The
Falklands War ( ), also called the
Falklands Conflict/Crisis, was fought in 1982
between Argentina
and the United Kingdom
(UK) over the disputed Falkland Islands
and South Georgia and the South Sandwich
Islands
. The Falkland Islands consist of two large and
many small islands in the South Atlantic Ocean
east of Argentina; their name and sovereignty over
them
have long been disputed.
The Falklands War started on Friday, 2 April 1982 with the
Argentine invasion and occupation of the Falkland Islands and South
Georgia, and ended with the Argentine surrender on 14 June 1982.
The war lasted 74 days, and resulted in the deaths of
255 British and 649 Argentine soldiers, sailors, and
airmen, and three civilian Falklanders. It was the last conflict
carried by the UK without any allied states.
The conflict was the result of a protracted
diplomatic confrontation
regarding the sovereignty of the islands. Neither state officially
declared war and the fighting was
largely limited to the territories under dispute and the South
Atlantic. The initial invasion was characterised by Argentina as
the re-occupation of its own territory, and by the UK as an
invasion of a
British
dependent territory.
Britain launched a naval
task force to
engage the
Argentine Navy and
Argentine Air Force, and retake
the islands by
amphibious
assault. The British eventually prevailed and at the end of
combat operations on 14 June the islands remained under British
control. However, as of 2009 and as it has since the 19th century,
Argentina shows no sign of relinquishing its claim. The claim
remains in the
Argentine
constitution after its reformation in 1994.The political
effects of the war were strong in both countries. A wave of
patriotic sentiment swept through both: the Argentine loss prompted
even larger protests against the military government, which
hastened its downfall; in the United Kingdom, the government of
Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher was bolstered.
It helped Thatcher's government to victory in the
1983 general election,
which prior to the war was seen as by no means certain. The war has
played an important role in the culture of both countries, and has
been the subject of several books, films, and songs. The cultural
and political weight of the conflict has had less effect on the
British public than on that of Argentina, where the war is still a
topic of discussion.
Lead-up to the conflict
In the period leading up to the war, and especially following the
transfer of power between General
Jorge Rafael Videla and General
Roberto Eduardo Viola in late-March
1981, Argentina had been in the midst of a devastating
economic crisis and large-scale
civil unrest against the
military junta that had been governing
the country since 1976. The newspaper
La Prensa speculated in a
step-by-step plan beginning with cutting off supplies to the
Islands, ending in direct actions late 1982, if the UN talks were
fruitless. In December 1981 there was a further change in the
Argentine military regime bringing to office a new
junta
headed by General
Leopoldo
Galtieri (acting president), Brigadier
Basilio Lami Dozo and Admiral
Jorge Anaya. Anaya would be the main architect
and supporter of a military solution for the long standing claim
over the islands, calculating that the United Kingdom would never
respond militarily. In doing so the Galtieri government hoped to
mobilise Argentines' long-standing patriotic feelings towards the
islands and thus divert public attention from the country's chronic
economic problems and the regime's ongoing human rights violations.
Such action would also bolster its dwindling legitimacy. The
ongoing tension between the two countries over the islands
increased on 19 March when a group of hired Argentine scrap metal
merchants raised the
Argentine
flag at South Georgia, an act that would later be seen as the
first offensive action in the war. The Argentine military junta,
suspecting that the UK would reinforce its South Atlantic Forces,
ordered the
invasion of the Falkland
Islands to be brought forward to 2 April.
Britain was initially taken by surprise by the Argentine attack on
the South Atlantic islands, despite repeated warnings by Royal Navy
captain Nicholas Barker and others. Barker believed that the
intention expressed in Defence Secretary John Nott's 1981 review to
withdraw the Royal Navy ship
HMS
Endurance, Britain's only naval presence in the South
Atlantic, sent a signal to the Argentines that Britain was
unwilling, and would soon be unable, to defend her territories and
subjects in the Falklands.
War
Invasion by Argentina
On 2 April
1982, Argentine
forces mounted amphibious landings of the Falkland
Islands
, following the civilian occupation of South
Georgia on March 19, before the Falklands War began.
The
invasion involved initial defence organised by the Falkland Islands' Governor
Sir Rex Hunt giving command to
Major Mike Norman of the Royal
Marines, the landing of Lieutenant Commander Guillermo
Sanchez-Sabarots' Amphibious
Commandos Group, the attack on Moody Brook barracks, the
engagement between the troops of Hugo Santillan and Bill Trollope
at Stanley
, and the battle and final surrender of Government
House.
Initial British response to the invasion
Word of the invasion first reached Britain via
amateur radio. The retaking of the Falkland
Islands was considered extremely difficult: the main constraint was
the disparity in deployable air cover (the British having 34
Harrier aircraft against
Argentina's 220 jet
fighters). The U.S. Navy considered a successful invasion by
the British to be 'a military impossibility'.
By
mid-April, the Royal Air Force had
set up an airbase
at Wideawake on the mid-Atlantic
island of
Ascension
, including a sizable force of Avro Vulcan B Mk 2 bombers, Handley Page
Victor K Mk 2 refuelling
aircraft, and McDonnell Douglas
Phantom FGR Mk 2 fighters to
protect them. Meanwhile the main British naval task force
arrived at Ascension to prepare for war. A small force had already
been sent south to recapture South Georgia.
Encounters began in April; the British Task Force was shadowed by
Boeing 707 aircraft of the
Argentine Air Force during their travel
to the south. Several of these flights were intercepted outside the
British-imposed exclusion zone, by
BAE
Sea Harriers; the unarmed 707 were not attacked because
diplomatic moves were still in progress and the UK had not yet
decided to commit itself to war. On April 23 a Brazilian commercial
Douglas DC-10 from
VARIG Airlines en route to South Africa was
intercepted. The Harriers sent to investigate were able to visually
identify the civilian plane.
Recapture of South Georgia and the attack on the Santa Fe
The South
Georgia force, Operation Paraquet
, under the command of Major Guy Sheridan RM,
consisted of Marines from 42 Commando, a
troop of the Special Air
Service
(SAS) and Special Boat Service
(SBS) troops who were intended to land as reconnaissance forces for an invasion by the
Royal Marines. All were
embarked on
RFA
Tidespring. First to arrive was the
Churchill-class submarine
HMS Conqueror on 19
April, and the island was over-flown by a radar-mapping
Handley Page Victor on 20 April.
The first
landings of SAS troops took place on 21 April, but—with the
southern hemisphere autumn setting in—the weather was so bad that
their landings and others made the next day were all withdrawn
after two helicopters crashed in fog on Fortuna Glacier
.On 23 April, a submarine alert was sounded
and operations were halted, with the
Tidespring being
withdrawn to deeper water to avoid interception. On 24 April, the
British forces regrouped and headed in to attack the submarine.
