if we define culture as any or all learned behavior. Within
mainstream physical anthropology, scholars tend to think that a
more restrictive definition is necessary. These researchers are
concerned with how human beings evolved to be different from other
species. A more precise definition of culture, which excludes
non-human social behavior, would allow physical anthropologists to
study how humans evolved their unique capacity for "culture".
Chimpanzees (
Pan troglodytes and
Pan paniscus)
are humans' (
Homo sapiens) closest living relative; both
are descended from a common ancestor which lived around five or six
million years ago. This is the same amount of time it took for
horses and zebras, lions and tigers, and rats and mice, to diverge
from their respective common ancestors The evolution of modern
humans is rapid:
Australopithicenes evolved four
million years ago and modern humans in past several hundred
thousand years. During this time humanity evolved three distinctive
features:
- (a) the creation and use of conventional symbols, including
linguistic symbols and their derivatives, such as written language
and mathematical symbols and notations; (b) the creation and use of
complex tools and other instrumental technologies; and (c) the
creation and participation in complex social organization and
institutions.
According to
developmental
psychologist Michael
Tomasello, "where these complex and species-unique behavioral
practices, and the cognitive skills that underlie them, came from"
is a fundamental anthropological question. Given that contemporary
humans and chimpanzees are far more different than horses and
zebras, or rats and mice, and that the evolution of this great
difference occurred in such a short period of time, "our search
must be for some small difference that made a big difference – some
adaptation, or small set of adaptations, that changed the process
of primate cognitive evolution in fundamental ways." According to
Tomasello, the answer to this question must form the basis of a
scientific definition of "human culture."
In a recent review of the major research on human and primate
tool-use, communication, and learning strategies, Tomasello argues
that the key human advances over primates (language, complex
technologies, complex social organization) are all the results of
humans pooling cognitive resources. This is called "the
ratchet effect:" innovations spread and are
shared by a group, and mastered "by youngsters, which enables them
to remain in their new and improved form within the group until
something better comes along." The key point is that children are
born good at a particular kind of social learning; this creates a
favored environment for social innovations, making them more likely
to be maintained and transmitted to new generations than individual
innovations. For Tomasello, human social learning—the kind of
learning that distinguishes humans from other primates and that
played a decisive role in human evolution—is based on two elements:
first, what he calls "imitative learning," (as opposed to
"emulative learning" characteristic of other primates) and second,
the fact that humans represent their experiences symbolically
(rather than iconically, as is characteristic of other primates).
Together, these elements enable humans to be both inventive, and to
preserve useful inventions. It is this combination that produces
the ratchet effect.



The kind of learning found among other primates is "emuluation
learning," which "focuses on the environmental events involved –
results or changes of state in the environment that the other
produced – rather than on the actions that produced those results."
Tomasello emphasizes that emulation learning is a highly adaptive
strategy for apes because it focuses on the effects of an act. In
laboratory experiments, chimpanzees were shown two different ways
for using a rake-like tool to obtain an out-of-reach-object. Both
methods were effective, but one was more efficient than the other.
Chimpanzees consistently emulated the more efficient method.
Examples of emulation learning are well-documented among primates.
Notable examples include Japanese
macaque
potato washing, Chimpanzee tool use, and Chimpanzee gestural
communication. In 1953, an 18-month-old female macaque monkey was
observed taking sandy pieces of sweet potato (given to the monkeys
by observers) to a stream (and later, to the ocean) to wash off the
sand. After three months, the same behavior was observed in her
mother and two playmates, and then the playmates' mothers. Over the
next two years seven other young macaques were observed washing
their potatoes, and by the end of the third year 40% of the troop
had adopted the practice. Although this story is popularly
represented as a straightforward example of human-like learning,
evidence suggests that it is not. Many monkeys naturally brush sand
off of food; this behavior had been observed in the macaque troop
prior to the first observed washing. Moreover, potato washing was
observed in four other separate macaque troops, suggesting that at
least four other individual monkeys had learned to wash off sand on
their own. Other monkey species in captivity quickly learn to wash
off their food. Finally, the spread of learning among the Japanese
macaques was fairly slow, and the rate at which new members of the
troop learned did not keep pace with the growth of the troop. If
the form of learning were imitation, the rate of learning should
have been exponential. It is more likely that monkeys the washing
behavior is based on the common behavior of cleaning off food, and
that monkeys that spent time by the water independently learned to
wash, rather than wipe their food. This explains both why those
monkeys that kept company with the original washer, and who thus
spent a good deal of time by the water, also figured out how to
wash their potatoes. It also explains why the rate at which this
behavior spread was slow.
Chimpanzees exhibit a variety of population-specific tool use:
termite-fishing, ant-fishing, ant-dipping, nut-cracking, and
leaf-sponging. Gombe chimpanzees fish for termites using small,
thin sticks, but chimpanzees in Western Africa use large sticks to
break holes in mounds and use their hands to scoop up termites.
Some of this variation may be the result of "environmental shaping"
(there is more rainfall in western Africa, softening termite mounds
and making them easier to break apart, than in the Gombe reserve in
eastern Africa. Nevertheless it is clear that chimpanzees are good
at emulation learning. Chimpanzee children independently know how
to roll over logs, and know how to eat insects. When children see
their mothers rolling over logs in order to eat the insects
beneath, they quickly learn to do the same. In other words, this
form of learning builds on activities the children already
know.




.jpg/180px-Children_in_Namibia(1_cropped).jpg)
The kind of learning characteristic of human children is "Imitative
learning," which "means reproducing an instrumental act understood
intentionally." Human infants begin to display some evidence of
this form of learning between the ages of nine and twelve months,
when infants fix their attention not only on an object, but on the
gaze of an adult which enables them to use adults as points of
reference and thus "act on objects in the way adults are acting on
them." This dynamic is well-documented and has also been termed
"joint engagement" or "joint attention." Essential to this dynamic
is the infants growing capacity to recognize others as "intentional
agents:" people "with the power to control their spontaneous
behavior" and who "have goals and make active choices among
behavioral means for attaining those goals."
The development of skills in joint attention by the end of a human
child's first year of life provides the basis for the development
of imitative learning in the second year. In one study 14-month old
children imitated an adult's overly-complex method of turning on a
light, even when they could have used an easier and more natural
motion to the same effect. In another study, 16-month old children
interacted with adults who alternated between a complex series of
motions that appeared intentional and a comparable set of motions
that appeared accidental; they imitated only those motions that
appeared intentional. Another study of 18-month old children
revealed that children imitate actions that adults intend , yet in
some way fail, to perform.Tomasello emphasizes that this kind of
imitative learning "relies fundamentally on infants' tendency to
identify with adults, and on their ability to distinguish in the
actions of others the underlying goal and the different means that
might be used to achieve it." He calls this kind of imitative
learning "cultural learning because the child is not just learning
about things from other persons, she is also learning things
through them — in the sense that she must know something of the
adult's perspective on a situation to learn the active use of this
same intentional act." He concludes that the key feature of
cultural learning is that it occurs only when an individual
"understands others as intentional agents, like the self, who have
a perspective on the world that can be followed into, directed and
shared"
Emulation learning and imitative learning are two different
adaptations that can only be assessed in their larger environmental
and evolutionary contexts. In one experiment, chimpanzees and
two-year-old children were separately presented with a
rake-like-tool and an out-of-reach object. Adult humans then
demonstrated two different ways to use the tool, one more
efficient, one less efficient. Chimpanzees used the same efficient
method following both demonstrations. Most of the human children,
however, imitated whichever method the adult was demonstrating.
Were chimps and humans to be compared on the basis of these
results, one might think that Chimpanzees are more intelligent.
