The Full Wiki

Falklands War: Map

  
  
  
  

Wikipedia article:

Map showing all locations mentioned on Wikipedia article:



The Falklands War ( ), also called the Falklands Conflict/Crisis, was fought in 1982 between Argentinamarker and the United Kingdommarker (UK) over the disputed Falkland Islandsmarker and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islandsmarker. The Falkland Islands consist of two large and many small islands in the South Atlantic Oceanmarker east of Argentina; their name and sovereignty over themmarker have long been disputed.

The Falklands War started on Friday, 2 April 1982 with the Argentine invasion and occupation of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia, and ended with the Argentine surrender on 14 June 1982. The war lasted 74 days, and resulted in the deaths of 255 British and 649 Argentine soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and three civilian Falklanders. It was the last conflict carried by the UK without any allied states.

The conflict was the result of a protracted diplomatic confrontation regarding the sovereignty of the islands. Neither state officially declared war and the fighting was largely limited to the territories under dispute and the South Atlantic. The initial invasion was characterised by Argentina as the re-occupation of its own territory, and by the UK as an invasion of a British dependent territory.

Britain launched a naval task force to engage the Argentine Navy and Argentine Air Force, and retake the islands by amphibious assault. The British eventually prevailed and at the end of combat operations on 14 June the islands remained under British control. However, as of 2009 and as it has since the 19th century, Argentina shows no sign of relinquishing its claim. The claim remains in the Argentine constitution after its reformation in 1994.The political effects of the war were strong in both countries. A wave of patriotic sentiment swept through both: the Argentine loss prompted even larger protests against the military government, which hastened its downfall; in the United Kingdom, the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was bolstered. It helped Thatcher's government to victory in the 1983 general election, which prior to the war was seen as by no means certain. The war has played an important role in the culture of both countries, and has been the subject of several books, films, and songs. The cultural and political weight of the conflict has had less effect on the British public than on that of Argentina, where the war is still a topic of discussion.

Lead-up to the conflict

In the period leading up to the war, and especially following the transfer of power between General Jorge Rafael Videla and General Roberto Eduardo Viola in late-March 1981, Argentina had been in the midst of a devastating economic crisis and large-scale civil unrest against the military junta that had been governing the country since 1976. The newspaper La Prensa speculated in a step-by-step plan beginning with cutting off supplies to the Islands, ending in direct actions late 1982, if the UN talks were fruitless. In December 1981 there was a further change in the Argentine military regime bringing to office a new junta headed by General Leopoldo Galtieri (acting president), Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo and Admiral Jorge Anaya. Anaya would be the main architect and supporter of a military solution for the long standing claim over the islands, calculating that the United Kingdom would never respond militarily. In doing so the Galtieri government hoped to mobilise Argentines' long-standing patriotic feelings towards the islands and thus divert public attention from the country's chronic economic problems and the regime's ongoing human rights violations. Such action would also bolster its dwindling legitimacy. The ongoing tension between the two countries over the islands increased on 19 March when a group of hired Argentine scrap metal merchants raised the Argentine flag at South Georgia, an act that would later be seen as the first offensive action in the war. The Argentine military junta, suspecting that the UK would reinforce its South Atlantic Forces, ordered the invasion of the Falkland Islands to be brought forward to 2 April.
Britain was initially taken by surprise by the Argentine attack on the South Atlantic islands, despite repeated warnings by Royal Navy captain Nicholas Barker and others. Barker believed that the intention expressed in Defence Secretary John Nott's 1981 review to withdraw the Royal Navy ship HMS Endurance, Britain's only naval presence in the South Atlantic, sent a signal to the Argentines that Britain was unwilling, and would soon be unable, to defend her territories and subjects in the Falklands.

War

Invasion by Argentina

On 2 April 1982, Argentinemarker forces mounted amphibious landings of the Falkland Islandsmarker, following the civilian occupation of South Georgia on March 19, before the Falklands War began. The invasion involved initial defence organised by the Falkland Islands' Governor Sir Rex Hunt giving command to Major Mike Norman of the Royal Marines, the landing of Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Sanchez-Sabarots' Amphibious Commandos Group, the attack on Moody Brook barracks, the engagement between the troops of Hugo Santillan and Bill Trollope at Stanleymarker, and the battle and final surrender of Government House.

Initial British response to the invasion



Word of the invasion first reached Britain via amateur radio. The retaking of the Falkland Islands was considered extremely difficult: the main constraint was the disparity in deployable air cover (the British having 34 Harrier aircraft against Argentina's 220 jet fighters). The U.S. Navy considered a successful invasion by the British to be 'a military impossibility'.

By mid-April, the Royal Air Force had set up an airbasemarker at Wideawake on the mid-Atlanticmarker island of Ascensionmarker, including a sizable force of Avro Vulcan B Mk 2 bombers, Handley Page Victor K Mk 2 refuelling aircraft, and McDonnell Douglas Phantom FGR Mk 2 fighters to protect them. Meanwhile the main British naval task force arrived at Ascension to prepare for war. A small force had already been sent south to recapture South Georgia.

Encounters began in April; the British Task Force was shadowed by Boeing 707 aircraft of the Argentine Air Force during their travel to the south. Several of these flights were intercepted outside the British-imposed exclusion zone, by BAE Sea Harriers; the unarmed 707 were not attacked because diplomatic moves were still in progress and the UK had not yet decided to commit itself to war. On April 23 a Brazilian commercial Douglas DC-10 from VARIG Airlines en route to South Africa was intercepted. The Harriers sent to investigate were able to visually identify the civilian plane.