On 25
April, after resupplying the Argentine garrison in South Georgia,
ARA Santa
Fe
was spotted on the surface by a Westland Wessex HAS Mk 3 helicopter from
HMS Antrim, which attacked
the Argentine submarine with depth
charges. HMS
Plymouth launched a
Westland
Wasp HAS.Mk.1 helicopter, and
HMS Brilliant launched a
Westland Lynx HAS Mk 2. The Lynx
launched a
torpedo, and
strafed the submarine with its
pintle-mounted
General Purpose Machine Gun; the
Wessex also fired on the
Santa Fe with its GPMG. The Wasp
from HMS
Plymouth as well as two other Wasps launched from
HMS Endurance fired
AS-12 ASM antiship missiles at the submarine,
scoring hits.
Santa Fe was damaged badly enough to prevent
her from submerging. The crew abandoned the submarine at the jetty
at
King Edward Point on South
Georgia.
With the
Tidespring now far out to sea and the Argentine
forces augmented by the submarine's crew, Major Sheridan decided to
gather the 76 men he had and make a direct assault that day. After
a short forced march by the British troops, the Argentine forces
surrendered without resistance. The message sent from the naval
force at South Georgia to London was, "Be pleased to inform Her
Majesty that the
White Ensign flies
alongside the
Union Jack in South
Georgia. God Save the Queen."Prime Minister Thatcher broke the news
to the media, telling them to "Just rejoice at that news!"
Black Buck raids
On 1 May operations against the Falklands opened with the "Black
Buck 1" attack (of a series of five) on the airfield at Stanley.
The overall effect of the raids on the war is difficult to
determine, and the raids consumed precious tanker
resources."... to get twenty-one bombs to Port Stanley is
going to take about one million, one hundred thousand pounds of
fuel - equalled
[sic] about 137,000 gallons.
That was enough fuel to fly 260 Sea Harrier bombing missions over
Port Stanley. Which in turn meant just over 1300 bombs. Interesting
stuff!" page 186 in Sharkey Ward: Sea Harrier over the Falklands,
1992, Cassell Military Paperbacks, ISBN 0-304-35542-9 The raids did
minimal damage to the runway and damage to radars was quickly
repaired. Commonly dismissed as post-war propaganda,"Propaganda
was, of course, used later to try to justify these missions: 'The
Mirage IIIs were redrawn from Southern Argentina to Buenos Aires to
add to the defences there following the Vulcan raids on the
islands.' Apparently the logic behind this statement was that if
the Vulcan could hit Port Stanley, the
[sic]
Buenos Aires was well within range as well and was vulnerable to
similar attacks. I never went along with that baloney. A lone
Vulcan or two running in to attack Buenos Aires without fighter
support would have been shot to hell in quick time."-"Mirage IIIs
were in evidence near the islands on several occasions during the
conflict, either escorting the Neptune reconnaissance missions or
on 'interference' flights that attempted to draw CAP attention away
from air-to-ground attacks."-"Suffice it to say that you didn't
need more than one or two Mirage IIIs to intercept a Vulcan attack
on Buenos Aires"-"It would have taken much more than a lone Vulcan
raid to upset Buenos Aires" pages 247-48 in Sea Harrier over the
Falklands Argentine sources were originally the source of claims
that the Vulcan raids influenced Argentina to withdraw Mirage IIIs
from Southern Argentina to the Buenos Aires Defence Zone. This
dissuasive effect was however watered down when British officials
made clear that there would be no strikes on air bases in
Argentina.
Of the five Black Buck raids, three were against Stanley Airfield,
with the other two anti-radar missions using
Shrike anti-radiation missiles.
Escalation of the air war
The Falklands had only three airfields.
The longest and only
paved runway was at the capital, Stanley
, and even it was too short to support fast
jets. Therefore, the Argentines were forced to launch their
major strikes from the mainland, severely hampering their efforts
at forward staging,
combat air
patrols and
close air support
over the islands. The effective loiter time of incoming Argentine
aircraft was low, and they were later compelled to overfly British
forces in any attempt to attack the islands.
The first major Argentine strike force comprised 36 aircraft
(
McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawks,
Israel Aircraft Industries Daggers,
English Electric B Mk 62
Canberras, and
Dassault Mirage
III escorts), and was sent on 1 May, in the belief that the
British invasion was imminent or landings had already taken place.
Only a section of Grupo 6 (flying
IAI
Dagger aircraft) found ships, which were firing at Argentine
defences near the islands. The Daggers managed to attack the ships
and return safely. This greatly boosted morale of the Argentine
pilots, who now knew they could survive an attack against modern
warships, protected by radar ground clutter from the Islands and by
using a late
pop-up profile.
Meanwhile, other Argentine aircraft were intercepted by
BAE Sea Harriers operating from
HMS Invincible. A Dagger and a
Canberra were shot down.
Combat broke out between Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1 fighters of No. 801
Naval Air Squadron and
Mirage
III fighters of Grupo 8. Both sides refused to fight at the
other's best altitude, until two Mirages finally descended to
engage. One was shot down by an
AIM-9L
Sidewinder air-to-air missile
(AAM), while the other escaped but damaged and without enough fuel
to return to its mainland air base. The plane made for Stanley,
where it fell victim to friendly fire from the Argentine
defenders.
As a result of this experience,
Argentine Air Force staff decided to
employ A-4 Skyhawks and Daggers only as strike units, the Canberras
only during the night, and Mirage IIIs (without air refuelling
capability or any capable AAM) as decoys to lure away the British
Sea Harriers. The decoying would be later extended with the
formation of the
Escuadron Fenix, a
squadron of civilian jets flying 24 hours-a-day simulating strike
aircraft preparing to attack the fleet. On one of these flights, an
Air Force
Learjet was shot down, killing the
squadron commander, Vice Commodore Rodolfo De La Colina, the
highest-ranking Argentine officer to die in the war.
Stanley was used as an Argentine strongpoint throughout the
conflict. Despite the Black Buck and Harrier raids on Stanley
airfield (no fast jets were stationed there for air defence) and
overnight shelling by detached ships, it was never out of action
entirely. Stanley was defended by a mixture of
Surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems
(Franco-German
Roland and
British
Tigercat) and Swiss-built
Oerlikon 35 mm twin
anti-aircraft cannons.