From an
evolutionary perspective they are
equally intelligent, but with different kinds of intelligence
adapted to different environments. Chimpanzee learning strategies
are well-suited to a stable physical environment that requires
little social cooperation (compared to humans). Human learning
strategies are well-suited to a complex social environment in which
understanding the intentions of others may be more important than
success at a specific task. Tomasello argues that this strategy has
made possible the "ratchet effect" that enabled humans to evolve
complex social systems that have enabled humans to adapt to
virtually every physical environment on the surface of the
earth.
Tomasello further argues that cultural learning is essential for
language-acquisition. Most children in any society, and all
children in some, do not learn all words through the direct efforts
of adults. "In general, for the vast majority of words in their
language, children must find a way to learn in the ongoing flow of
social interaction, sometimes from speech not even addressed to
them." This finding has been confirmed by a variety of experiments
in which children learned words even when the referent was not
present, multiple referents were possible, and the adult was not
directly trying to teach the word to the child. Tomasello concludes
that "a linguistic symbol is nothing other than a marker for an
intersubjectively shared understanding of a situation.
Tomasello's 1999 review of the research contrasting human and
non-human primate learning strategies confirms
biological anthropologist Ralph Holloway's 1969 argument that a
specific kind of sociality linked to symbolic cognition were the
keys to human evolution, and constitute the nature of culture.
According to Holloway, the key issue in the evolution of
H.
sapiens, and the key to understanding "culture," "is how man
organizes his experience." Culture is "the
imposition of
arbitrary form upon the environment." This fact, Holloway
argued, is primary to and explains what is distinctive about human
learning strategies, tool-use, and language. Human tool-making and
language express "similar, if not identical, cognitive processes"
and provide important evidence for how humankind evolved.
In other words, whereas McGrew argues that anthropologists must
focus on behaviors like communication and tool-use because they
have no access to the mind, Holloway argues that human language and
tool-use, including the earliest stone tools in the fossil record,
are highly suggestive of cognitive differences between humans and
non-humans, and that such cognitive differences in turn explain
human evolution. For Holloway, the question is not whether other
primates communicate, learn or make tools, but that the
way they do these things. "Washing potatoes in the ocean …
stripping branches of leaves to get termites," and other examples
of primate tool-use and learning "are iconic, and there is no
feedback from the environment to the animal ." Human tools,
however, express an independence from natural form that manifests
symbolic thinking. "In the preparation of the stick for
termite-eating, the relation between product and raw material is
iconic. In the making of a stone tool, in contrast, there is no
necessary relation between the form of the final product and the
original material."
In Holloway's view, our non-human ancestors, like those of modern
chimpanzees and other primates, shared motor and sensory skills,
curiosity, memory, and intelligence, with perhaps differences in
degree. "It is when these are integrated with the unique attributes
of arbitrary production (symbolization) and imposition that man qua
cultural man appears."
- I have suggested above that whatever culture may be, it
includes "the imposition of arbitrary forms upon the environment."
This phrase has two components. One is a recognition that the
relationship between the coding process and the phenomenon (be it a
tool, social network, or abstract principle) is non-iconic. The
other is an idea of man as a creature who can make delusional
systems work—who imposes his fantasies, his noniconic constructs
(and constructions) , upon the environment. The altered environment
shapes his perceptions, and these are again forced back on the
environment, are incorporated into the environment, and press for
further adaptation.
This is comparable to the "ratcheting" aspect suggested by
Tomasello and others that enabled human evolution to accelerate.
Holloway concludes that the first instance of symbolic thought
among humans provided a "kick-start" for brain development, tool
complexity, social structure, and language to evolve through a
constant dynamic of positive feedback. "This interaction between
the propensity to structure the environment arbitrarily and the
feedback from the environment to the organism is an emergent
process, a process different in kind from anything that preceded it
."

Simple-edge chopper

Chopping-tool
Linguists
Charles Hockett and R.
Ascher have identified thirten design-features of language, some
shared by other forms of animal connunication. One feature that
distinguishes human language is its tremendous productivity; in
other words, competent speakers of a language are capable of
producing an infinite number of original utterances. This
productivity seems to be made possible by a few critical features
unique to human language. One is "duality of patterning," meaning
that human language consists of the articulation of several
distinct processes, each with its own set of rules: combining
phonemes to produce
morphemes, combining
morphemes to produce words, and combining words to
produce sentences. This means that a person can master a relatively
limited number of signals and sets of rules, to create infinite
combinations. Another crucial element is that human language is
symbolic: the sound of words (or their
shape, when written) bear no relation to what they represent. In
other words, their meaning is arbitrary. That words have meaning is
a matter of convention. Since the meaning of words are arbitrary,
any word may have several meanings, and any object may be referred
to using a variety of words; the actual word used to describe a
particular object depends on the context, the intention of the
speaker, and the ability of the listener to judge these
appropriately. As Tomasello notes,
- An individual language user looks at a tree and, before drawing
the attention of her interlocutor to that tree, must decide, based
on her assessment of the listener's current knowledge and
expectations, whether to say "that tree over there," "it," "the
oak," "that hundred-year-oak," "the tree," "the bagswing tree,"
"that thing in the front yard," "the ornament," "the
embarrassment," or any of a number of other expressions. … And
these decisions are not made on the basis of the speaker's direct
goal with respect to the object or activity involved, but rather
that they are made on the basis of her goal with respect to the
listener's interest and attention to that object or activity.
This is why symbolic cognition and communication and imitative
learning go hand-in-hand.
Holloway argues that the stone-tools associated with genus
Homo have the same features of human language:
- Returning to matter of syntax, rules, and concatenated activity
mentioned above, almost any model which describes a language
process can also be used to describe tool-making. This is hardly
surprising. Both activities are concatenated, both have rigid rules
about eh serialization of unit activities (the grammar, syntax),
both are hierarchical systems of activity (as is any motor
activity), and both produce arbitrary configurations which thence
become part of the environment, either temporarily or
permanently.
- productivity can be seen in the facts that basic types were
probably used for multiple purposes, that tool industries tend to
expand with time, and that a slight variation on h basic pattern
may be made to met some new functional requisite. Elements of a
basic "vocabulary" of motor operations—flakes, detachment,
rotation, preparation of striking platform, etc.—are used in
different combinations to produce dissimilar tools, with different
forms, and supposedly, different uses. . . . Taking each motor
event alone, no one action is complete; each action depends on the
prior one and requires a further one, and each is dependent in
another ay on the original plan. In other words, at each point of
the action except the last, the piece is not "satisfactory" in
structure. Each unit action is meaningless by itself in the sense
of the use of the tool; it is meaningful only in the context of the
whole completed set of actions culminating in the final product.
This exactly parallels language.
As Tomasello has demonstrated, symbolic thought can operate only in
a particular social environment:
- Arbitrary symbols enforce consensus of perceptions, which not
only allows members to communicate about the same objects in terms
of space and time (as in hunting) but it also makes it possible for
social relationships to be standardized and manipulated through
symbols. It means that idiosyncracies are smoothed out and
perceived within classes of behavior. By enforcing perceptual
invariance, symbols also enforce social behavioral constancy, and
enforcing social behavioral constancy is a prerequisite to
differential task-role sectors in a differentiated social group
adapting not only to the outside environment but to its own
membership.
Biological anthropologist
Terrence Deacon, in a synthesis of over twenty years of research on
human evolution, human neurology, and primatology, describes this
"ratcheting effect" as a form of "Baldwinian Evolution." Named
after
psychologist James Baldwin, this describes a situation in
which an animal's behavior has evolutionary consequences when it
changes the natural environment and thus the selective forces
acting on the animal.
- Once some useful behavior spreads within a population and
becomes more important for subsistence, it will generate selection
pressures on genetic traits that support its propagation ... Stone
and tymbolic tools, which were initially acquired with the aid of
flexible ape-learning abilities, ultimately turned the tables on
their users and forced them to adapt to a new niche opened by these
technologies. Rather than being just useful tricks, these
behavioral proshteses for obtaining food and organizing social
behaviors became indispensible elements in a new adaptive complex.