Recapture of South Georgia and the attack on the Santa Fe

The South Georgia force, Operation Paraquetmarker, under the command of Major Guy Sheridan RM, consisted of Marines from 42 Commando, a troop of the Special Air Servicemarker (SAS) and Special Boat Servicemarker (SBS) troops who were intended to land as reconnaissance forces for an invasion by the Royal Marines. All were embarked on RFA Tidespring. First to arrive was the Churchill-class submarine HMS Conqueror on 19 April, and the island was over-flown by a radar-mapping Handley Page Victor on 20 April. The first landings of SAS troops took place on 21 April, but—with the southern hemisphere autumn setting in—the weather was so bad that their landings and others made the next day were all withdrawn after two helicopters crashed in fog on Fortuna Glaciermarker.On 23 April, a submarine alert was sounded and operations were halted, with the Tidespring being withdrawn to deeper water to avoid interception. On 24 April, the British forces regrouped and headed in to attack the submarine. On 25 April, after resupplying the Argentine garrison in South Georgia, ARA Santa Femarker was spotted on the surface by a Westland Wessex HAS Mk 3 helicopter from HMS Antrim, which attacked the Argentine submarine with depth charges. HMS Plymouth launched a Westland Wasp HAS.Mk.1 helicopter, and HMS Brilliant launched a Westland Lynx HAS Mk 2. The Lynx launched a torpedo, and strafed the submarine with its pintle-mounted General Purpose Machine Gun; the Wessex also fired on the Santa Fe with its GPMG. The Wasp from HMS Plymouth as well as two other Wasps launched from HMS Endurance fired AS-12 ASM antiship missiles at the submarine, scoring hits. Santa Fe was damaged badly enough to prevent her from submerging. The crew abandoned the submarine at the jetty at King Edward Point on South Georgia.

With the Tidespring now far out to sea and the Argentine forces augmented by the submarine's crew, Major Sheridan decided to gather the 76 men he had and make a direct assault that day. After a short forced march by the British troops, the Argentine forces surrendered without resistance. The message sent from the naval force at South Georgia to London was, "Be pleased to inform Her Majesty that the White Ensign flies alongside the Union Jack in South Georgia. God Save the Queen."Prime Minister Thatcher broke the news to the media, telling them to "Just rejoice at that news!"

Black Buck raids



On 1 May operations against the Falklands opened with the "Black Buck 1" attack (of a series of five) on the airfield at Stanley. The overall effect of the raids on the war is difficult to determine, and the raids consumed precious tanker resources."... to get twenty-one bombs to Port Stanley is going to take about one million, one hundred thousand pounds of fuel - equalled[sic] about 137,000 gallons. That was enough fuel to fly 260 Sea Harrier bombing missions over Port Stanley. Which in turn meant just over 1300 bombs. Interesting stuff!" page 186 in Sharkey Ward: Sea Harrier over the Falklands, 1992, Cassell Military Paperbacks, ISBN 0-304-35542-9 The raids did minimal damage to the runway and damage to radars was quickly repaired. Commonly dismissed as post-war propaganda,"Propaganda was, of course, used later to try to justify these missions: 'The Mirage IIIs were redrawn from Southern Argentina to Buenos Aires to add to the defences there following the Vulcan raids on the islands.' Apparently the logic behind this statement was that if the Vulcan could hit Port Stanley, the[sic] Buenos Aires was well within range as well and was vulnerable to similar attacks. I never went along with that baloney. A lone Vulcan or two running in to attack Buenos Aires without fighter support would have been shot to hell in quick time."-"Mirage IIIs were in evidence near the islands on several occasions during the conflict, either escorting the Neptune reconnaissance missions or on 'interference' flights that attempted to draw CAP attention away from air-to-ground attacks."-"Suffice it to say that you didn't need more than one or two Mirage IIIs to intercept a Vulcan attack on Buenos Aires"-"It would have taken much more than a lone Vulcan raid to upset Buenos Aires" pages 247-48 in Sea Harrier over the Falklands Argentine sources were originally the source of claims that the Vulcan raids influenced Argentina to withdraw Mirage IIIs from Southern Argentina to the Buenos Aires Defence Zone. This dissuasive effect was however watered down when British officials made clear that there would be no strikes on air bases in Argentina.

Of the five Black Buck raids, three were against Stanley Airfield, with the other two anti-radar missions using Shrike anti-radiation missiles.

Escalation of the air war



The Falklands had only three airfields. The longest and only paved runway was at the capital, Stanleymarker, and even it was too short to support fast jets. Therefore, the Argentines were forced to launch their major strikes from the mainland, severely hampering their efforts at forward staging, combat air patrols and close air support over the islands. The effective loiter time of incoming Argentine aircraft was low, and they were later compelled to overfly British forces in any attempt to attack the islands.

The first major Argentine strike force comprised 36 aircraft (McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawks, Israel Aircraft Industries Daggers, English Electric B Mk 62 Canberras, and Dassault Mirage III escorts), and was sent on 1 May, in the belief that the British invasion was imminent or landings had already taken place. Only a section of Grupo 6 (flying IAI Dagger aircraft) found ships, which were firing at Argentine defences near the islands. The Daggers managed to attack the ships and return safely. This greatly boosted morale of the Argentine pilots, who now knew they could survive an attack against modern warships, protected by radar ground clutter from the Islands and by using a late pop-up profile.

Meanwhile, other Argentine aircraft were intercepted by BAE Sea Harriers operating from HMS Invincible. A Dagger and a Canberra were shot down.

Combat broke out between Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1 fighters of No. 801 Naval Air Squadron and Mirage III fighters of Grupo 8. Both sides refused to fight at the other's best altitude, until two Mirages finally descended to engage. One was shot down by an AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missile (AAM), while the other escaped but damaged and without enough fuel to return to its mainland air base. The plane made for Stanley, where it fell victim to friendly fire from the Argentine defenders.

As a result of this experience, Argentine Air Force staff decided to employ A-4 Skyhawks and Daggers only as strike units, the Canberras only during the night, and Mirage IIIs (without air refuelling capability or any capable AAM) as decoys to lure away the British Sea Harriers. The decoying would be later extended with the formation of the Escuadron Fenix, a squadron of civilian jets flying 24 hours-a-day simulating strike aircraft preparing to attack the fleet. On one of these flights, an Air Force Learjet was shot down, killing the squadron commander, Vice Commodore Rodolfo De La Colina, the highest-ranking Argentine officer to die in the war.
Stanley was used as an Argentine strongpoint throughout the conflict. Despite the Black Buck and Harrier raids on Stanley airfield (no fast jets were stationed there for air defence) and overnight shelling by detached ships, it was never out of action entirely. Stanley was defended by a mixture of Surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems (Franco-German Roland and British Tigercat) and Swiss-built Oerlikon 35 mm twin anti-aircraft cannons. Lockheed Hercules transport night flights brought supplies, weapons, vehicles, and fuel, and airlifted out the wounded up until the end of the conflict. The few RN Sea Harriers were considered too valuable by day to risk in night-time blockade operations, and their Blue Fox radar was not an effective look-down over land radar.