Lockheed
Hercules transport night flights brought supplies, weapons,
vehicles, and fuel, and airlifted out the wounded up until the end
of the conflict. The few RN Sea Harriers were considered too
valuable by day to risk in night-time blockade operations, and
their Blue Fox radar was not an effective look-down over land
radar.
The only Argentine Hercules shot down by the British was lost on 1
June when TC-63 was intercepted by a Sea Harrier in daylight when
it was searching for the British fleet north-east of the islands
after the Argentine Navy retired its last
SP-2H Neptune due to airframe attrition.
After the failure of the operation Mikado, five Royal Navy
submarines lined up, submerged, on the edge of Argentina’s 12-mile
territorial limit to provide early warning of bombing raids on the
British task force
Sinking of Belgrano
The Sun's "Gotcha" headline.
Two separate British naval task forces (surface vessels and
submarines) and the Argentine fleet were operating in the
neighbourhood of the Falklands, and soon came into conflict. The
first naval loss was the
World War II
vintage Argentine
light cruiser
ARA General Belgrano.
The
nuclear-powered submarine HMS
Conqueror sank
Belgrano on 2 May. Three
hundred and twenty-three members of
Belgrano's crew died
in the incident. Over 700 men were rescued from the open ocean
despite cold seas and stormy weather. Losses from
Belgrano
totalled just over half of Argentine deaths in the Falklands
conflict.
The loss of ARA
General Belgrano hardened the stance of
the Argentine government.
Regardless of controversies over the sinking, it had a crucial
strategic effect: the elimination of the Argentine naval threat.
After her loss, the entire Argentine fleet, with the exception of
the conventional submarine
ARA San
Luis, returned to port and did not leave again for the
duration of hostilities. The two escorting
destroyers and the battle group centred on the
aircraft carrier
ARA
Veinticinco de Mayo both withdrew from the area,
ending the direct threat to the British fleet that their
pincer movement had represented.
In a separate incident later that night, British forces engaged an
Argentine patrol gunboat, the
ARA
Alferez Sobral. At the time, the
Alferez
Sobral was searching for the crew of the
Argentine Air Force English Electric Canberra light
bomber shot down on 1 May. Two Royal Navy
Lynx fired four
Sea
Skua missiles against her. Badly damaged and with eight crew
dead, the
Sobral managed to return to
Puerto Deseado two days later, but the
Canberra's crew were never found.
Initial reports conflated the two incidents, contributing to
confusion about the number of casualties and the identity of the
vessel that sank. The British tabloid newspaper
The Sun greeted the initial reports
of the attack with the headline "GOTCHA". This first edition was
published before news was known that the
Belgrano had
actually sunk (reporting instead, erroneously, that the gunboat had
sunk) and carried no reports of actual Argentine deaths. The
headline was replaced in later editions by the slightly more
tempered "Did 1,200 Argies drown?".
Sinking of HMS Sheffield
On 4 May,
two days after the sinking of Belgrano, the British lost
the Type 42 destroyer HMS
Sheffield
to fire following an Exocet
missile strike. Sheffield had been ordered forward
with two other Type 42s to provide a long-range radar and
medium-high altitude missile
picket far from the British carriers. She
was struck amidships, with devastating effect, ultimately killing
20 crew members and severely injuring 24 others. The ship was
abandoned several hours later, gutted and deformed by the fires
that continued to burn for six more days. She finally sank outside
the
Maritime Exclusion Zone on
10 May.
The incident is described in detail by Admiral
Sandy Woodward in his book
One Hundred
Days, Chapter One. Woodward was a former commanding officer of
Sheffield.
The tempo of operations increased throughout the second half of May
as United Nations attempts to mediate a peace were rejected by the
British, who felt that any delay would make a campaign impractical
in the South Atlantic storms. The destruction of
Sheffield
had a profound impact on the British public, bringing home the fact
that the "Falklands Crisis", as the
BBC
News put it, was now an actual "shooting war".
SAS operations
Given the
threat to the British fleet posed by the Etendard / Exocet
combination, plans were made to use Special Air Service
troops to attack the home base of the five
Etendards at Río Grande, Tierra del Fuego
. The operation was code named "
Mikado". The aim was to destroy the
missiles and the aircraft that carried them, and to kill the pilots
in their quarters. Two plans were drafted and underwent preliminary
rehearsal: a landing by approximately fifty-five SAS in two
C-130 Hercules aircraft directly on
the runway at Rio Grande; and infiltration of twenty-four SAS by
inflatable boats brought within a few miles of the coast by
submarine. Neither plan was implemented; the earlier airborne
assault plan attracted considerable hostility from some members of
the SAS, who considered the proposed raid a suicide mission.
Ironically, the Rio Grande area would be
defended by four full-strength battalions of Marine Infantry of the
Argentine Marine Corps of the Argentine
Navy, some of whose officers were trained in the UK by the
SBS
years earlier.
After the war, Argentine marine commanders admitted that they were
waiting for some kind of landing by SAS forces but never expected a
Hercules to land directly on their runways, although they would
have pursued British forces even into Chilean territory if they
were attacked.
An SAS reconnaissance team was despatched to carry out preparations
for a seaborne infiltration. A
Westland Sea King helicopter carrying the
assigned team took off from HMS
Invincible on the night of
17 May, but bad weather forced it to land from its target, and the
mission was aborted.
The pilot flew to Chile
and dropped
off the SAS team, before setting fire to his helicopter and
surrendering to the Chilean authorities. The discovery of
the burnt-out helicopter attracted considerable international
attention at the time.
On 14 May
the SAS carried out the raid on Pebble Island
at the Falklands, where the Argentine Navy had
taken over a grass airfield for FMA IA 58 Pucará light ground attack
aircraft and T-34 Mentors. The
raid destroyed the aircraft there.
Landing at San Carlos — Bomb Alley

Context of landings in the
Falklands.

San Carlos landing sites.

Gate guardian painted in the colours
of the last A-4Q of the Argentine Navy to attack HMS
Ardent.
The pilot Lieutenant Marcelo Gustavo Márquez was killed in
action.
During
the night on 21 May the British Amphibious Task Group under the
command of Commodore Michael Clapp (Commodore, Amphibious Warfare -
COMAW) mounted Operation
Sutton, the amphibious landing on beaches around San Carlos
Water
, on the northwestern coast of East Falkland
facing onto Falkland Sound
. The bay, known as
Bomb Alley by
British forces, was the scene of repeated air attacks by low-flying
Argentine jets.