The origin of "humanness" can be defined as that point in our
evolution where these tools became the principle source of
selection on our bodies and brains. It is the diagnostic of
Homo symbolicus.
According to Deacon, this occurred between 2 and 2.5 million years
ago, when we have the first fossil evidence of stone tool use and
the beginning of a trend in an increase in brain size. But it is
the evolution of symbolic language which is the cause—and not the
effect—of these trends. More specifically, Deacon is suggesting
that
Australopithecines, like contemporary apes, used
tools; it is possible that over the millions of years of
Australopithecine history, many troops developed symbolic
communication systems. All that was necessary was that one of these
groups so altered their environment that "it introduced selection
for very different learning abilities than affected prior species."
This troop or population kick-started the Baldwinian process (the
"ratchet effect") that led to their evolution to genus
Homo.
The question for Deacon is, what behavioral-environmental changes
could have made the development of symbolic thinking adaptive? Here
he emphasizes the importance of distinguishing hmans from all other
species, not in order to privilege human intelligence but to
problematize it. Given that the evolution of
H. sapiens
began with ancestors who did not yet have "culture," what led them
to move away from cognitive, learning, communication, and
tool-making strategies that were and continued to be adaptive for
most other primates (and, some have suggested, most other species
of animals)? Learning symbol systems is more time consuming than
other forms of communication, so symbolic thought made possible a
different communication strategy, but not a more efficient one than
other primates. Nevertheless, it must have offered some selective
advantage of
H. sapiens to have evolved. Deacon starts by
looking a two key determinents in evolutionary history: foraging
behavior, and patterns of sexual relations. As he observes
competition for sexual access limits the possibilities for social
cooperation in many species; yet, Deacon observes, there are three
consistent patterns in human reproduction that distinguish them
from other species:
- Both males and females usually contribute effort towards the
rearing of their offspring, though often to differing extents and
in very different ways.
- In all societies, the great majority if adult males and females
are bound by long-term, exlusive secual access rights and
pronibitions to particular individuals of the opposite sex.
- They maintain these exclusive sexual relations while living in
modest to large-sized, multi-male, multi-female, cooperative social
groups.
Moreover, there is one feature common to all known human foraging
societies (all humans prior to ten or fifteen thousand years ago),
and markedly different from other primates: "the use of meat. . . .
The appearance of the first stone tools nearly 2.5 million years
ago almost certainly correlates with a radical shift in foraging
behavior in order to gain access to meat." Deacon does not believe
that symbolic thought was necessary for hunting or tool-making
(although tool-making may be a reliable index of symbolic thought);
rather, it was necessary for the success of distinctive social
relations.
The key is that while men and women are equally effective foragers,
mothers carrying dependent children are not effective hunters. They
must thus depend on male hunters. This favors a system in which
males have exclusive sexual access to females, and females can
predict that their sexual partner will provide food for them and
their children. In most mammalian species the result is a system of
rank or sexual competition that results in either polygyny, or
life-long pair-bonding between two individuals who live relatively
independent of other adults of their species; in both cases male
aggression plays an important role in maintaining sexual access to
mate(s). What is unique about humans?
- Human reliance on resources that are relatively unavailable to
females with infants selects not only for coopartion between a
child's father and mother but also for the cooperation of other
relatives and friends, including elderly individuals and juveniles,
who can be relied upon for assistance. The special demands of
acquiring meat and caring for infants in our own evolution together
contribute to the underlying impetus for the third characteristic
feature of human reproductive patterns: cooperative group
living.
What is uniquely characteristic about human societies is what
required symbolic cognition, which consequently leads to the
evolution of culture: "cooperative, mixed-sex social groups, with
significant male care and provisioning of offspring, and relatively
stable patterns of reproductive exclusion." This combination is
relatively rare in other species because it is "highly susceptible
to disintegration." Language and culture provide the glue that
holds it together.
Chimpanzees also, on occasion, hunt meat; in most cases, however,
males consume the meat immediately, and only on occasion share with
females who happen to be nearby. Among chimpanzees, hunting for
meat increases when other sources of food become scarce, but under
these conditions, sharing descreases. The first forms of symbolic
thinking made stone-tools possible, which in turn made hunting for
meat a more dependable source of food for our nonhuman ancestors
while making possible forms of social communication that make
sharing—between males and females, but also among males, decreasing
sexual competition:
- So the socio-ecological problem posed by the transition to a
meat-supplemented subsistence strategy is that it cannot be
utilized without a social structure which guarantees unambiguous
and exclusive mating and is sufficiently egalitarian to sustain
cooperation via shared or parallel reproductive interests. This
problem can be solved symbolically.
Symbols and symbolic thinking thus make possible a central feature
of social relations in every human population: reciprocity.
Evolutionary scientists have developed
a model to explain
reciprocal altruism among closely
related individuals. Symbolic thought makes possible reciprocity
between distantly related individuals.
Archeological approaches to culture: matter and meaning
In the 19th century
archeology was often
a supplement to
history, and the goal of
archeologists was to identify artifacts according to their
typology and
stratigraphy, thus marking their location in
time and space. Franz Boas established that archeology be one of
American anthropology's four fields, and debates among
archeologists have often paralleled debates among cultural
anthropologists. In the 1920s and 1930s, Australian-British
archeologist
V. Gordon Childe and American archeologist
W. C.
McKern independently began moving from
asking about the date of an artifact, to asking about the people
who produced it — when archeologists work alongside historians,
historical materials generally help answer these questions, but
when historical materials are unavailable, archeologists had to
develop new methods. Childe and McKern focused on analyzing the
relationships among objects found together; their work established
the foundation for a three-tiered model:
- An individual artifact, which has surface, shape, and
technological attributes (e.g. an arrowhead)
- A sub-assemblage, consisting of artifacts that are found, and
were likely used, together (e.g. an arrowhead, bow and knife)
- An assemblage of subasemblages that together constitute the
archeological site (e.g. the arrowhead, bow and knife; a pot and
the remains of a hearth; a shelter)
Childe argued that a "constantly recurring assemblage of artifacts"
to be an "
archaeological
culture." Childe and others viewed "each archeological culture
... the manifestation in material terms of a specific
people."
In 1948
Walter Taylor systematized the
methods and concepts that archeologists had developed and proposed
a general model for the archeological contribution to knoweldge of
cultures. He began with the mainstream understanding of culture as
the product of human cognitive activity, and the Boasian emphasis
on the subjective meanings of objects as dependent on their
cultural context. He defined culture as "a mental phenomenon,
consisting of the contents of minds, not of material objects or
observable behavior." He then devised a three-tiered model linking
cultural anthropology to archeology, which he called
conjunctive archeology:
- Culture, which is unobservable and nonmaterial
- Behaviors resulting from culture, which are observable and
nonmaterial
- Objectifications, such as artifacts and architecture, which are
the result of behavior and material
That is, material artifacts were the material residue of culture,
but not culture itself. Taylor's point was that the archeological
record could contribute to anthropological knowledge, but only if
archeologists reconceived their work not just as digging up
artifacts and recording their location in time and space, but as
inferring from material remains the behaviors through which they
were produced and used, and inferring from these behaviors the
mental activities of people. Although many archeologists agreed
that their research was integral to anthropology, Taylor's program
was never fully implemented. One reason was that his three-tier
model of inferences required too much fieldwork and laboratory
analysis to be practical. Moreover, his view that material remains
were not themselves cultural, and in fact twice-removed from
culture, in fact left archeology marginal to cultural
anthropology.