The only Argentine Hercules shot down by the British was lost on 1 June when TC-63 was intercepted by a Sea Harrier in daylight when it was searching for the British fleet north-east of the islands after the Argentine Navy retired its last SP-2H Neptune due to airframe attrition.

After the failure of the operation Mikado, five Royal Navy submarines lined up, submerged, on the edge of Argentina’s 12-mile territorial limit to provide early warning of bombing raids on the British task force

Sinking of Belgrano

The Sun's "Gotcha" headline.
Two separate British naval task forces (surface vessels and submarines) and the Argentine fleet were operating in the neighbourhood of the Falklands, and soon came into conflict. The first naval loss was the World War II vintage Argentine light cruiser ARA General Belgrano. The nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror sank Belgrano on 2 May. Three hundred and twenty-three members of Belgrano's crew died in the incident. Over 700 men were rescued from the open ocean despite cold seas and stormy weather. Losses from Belgrano totalled just over half of Argentine deaths in the Falklands conflict.

The loss of ARA General Belgrano hardened the stance of the Argentine government.

Regardless of controversies over the sinking, it had a crucial strategic effect: the elimination of the Argentine naval threat. After her loss, the entire Argentine fleet, with the exception of the conventional submarine ARA San Luis, returned to port and did not leave again for the duration of hostilities. The two escorting destroyers and the battle group centred on the aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo both withdrew from the area, ending the direct threat to the British fleet that their pincer movement had represented.

In a separate incident later that night, British forces engaged an Argentine patrol gunboat, the ARA Alferez Sobral. At the time, the Alferez Sobral was searching for the crew of the Argentine Air Force English Electric Canberra light bomber shot down on 1 May. Two Royal Navy Lynx fired four Sea Skua missiles against her. Badly damaged and with eight crew dead, the Sobral managed to return to Puerto Deseado two days later, but the Canberra's crew were never found.

Initial reports conflated the two incidents, contributing to confusion about the number of casualties and the identity of the vessel that sank. The British tabloid newspaper The Sun greeted the initial reports of the attack with the headline "GOTCHA". This first edition was published before news was known that the Belgrano had actually sunk (reporting instead, erroneously, that the gunboat had sunk) and carried no reports of actual Argentine deaths. The headline was replaced in later editions by the slightly more tempered "Did 1,200 Argies drown?".

Sinking of HMS Sheffield



On 4 May, two days after the sinking of Belgrano, the British lost the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffieldmarker to fire following an Exocet missile strike. Sheffield had been ordered forward with two other Type 42s to provide a long-range radar and medium-high altitude missile picket far from the British carriers. She was struck amidships, with devastating effect, ultimately killing 20 crew members and severely injuring 24 others. The ship was abandoned several hours later, gutted and deformed by the fires that continued to burn for six more days. She finally sank outside the Maritime Exclusion Zone on 10 May.

The incident is described in detail by Admiral Sandy Woodward in his book One Hundred Days, Chapter One. Woodward was a former commanding officer of Sheffield.

The tempo of operations increased throughout the second half of May as United Nations attempts to mediate a peace were rejected by the British, who felt that any delay would make a campaign impractical in the South Atlantic storms. The destruction of Sheffield had a profound impact on the British public, bringing home the fact that the "Falklands Crisis", as the BBC News put it, was now an actual "shooting war".

SAS operations



Given the threat to the British fleet posed by the Etendard / Exocet combination, plans were made to use Special Air Servicemarker troops to attack the home base of the five Etendards at Río Grande, Tierra del Fuegomarker. The operation was code named "Mikado". The aim was to destroy the missiles and the aircraft that carried them, and to kill the pilots in their quarters. Two plans were drafted and underwent preliminary rehearsal: a landing by approximately fifty-five SAS in two C-130 Hercules aircraft directly on the runway at Rio Grande; and infiltration of twenty-four SAS by inflatable boats brought within a few miles of the coast by submarine. Neither plan was implemented; the earlier airborne assault plan attracted considerable hostility from some members of the SAS, who considered the proposed raid a suicide mission. Ironically, the Rio Grande area would be defended by four full-strength battalions of Marine Infantry of the Argentine Marine Corps of the Argentine Navy, some of whose officers were trained in the UK by the SBSmarker years earlier.

After the war, Argentine marine commanders admitted that they were waiting for some kind of landing by SAS forces but never expected a Hercules to land directly on their runways, although they would have pursued British forces even into Chilean territory if they were attacked.

An SAS reconnaissance team was despatched to carry out preparations for a seaborne infiltration. A Westland Sea King helicopter carrying the assigned team took off from HMS Invincible on the night of 17 May, but bad weather forced it to land from its target, and the mission was aborted. The pilot flew to Chilemarker and dropped off the SAS team, before setting fire to his helicopter and surrendering to the Chilean authorities. The discovery of the burnt-out helicopter attracted considerable international attention at the time.

On 14 May the SAS carried out the raid on Pebble Islandmarker at the Falklands, where the Argentine Navy had taken over a grass airfield for FMA IA 58 Pucará light ground attack aircraft and T-34 Mentors. The raid destroyed the aircraft there.

Landing at San Carlos — Bomb Alley

Context of landings in the Falklands.
San Carlos landing sites.
Gate guardian painted in the colours of the last A-4Q of the Argentine Navy to attack HMS Ardent.
The pilot Lieutenant Marcelo Gustavo Márquez was killed in action.


During the night on 21 May the British Amphibious Task Group under the command of Commodore Michael Clapp (Commodore, Amphibious Warfare - COMAW) mounted Operation Sutton, the amphibious landing on beaches around San Carlos Watermarker, on the northwestern coast of East Falklandmarker facing onto Falkland Soundmarker. The bay, known as Bomb Alley by British forces, was the scene of repeated air attacks by low-flying Argentine jets.

The 4,000 men of 3 Commando Brigademarker were put ashore as follows: 2nd battalion of the Parachute Regiment (2 Para) from the RORO ferry Norland and 40 Commando (Royal Marines) from the amphibious ship HMS Fearless were landed at San Carlos (Blue Beach), 3 Para from the amphibious ship HMS Intrepid were landed at Port San Carlosmarker (Green Beach) and 45 Commando from RFA Stromness were landed at Ajax Baymarker (Red Beach). Notably the waves of 8 LCU and 8 LCVPs were led by Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour who had commanded the Falklands detachment only a year previously. 42 Commando on the ocean liner SS Canberra was a tactical reserve. Units from the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers etc. and tanks were also put ashore with the landing craft, the Round table class LSL and mexeflote barges. Rapier missile launchers were carried as underslung loads of Sea King for rapid deployment.

