Gottfried Wilhelm von
Leibniz ( ; 1 July 1646 – 14 November 1716) was a German
philosopher, polymath
and mathematician who wrote primarily
in Latin and French.
He occupies a grand place in both the
history of philosophy and the
history of mathematics. He invented
infinitesimal calculus
independently of
Newton, and his
notation has been in general use
since then. He also invented the
binary system, the foundation of
virtually all modern computer architectures. In philosophy, he is
mostly remembered for
optimism,
i.e. his conclusion that our
universe is, in a restricted sense, the best
possible one
God could have made. He was, along
with
René Descartes and
Baruch Spinoza, one of the three greatest
17th-century
rationalists and
anticipates modern
logic and
analysis, but his philosophy also looks
back to the
scholastic tradition, in
which logic was an important part. Leibniz also made major
contributions to
physics and
technology, and anticipated notions that surfaced
much later in
biology,
medicine,
geology,
probability theory,
psychology,
linguistics, and
information science. He also wrote on
politics,
law,
ethics,
theology,
history,
philosophy and
philology, even occasional verse. His
contributions to this vast array of subjects are scattered in
journals and in tens of thousands of letters and unpublished
manuscripts. As of 2009, there is no complete edition of Leibniz's
writings.
Biography
Early life
Gottfried
Leibniz was born on 1 July 1646 in Leipzig
to Friedrich
Leibniz and Catherina Schmuck. His father died when he was
six, so he learned his religious and moral values from his mother.
These would exert a profound influence on his philosophical thought
in later life. As an adult, he often styled himself "von Leibniz",
and many posthumous editions of his works gave his name on the
title page as "Freiherr [Baron] G. W. von Leibniz." However, no
document has been found confirming that he was ever granted a
patent of nobility.
Upon the
death of his father, a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the
University of
Leipzig
, Leibniz was left with the father's personal
library, to which he was granted free access from age seven
onwards. While his schoolwork focused on a small canon of
authorities, his father's library enabled him to study a wide
variety of advanced philosophical and theological works that he
would not have otherwise been able to read until his university
studies. Access to his father's library accelerated his mastery of
Latin. Leibniz was proficient by age
12, composing three hundred hexameters of Latin verse in a single
morning for a school celebration at age 13.
He entered his father's university at age 14 and completed a
Bachelor's degree in philosophy on 2 December 1662. He defended his
Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui, which
addressed the
Principle of
individuation, on 9 June 1663. He soon after took a Master's
degree in philosophy on 7 February 1664. He published and defended
a dissertation
Specimen Quaestionum Philosophicarum ex Jure
collectarum, arguing for both a theoretical and a pedagogical
relationship between philosophy and law, in December 1664. After
two years of legal studies, he was awarded a Bachelor's degree in
law on 28 September 1665.
In 1666 (age 20), he published his first book,
On the Art of Combinations, the
first part of which was also his
habilitation thesis in philosophy. His next
goal was to obtain a license and doctorate in law, which normally
required three years of study.
Older students blocked his early graduation
plans, leading him to leave Leipzig
in September
1666. He enrolled in the
University of Altdorf and almost
immediately submitted a thesis, which he had likely been writing
earlier at Leipzig. The title of the thesis was
Disputatio de
Casibus perplexis in Jure. Leibniz obtained a license and
doctorate in law in November of that year. He then declined an
offer of academic appointment at Altdorf, and spent the rest of his
life in the service of two major German noble families.
1666–74
Leibniz's
first position was as a salaried alchemist
in Nuremberg
, even though he knew nothing about the
subject. He soon met Johann Christian von Boineburg
(1622–1672), the dismissed chief minister of the Elector of
Mainz
, Johann Philipp von
Schönborn. Von Boineburg hired Leibniz as an assistant,
and shortly thereafter reconciled with the Elector and introduced
Leibniz to him. Leibniz then dedicated an essay on law to the
Elector in the hope of obtaining employment. The stratagem worked;
the Elector asked Leibniz to assist with the redrafting of the
legal code for his Electorate. In 1669, Leibniz was appointed
Assessor in the Court of Appeal. Although von Boineburg died late
in 1672, Leibniz remained under the employment of his widow until
she dismissed him in 1674.
Von Boineburg did much to promote Leibniz's reputation, and the
latter's memoranda and letters began to attract favorable notice.