In 1962 Leslie White's former student
Lewis Binford proposed a new model for
anthropological archeology, called "the New Archeology" or
"
Processual Archeology,"
based on White's definition of culture as "the extra-somatic means
of adaptation for the human organism." This definition allowed
Binford to establish archeology as a crucial field for the pursuit
of the methodology of Julian Steward's cultural ecology:
- The comparative study of cultural systems with variable
technologies in a similar environmental range or similar
technologies in differing environments is a major methodology of
what Steward (1955: 36–42) has called "cultural ecology," and
certainly is a valuable means of increasing our understanding of
cultural processes. Such a methodology is also useful in
elucidating the structural relationships between major cultural
sub-systems such as the social and ideological sub-systems.
In other words, Binford proposed an archeology that would be
central to the dominant project of cultural anthropologists at the
time (culture as non-genetic adaptations to the environment); the
"new archeology" was the cultural anthropology (in the form of
cultural ecology or ecological anthropology) of the past.
In the 1980s, there was a movement in the United Kingdom and Europe
against the view of archeology as a field of anthropology, echoing
Radcliffe-Brown's earlier rejection of cultural anthropology.
During
this same period, then-Cambridge
archeologist Ian Hodder
developed "post-processual
archeology" as an alternative. Like Binford (and unlike
Taylor) Hodder views artifacts not as objectifications of culture
but
as culture itself. Unlike Binford, however, Hodder
does not view culture as an environmental adaptation. Instead, he
"is committed to a fluid semiotic version of the traditional
culture concept in which material items, artifacts, are full
participants in the creation, deployment, alteration, and fading
away of symbolic complexes." His 1982 book,
Symbols in
Action, evokes the symbolic anthropology of Geertz, Schneider,
with their focus on the context dependent meanings of cultural
things, as an alternative to White and Steward's materialist view
of culture. In his 1991 textbook,
Reading the Past: Current
Approaches to Interpretation in Archaeology Hodder argued that
archeology is more closely aligned to history than to
anthropology.
Language and culture
The connection between culture and language has been noted as far
back as the classical period and probably long before. The ancient
Greeks, for example, distinguished between civilized peoples and
bárbaros "those who babble", i.e. those
who speak unintelligible languages. The fact that different groups
speak different, unintelligible languages is often considered more
tangible evidence for cultural differences than other less obvious
cultural traits.
The German romanticists of the 19th century such as Herder, Wundt
and Humbolt, often saw language not just as one cultural trait
among many but rather as the direct expression of a people's
national character, and as such as culture in a kind of condensed
form. Herder for example suggests, "Denn jedes Volk ist Volk; es
hat seine National Bildung wie seine Sprache" (Since every people
is a People, it has its own national culture expressed through its
own language).
Franz Boas, founder of American anthropology, like his German
forerunners, maintained that the shared language of a community is
the most essential carrier of their common culture. Boas was the
first anthropologist who considered it unimaginable to study the
culture of a foreign people without also becoming acquainted with
their language. For Boas, the fact that the intellectual culture of
a people was largely constructed, shared and maintained through the
use of language, meant that understanding the language of a
cultural group was the key to understanding its culture. At the
same time, though, Boas and his students were aware that culture
and language are not directly dependent on one another. That is,
groups with widely different cultures may share a common language,
and speakers of completely unrelated languages may share the same
fundamental cultural traits. Numerous other scholars have suggested
that the form of language determines specific cultural traits. This
is similar to the notion of
Linguistic determinism, which states
that the form of language determines individual thought. While Boas
himself rejected a causal link between language and culture, some
of his intellectual heirs entertained the idea that habitual
patterns of speaking and thinking in a particular language may
influence the culture of the linguistic group. Such belief is
related to the theory of
Linguistic relativity. Boas, like most
modern anthropologists, however, was more inclined to relate the
interconnectedness between language and culture to the fact that,
as B.L. Whorf put it, "they have grown up together".
Indeed, the origin of language, understood as the human capacity of
complex symbolic communication, and the origin of complex culture
is often thought to stem from the same evolutionary process in
early man. Linguists and evolutionary anthropologists suppose that
language evolved as early humans began to live in large communities
which required the use of complex communication to maintain social
coherence. Language and culture then both emerged as a means of
using symbols to construct social identity and maintain coherence
within a social group too large to rely exclusively on pre-human
ways of building community such as for example
grooming. Since language and culture are
both in essence symbolic systems, twentieth century cultural
theorists have applied the methods of analyzing language developed
in the science of linguistics to also analyze culture. Particularly
the
structural theory of
Ferdinand de Saussure, which describes
symbolic systems as consisting of signs (a pairing of a particular
form with a particular meaning), has come to be applied widely in
the study of culture. But also post-structuralist theories, that
nonetheless still rely on the parallel between language and culture
as systems of symbolic communication, have been applied in the
field of
semiotics. The parallel between
language and culture can then be understood as analog to the
parallel between a linguistic sign, consisting for example of the
sound [kau] and the meaning "cow", and a cultural sign, consisting
for example of the cultural form of "wearing a crown" and the
cultural meaning of "being king". In this way it can be argued that
culture is itself a kind of language. Another parallel between
cultural and linguistic systems is that they are both systems of
practice, that is they are a set of special ways of doing things
that is constructed and perpetuated through social interactions.
Children, for example, acquire language in the same way as they
acquire the basic cultural norms of the society they grow up in -
through interaction with older members of their cultural
group.
However, languages, now understood as the particular set of speech
norms of a particular community, are also a part of the larger
culture of the community that speak them. Humans use language as a
way of signalling identity with one cultural group and difference
from others. Even among speakers of one language several different
ways of using the language exist, and each is used to signal
affiliation with particular subgroups within a larger culture. In
linguistics such different ways of using the same language are
called "
varities". For
example, the English language is spoken differently in the USA, the
UK and Australia, and even within English-speaking countries there
are hundreds of
dialects of English that
each signal a belonging to a particular region and/or subculture.
For example, in the UK the
cockney dialect
signals its speakers' belonging to the group of lower class workers
of east London. Differences between varieties of the same language
often consist in different pronunciations and vocabulary, but also
sometimes of different grammatical systems and very often in using
different
styles (e.g. cockney
Rhyming slang or
Lawyers' jargon). Linguists and
anthropologists, particularly
sociolinguists,
ethnolinguists and
linguistic anthropologists have
specialized in studying how ways of speaking vary between speech
communities.
A community's ways of speaking or signing are a part of the
community's culture, just as other shared practices are. Language
use is a way of establishing and displaying group identity. Ways of
speaking function not only to facilitate communication, but also to
identify the social position of the speaker. Linguists calls
different ways of speaking language
varieties, a term that encompasses
geographically or socioculturally defined
dialects as well as the
jargons or
styles of
subcultures. Linguistic anthropologists and
sociologists of language define communicative style as the ways
that language is used and understood within a particular
culture.
The differences between languages does not consist only in
differences in pronunciation, vocabulary or grammar, but also in
different "cultures of speaking". Some cultures for example have
elaborate systems of "social deixis", systems of signalling social
distance through linguistic means. In English, social deixis is
shown mostly though distinguishing between addressing some people
by first name and others by surname, but also in titles such as
"Mrs.", "boy", "Doctor" or "Your Honor", but in other languages
such systems may be highly complex and codified in the entire
grammar and vocabulary of the language. In several languages of
east Asia, for example
Thai,
Burmese and
Javanese, different words are used according to
whether a speaker is addressing someone of higher or lower rank
than one self in a ranking system with animals and children ranking
the lowest and gods and membes of royalty as the highest. Other
languages may use different forms of address when speaking to
speakers of the opposite gender or in-law relatives and many
languages have special
ways of speaking to
infants and children. Among other groups, the culture of
speaking may entail
not speaking to particular people, for
example many indigenous cultures of Australia have a
taboo against talking to one's in-law relatives, and
in some cultures speech is not addressed directly to children. Some
languages also require different ways of speaking for different
social classes of speakers, and often such a system is based on
gender differences as well as in
Japanese and
Koasati.