By dawn the next day they had established a secure beachhead from which to conduct offensive operations. From there Brigadier Thompson's plan was to capture Darwinmarker and Goose Greenmarker before turning towards Port Stanley.Now, with the British troops on the ground, the Argentine Air Force began the night bombing campaign against them using Canberra bomber planes until the last day of the war (14 June).

At sea, the paucity of the British ships' anti-aircraft defences was demonstrated in the sinking of HMS Ardent on 21 May, HMS Antelope on 21 May, and MV Atlantic Conveyormarker (struck by two AM39 Exocets) on 25 May along with a vital cargo of helicopters, runway-building equipment and tents. The loss of all but one of the Chinook helicopters being carried by the Atlantic Conveyor was a severe blow from a logistics perspective. Also lost on this day was HMS Coventry, a sister to HMS Sheffieldmarker, whilst in company with HMS Broadsword after being ordered to act as decoy to draw away Argentinian aircraft from other ships at San Carlos Bay. HMS Argonaut and HMS Brilliant were badly damaged. However, many British ships escaped terminal damage because of the Argentine pilots' bombing tactics.

In order to avoid the highest concentration of British air defences, Argentine pilots released ordnance from very low altitude so that their bomb fuze did not have sufficient time to arm before impact. The low release of the retarded bombs (some of which had been sold to the Argentines by the British years earlier) meant that many never exploded, as there was insufficient time in the air for them to arm themselves. A simple free-fall bomb will, during a low altitude release, impact almost directly below the aircraft which is then within the lethal fragmentation zone of the resulting explosion. A retarded bomb has a small parachute or air brake that opens to reduce the speed of the bomb to produce a safe separation between the two. The fuze for a retarded bomb requires a minimum time over which the retarder is open to ensure safe separation. The pilots would have been aware of this, but due to the high concentration levels required in order to avoid the anti-aircraft defences of SAM and AAA, as well as any British Sea Harrier, many failed to climb to the necessary release point. The problem was solved by the improvised fitting of retarding devices, allowing low-level bombing attacks as employed on 8 June.

In his autobiographical account of the Falklands War, Admiral Woodward blames the BBC World Service for these changes to the bombs. The World Service reported the lack of detonations after receiving a briefing on the matter from a Ministry of Defence official. He describes the BBC as being more concerned with being "fearless seekers after truth" than with the lives of British servicemen. Colonel 'H'. Jones levelled similar accusations against the BBC after they disclosed the impending British attack on Goose Green by 2 Para. Jones had threatened to lead the prosecution of senior BBC officials for treason but was unable to do so since he was himself killed in action around Goose Green. Thirteen bombs hit British ships without detonating. Lord Craig, the retired Marshal of the Royal Air Force, is said to have remarked: "Six better fuses and we would have lost" although Ardent and Antelope were both lost despite the failure of bombs to explode. The fuses were functioning correctly, and the bombs were simply released from too low an altitude. The Argentines lost nearly twenty aircraft in the attacks.

Battle of Goose Green

East Falkland showing San Carlos bridgehead, Teal Inlet, Mt Kent and Mt Challenger.


From early on 27 May until 28 May, 2 Para, (approximately 500 men) with Artillery support from 8 (Alma) Cdo Bty RA, approached and attacked Darwinmarker and Goose Greenmarker, which was held by the Argentine 12th Inf Regt. After a tough struggle which lasted all night and into the next day, 17 British and 55 Argentine soldiers had been killed, and 1,050 Argentine troops (including around 350 Argentine Air Force non-combatant personnel of the Condor airfield) taken prisoner. The BBC announced the taking of Goose Green on the BBC World Service before it had actually happened. It was during this attack that Lieutenant Colonel H. Jones, the commanding officer of 2 Para was killed while charging into the well-prepared Argentine positions at the head of his battalion. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.

With the sizeable Argentine force at Goose Green out of the way, British forces were now able to break out of the San Carlosmarker bridgehead. On 27 May, men of 45 Cdo and 3 Para started walking across East Falklandmarker towards the coastal settlement of Teal Inletmarker.

Special forces on Mount Kent

Meanwhile, 42 Commando prepared to move by helicopter to Mount Kent. Unknown to senior British officers, the Argentine generals were determined to tie down the British troops in the Mount Kent area, and on 27 May and 28 May they sent transport aircraft loaded with Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles and commandos (602nd Commando Company and 601st National Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron) to Stanleymarker. This operation was known as Operation AUTOIMPUESTA (Self-Determination-Initiative). For the next week, the Special Air Servicemarker (SAS) and Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadremarker of 3 Commando Brigademarker waged intense patrol battles with patrols of the volunteers' 602nd Commando Company under Major Aldo Rico, normally 2IC of the 22nd Mountain Infantry Regiment. Throughout 30 May, Royal Air Force Harriers were active over Mount Kent. One of them — Harrier XZ 963 flown by Squadron-Leader Jerry Pook — in responding to a call for help from D Squadron, attacked Mount Kent's eastern lower slopes, and that led to its loss through small-arms fire.

The Argentine Navy used their last AM39 Exocet missile attempting to attack HMS Invincible on 30 May. There are claims the missile struck, however the British have denied this, some citing that HMS Avenger shot it down.

On the 31 May, the Royal Marines Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadremarker (M&AWC) defeated Argentine Special Forces at the Battle of Top Malo Housemarker. A 13-strong Argentine Army Commando detachment (Captain Jose Vercesi's 1st Assault Section, 602nd Commando Company) found itself trapped in a small shepherd's house at Top Malo. The Argentine commandos fired from windows and doorways and then took refuge in a stream bed from the burning house. Completely surrounded, they fought 19 M&AWC marines under Captain Rod Boswell for forty-five minutes until, with their ammunition almost exhausted, they elected to surrender. Three Cadre members were badly wounded. On the Argentine side there were two dead including Lieutenant Ernesto Espinoza and Sergeant Mateo Sbert (who were decorated for their bravery). Only five Argentines were left unscathed. As the British mopped up Top Malo House, down from Malo Hill came Lieutenant Fraser Haddow's M&AWC patrol, brandishing a large Union Flag. One wounded Argentine soldier, Lieutenant Horacio Losito, commented that their escape route would have taken them through Haddow's position.

