Frederick Carlton Weyand
(born in Arbuckle,
California, September 15, 1916) is a former U.S.
Army General. Weyand was
the last commander of American military operations in the Vietnam
War from 1972-1973, and served as the 28th US Army Chief of Staff
commissioned a second lieutenant through the Reserve Officers Training
Corps program at the University of
California at Berkeley, where he graduated in May 1938.
Arline Langhart in 1940.
World War Two
From 1940-1942 Weyand was assigned to active duty and served with
the 6th Field Artillery
graduated from the Command and General Staff
College at Fort
Leavenworth in 1942 and
served as adjutant of the Harbor Defense Command in San Francisco
He moved on to the Office of the Chief of
Intelligence for the War Department General Staff in 1944. He
became assistant chief of staff for intelligence in the China-Burma-India Theater
1944–1945. In the immediate aftermath of the war he was in the
Military Intelligence Service in Washington from 1945–1946
Service After World War Two and During the Korean War
He was chief of staff for intelligence, United States Army Forces,
Middle Pacific from 1946–1949. He graduated from the U.S. Army Infantry School
Benning in 1950. He became commander of the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment
and the assistant chief of staff, G–3, of the 3d Infantry Division
during the Korean War
Prior to the Vietnam War
He served on the faculty of the Infantry School from 1952 to 1953.
Following this assignment he attended the Armed Forces Staff College
upon graduation became military assistant in the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management until
1954. He moved on to become military assistant and executive to the
Secretary of the Army from 1954 to 1957. He then graduated from
the Army War
College in 1958, moving on to command the 3d Battalion, 6th Infantry
Regiment, in Europe, 1958–1959.
He served in the Office
of the United States Commander in Berlin in 1960 then became chief
of staff for the Communications Zone, United States Army, Europe
1960–1961;. He was the deputy chief and chief of legislative
liaison for the Department of the Army from 1961–1964.
Vietnam War Service
Lieutenant General Weyand as Commander
of II Field Force in Vietnam.
Weyand became commander of the 25th Infantry Division
, stationed in
Hawaii, in 1964. He continued to lead the division as it was
introduced into operations in Vietnam in 1965 and 1966.
as the head of the 25th Division until 1967, when he became deputy,
then acting commander, and finally commander of II Field Force, Vietnam responsible
for III Corps Tactical Zone
comprising the 11 provinces around Saigon.
1968, he became chief of the Office of Reserve Components.
A dissenter from General William Westmoreland's more conventional
war strategy, Weyand's experience as a former intelligence officer
gave him a sense of the enemy's intentions. He realized that "the
key to success in Vietnam was in securing and pacifying the towns
and villages of South Vietnam" (Mark Salter, John McCain "Hard
Call: The Art of Great Decisions"). Weyand managed to convince a
reluctant General Westmoreland to allow him to redeploy troops away
from the Cambodian border area closer to Saigon, significantly
contributing to making the 1968 Tet Offensive a military
catastrophe for North Vietnam.
In 1969, he then was named the military advisor to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge
Paris Peace Talks
. In 1970 he
became assistant chief of staff for force development. Later in
1970, he became deputy commander and commander of the Military Assistance
. He succeeded General Creighton Abrams
, who became the
army Chief of Staff, as Commander of MACV on June 30, 1972. By the
end of 1972 General Weyand had overseen the withdrawal of all
United States military forces from South
Post-Vietnam Commands and Chief of Staff
He was commander in chief of the United States Army, Pacific
1973; was vice chief of staff of the United States Army, 1973–1974;
was chief of staff of the United States Army, 3 October 1974–31
September 1976; supervised Army moves to improve the
combat-to-support troop ratio, to achieve a sixteen-division force,
to enhance the effectiveness of roundout units, and to improve
personnel and logistical readiness; retired from active service,
Confidential Source for 1967 New York Times Article
In an editorial in the New York Times
on December 11, 2006, Murray Fromson, a reporter for CBS
during the Vietnam War, stated that General Weyand
had agreed to reveal himself as the confidential source for New
York Times reporter R.W. Apple's August 7, 1967 story "Vietnam: The
Signs of Stalemate." General Weyand, then commander of III Corps in
Vietnam, told Apple and Fromson (who reported the same story for
CBS) that "I’ve destroyed a single division three times . . . I’ve
chased main-force units all over the country and the impact was
zilch. It meant nothing to the people. Unless a more positive and
more stirring theme than simple anti-communism can be found, the
war appears likely to go on until someone gets tired and quits,
which could take generations." This story was the first intimation
that war was reaching a stalemate, and contributed to changing
sentiment about the war.