Cultural anthropology
1899–1946: Universal versus particular
The modern anthropological understanding of culture has its origins
in the 19th century with German anthropologist
Adolf Bastian's theory of the "psychic unity
of mankind," which, influenced by Herder and von Humboldt,
challenged the identification of "culture" with the way of life of
European elites, and British anthropologist
Edward Burnett Tylor's attempt to
define culture as inclusively as possible. Tylor in 1874 described
culture in the following way: "Culture or
civilization, taken in its wide
ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."
Although Tylor was not aiming to propose a general theory of
culture (he explained his understanding of culture in the course of
a larger argument about the nature of religion), American
anthropologists have generally presented their various definitions
of culture as refinements of Tylor's. Franz Boas's student
Alfred Kroeber (1876–1970) identified culture
with the "superorganic," that is, a domain with ordering principles
and laws that could not be explained by or reduced to biology. In
1973, Gerald Weiss reviewed various definitions of culture and
debates as to their parsimony and power, and proposed as the most
scientifically useful definition that "culture" be defined "
as
our generic term for all human nongenetic, or metabiological,
phenomena" (italics in the original).
Franz Boas, founded modern American
anthropology with the establishment of the first graduate program
in anthropology at Columbia University in 1896. At the time the
dominant model of culture was that of
cultural evolution, which posited that
human societies progressed through stages of savagery to barbarism
to civilization; thus, societies that for example are based on
horticulture and
Iroquois kinship
terminology are less evolved that societies based on agriculture
and
Eskimo kinship terminology. One
of Boas's greatest accomplishments was to demonstrate convincingly
that this model is fundamentally flawed, empirically,
methodologically, and theoretically. Moreover, he felt that our
knowledge of different cultures was so incomplete, and often based
on unsystematic or unscientific research, that it was impossible to
develop any scientifically valid general model of human cultures.
Instead, he established the principle of
cultural relativism and trained students
to conduct rigorous
participant
observation field research in different societies. Boas
understood the capacity for culture to involve symbolic thought and
social learning, and considered the evolution of a capacity for
culture to coincide with the evolution of other, biological,
features defining
genus Homo.
Nevertheless, he argued that culture could not be reduced to
biology or other expressions of symbolic thought, such as language.
Boas and his students understood culture inclusively and resisted
developing a general definition of culture. Indeed, they resisted
identifying "culture" as a thing, instead using culture as an
adjective rather than a noun. Boas argued that cultural "types" or
"forms" are always in a state of flux. His student Alfred Kroeber
argued that the "unlimited receptivity and assimilativeness of
culture" made it practically impossible to think of cultures as
discrete things.
Boas's students dominated
cultural
anthropology through World War II, and continued to have great
influence through the 1960s. They were especially interested in two
phenomena: the great variety of forms culture took around the
world, and the many ways individuals were shaped by and acted
creatively through their own cultures. This led his students to
focus on the history of cultural traits: how they spread from one
society to another, and how their meanings changed over time—and
the life histories of members of other societies. Others, such as
Ruth Benedict (1887–1948) and
Margaret Mead (1901–1978), produced monographs
or comparative studies analyzing the forms of creativity possible
to individuals within specific cultural configurations. Essential
to their research was the concept of "context": culture provided a
context that made the behavior of individuals understandable;
geography and history provided a context for understanding the
differences between cultures. Thus, although Boasians were
committed to the belief in the psychic unity of humankind and the
universality of culture, their emphasis on local context and
cultural diversity led them away from proposing
cultural universals or universal theories
of culture.
There is a tension in cultural anthropology between the claim that
culture as a universal (the fact that all human societies have
culture), and that it is also particular (culture takes a
tremendous variety of forms around the world). Since Boas, two
debates have dominated cultural anthropology. The first has to do
with ways of modeling particular cultures. Specifically,
anthropologists have argued as to whether "culture" can be thought
of as a bounded and integrated thing, or as a quality of a diverse
collection of things, the numbers and meanings of which are in
constant flux. Boas's student Ruth Benedict suggested that in any
given society cultural traits may be more or less "integrated,"
that is, constituting a pattern of action and thought that gives
purpose to people's lives, and provides them with a basis from
which to evaluate new actions and thoughts, although she implies
that there are various degrees of integration; indeed, she observes
that some cultures fail to integrate. Boas, however, argued that
complete integration is rare and that a given culture only appears
to be integrated because of observer bias. For Boas, the appearance
of such patterns—a national culture, for example—was the effect of
a particular point of view.
The first debate was effectively suspended in 1934 when Ruth
Benedict published
Patterns of
Culture, which has continuously been in print. Although this
book is well known for popularizing the Boasian principle of
cultural relativism, among
anthropologists it constituted both an important summary of the
discoveries of Boasians, and a decisive break from Boas's emphasis
on the mobility of diverse cultural traits. "Anthropological work
has been overwhelmingly devoted to the analysis of cultural
traits," she wrote "rather than to the study of cultures as
articulated wholes." Influenced by Polish-British social
anthropologist
Bronislaw
Malinowski, however, she argued that "The first essential, so
it seems today, is to study the living culture, to know its habits
of thought and the functions of its institutions" and that "the
only way in which we can know the significance of the selected
detail of behavior is against the background of the motives and
emotions and values that are institutionalized in that culture."
Influenced by German historians
Wilhelm
Dilthey and
Oswald Spengler, as
well as by
gestalt psychology,
she argued that "the whole determines its parts, not only their
relation but their very nature," and that "cultures, likewise, are
more than the sum of their traits." Just as each spoken language
draws very selectively from an extensive, but finite, set of sounds
any human mouth (free from defect) can make, she concluded that in
each society people, over time and through both conscious and
unconscious processes, selected from an extensive but finite set of
cultural traits which then combine to form a unique and distinctive
pattern."
- The significance of cultural behavior is not exhausted when we
have clearly understood that it is local and man-made and hugely
variable. It tends to be integrated. A culture, like an individual,
is a more or less consistent pattern of thought and action. Within
each culture there come into being characteristic purposes not
necessarily shared by other types of society. In obedience to their
purposes, each people further and further consolodates its
experience, and in proportion to the urgency of these drives the
heterogeneous items of behavior take more and more congruous shape.
Taken up by a well-integrated culture, the most ill-assorted acts
become characteristic of its particular goals, often by the most
unlikely metamorphoses.
Although Benedict felt that virtually all cultures are patterened,
she argued that these patterns change over time as a consequence of
human creativity, and therefore different societies around the
world had distinct characters.
Patterns of Culture
contrasts
Zuňi,
Dobu
and
Kwakiutl cultures as a way of
highlighting different ways of being human. Benedict observed that
many Westerners felt that this view forced them to abandon their
"dreams of permanence and ideality and with the individual's
illusions of autonomy" and that for many, this made existence
"empty." She argued however that once people accepted the results
of scientific research, people would "arrive then at a more
realistic social faith, accepting as grounds of hope and as new
bases for tolerance the coexisting and equally valid patterns of
life which mankind has created for itself from the raw materials of
existence."
This view of culture has had a tremendous impact outside of
anthropology, and dominated American anthropology until
the Cold War, when anthropologists like
Sidney Mintz and
Eric Wolf rejected the validity and value of
approaching "each culture" as "a world in itself" and "relatively
stable.". They felt that, too often, this approach ignored the
impact of
imperialism,
colonialism, and the world
capitalist economy on the peoples Benedict and
her followers studied (and thus re-opened the debate on the
relationship between the universal and the particular, in the form
of the relationship between the global and the local). In the
meantime, its emphasis on metamorphising patterns influenced French
structuralism and made American
anthropologists receptive to British
structural-functionalism.