Leibniz's service to the Elector soon followed a
diplomatic role.
He published an essay, under the pseudonym
of a fictitious Polish
nobleman,
arguing (unsuccessfully) for the German candidate for the Polish
crown. The main European geopolitical reality during
Leibniz's adult life was the ambition of
Louis XIV of France, backed by French
military and economic might. Meanwhile, the
Thirty Years' War had left German-speaking
Europe exhausted, fragmented, and economically backward. Leibniz
proposed to protect German-speaking Europe by distracting Louis as
follows.
France would be invited to take Egypt
as a
stepping stone towards an eventual conquest of the Dutch East
Indies
. In return, France would agree to leave
Germany and the Netherlands undisturbed. This plan obtained the
Elector's cautious support.
In 1672, the French government invited
Leibniz to Paris
for
discussion, but the plan was soon overtaken by events and became
irrelevant. Napoleon's failed invasion of Egypt in 1798 can
be seen as an unwitting implementation of Leibniz's plan.
Thus Leibniz began several years in Paris.
Soon after arriving,
he met Dutch
physicist
and mathematician Christiaan
Huygens and realised that his own knowledge of mathematics and
physics was spotty. With Huygens as mentor, he began a
program of self-study that soon pushed him to making major
contributions to both subjects, including inventing his version of
the differential and integral
calculus. He
met
Malebranche and
Antoine Arnauld, the leading French
philosophers of the day, and studied the writings of
Descartes and
Pascal,
unpublished as well as published. He befriended a German
mathematician,
Ehrenfried Walther von
Tschirnhaus; they corresponded for the rest of their
lives.
When it
became clear that France would not implement its part of Leibniz's
Egyptian plan, the Elector sent his nephew, escorted by Leibniz, on
a related mission to the English government in London
, early in
1673. There Leibniz came into acquaintance of
Henry Oldenburg and
John Collins. After
demonstrating a calculating machine he had been designing and
building since 1670 to the
Royal
Society , the first such machine that could execute all four
basic arithmetical operations, the Society made him an external
member. The mission ended abruptly when news reached it of the
Elector's death, whereupon Leibniz promptly returned to Paris and
not, as had been planned, to Mainz.
The sudden deaths of Leibniz's two patrons in the same winter meant
that Leibniz had to find a new basis for his career. In this
regard, a 1669 invitation from the Duke of
Brunswick to visit Hanover proved
fateful. Leibniz declined the invitation, but began corresponding
with the Duke in 1671. In 1673,
the Duke
offered him the post of Counsellor which Leibniz very reluctantly
accepted two years later, only after it became clear that no
employment in Paris, whose intellectual stimulation he relished, or
with the
Habsburg imperial court was
forthcoming.
House of Hanover, 1676–1716
Leibniz managed to delay his arrival in Hanover until the end of
1676, after making one more short journey to London, where he
possibly was shown some of Newton's unpublished work on the
calculus. This fact was deemed evidence supporting the accusation,
made decades later, that he had stolen the calculus from Newton.
On the
journey from London to Hanover, Leibniz stopped in The Hague
where he met Leeuwenhoek, the discoverer of
microorganisms. He also spent several days in intense
discussion with
Spinoza, who had just
completed his masterwork, the
Ethics. Leibniz respected Spinoza's
powerful intellect, but was dismayed by his conclusions that
contradicted both Christian and Jewish orthodoxy.
In 1677, he was promoted, at his request, to Privy Counselor of
Justice, a post he held for the rest of his life. Leibniz served
three consecutive rulers of the House of Brunswick as historian,
political adviser, and most consequentially, as librarian of the
ducal library. He thenceforth employed his pen
on all the various political, historical, and
theological matters involving the House of
Brunswick; the resulting documents form a valuable part of the
historical record for the period.
Among the few people in north Germany to accept Leibniz were the
Electress
Sophia of Hanover
(1630–1714), her daughter
Sophia Charlotte of Hanover
(1668–1705), the Queen of Prussia and her avowed disciple, and
Caroline of Ansbach, the consort
of her grandson, the future
George II. To each of these women
he was correspondent, adviser, and friend. In turn, they all
approved of Leibniz more than did their spouses and the future king
George I of Great
Britain.