The 4,000
men of 3 Commando
Brigade
were put ashore as follows: 2nd battalion of the
Parachute
Regiment (2 Para) from the RORO ferry
Norland and 40 Commando
(Royal Marines) from the amphibious
ship HMS Fearless were
landed at San Carlos (Blue Beach), 3 Para from the amphibious ship
HMS Intrepid were landed
at Port San
Carlos
(Green Beach) and 45 Commando from RFA Stromness were landed at
Ajax
Bay
(Red Beach). Notably the waves of 8
LCU and 8
LCVPs
were led by Major
Ewen
Southby-Tailyour who had commanded the Falklands detachment
only a year previously. 42 Commando on the ocean liner
SS Canberra was a tactical reserve.
Units from the
Royal Artillery,
Royal Engineers etc. and tanks were
also put ashore with the landing craft, the
Round table class
LSL and
mexeflote barges.
Rapier
missile launchers were carried as underslung loads of
Sea King for rapid deployment.
By dawn the next day they had established a secure beachhead from
which to conduct offensive operations.
From there Brigadier Thompson's plan was to capture
Darwin
and Goose
Green
before turning towards Port Stanley.Now,
with the British troops on the ground, the
Argentine Air Force began the night
bombing campaign against them using
Canberra bomber planes until the
last day of the war (14 June).
At sea,
the paucity of the British ships' anti-aircraft defences was
demonstrated in the sinking of HMS
Ardent on 21 May, HMS
Antelope on 21 May, and MV
Atlantic Conveyor
(struck by two AM39 Exocets) on 25 May along with a
vital cargo of helicopters,
runway-building equipment and tents. The loss of all but one
of the
Chinook
helicopters being carried by the Atlantic Conveyor was a severe
blow from a logistics perspective.
Also lost on this day was HMS Coventry, a sister to
HMS
Sheffield
, whilst in company with HMS Broadsword after being
ordered to act as decoy to draw away Argentinian aircraft from
other ships at San Carlos Bay. HMS Argonaut and
HMS Brilliant were badly
damaged. However, many British ships escaped terminal damage
because of the Argentine pilots' bombing tactics.
In order to avoid the highest concentration of British air
defences, Argentine pilots released ordnance from very low altitude
so that their bomb
fuze did not have
sufficient time to arm before impact. The low release of the
retarded bombs (some of
which had been sold to the Argentines by the British years earlier)
meant that many never exploded, as there was insufficient time in
the air for them to arm themselves. A simple free-fall bomb will,
during a low altitude release, impact almost directly below the
aircraft which is then within the lethal fragmentation zone of the
resulting explosion. A retarded bomb has a small parachute or air
brake that opens to reduce the speed of the bomb to produce a safe
separation between the two. The fuze for a retarded bomb requires a
minimum time over which the retarder is open to ensure safe
separation. The pilots would have been aware of this, but due to
the high concentration levels required in order to avoid the
anti-aircraft defences of
SAM and
AAA, as well as any British
Sea Harrier, many failed to climb to the
necessary release point. The problem was solved by the improvised
fitting of
retarding devices, allowing
low-level bombing attacks as employed on 8 June.
In his autobiographical account of the Falklands War, Admiral
Woodward blames the
BBC World
Service for these changes to the bombs. The World Service
reported the lack of detonations after receiving a briefing on the
matter from a
Ministry of Defence
official. He describes the BBC as being more concerned with being
"fearless seekers after truth" than with the lives of British
servicemen.
Colonel 'H'. Jones levelled
similar accusations against the BBC after they disclosed the
impending British attack on Goose Green by
2 Para. Jones had
threatened to lead the prosecution of senior BBC officials for
treason but was unable to do so since he was himself killed in
action around Goose Green. Thirteen bombs hit British ships without
detonating.
Lord
Craig, the retired
Marshal of the Royal Air
Force, is said to have remarked: "Six better fuses and we would
have lost" although
Ardent and
Antelope were both
lost despite the failure of bombs to explode. The fuses were
functioning correctly, and the bombs were simply released from too
low an altitude. The Argentines lost nearly twenty aircraft in the
attacks.
Battle of Goose Green

East Falkland showing San Carlos
bridgehead, Teal Inlet, Mt Kent and Mt Challenger.
From
early on 27 May until 28 May, 2 Para, (approximately 500 men) with
Artillery support from 8 (Alma) Cdo Bty RA, approached and attacked
Darwin
and Goose
Green
, which was held by the Argentine 12th Inf
Regt. After a tough struggle which lasted all night and into
the next day, 17 British and 55 Argentine soldiers had been killed,
and 1,050 Argentine troops (including around 350 Argentine Air
Force non-combatant personnel of the
Condor airfield)
taken prisoner. The BBC announced the taking of Goose Green on the
BBC World Service before it had
actually happened. It was during this attack that
Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, the commanding
officer of 2 Para was killed while charging into the well-prepared
Argentine positions at the head of his battalion. He was
posthumously awarded the
Victoria
Cross.
With the
sizeable Argentine force at Goose Green out of the way, British
forces were now able to break out of the San
Carlos
bridgehead. On 27 May, men of 45 Cdo and 3 Para
started walking across East Falkland
towards the coastal settlement of Teal Inlet
.
Special forces on Mount Kent
Meanwhile, 42 Commando prepared to move by helicopter to Mount
Kent.
Unknown to senior British officers, the
Argentine generals were determined to tie down the British troops
in the Mount Kent area, and on 27 May and 28 May they sent
transport aircraft loaded with Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles and
commandos (602nd Commando Company and 601st
National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron) to Stanley
. This operation was known as Operation
AUTOIMPUESTA (Self-Determination-Initiative).
For the next week,
the Special Air
Service
(SAS) and Mountain and Arctic Warfare
Cadre
of 3 Commando Brigade
waged intense patrol battles with patrols of the
volunteers' 602nd Commando Company under Major Aldo Rico, normally
2IC of the 22nd Mountain Infantry Regiment. Throughout 30
May, Royal Air Force Harriers were active over Mount Kent. One of
them — Harrier XZ 963 flown by Squadron-Leader Jerry Pook — in
responding to a call for help from D Squadron, attacked Mount
Kent's eastern lower slopes, and that led to its loss through
small-arms fire.
The Argentine Navy used their last AM39 Exocet missile attempting
to attack
HMS Invincible on 30
May. There are claims the missile struck, however the British have
denied this, some citing that
HMS
Avenger shot it down.