Mexican village with the nodes as
marriages

Iroqois Kinship Structure

Culinary triangle
The second debate has been over the ability to make universal
claims about all cultures. Although Boas argued that
anthropologists had yet to collect enough solid evidence from a
diverse sample of societies to make any valid general or universal
claims about culture, by the 1940s some felt ready. Whereas Kroeber
and Benedict had argued that "culture"—which could refer to local,
regional, or trans-regional scales—was in some way "patterned" or
"configured," some anthropologists now felt that enough data had
been collected to demonstrate that it often took highly structured
forms. The question these anthropologists debated was, were these
structures statistical artifacts, or where they expressions of
mental models? This debate emerged full-fledged in 1949, with the
publication of
George Murdock's
Social Structure, and
Claude Lévi-Strauss's
Les
Structures Élémentaires de la Parenté.
Opposing
Boas and his students, Yale
anthropologist George Murdock, who
compiled the Human Relations
Area Files. These files code cultural variables found in
different societies, so that anthropologists can use
statistical methods to study correlations among
different variables. The ultimate aim of this project is to develop
generalizations that apply to increasingly larger numbers of
individual cultures. Later, Murdock and
Douglas R. White developed the
standard cross-cultural
sample as a way to refine this method.
French anthropologist
Claude
Lévi-Strauss's
structuralist
anthropology brought together ideas of Boas (especially Boas's
belief in the mutability of cultural forms, and Bastian's belief in
the psychic unity of humankind) and French sociologist's
Émile Durkheim's focus on social
structures (institutionalized relationships among persons and
groups of persons). Instead of making generalizations that applied
to large numbers of societies, Lévi-Strauss sought to derive from
concrete cases increasingly abstract models of human nature. His
method begins with the supposition that culture exists in two
different forms: the many distinct structures that could be
inferred from observing members of the same society interact (and
of which members of a society are themselves aware), and abstract
structures developed by analyzing shared ways (such as
myths and
rituals) members of a
society represent their social life (and of which members of a
society are not only
not consciously aware, and which
typically stand in opposition to, or negate, the social structures
of which people
are aware). He then sought to develop one
universal mental structure that could only be inferred through the
systematic comparison of particular social and cultural structures.
He argued that just as there are laws through which a finite and
relatively small number of chemical elements could be combined to
create a seemingly infinite variety of things, there were a finite
and relatively small number of cultural elements which people
combine to create the great variety of cultures anthropologists
observe. The systematic comparison of societies would enable an
anthropologist to develop this cultural "table of elements," and
once completed, this table of cultural elements would enable an
anthropologist to analyze specific cultures and achieve insights
hidden to the very people who produced and lived through these
cultures. Structuralism came to dominate French anthropology and,
in the late 1960s and 1970s, came to have great influence on
American and British anthropology.
Murdock's HRAF and Lévi-Strauss's structuralism provide two
ambitious ways to seek the universal in the particular, and both
approaches continue to appeal to different anthropologists.
However, the differences between them reveal a tension implicit in
the heritage of Tylor and Bastian. Is culture to be found in
empirically observed behaviors that may
form the basis of generalizations? Or does it consist of universal
mental processes, which must be inferred and abstracted from
observed behavior? This question has driven debates among
biological anthropologists and
archeologists as well.
Structural-Functionalist challenge: Society versus culture
In the 1940s the Boasian understanding of culture was challenged by
a new paradigm for anthropological and social science research
called
Structural
functionalism. This paradigm developed independently but in
parallel in both the United Kingdom and in the United States (In
both cases it is
sui generis: it has no direct
relationship to "structuralism" except that both French
structuralism and Anglo-American Structural-Functionalism were all
influenced by Durkheim. It is also analogous, but unrelated to,
other forms of "functionalism"). Whereas the Boasians viewed
anthropology as that natural science dedicated to the study of
humankind, structural functionalists viewed anthropology as one
social science among many, dedicated to the study of one specific
facet of humanity. This led structural-functionalists to redefine
and minimize the scope of "culture."
In the United Kingdom, the creation of structural functionalism was
anticipated by
Raymond Firth's
(1901–2002)
We the Tikopia, published in 1936, and marked
by the publication of
African Political Systems, edited by
Meyer Fortes (1906–1983) and
E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1902–1973) in 1940. In
these works these anthropologists forwarded a synthesis of the
ideas of their mentor,
Bronislaw
Malinowski (1884-1942), and his rival,
A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955). Both
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown viewed anthropology—what they call
"
social anthropology"—as that
branch of sociology that studied so-called primitive societies.
According to Malinowski's theory of
functionalism, all human beings
have certain biological needs, such as the need for food and
shelter, and humankind has the biological need to reproduce. Every
society develops its own institutions, which function to fulfill
these needs. In order for these institutions to function,
individuals take on particular social roles that regulate how they
act and interact. Although members of any given society may not
understand the ultimate functions of their roles and institutions,
an ethnographer can develop a model of these functions through the
careful observation of social life. Radcliffe-Brown rejected
Malinowski's notion of function, and believed that a general theory
of primitive social life could only be built up through the careful
comparison of different societies. Influenced by the work of French
sociologist
Émile Durkheim
(1858–1917), who argued that primitive and modern societies are
distinguished by distinct social structures, Radcliffe-Brown argued
that anthropologists first had to map out the social structure of
any given society before comparing the structures of different
societies. Firth, Fortes, and Evans-Pritchard found it easy to
combine Malinowski's attention to social roles and institutions
with Radcliffe-Brown's concern with social structures. They
distinguished between "social organization" (observable social
interactions) and "social structure" (rule-governed patterns of
social interaction), and shifted their attention from biological
functions to social functions (for example, how different
institutions are functionally integrated, and the extent to, and
ways in, which institutions function to promote social solidarity
and stability. In short, instead of culture (understood as all
human non-genetic or extra-somatic phenomena)they made "sociality"
(interations and relationships among persons and groups of people)
their object of study. (Indeed, Radcliffe-Brown once wrote "I
should like to invoke a taboo on the word
culture.")
Coincidentally, in 1946 sociologist Talcott
Parsons (1902–1979) founded the Department of Social
Relations at Harvard University
. Influenced by such European sociologists as
Émile Durkheim and
Max Weber, Parsons developed a theory of social
action that was closer to British
social anthropology than to Boas's
American anthropology, and which he also called "structural
functionalism." Parson's intention was to develop a total theory of
social action (why people act as they do), and to develop at
Harvard and inter-disciplinary program that would direct research
according to this theory. His model explained human action as the
result of four systems:
- the "behavioral system" of biological needs
- the "personality system" of an individual's characteristics
affecting their functioning in the social world
- the "social system" of patterns of units of social interaction,
especially social status and role
- the "cultural system" of norms and values that regulate social
action symbolically
According to this theory, the second system was the proper object
of study for psychologists; the third system for sociologists, and
the fourth system for cultural anthropologists. Whereas the
Boasians considered all of these systems to be objects of study by
anthropologists, and "personality" and "status and role" to be as
much a part of "culture" as "norms and values," Parsons envisioned
a much narrower role for anthropology and a much narrower
definition of culture.
Although Boasian cultural anthropologists were interested in norms
and values, among many other things, it was only with the rise of
structural functionalism that people came to identify "culture"
with "norms and values." Many American anthropologists rejected
this view of culture (and by implication, anthropology). In 1980,
anthropologist
Eric Wolf wrote,
- As the social sciences transformed themselves into "behavioral"
science, explanations for behavior were no longer traced to
culture: behavior was to be understood in terms of psychological
encounters, strategies of economic choice, strivings for payoffs in
games of power. Culture, once extended to all acts and ideas
employed in social life, was now relegated to the margins as "world
view" or "values."
Nevertheless, several of Talcott Parsons' students emerged as
leading American anthropologists. At the same time, many American
anthropologists had a high regard for the research produced by
social anthropologists in the 1940s and 1950s, and found
structural-functionalism to provide a very useful model for
conducting ethnographic research.