Major Mario Castagneto's 601st Commandos tried to move forward on Kawasaki motorbikes and commandeered Land Rovers to rescue 602nd Commando Company on Estancia Mountain. Spotted by 42 Commando of the Royal Marines, they were engaged with 81mm mortars and forced to withdraw to Two Sisters mountain. Captain Eduardo Villarruel on Estancia Mountain realised his position had become untenable and after conferring with fellow officers ordered a withdrawal.

The Argentine operation also saw the extensive use of helicopter support to position and extract patrols; the Argentine Army 601st Combat Aviation Battalion also suffered casualties. At about 11.00 a.m. on 30 May, an Aerospatiale SA-330 Puma helicopter was brought down by a shoulder-launched Stinger surface-to-air missile (SAM) fired by the SASmarker in the vicinity of Mount Kent in which six National Gendarmerie Special Forces were killed and eight more wounded in the crash.

As Brigadier Julian Thompson commented, "It was fortunate that I had ignored the views expressed by Northwood that reconnaissance of Mount Kent before insertion of 42 Commando was superfluous. Had D Squadron not been there, the Argentine Special Forces would have caught the Commando before deplaning and, in the darkness and confusion on a strange landing zone, inflicted heavy casualties on men and helicopters."

Bluff Cove and Fitzroy

The abandoned hulk of RFA Sir Tristram in Fitzroy.
By 1 June, with the arrival of a further 5,000 British troops of the 5th Infantry Brigade, the new British divisional commander, Major General Jeremy Moore RM, had sufficient force to start planning an offensive against Stanleymarker.

During this build-up, the Argentine air assaults on the British naval forces continued, killing 56. Of the dead, 32 were from the Welsh Guards on RFA Sir Galahad and RFA Sir Tristram on 8 June. According to Surgeon-Commander Rick Jolly of the Falklands Field Hospital, more than 150 men suffered burns and injuries of some kind in the attack, including, famously, Simon Weston.

The Guards were sent to support a dashing advance along the southern approach to Stanley. On 2 June a small advance party of 2 Para moved to Swan Inlet house in a number of Army Westland Scout helicopters. Telephoning ahead to Fitzroy, they discovered the area clear of Argentines and (exceeding their authority) commandeered the one remaining RAF Chinook helicopter to frantically ferry another contingent of 2 Para ahead to Fitzroymarker (a settlement on Port Pleasant) and Bluff Covemarker (a settlement confusingly, and perhaps ultimately fatally, on Port Fitzroy).

This un-coordinated advance caused planning nightmares for the commanders of the combined operation, as they now found themselves with a string of indefensible positions on their southern flank. Support could not be sent by air as the single remaining Chinook was already heavily oversubscribed. The soldiers could march, but their equipment and heavy supplies would need to be ferried by sea. Plans were drawn up for half the Welsh Guards to march light on the night of 2 June, whilst the Scots Guards and the second half of the Welsh Guards were to be ferried from San Carlos Watermarker in the Landing Ship Logistics (LSL) Sir Tristram and the landing platform dock (LPD) Intrepid on the night of 5 June. Intrepid was planned to stay one day and unload itself and as much of Sir Tristram as possible, leaving the next evening for the relative safety of San Carlos. Escorts would be provided for this day, after which Sir Tristram would be left to unload using an inflatable platform known as a Mexeflote for as long as it took to finish.

Political pressure from above to not risk the LPD forced Commodore Clapp to alter this plan. Two lower-value LSLs would be sent, but without suitable beaches on which to land, Intrepid's landing craft would need to accompany them to unload. A complicated operation across several nights with Intrepid and her sister ship Fearless sailing half-way to dispatch their craft was devised. The attempted overland march by half the Welsh Guards failed, possibly as they refused to march light and attempted to carry their equipment. They returned to San Carlos and were landed directly at Bluff Cove when Fearless dispatched her landing craft. Sir Tristram sailed on the night of 6 June and was joined by Sir Galahad at dawn on 7 June. Anchored apart in Port Pleasant, the landing ships were near Fitzroy, the designated landing point. The landing craft should have been able to unload the ships to that point relatively quickly, but confusion over the ordered disembarcation point (the first half of the Guards going direct to Bluff Cove) resulted in the senior Welsh Guards infantry officer aboard insisting his troops be ferried the far longer distance directly to Port Fitzroy/Bluff Cove. The intention was for the infantrymen to march via the recently repaired Bluff Cove bridge (destroyed by retreating Argentine combat engineers) to their destination, a journey of around seven miles (11 km).

The longer journey time of the landing craft taking the troops directly to Bluff Cove and the squabbling over how the landing was to be performed caused enormous delay in unloading. This had disastrous consequences. Without escorts, having not yet established their air defence, and still almost fully laden, the two LSLs in Port Pleasant were sitting targets for two waves of Argentine A-4 Skyhawks.

The disaster at Port Pleasant (although often known as Bluff Cove) would provide the world with some of the most sobering images of the war as TV news video footage showed Navy helicopters hovering in thick smoke to winch survivors from the burning landing ships. British casualties were 49 killed and 115 wounded. However, Argentine General Mario Menendez, commander of Argentine forces in the Falklands, was told that 900 British soldiers had died. He expected that the losses would cause enemy morale to drop and the British assault to stall.

The Fall of Stanley

Notable battles:


On the night of 11 June after several days of painstaking reconnaissance and logistic build-up, British forces launched a brigade-sized night attack against the heavily defended ring of high ground surrounding Stanley. Units of 3 Commando Brigade, supported by naval gunfire from several Royal Navy ships, simultaneously assaulted in the Battle of Mount Harrietmarker, Battle of Two Sistersmarker, and Battle of Mount Longdonmarker. Mount Harriet was taken at a cost of 2 British and 18 Argentine soldiers. At Two Sisters, the British faced both enemy resistance and friendly fire, but managed to capture their objectives. The toughest battle was at Mount Longdon. British forces were bogged down by assault rifle, mortar, machine gun, artillery fire, sniper fire, and ambushes. Despite this, the British continued their advance.