On the 31
May, the Royal Marines Mountain and Arctic Warfare
Cadre
(M&AWC) defeated Argentine Special Forces at
the Battle of
Top Malo House
. A 13-strong Argentine Army Commando
detachment (Captain Jose Vercesi's 1st Assault Section, 602nd
Commando Company) found itself trapped in a small shepherd's house
at Top Malo. The Argentine commandos fired from windows and
doorways and then took refuge in a stream bed from the burning
house. Completely surrounded, they fought 19 M&AWC marines
under Captain Rod Boswell for forty-five minutes until, with their
ammunition almost exhausted, they elected to surrender. Three Cadre
members were badly wounded. On the Argentine side there were two
dead including Lieutenant Ernesto Espinoza and Sergeant Mateo Sbert
(who were decorated for their bravery). Only five Argentines were
left unscathed. As the British mopped up Top Malo House, down from
Malo Hill came Lieutenant Fraser Haddow's M&AWC patrol,
brandishing a large
Union Flag. One
wounded Argentine soldier, Lieutenant Horacio Losito, commented
that their escape route would have taken them through Haddow's
position.
Major Mario Castagneto's 601st Commandos tried to move forward on
Kawasaki motorbikes and commandeered
Land Rovers to rescue 602nd Commando
Company on Estancia Mountain. Spotted by 42 Commando of the Royal
Marines, they were engaged with
81mm
mortars and forced to withdraw to Two Sisters mountain. Captain
Eduardo Villarruel on Estancia Mountain realised his position had
become untenable and after conferring with fellow officers ordered
a withdrawal.
The Argentine operation also saw the extensive use of helicopter
support to position and extract patrols; the Argentine Army 601st
Combat Aviation Battalion also suffered casualties.
At about 11.00 a.m.
on 30 May, an Aerospatiale SA-330
Puma helicopter was brought down by a shoulder-launched
Stinger surface-to-air missile (SAM) fired by
the SAS
in the vicinity of Mount Kent in which six National Gendarmerie Special
Forces were killed and eight more wounded in the
crash.
As Brigadier Julian Thompson commented, "It was fortunate that I
had ignored the views expressed by Northwood that reconnaissance of
Mount Kent before insertion of 42 Commando was superfluous. Had D
Squadron not been there, the Argentine Special Forces would have
caught the Commando before deplaning and, in the darkness and
confusion on a strange landing zone, inflicted heavy casualties on
men and helicopters."
Bluff Cove and Fitzroy
The abandoned hulk of RFA
Sir Tristram in Fitzroy.
By 1
June, with the arrival of a further 5,000 British troops of the 5th
Infantry Brigade, the new British divisional commander, Major
General Jeremy Moore RM, had sufficient
force to start planning an offensive against Stanley
.
During this build-up, the Argentine air assaults on the British
naval forces continued, killing 56. Of the dead, 32 were from the
Welsh Guards on
RFA Sir Galahad and
RFA Sir Tristram
on 8 June. According to Surgeon-Commander Rick Jolly of the
Falklands Field Hospital, more than 150 men suffered burns and
injuries of some kind in the attack, including, famously,
Simon Weston.
The Guards were sent to support a
dashing advance along
the southern approach to Stanley. On 2 June a small advance party
of 2 Para moved to Swan Inlet house in a number of Army
Westland Scout helicopters.
Telephoning ahead to
Fitzroy, they discovered the area clear of Argentines and
(exceeding their authority) commandeered the one remaining RAF Chinook helicopter to frantically ferry
another contingent of 2 Para ahead to Fitzroy
(a settlement on Port Pleasant) and Bluff Cove
(a settlement confusingly, and perhaps ultimately
fatally, on Port Fitzroy).
This un-coordinated advance caused planning nightmares for the
commanders of the combined operation, as they now found themselves
with a string of indefensible positions on their southern flank.
Support could not be sent by air as the single remaining Chinook
was already heavily oversubscribed. The soldiers could march, but
their equipment and heavy supplies would need to be ferried by sea.
Plans
were drawn up for half the Welsh Guards to march light on the night
of 2 June, whilst the Scots Guards and the second half of the Welsh
Guards were to be ferried from San Carlos Water
in the Landing
Ship Logistics (LSL) Sir Tristram and the landing platform dock (LPD)
Intrepid on the night of 5 June. Intrepid
was planned to stay one day and unload itself and as much of
Sir Tristram as possible, leaving the next evening for the
relative safety of San Carlos. Escorts would be provided for this
day, after which
Sir Tristram would be left to unload
using an inflatable platform known as a Mexeflote for as long as it
took to finish.
Political pressure from above to not risk the LPD forced Commodore
Clapp to alter this plan. Two lower-value LSLs would be sent, but
without suitable beaches on which to land,
Intrepid's
landing craft would need to accompany
them to unload. A complicated operation across several nights with
Intrepid and her sister ship
Fearless sailing half-way to
dispatch their craft was devised. The attempted overland march by
half the Welsh Guards failed, possibly as they refused to march
light and attempted to carry their equipment. They returned to San
Carlos and were landed directly at Bluff Cove when
Fearless dispatched her landing craft.
Sir
Tristram sailed on the night of 6 June and was joined by
Sir Galahad at dawn on 7 June. Anchored apart in Port
Pleasant, the landing ships were near Fitzroy, the designated
landing point. The landing craft should have been able to unload
the ships to that point relatively quickly, but confusion over the
ordered disembarcation point (the first half of the Guards going
direct to Bluff Cove) resulted in the senior Welsh Guards infantry
officer aboard insisting his troops be ferried the far longer
distance directly to Port Fitzroy/Bluff Cove. The intention was for
the infantrymen to march via the recently repaired Bluff Cove
bridge (destroyed by retreating Argentine
combat engineers) to their destination, a
journey of around seven miles (11 km).
The longer journey time of the landing craft taking the troops
directly to Bluff Cove and the squabbling over how the landing was
to be performed caused enormous delay in unloading. This had
disastrous consequences. Without escorts, having not yet
established their air defence, and still almost fully laden, the
two LSLs in Port Pleasant were sitting targets for two waves of
Argentine
A-4 Skyhawks.
The disaster at Port Pleasant (although often known as Bluff Cove)
would provide the world with some of the most sobering images of
the war as TV news video footage showed
Navy helicopters hovering in thick smoke to winch
survivors from the burning landing ships. British casualties were
49 killed and 115 wounded. However, Argentine General
Mario Menendez, commander of Argentine forces
in the Falklands, was told that 900 British soldiers had died. He
expected that the losses would cause enemy morale to drop and the
British assault to stall.
The Fall of Stanley
- Notable battles:
On the night of 11 June after several days of painstaking
reconnaissance and logistic build-up, British forces launched a
brigade-sized night attack against the heavily defended ring of
high ground surrounding Stanley.