The combination of American cultural anthropology theory with
British social anthropology methods has led to some confusion
between the concepts of "society" and "culture." For most
anthropologists, these are distinct concepts. Society refers to a
group of people; culture refers to a pan-human capacity and the
totality of non-genetic human phenomena. Societies are often
clearly bounded; cultural traits are often mobile, and cultural
boundaries, such as they are, are typically porous, permeable, and
plural. During the 1950s and 1960s anthropologists often worked in
places where social and cultural boundaries coincided, thus
obscuring the distinction.
When disjunctures between these boundaries
become highly salient, for example during the period of European
de-colonization of Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, or during the
post-Bretton
Woods
realignment of globalization, however, the difference often
becomes central to anthropological debates.
1946–1968: Symbolic versus adaptive
Parsons' students
Clifford Geertz
and
David M. Schneider, and Schneider's student
Roy Wagner, went on to important careers
as cultural anthropologists and developed a school within American
cultural anthropology called "symbolic anthropology," the study of
the social construction and social effects of symbols. Since
symbolic anthropology easily complemented social anthropologists'
studies of social life and social structure, many British
structural-functionalists (who rejected or were uninterested in
Boasian cultural anthropology) accepted the Parsonian definition of
"culture" and "cultural anthropology." British anthropologist
Victor Turner (who eventually left the
United Kingdom to teach in the United States) was an important
bridge between American and British symbolic anthropology.
Attention to symbols, the meaning of which depended almost entirely
on their historical and social context, appealed to many Boasians.
Leslie White asked of cultural things,
"What sort of objects are they? Are they physical objects? Mental
objects? Both? Metaphors? Symbols? Reifications?" In
Science of
Culture (1949), he concluded that they are objects
"
sui generis"; that is, of
their own kind. In trying to define that kind, he hit upon a
previously unrealized aspect of symbolization, which he called "the
symbolate"—an object created by the act of symbolization. He thus
defined culture as "symbolates understood in an extra-somatic
context."
Nevertheless, by the 1930s White began turning away from the
Boasian approach. He wrote,
- In order to live man, like all other species, must come to
terms with the external world.... Man employs his sense organs,
nerves, glands, and muscles in adjusting himself to the external
world. But in addition to this he has another means of adjustment
and control.... This mechanism is culture.
Although this view echoes that of Malinowski, the key concept for
White was not "function" but "adaptation." Whereas the Boasians
were interested in the history of specific traits, White was
interested in the cultural history of the human species, which he
felt should be studied from an evolutionary perspective. Thus, the
task of anthropology is to study "not only how culture evolves, but
why as well.... In the case of man ... the power to invent and to
discover, the ability to select and use the better of two tools or
ways of doing something- these are the factors of cultural
evolution." Unlike 19th century evolutionists, who were concerned
with how civilized societies rose above primitive societies, White
was interested in documenting how, over time, humankind as a whole
has through cultural means discovered more and more ways for
capturing and harnessing energy from the environment, in the
process transforming culture.
At the same time that White was developing his theory of
cultural evolution, Kroeber's student
Julian Steward was developing his
theory of
cultural ecology. In 1938
he published
Basin-Plateau Aboriginal Socio-Political
Groups in which he argued that diverse societies—for example
the indigenous
Shoshone or White farmers on
the Great Plains—were not less or more evolved; rather, they had
adapted differently to different environments. Whereas Leslie White
was interested in culture understood holistically as a property of
the human species, Julian Steward was interested in culture as the
property of distinct societies. Like White he viewed culture as a
means of adapting to the environment, but he criticized Whites
"unilineal" (one direction) theory of cultural evolution and
instead proposed a model of "multilineal" evolution in which (in
the Boasian tradition) each society has its own cultural
history.
When Julian Steward left a teaching position at the University of
Michigan to work in Utah in 1930, Leslie White took his place; in
1946 Julian Steward was made Chair of the Columbia University
Anthropology Department. In the 1940s and 1950s their students,
most notably
Marvin Harris,
Sidney Mintz,
Robert
Murphy,
Roy Rappaport,
Marshall Sahlins,
Elman Service,
Andrew P. Vayda and
Eric Wolf
dominated American anthropology. Most promoted materialist
understandings of culture in opposition to the symbolic approaches
of Geertz and Schneider. Harris, Rappaport, and Vayda were
especially important for their contributions to
cultural materialism and
ecological anthropology,
both of which argued that "culture" constituted an extra-somatic
(or non-biological) means through which human beings could adapt to
life in drastically differing physical environments.
The debate between symbolic and materialist approaches to culture
dominated American Anthropologists in the 1960s and 1970s. The
Vietnam War and the publication of
Dell Hymes'
Reinventing
Anthropology, however, marked a growing dissatisfaction with
the then dominant approaches to culture. Hymes argued that
fundamental elements of the Boasian project such as holism and an
interest in diversity were still worth pursuing: "interest in other
peoples and their ways of life, and concern to explain them within
a frame of reference that includes ourselves." Moreover, he argued
that cultural anthropologists are singularly well-equipped to lead
this study (with an indirect rebuke to sociologists like Parsons
who sought to subsume anthropology to their own project):
- In the practice there is a traditional place for openness to
phenomena in ways not predefined by theory or design –
attentiveness to complex phenomena, to phenomena of interest,
perhaps aesthetic, for their own sake, to the sensory as well as
intellectual, aspects of the subject. These comparative and
practical perspectives, though not unique to formal anthropology,
are specially husbanded there, and might well be impaired, if the
study of man were to be united under the guidance of others who
lose touch with experience in concern for methodology, who forget
the ends of social knowledge in elaborating its means, or who are
unwittingly or unconcernedly culture-bound..
It is these elements, Hymes argued, that justify a "general study
of man," that is, "anthropology".
During this time notable anthropologists such as Mintz, Murphy,
Sahlins, and Wolf eventually broke away, experimenting with
structuralist and
Marxist approaches to culture, they continued to
promote cultural anthropology against structural
functionalism.
1940–present: Local versus global
Boas and Malinowski established ethnographic research as a highly
localized method for studying culture. Yet Boas emphasized that
culture is dynamic, moving from one group of people to another, and
that specific cultural forms have to be analyzed in a larger
context. This has led anthropologists to explore different ways of
understanding the global dimensions of culture.
In the 1940s and 1950s, several key studies focused on how trade
between indigenous peoples and the Europeans who had conquered and
colonized the Americas influenced indigenous culture, either
through change in the organization of labor, or change in critical
technologies.
Bernard Mishkin
studied the effect of the introduction of horses on
Kiowa political organization and warfare.
Oscar Lewis explored the influence of the fur
trade on
Blackfoot culture
(relying heavily on historical sources).
Joseph Jablow documented how
Cheyenne social organization and subsistence
strategy between 1795 and 1840 were determined by their position in
trade networks linking Whites and other Indians.
Frank Secoy argued that Great Plains
Indians' social organization and military tactics
changed as horses, introduced by the Spanish in the south, diffused
north, and guns, introduced by the British and French in the east,
diffused west.
In the 1950s
Robert Redfield and
students of
Julian Steward pioneered
"community studies," namely, the study of distinct communities
(whether identified by race, ethnicity, or economic class) in
Western or "Westernized" societies, especially cities. They thus
encountered the antagonisms 19th century critics described using
the terms "high culture" and "low culture." These 20th century
anthropologists struggled to describe people who were politically
and economically inferior but not, they believed, culturally
inferior.
Oscar Lewis proposed the
concept of a "culture of poverty" to describe the cultural
mechanisms through which people adapted to a life of economic
poverty. Other anthropologists and sociologists began using the
term "sub-culture" to describe culturally distinct communities that
were part of larger societies.
One important kind of subculture is that formed by an immigrant
community. In dealing with immigrant groups and their cultures,
there are various approaches:
- Leitkultur (core culture): A model
developed in Germany by Bassam Tibi. The
idea is that minorities can have an identity of their own, but they
should at least support the core concepts of the culture on which
the society is based.