During this battle, 13 were killed when HMS Glamorgan, straying too close to shore while returning from the gun line, was struck by an improvised trailer-based Exocet MM38 launcher taken from ARA Seguí destroyer by Argentine Navy technicians. On this day, Sgt Ian McKay of 4 Platoon, B Company, 3 Para died in a grenade attack on an Argentine bunker which was to earn him a posthumous Victoria Cross. After a night of fierce fighting, all objectives were secured. Both sides had suffered heavy losses.

The night of 13 June saw the start of the second phase of attacks, in which the momentum of the initial assault was maintained. 2 Para with tank support captured Wireless Ridge at the Battle of Wireless Ridgemarker, at a loss of 3 British and 25 Argentine dead, and the 2nd battalion, Scots Guards captured Mount Tumbledown at the Battle of Mount Tumbledownmarker, which cost the British 10 dead and the Argentines 30 dead.

A pile of discarded Argentine weapons in Port Stanley.
With the last natural defence line at Mount Tumbledown breached, the Argentine town defences of Stanleymarker began to falter. In the morning gloom, one company commander got lost and his junior officers became despondent. Private Santiago Carrizo of the 3rd Regiment described how a platoon commander ordered them to take up positions in the houses and "if a Kelper resists, shoot him", but the entire company did nothing of the kind.

The commander of the Argentine garrison in Stanley, Brigade General Mario Menéndez, surrendered to Major General Jeremy Moore. 9,800 Argentine troops were made prisoners of war and some 4,167 were repatriated to Argentina on the ocean liner Canberra alone.

Surrender of Corbeta Uruguay

On 20 June the British retook the South Sandwich Islands, (which involved accepting the surrender of the Southern Thulemarker Garrison at the Corbeta Uruguaymarker base) and declared hostilities to be over. Argentina had established Corbeta Uruguay in 1976, but prior to 1982 the United Kingdom had contested the existence of the Argentine base only through diplomatic channels.

Casualties

San Carlos War Memorial and Cemetery, Falkland islands.
British dead are buried after the battle of Goose Green.
In total 907 were killed during the 74 days of the conflict:

Of the 86 Royal Navy personnel, 22 were lost in HMS Ardent, 19 + 1 lost in HMS Sheffieldmarker, 18 + 1 lost in HMS Coventry and 13 lost in HMS Glamorgan. 14 naval cooks were among the dead, the largest number from any one branch in the Royal Navy.

33 of the British Army's dead came from the Welsh Guards, 21 from the 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, 18 from the 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, 19 from the Special Air Servicemarker (SAS), 3 from Royal Signals and 8 from each of the Scots Guards and Royal Engineers.

As well as memorials on the islands, there is a memorial to the British war dead in the crypt of St Paul's Cathedralmarker, Londonmarker. There is a memorial at Plaza San Martín in Buenos Airesmarker for the Argentine war dead, another one in Rosariomarker, and a third one in Ushuaiamarker.

During the war, British dead were put into plastic body bags and buried in mass graves. After the war, the bodies were removed, given funeral services, and reburied. Argentine dead were buried on the islands during the war. The United Kingdom offered to send the bodies back to Argentina, but Argentina refused, knowing that the remains would ensure a continuing Argentine presence on the islands. There is a cemetery for Argentine dead on the islands.

There were 1,188 Argentine and 777 British non-fatal casualties. Further information about the field hospitals and hospital ships is at Ajax Baymarker, List of hospitals and hospital ships of the Royal Navy, HMS Hydra and Argentine Navy's ARA Almirante Irizar.

There are still 125 uncleared minefields on the Falkland Islands and UXO are scattered all over the battle fields due to the soft peat ground. According to forcesmemorial.org.uk via Falklands 25's "Official Commemorative Publication" 30 British servicemen have died on the islands since the end of the hostilities.

See also Argentine and British ground forces in the Falklands War


Consequences of the Falklands War

This brief war brought many consequences for all the parties involved, besides the great loss of human life and materiel.

In Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher won the time and support she required for her economic measures to take effect, national pride received a big boost of confidence and assurance, the Royal Navy proved its value once more.

The islanders subsequently had full British citizenship restored in 1983, their lifestyle was improved by investments Britain made after the war and the liberalisation of economic measures that had been stalled through fear of angering Argentina. In 1985, a new constitution was enacted promoting self-government, which has continued to devolve power to the islanders.

The war for Argentina also had an effect in Argentina through the return of democracy and the military, formerly the “moral reserve of the nation” completely lost their reputation.

Public relations

Argentina

Selected war correspondents were regularly flown to Port Stanley in military aircraft to report on the war. Back in Buenos Aires newspapers and magazines faithfully reported on "the heroic actions of the largely conscript army and its successes".

Officers from the intelligence services were attached to the newspapers and 'leaked' information confirming the official communiqués from the government. The glossy magazines Gente and Siete Días swelled to sixty pages with colour photographs of British warships in flames - many of them faked - and bogus eyewitness reports of the Argentine commandos' guerrilla war on South Georgia 6 May and an already dead Pucará pilot's attack on HMS Hermes (Lt. Daniel Antonio Jukic had been killed at Goose Green during a British air strike on 1 May). Most of the faked photos actually came from the tabloid press.

The Argentine troops on the Falkland Islands could read Gaceta Argentina—a newspaper intended to boost the morale among the servicemen. Some of its untruths could easily be unveiled by the soldiers who recovered corpses.Middlebrook (1989), p. 94, "First of May. Menéndez ordered the publication of a newspaper for the troops on the Falkland Islands called Gaceta Argentina. It stated that one of the Mirages lost 1 May had collided with a Sea Harrier and the Argentine pilot survived. In fact Argentine AAA at Stanley shot down the Mirage when it tried to emergency land there. It was a blatant lie for all those Argentine servicemen who had seen the Mirage being shot down by Argentine guns and had removed the dead pilot from the crashed aeroplane. Similar the junta’s press office in Buenos Aires informed that Lieutenant Antonio Jukic, who actually was killed in his Pucará on the ground at Goose Green, had perished in a gallant, single-handed Pucará attack on HMS Hermes, setting it on fire. This statement was illustrated with dramatic sketches. The men at Goose Green knew that Lieutenant Jukic died on the ground there.