Units of 3 Commando Brigade, supported by
naval gunfire from several Royal Navy ships, simultaneously
assaulted in the Battle of Mount Harriet
, Battle of Two Sisters
, and Battle of Mount Longdon
. Mount Harriet was taken at a cost of 2
British and 18 Argentine soldiers. At Two Sisters, the British
faced both enemy resistance and friendly fire, but managed to
capture their objectives. The toughest battle was at Mount Longdon.
British forces were bogged down by assault rifle, mortar, machine
gun, artillery fire, sniper fire, and ambushes. Despite this, the
British continued their advance.
During this battle, 13 were killed when
HMS Glamorgan, straying too
close to shore while returning from the gun line, was struck by an
improvised trailer-based
Exocet MM38 launcher
taken from ARA
Seguí destroyer by Argentine Navy
technicians. On this day, Sgt
Ian McKay of
4 Platoon, B Company, 3 Para died in a grenade attack on an
Argentine bunker which was to earn him a posthumous
Victoria Cross. After a night of fierce
fighting, all objectives were secured. Both sides had suffered
heavy losses.
The night of 13 June saw the start of the second phase of attacks,
in which the momentum of the initial assault was maintained.
2 Para
with tank support captured Wireless Ridge at the Battle of
Wireless Ridge
, at a loss of 3 British and 25 Argentine dead, and
the 2nd battalion, Scots Guards
captured Mount Tumbledown at the Battle of
Mount Tumbledown
, which cost the British 10 dead and the Argentines
30 dead.

A pile of discarded Argentine weapons
in Port Stanley.
With the
last natural defence line at Mount
Tumbledown breached, the Argentine town defences of Stanley
began to falter. In the morning gloom, one
company commander got lost and his junior officers became
despondent. Private Santiago Carrizo of the 3rd Regiment described
how a platoon commander ordered them to take up positions in the
houses and "if a
Kelper resists, shoot him",
but the entire company did nothing of the kind.
The commander of the Argentine garrison in Stanley, Brigade General
Mario Menéndez, surrendered to Major General Jeremy Moore. 9,800
Argentine troops were made prisoners of war and some 4,167 were
repatriated to Argentina on the
ocean
liner Canberra alone.
Surrender of Corbeta Uruguay
On 20
June the British retook the South
Sandwich Islands, (which involved accepting the surrender of
the Southern
Thule
Garrison at the Corbeta Uruguay
base) and declared hostilities to be
over. Argentina had established Corbeta Uruguay in 1976, but
prior to 1982 the United Kingdom had contested the existence of the
Argentine base only through diplomatic channels.
Casualties

San Carlos War Memorial and Cemetery,
Falkland islands.

British dead are buried after the
battle of Goose Green.
In total 907 were killed during the 74 days of the conflict:
- Argentina - 649
- United Kingdom - 258
Of the 86
Royal Navy personnel, 22 were lost in
HMS Ardent, 19 + 1 lost
in HMS
Sheffield
, 18 + 1 lost in HMS
Coventry and 13 lost in HMS
Glamorgan. 14 naval cooks were among the dead,
the largest number from any one branch in the Royal Navy.
33 of the
British Army's dead came from the
Welsh Guards, 21 from the 3rd
Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, 18
from the 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, 19
from the Special Air
Service
(SAS), 3 from Royal
Signals and 8 from each of the Scots
Guards and Royal
Engineers.
As well
as memorials on the islands, there is a memorial to the British war
dead in the crypt of St Paul's Cathedral
, London
.
There is
a memorial at Plaza
San Martín in Buenos
Aires
for the Argentine war dead, another one in
Rosario
, and a third one in
Ushuaia
.
During the war, British dead were put into plastic body bags and
buried in mass graves. After the war, the bodies were removed,
given funeral services, and reburied. Argentine dead were buried on
the islands during the war. The United Kingdom offered to send the
bodies back to Argentina, but Argentina refused, knowing that the
remains would ensure a continuing Argentine presence on the
islands. There is a
cemetery for Argentine dead on
the islands.
There were 1,188 Argentine and 777 British non-fatal casualties.
Further
information about the field hospitals and hospital ships is at
Ajax
Bay
, List of
hospitals and hospital ships of the Royal Navy, HMS Hydra and Argentine Navy's
ARA Almirante
Irizar.
There are still 125 uncleared minefields on the Falkland Islands
and
UXO are scattered all over
the battle fields due to the soft peat ground. According to
forcesmemorial.org.uk via Falklands 25's "Official Commemorative
Publication" 30 British servicemen have died on the islands since
the end of the hostilities.
- See also Argentine and
British
ground forces in the Falklands War
Consequences of the Falklands War
This brief war brought many consequences for all the parties
involved, besides the great loss of human life and
materiel.
In Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher won the time and support she
required for her economic measures to take effect, national pride
received a big boost of confidence and assurance, the Royal Navy
proved its value once more.
The islanders subsequently had full British citizenship restored in
1983, their lifestyle was improved by investments Britain made
after the war and the liberalisation of economic measures that had
been stalled through fear of angering Argentina. In 1985, a new
constitution was enacted promoting self-government, which has
continued to devolve power to the islanders.
The war for Argentina also had an effect in Argentina through the
return of democracy and the military, formerly the “moral reserve
of the nation” completely lost their reputation.
Public relations
Argentina
Selected war correspondents were regularly flown to Port Stanley in
military aircraft to report on the war. Back in Buenos Aires
newspapers and magazines faithfully reported on "the heroic actions
of the largely conscript army and its successes".
Officers from the intelligence services were attached to the
newspapers and 'leaked' information confirming the official
communiqués from the government. The glossy magazines
Gente and
Siete Días swelled to sixty pages with
colour photographs of British warships in flames - many of them
faked - and bogus eyewitness reports of the Argentine commandos'
guerrilla war on South Georgia 6 May and an already dead Pucará
pilot's attack on HMS
Hermes (Lt. Daniel Antonio Jukic had
been killed at Goose Green during a British air strike on 1 May).
Most of the faked photos actually came from the tabloid
press.
The Argentine troops on the Falkland Islands could read
Gaceta
Argentina—a newspaper intended to boost the morale among the
servicemen. Some of its untruths could easily be unveiled by the
soldiers who recovered corpses.Middlebrook (1989), p. 94, "First of
May. Menéndez ordered the publication of a newspaper for the troops
on the Falkland Islands called
Gaceta Argentina. It stated
that one of the Mirages lost 1 May had collided with a Sea Harrier
and the Argentine pilot survived. In fact Argentine AAA at Stanley
shot down the Mirage when it tried to emergency land there. It was
a blatant lie for all those Argentine servicemen who had seen the
Mirage being shot down by Argentine guns and had removed the dead
pilot from the crashed aeroplane. Similar the junta’s press office
in Buenos Aires informed that Lieutenant Antonio Jukic, who
actually was killed in his Pucará on the ground at Goose Green, had
perished in a gallant, single-handed Pucará attack on HMS Hermes,
setting it on fire. This statement was illustrated with dramatic
sketches. The men at Goose Green knew that Lieutenant Jukic died on
the ground there.