- Melting Pot: In
the United
States
, the traditional view has been one of a melting pot
where all the immigrant cultures are mixed and amalgamated without
state intervention.
- Monoculturalism: In some
European states, culture is very closely linked to nationalism, thus government policy is to
assimilate immigrants, although recent increases in migration have
led many European states to experiment with forms of
multiculturalism.
- Multiculturalism: A policy that
immigrants and others should preserve their cultures with the
different cultures interacting peacefully within one nation.
The way nation states treat immigrant cultures rarely falls neatly
into one or another of the above approaches. The degree of
difference with the host culture (i.e., "foreignness"), the number
of immigrants, attitudes of the resident population, the type of
government policies that are enacted, and the effectiveness of
those policies all make it difficult to generalize about the
effects. Similarly with other subcultures within a society,
attitudes of the mainstream population and communications between
various cultural groups play a major role in determining outcomes.
The study of cultures within a society is complex and research must
take into account a myriad of variables.
Cultural studies
In the United Kingdom, sociologists and other scholars influenced
by
Marxism, such as
Stuart Hall and
Raymond Williams, developed
Cultural Studies. Following nineteenth
century Romantics, they identified "culture" with consumption goods
and leisure activities (such as art, music, film, food, sports, and
clothing). Nevertheless, they understood patterns of consumption
and leisure to be determined by relations of production, which led
them to focus on class relations and the organization of
production. In the United States, "Cultural Studies" focuses
largely on the study of
popular
culture, that is, the social meanings of mass-produced consumer
and leisure goods. The term was coined by
Richard Hoggart in 1964 when he founded the
Birmingham
Centre for Contemporary
Cultural Studies or CCCS. It has since become strongly
associated with
Stuart
Hall, who succeeded Hoggart as Director.
From the 1970s onward, Stuart Hall's pioneering work, along with
his colleagues
Paul
Willis,
Dick Hebdige, Tony
Jefferson, and
Angela McRobbie,
created an international intellectual movement. As the field
developed it began to combine
political economy,
communication,
sociology,
social
theory,
literary theory,
media theory,
film/video studies,
cultural anthropology,
philosophy,
museum
studies and
art history in order to
study cultural phenomena or cultural texts. In this field
researchers often concentrate on how particular phenomena relate to
matters of
ideology,
nationality,
ethnicity,
social class, and/or
gender. Cultural studies is concerned with the
meaning and practices
of everyday life. These practices comprise the ways people do
particular things (such as watching television, or eating out) in a
given culture. This field studies the meanings and uses people
attribute to various objects and practices. Recently, as
capitalism has spread throughout the world (a
process called
globalization),
cultural studies has begun to analyse local and global forms of
resistance to Western hegemony.
In the context of cultural studies, the idea of a
text not only includes written language, but also
films,
photograph,
fashion or
hairstyles: the texts of cultural studies comprise
all the meaningful artifacts of culture. Similarly, the discipline
widens the concept of "culture". "Culture" for a cultural studies
researcher not only includes traditional
high culture (the culture of
ruling social
groups) and
popular culture, but
also everyday meanings and practices. The last two, in fact, have
become the main focus of cultural studies. A further and recent
approach is
comparative
cultural studies, based on the discipline of
comparative literature and cultural
studies.
Scholars
in the United
Kingdom
and the United States
developed somewhat different versions of cultural
studies after the field's inception in the late 1970s. The
British version of cultural studies was developed in the 1950s and
1960s mainly under the influence first of Richard Hoggart,
E. P.
Thompson, and Raymond Williams, and later Stuart Hall and
others at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the
University of
Birmingham
. This included overtly political,
left-wing views, and criticisms of
popular culture as 'capitalist'
mass culture; it absorbed some of the
ideas of the
Frankfurt School
critique of the "
culture industry"
(i.e. mass culture). This emerges in the writings of early British
cultural-studies scholars and their influences: see the work of
(for example) Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall, Paul Willis, and
Paul Gilroy.
Whereas in the United States Lindlof & Taylor say that
"cultural studies was grounded in a pragmatic, liberal-pluralist
tradition". The American version of cultural studies initially
concerned itself more with understanding the subjective and
appropriative side of audience reactions to, and uses of,
mass culture; for example, American
cultural-studies advocates wrote about the liberatory aspects of
fandom. The distinction between American and
British strands, however, has faded. Some researchers, especially
in early British cultural studies, apply a
Marxist model to the field. This strain of thinking
has some influence from the
Frankfurt
School, but especially from the
structuralist Marxism of
Louis Althusser and others. The main focus
of an orthodox Marxist approach concentrates on the
production of
meaning. This model assumes a
mass production of culture and identifies power as residing with
those producing
cultural
artifacts. In a Marxist view, those who control the
means of production (the economic
base) essentially control a culture. Other approaches to
cultural studies, such as
feminist cultural
studies and later American developments of the field, distance
themselves from this view. They criticize the Marxist assumption of
a single, dominant meaning, shared by all, for any cultural
product. The non-Marxist approaches suggest that different ways of
consuming cultural artifacts affect the meaning of the product.
This view is best exemplified by the book
Doing Cultural
Studies: The Case of the Sony Walkman (by Paul du Gay et al.),
which seeks to challenge the notion that those who produce
commodities control the meanings that people attribute to them.
Feminist cultural analyst, theorist and art historian
Griselda Pollock contributed to cultural
studies from viewpoints of
art history
and
psychoanalysis. The writer
Julia Kristeva is influential voices
in the turn of the century, contributing to cultural studies from
the field of art and psychoanalytical
French feminism.
Cultural change
Cultural invention has come to
mean any innovation that is new and found to be useful to a group
of people and expressed in their behavior but which does not exist
as a physical object. Humanity is in a global "accelerating culture
change period", driven by the expansion of international commerce,
the mass media, and above all, the
human population explosion, among other
factors.
Cultures are internally affected by both forces encouraging change
and forces resisting change. These forces are related to both
social structures and natural
events, and are involved in the perpetuation of cultural ideas and
practices within current structures, which themselves are subject
to change. (See
structuration.)
Social conflict and the development of technologies can produce
changes within a society by altering social dynamics and promoting
new
cultural models, and spurring or
enabling
generative action. These
social shifts may accompany
ideological
shifts and other types of cultural change. For example, the U.S.
feminist movement involved new
practices that produced a shift in gender relations, altering both
gender and economic structures. Environmental conditions may also
enter as factors. Changes include following for the film local
hero. For example, after tropical forests returned at the end of
the last
ice age, plants suitable for
domestication were available, leading to the invention of
agriculture, which in turn brought about many
cultural innovations and shifts in social dynamics.
Cultures are externally affected via contact between societies,
which may also produce—or inhibit—social shifts and changes in
cultural practices. War or competition over resources may impact
technological development or social dynamics. Additionally,
cultural ideas may transfer from one society to another, through
diffusion or acculturation. In
diffusion, the form of something
(though not necessarily its meaning) moves from one culture to
another. For example,
hamburgers, mundane
in the United States, seemed exotic when introduced into China.
"Stimulus diffusion" (the sharing of ideas) refers to an element of
one culture leading to an invention or propagation in another.
"Direct Borrowing" on the other hand tends to refer to
technological or tangible diffusion from one culture to another.
Diffusion of innovations
theory presents a research-based model of why and when individuals
and cultures adopt new ideas, practices, and products.
Acculturation has different meanings,
but in this context refers to replacement of the traits of one
culture with those of another, such has happened to certain
Native American
tribes and to many indigenous peoples across the globe during the
process of
colonization. Related
processes on an individual level include
assimilation (adoption of a different
culture by an individual) and
transculturation.
See also
Notes
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- Williams (1983), p.90. Cited in Shuker, Roy (1994).
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argues that contemporary definitions of culture fall into three
possibilities or mixture of the following three: * "a general
process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development" * "a
particular way of life, whether of a people, period, or a group" *
"the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic
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