Gaceta Argentino summed up the British losses up to 25 May as: 5 warship sunk (correct number 3), 3 transport ships including RMS Canberra (1; Atlantic Conveyor), 14 Sea Harriers (2 shot down & 3 accidents) and many ships damaged, including HMS Hermes. Gaceta Argentino even wrote: "All of these details refer only to proven claims and not to estimated or unproven claims..."".

The Malvinas course united the Argentines in a patriotic atmosphere which protected the junta from critics—even the Madres de Plaza de Mayo were exposed to death threats from ordinary people.

HMS Invincible was repeatedly sunk in the Argentine press, and on 30 April 1982 the Argentine magazine Tal Cual showed UK's PM Thatcher with an eyepatch and the text: Pirate, witch and assassin. Guilty!http://www.scienceandsociety.co.uk/results.asp?image=10438336&wwwflag=2&imagepos=12

Three British reporters sent to Argentina to cover the war from the 'other side' were jailed until the end of the war.

United Kingdom

Seventeen newspaper reporters, two photographers, two radio reporters and three television reporters with five technicians sailed with the Task Force to the war. The Newspaper Publishers' Association selected them from among 160 applicants, excluding foreign media. Due to the hasty departure, not all of them were "the right stuff": two journalists on HMS Invincible were interested in nothing but Queen Elizabeth II's son Prince Andrew.

Merchant vessels had the civilian Inmarsat uplink, which enabled written telex as well as voice report transmissions via satellite. On Canberra there was a facsimile machine which was used to upload 202 pictures from the South Atlantic over the course of the war. The Royal Navy leased bandwidth on the US Defense Satellite Communications System for worldwide communications. Television demands a thousand times the data rate of telephone, but the MoD was unsuccessful in convincing the US to allocate more bandwidth. TV producers suspected that the enquiry was half-hearted; since the Vietnam War television pictures of casualties and traumatised soldiers were recognised as having negative propaganda value. However the technology only allowed uploading a single frame per 20 minutes - and only if the military satellites were allocated 100 % to television transmissions. Videotapes were shipped to Ascension Island, where a broadband satellite uplink was available, resulting in TV coverage being delayed by three weeks.

The press was very dependent on the Royal Navy, and was censored on site. Many reporters in the UK knew more about the war than those with the Task Force.

The Royal Navy expected Fleet Streetmarker to conduct a World War Two style positive news campaign but the majority of the British media, especially the BBC, reported the war in a neutral fashion. Reporters referred to "the British troops" and "the Argentinian troops" instead of "our lads" and the dehumanised "Argies". The two main tabloid papers presented opposing viewpoints: The Daily Mirror was decidedly anti-war, whilst The Sun became notorious for its jingoistic and xenophobic headlines, including the 20 April headline "Stick It Up Your Junta!", and was condemned for the "Gotcha" headline following the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano.

Cultural impact



There were wide-ranging influences on popular culture in both the UK and Argentina, from the immediate postwar period to the present. The words yomp and Exocet entered the British vernacular as a result of the war. The Falklands War also provided material for theatre, film and TV drama and influenced the output of musicians including (among others) Iron Maiden, Pink Floyd, New Order, Gang of Four, Joe Jackson, Crass, Dire Straits (the song Brothers in arms was played in memory of the dead soldiers), New Model Army, The Levellers, Steve Dahl, Latin Quarter, the Super Furry Animals, and Elvis Costello, whose song "Shipbuilding", sung by Robert Wyatt, reached the British top 40.