Gaceta Argentino summed up the British losses up to 25 May as: 5
warship sunk (correct number 3), 3 transport ships including RMS
Canberra (1; Atlantic Conveyor), 14 Sea Harriers (2 shot down &
3 accidents) and many ships damaged, including HMS Hermes. Gaceta
Argentino even wrote: "
All of these details refer only to
proven claims and not to estimated or unproven
claims..."".
The
Malvinas course united the Argentines in a patriotic
atmosphere which protected the junta from critics—even the
Madres de Plaza de
Mayo were exposed to
death
threats from ordinary people.
HMS
Invincible was repeatedly sunk in the Argentine press,
and on 30 April 1982 the Argentine magazine
Tal Cual
showed UK's PM Thatcher with an eyepatch and the text:
Pirate,
witch and assassin.
Guilty!http://www.scienceandsociety.co.uk/results.asp?image=10438336&wwwflag=2&imagepos=12
Three British reporters sent to Argentina to cover the war from the
'other side' were jailed until the end of the war.
United Kingdom
Seventeen newspaper reporters, two photographers, two radio
reporters and three television reporters with five technicians
sailed with the Task Force to the war. The Newspaper Publishers'
Association selected them from among 160 applicants, excluding
foreign media. Due to the hasty departure, not all of them were
"the right stuff": two journalists on HMS
Invincible were
interested in nothing but Queen Elizabeth II's son
Prince Andrew.
Merchant vessels had the civilian
Inmarsat
uplink, which enabled written
telex
as well as voice report transmissions via satellite. On Canberra
there was a
facsimile machine which was used to
upload 202 pictures from the South Atlantic over the course of the
war. The Royal Navy leased bandwidth on the US
Defense Satellite
Communications System for worldwide communications. Television
demands a thousand times the data rate of telephone, but the MoD
was unsuccessful in convincing the US to allocate more bandwidth.
TV producers suspected that the enquiry was half-hearted; since the
Vietnam War television pictures of
casualties and traumatised soldiers were recognised as having
negative propaganda value. However the technology only allowed
uploading a single frame per 20 minutes - and only if the military
satellites were allocated 100 % to television transmissions.
Videotapes were shipped to Ascension Island, where a broadband
satellite uplink was available, resulting in TV coverage being
delayed by three weeks.
The press was very dependent on the Royal Navy, and was
censored on site. Many reporters in the UK knew
more about the war than those with the Task Force.
The Royal
Navy expected Fleet
Street
to conduct a World War Two style positive news
campaign but the majority of the British media, especially the BBC,
reported the war in a neutral fashion. Reporters referred to
"the British troops" and "the Argentinian troops" instead of "our
lads" and the dehumanised "Argies". The two main tabloid papers
presented opposing viewpoints:
The Daily Mirror was decidedly anti-war,
whilst
The Sun became
notorious for its jingoistic and xenophobic headlines, including
the 20 April headline "Stick It Up Your Junta!", and was condemned
for the "Gotcha" headline following the sinking of the
ARA General Belgrano.
Cultural impact
There were wide-ranging influences on popular culture in both the
UK and Argentina, from the immediate postwar period to the present.
The words
yomp and
Exocet entered the British vernacular as a
result of the war. The Falklands War also provided material for
theatre, film and TV drama and influenced the output of musicians
including (among others)
Iron Maiden,
Pink Floyd,
New
Order,
Gang of Four,
Joe Jackson,
Crass,
Dire Straits (the
song
Brothers in arms was played in memory of the dead
soldiers),
New Model Army,
The Levellers,
Steve Dahl,
Latin
Quarter, the
Super Furry
Animals, and
Elvis Costello,
whose song "
Shipbuilding", sung
by
Robert Wyatt, reached the British
top 40.
See also
Notes
- Argentina for Falklands Sovereignty
Prensa Latina Latin America New Agency accessed 21 June 2007
- Constitución Nacional: "La Nación Argentina
ratifica su legítima e imprescriptible soberanía sobre las Islas
Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur y los espacios
marítimos e insulares correspondientes, por ser parte integrante
del territorio nacional"
- Cómo evitar que Londres convierta a las Malvinas en
un Estado independiente
- Argentina - the horrors of a dictatorial past live on
Radio Netherlands Worldwide
- Jimmy Burns: The land that lost its heroes, 1987,
Bloomsbury Publishing, ISBN 0-7475-0002-9
- " " ("This was neither about national pride nor anything else.
The junta —Galtieri told me— never believed the British would
respond. He thought the Western World was corrupt. That the British
people had no God, that the US was corrupt... I could never
convince him that the British would not only fight back but also
win [the war].")
- Argentine Government
- En Buenos Aires, la Junta comenzó a estudiar la
posibilidad de ocupar las Islas Malvinas y Georgias antes de que
los británicos pudieran reforzarlas
- high cost of cuts, The | Spectator, The | Find
Articles at BNET.com
- BBC NEWS | UK | How BBC man scooped invasion
news
- One Hundred Days Woodward, Admiral Sandy (1992)
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, p.72.
ISBN 9781557506511; ISBN 9781557506528. Cited in To Rule The
Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World Herman, A
(2004) Harper
Collins, New York, p.560
- Brown 1987, p. 110
- Submarine Operations during the Falklands War - US Naval
War College
- [1] "As a result of these heavy losses...it was
decided to pull the Mirage III's back to the mainland to stand
alert for a possible Vulcan attack."
- [2] "Finally, the bombing raids caused the
Argentines to fear an air attack on the mainland, causing them to
retain some Mirage aircraft and Roland missiles for defense."
- [3] La familia Mirage, Aeroespacio, Fuerza
Aerea Argentina, ISSN 0001-9127, "Los M III debían defender el
territorio continental argentino de posibles ataques de los
bombarderos Vulcan de la RAF, brindar escolta a los cazabombarderos
de la FAA, e impedir los ataques de aviones de la Royal Navy y de
la RAF sobre las Malvinas." ("The M III would defend the
Argentine mainland against possible attacks by Vulcan bombers from
the RAF, providing escort of fighter bombers to the FAA, and to
prevent attacks by aircraft of the Royal Navy and RAF on the
Falklands.")
- [4]"Unfortunately the British Secretary of
State for Defense announced sometime later that Britain would not
bomb targets on the Argentine mainland. This statement was
undoubtedly welcomed by the Argentine military command because it
permitted the very limited number of Roland SAM's to be deployed
around the airfield at Stanley."
- Rodríguez Mottino, Horacio: La Artillería Argentina en
Malvinas. Ed. Clío, 1985. Page 170
- [5] [6]
- Fuerza Aérea Argentina
- ASN Aircraft accident description Lockheed C-130H
Hercules TC-63 - Pebble Island
- See Underwater and undercover: how nuclear subs were
first line of Falklands defence retrieved 22 Sept. 2009)
- Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days, page 8.
ISBN 9780007134670
- www.eliteukforces.info
- telegraph.co.uk SAS 'suicide mission' to wipe out Exocets
- Middlebrook, p. 75.
- La Infantería de Marina de la Armada Argentina en el
Conflicto del Atlántico Sur, ISBN 987-433-641-2
- Thatcher in the dark on sinking of Belgrano - Times
Online
- Bomb Alley — Falklands Island 1982.
- Charles ends Falklands tour on sombre note, BBC
News.
- Captain Hart Dyke, Commanding Officer of HMS
Coventry
- Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982 — British
ships lost & damaged.
- Scotsman.
- Royal Navy.
- Commodore Ruben Oscar Moro La Guerra Inaudita, 2000 ISBN
987-96007-3-8
- [7] "The attack against the HMS Invincible"
- [8]30 May 1982
- [9] operationcorporate.com
- [10] Sunday May 30
- [11] David Aldea, The Argentine Commandos
on Mount Kent
- Argentine Puma Shot Down By American “Stinger”
Missile
- Julian Thompson, No Picnic, p. 93, Cassell & Co,
2001
- Rick Jolly, The Red & Green Life Machine, page
124
- Twentieth century battlefields-The Falklands
- An interview with CL (R) Ing. Julio Pérez, chief designer
of Exocet trailer-based launcher
- Hastings and Jenkins: The Battle for the Falklands, p.
307
- Buenos Aires War Memorial is at coordinates
- list
- list
- list
- list
- Falkland Islands - A history of the 1982
conflict
- According to [12] 260. The extras are: Paul T. Mills from HMS
Coventry, died from complications from a skull fracture from the
air attack, died 29 March 1983 and Brian Biddick from HMHS Uganda
who died after an emergency operation on the voyage to the
Falklands 12 May 1982
- list
- list
- Falkland Islands - A history of the 1982
conflict
- Para
- SAS
- rest of army
- Welcome to St Paul's Cathedral - Lady Thatcher
marks Falklands anniversary at St Paul's
- [13]
- Even opposers of the military government supported Galtieri;
Ernesto
Sabato: "Don't be mistaken, Europe; it is not a dictatorship
that is fighting for the Malvinas, it is the whole Nation."
- Harris
- I went as a reporter but ended up a prisoner of
war, The
Observer Sunday 1 April 2007
- Freedman, "two journalists on Invincible were
interested in no issue other than what Prince Andrew, a helicopter
pilot as well as the Queen's son, was up to"
- Freedman 2005, Vol. 2 p. 36
- Harris, "You must have been told you couldn't report bad news
...You were expected to do a 1940 propaganda job."
- Hastings and Jenkins: The Battle for the
Falklands
- Channel 4 - When Britain Went to War
- [14] A new Britain, a new kind of newspaper,
the Guardian, Monday 25 February 2002 (retrieved on 7 September
2007)
- [15] Forty years of The Sun (retrieved on 7
September 2007)
- [16] British Library Website on the "Gotcha"
headline (retrieved on 7 September 2007)
Bibliography
- Barnett, Anthony, IRON BRITANNIA Why Parliament waged its
Falklands war. Allison & Busby, 1982. ISBN
0-85031-493-3
- Brown, David, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War.
Leo Cooper, 1987. ISBN 0850520592
- Dalyell, Tam, One Man's
Falklands. Cecil Woolf, 1982. ISBN 0-900821-65-5.
- Dalyell, Tam, Thatcher's Torpedo. Cecil Woolf, 1983.
ISBN 0-900821-66-3.
- Femenia, Nora, National Identity in Times of Crises: the
scripts of the Falklands-Malvinas War. Nova Science
Publishers, Inc, 1996. ISBN 1-56072-196-0.
- Franks et al., Falkland Islands Review, Report of a
Committee of Privy Counsellors. HMSO, January 1983. Cmnd.
8787.
- Freedman, Sir Lawrence.
Official History of the Falklands Campaign: Vols 1 &
2. Frank Cass, 2005. ISBN 0-7146-5206-7 and ISBN
0-7146-5207-5.
- Gavshon, Arthur and Rice, Desmond, The Sinking of the
Belgrano. Secker & Warburg, 1984. ISBN 0-436-41332-9.
- Harris, Robert, GOTCHA! The Media, the Government
and the Falklands Crisis. Faber and Faber, 1983. ISBN
0-571-13052-6.
- Hobson, Chris and Noble, Andrew, Falklands Air
War
- Hunt, Sir Rex: My
Falkland Days, Politico's Publishing, 1992, ISBN
978-1842750179
- Kon, Daniel, Los Chicos de la Guerra, The Argentine
conscripts' own moving accounts of their Falklands War
(English translation). New English Library 1983. ISBN
0-450-05611-2.
- McManners, Hugh, Forgotten Voices of the
Falklands, Ebury Press, 2007,
ISBN 9780091908805
- Middlebrook, Martin: "The Argentine fight for the Malvinas -
The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War", Pen and Sword Books,
1989, ISBN 0-670-82106-3
- Middlebrook, Martin. The Argentine Fight for the
Falklands. Pen & Sword Military Classics, 2003. ISBN
0-85052-978-6
- Norton-Taylor, Richard. The Ponting Affair. Cecil
Woolf, 1985. ISBN 0-900821-73-6.
- Ponting, Clive. The Right to Know: The Inside Story of the
Belgrano Affair. Sphere Books, 1985. ISBN 0-7221-6944-2
- Sunday Times Insight Team. The Falklands War. Sphere
Books, 1982. ISBN 0-7221-8282-1.
- Tinker, Lieut. David, R.N. A Message from the Falklands,
The Life and Gallant Death of David Tinker, Lieut. R.N.
from his Letters and Poems. Penguin, 1982. ISBN
0-14-006778-7.
- Thornton, Richard C. 'The Falklands Sting.
Brassey's, 1998. ISBN 1-57488-155-8.
- Underwood, Geoffrey. Our Falklands War, The Men of the Task
Force Tell Their Story. Maritime Books, 1983. ISBN
0-907771-08-4.
External links