See also



Notes

  1. Argentina for Falklands Sovereignty Prensa Latina Latin America New Agency accessed 21 June 2007
  2. Constitución Nacional: "La Nación Argentina ratifica su legítima e imprescriptible soberanía sobre las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur y los espacios marítimos e insulares correspondientes, por ser parte integrante del territorio nacional"
  3. Cómo evitar que Londres convierta a las Malvinas en un Estado independiente
  4. Argentina - the horrors of a dictatorial past live on Radio Netherlands Worldwide
  5. Jimmy Burns: The land that lost its heroes, 1987, Bloomsbury Publishing, ISBN 0-7475-0002-9
  6. " " ("This was neither about national pride nor anything else. The junta —Galtieri told me— never believed the British would respond. He thought the Western World was corrupt. That the British people had no God, that the US was corrupt... I could never convince him that the British would not only fight back but also win [the war].")
  7. Argentine Government
  8. En Buenos Aires, la Junta comenzó a estudiar la posibilidad de ocupar las Islas Malvinas y Georgias antes de que los británicos pudieran reforzarlas
  9. high cost of cuts, The | Spectator, The | Find Articles at BNET.com
  10. BBC NEWS | UK | How BBC man scooped invasion news
  11. One Hundred Days Woodward, Admiral Sandy (1992) Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, p.72. ISBN 9781557506511; ISBN 9781557506528. Cited in To Rule The Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World Herman, A (2004) Harper Collins, New York, p.560
  12. Brown 1987, p. 110
  13. Submarine Operations during the Falklands War - US Naval War College
  14. [1] "As a result of these heavy losses...it was decided to pull the Mirage III's back to the mainland to stand alert for a possible Vulcan attack."
  15. [2] "Finally, the bombing raids caused the Argentines to fear an air attack on the mainland, causing them to retain some Mirage aircraft and Roland missiles for defense."
  16. [3] La familia Mirage, Aeroespacio, Fuerza Aerea Argentina, ISSN 0001-9127, "Los M III debían defender el territorio continental argentino de posibles ataques de los bombarderos Vulcan de la RAF, brindar escolta a los cazabombarderos de la FAA, e impedir los ataques de aviones de la Royal Navy y de la RAF sobre las Malvinas." ("The M III would defend the Argentine mainland against possible attacks by Vulcan bombers from the RAF, providing escort of fighter bombers to the FAA, and to prevent attacks by aircraft of the Royal Navy and RAF on the Falklands.")
  17. [4]"Unfortunately the British Secretary of State for Defense announced sometime later that Britain would not bomb targets on the Argentine mainland. This statement was undoubtedly welcomed by the Argentine military command because it permitted the very limited number of Roland SAM's to be deployed around the airfield at Stanley."
  18. Rodríguez Mottino, Horacio: La Artillería Argentina en Malvinas. Ed. Clío, 1985. Page 170
  19. [5] [6]
  20. Fuerza Aérea Argentina
  21. ASN Aircraft accident description Lockheed C-130H Hercules TC-63 - Pebble Island
  22. See Underwater and undercover: how nuclear subs were first line of Falklands defence retrieved 22 Sept. 2009)
  23. Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days, page 8. ISBN 9780007134670
  24. www.eliteukforces.info
  25. telegraph.co.uk SAS 'suicide mission' to wipe out Exocets
  26. Middlebrook, p. 75.
  27. La Infantería de Marina de la Armada Argentina en el Conflicto del Atlántico Sur, ISBN 987-433-641-2
  28. Thatcher in the dark on sinking of Belgrano - Times Online
  29. Bomb Alley — Falklands Island 1982.
  30. Charles ends Falklands tour on sombre note, BBC News.
  31. Captain Hart Dyke, Commanding Officer of HMS Coventry
  32. Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982 — British ships lost & damaged.
  33. Scotsman.
  34. Royal Navy.
  35. Commodore Ruben Oscar Moro La Guerra Inaudita, 2000 ISBN 987-96007-3-8
  36. [7] "The attack against the HMS Invincible"
  37. [8]30 May 1982
  38. [9] operationcorporate.com
  39. [10] Sunday May 30
  40. [11] David Aldea, The Argentine Commandos on Mount Kent
  41. Argentine Puma Shot Down By American “Stinger” Missile
  42. Julian Thompson, No Picnic, p. 93, Cassell & Co, 2001
  43. Rick Jolly, The Red & Green Life Machine, page 124
  44. Twentieth century battlefields-The Falklands
  45. An interview with CL (R) Ing. Julio Pérez, chief designer of Exocet trailer-based launcher
  46. Hastings and Jenkins: The Battle for the Falklands, p. 307
  47. Buenos Aires War Memorial is at coordinates
  48. list
  49. list
  50. list
  51. list
  52. Falkland Islands - A history of the 1982 conflict
  53. According to [12] 260. The extras are: Paul T. Mills from HMS Coventry, died from complications from a skull fracture from the air attack, died 29 March 1983 and Brian Biddick from HMHS Uganda who died after an emergency operation on the voyage to the Falklands 12 May 1982
  54. list
  55. list
  56. Falkland Islands - A history of the 1982 conflict
  57. Para
  58. SAS
  59. rest of army
  60. Welcome to St Paul's Cathedral - Lady Thatcher marks Falklands anniversary at St Paul's
  61. [13]
  62. Even opposers of the military government supported Galtieri; Ernesto Sabato: "Don't be mistaken, Europe; it is not a dictatorship that is fighting for the Malvinas, it is the whole Nation."
  63. Harris
  64. I went as a reporter but ended up a prisoner of war, The Observer Sunday 1 April 2007
  65. Freedman, "two journalists on Invincible were interested in no issue other than what Prince Andrew, a helicopter pilot as well as the Queen's son, was up to"
  66. Freedman 2005, Vol. 2 p. 36
  67. Harris, "You must have been told you couldn't report bad news ...You were expected to do a 1940 propaganda job."
  68. Hastings and Jenkins: The Battle for the Falklands
  69. Channel 4 - When Britain Went to War
  70. [14] A new Britain, a new kind of newspaper, the Guardian, Monday 25 February 2002 (retrieved on 7 September 2007)
  71. [15] Forty years of The Sun (retrieved on 7 September 2007)
  72. [16] British Library Website on the "Gotcha" headline (retrieved on 7 September 2007)


Bibliography



  • Barnett, Anthony, IRON BRITANNIA Why Parliament waged its Falklands war. Allison & Busby, 1982. ISBN 0-85031-493-3
  • Brown, David, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War. Leo Cooper, 1987. ISBN 0850520592
  • Dalyell, Tam, One Man's Falklands. Cecil Woolf, 1982. ISBN 0-900821-65-5.
  • Dalyell, Tam, Thatcher's Torpedo. Cecil Woolf, 1983. ISBN 0-900821-66-3.
  • Femenia, Nora, National Identity in Times of Crises: the scripts of the Falklands-Malvinas War. Nova Science Publishers, Inc, 1996. ISBN 1-56072-196-0.
  • Franks et al., Falkland Islands Review, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors. HMSO, January 1983. Cmnd. 8787.
  • Freedman, Sir Lawrence. Official History of the Falklands Campaign: Vols 1 & 2. Frank Cass, 2005. ISBN 0-7146-5206-7 and ISBN 0-7146-5207-5.
  • Gavshon, Arthur and Rice, Desmond, The Sinking of the Belgrano. Secker & Warburg, 1984. ISBN 0-436-41332-9.
  • Harris, Robert, GOTCHA! The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis. Faber and Faber, 1983. ISBN 0-571-13052-6.
  • Hobson, Chris and Noble, Andrew, Falklands Air War
  • Hunt, Sir Rex: My Falkland Days, Politico's Publishing, 1992, ISBN 978-1842750179
  • Kon, Daniel, Los Chicos de la Guerra, The Argentine conscripts' own moving accounts of their Falklands War (English translation). New English Library 1983. ISBN 0-450-05611-2.
  • McManners, Hugh, Forgotten Voices of the Falklands, Ebury Press, 2007, ISBN 9780091908805
  • Middlebrook, Martin: "The Argentine fight for the Malvinas - The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War", Pen and Sword Books, 1989, ISBN 0-670-82106-3
  • Middlebrook, Martin. The Argentine Fight for the Falklands. Pen & Sword Military Classics, 2003. ISBN 0-85052-978-6
  • Norton-Taylor, Richard. The Ponting Affair. Cecil Woolf, 1985. ISBN 0-900821-73-6.
  • Ponting, Clive. The Right to Know: The Inside Story of the Belgrano Affair. Sphere Books, 1985. ISBN 0-7221-6944-2
  • Sunday Times Insight Team. The Falklands War. Sphere Books, 1982. ISBN 0-7221-8282-1.
  • Tinker, Lieut. David, R.N. A Message from the Falklands, The Life and Gallant Death of David Tinker, Lieut. R.N. from his Letters and Poems. Penguin, 1982. ISBN 0-14-006778-7.
  • Thornton, Richard C. 'The Falklands Sting. Brassey's, 1998. ISBN 1-57488-155-8.
  • Underwood, Geoffrey. Our Falklands War, The Men of the Task Force Tell Their Story. Maritime Books, 1983. ISBN 0-907771-08-4.


External links




Embed code:






Got something to say? Make a comment.
Your name
Your email address
Message