The population of Hanover was only about 10,000, and its
provinciality eventually grated on Leibniz. Nevertheless, to be a
major courtier to the House of
Brunswick was quite an honor,
especially in light of the meteoric rise in the prestige of that
House during Leibniz's association with it. In 1692, the Duke of
Brunswick became a hereditary Elector of the
Holy Roman Empire. The British
Act of Settlement 1701 designated the
Electress Sophia and her descent as the royal family of the United
Kingdom, once both King
William
III and his sister-in-law and successor,
Queen Anne, were dead. Leibniz played
a role in the initiatives and negotiations leading up to that Act,
but not always an effective one.
For example, something he published
anonymously in England, thinking to promote the Brunswick cause,
was formally censured by the British Parliament
.
The Brunswicks tolerated the enormous effort Leibniz devoted to
intellectual pursuits unrelated to his duties as a courtier,
pursuits such as perfecting the calculus, writing about other
mathematics, logic, physics, and philosophy, and keeping up a vast
correspondence. He began working on the calculus in 1674; the
earliest evidence of its use in his surviving notebooks is 1675. By
1677 he had a coherent system in hand, but did not publish it until
1684. Leibniz's most important mathematical papers were published
between 1682 and 1692, usually in a journal which he and Otto
Mencke founded in 1682, the
Acta
Eruditorum. That journal played a key role in advancing
his mathematical and scientific reputation, which in turn enhanced
his eminence in diplomacy, history, theology, and philosophy.
The Elector
Ernst
August commissioned Leibniz to write a history of the House of
Brunswick, going back to the
time of
Charlemagne or earlier, hoping
that the resulting book would advance his dynastic ambitions. From
1687 to 1690, Leibniz traveled extensively in Germany, Austria, and
Italy, seeking and finding archival materials bearing on this
project. Decades went by but no history appeared; the next Elector
became quite annoyed at Leibniz's apparent dilatoriness. Leibniz
never finished the project, in part because of his huge output on
many other fronts, but also because he insisted on writing a
meticulously researched and erudite book based on archival sources,
when his patrons would have been quite happy with a short popular
book, one perhaps little more than a
genealogy with commentary, to be completed in
three years or less. They never knew that he had in fact carried
out a fair part of his assigned task: when the material Leibniz had
written and collected for his history of the House of Brunswick was
finally published in the 19th century, it filled three
volumes.
In 1711, John Keill, writing in the journal of the Royal Society
and with Newton's presumed blessing, accused Leibniz of having
plagiarized Newton's calculus. Thus began the
calculus priority
dispute which darkened the remainder of Leibniz's life. A
formal investigation by the Royal Society (in which Newton was an
unacknowledged participant), undertaken in response to Leibniz's
demand for a retraction, upheld Keill's charge. Historians of
mathematics writing since 1900 or so have tended to acquit Leibniz,
pointing to important differences between Leibniz's and Newton's
versions of the calculus.
In 1711, while traveling in northern Europe, the Russian
Tsar Peter the Great
stopped in Hanover and met Leibniz, who then took some interest in
matters Russian over the rest of his life.
In 1712, Leibniz
began a two year residence in Vienna
, where he
was appointed Imperial Court Councillor to the Habsburgs. On the death of Queen Anne in
1714, Elector Georg Ludwig became King
George I of Great Britain, under
the terms of the 1701
Act of
Settlement. Even though Leibniz had done much to bring about
this happy event, it was not to be his hour of glory. Despite the
intercession of the Princess of Wales,
Caroline of Ansbach, George I forbade
Leibniz to join him in London until he completed at least one
volume of the history of the Brunswick family his father had
commissioned nearly 30 years earlier. Moreover, for George I to
include Leibniz in his London court would have been deemed
insulting to Newton, who was seen as having won the calculus
priority dispute and whose standing in British official circles
could not have been higher. Finally, his dear friend and defender,
the dowager Electress
Sophia, died
in 1714.
Leibniz
died in Hanover
in 1716: at the time, he was so out of favor that
neither George I (who happened to be near Hanover at the time) nor
any fellow courtier other than his personal secretary attended the
funeral. Even though Leibniz was a life member of the Royal
Society and the
Berlin
Academy of Sciences, neither organization saw fit to honor his
passing. His grave went unmarked for more than 50 years. Leibniz
was eulogized by
Fontenelle,
before the Academie des Sciences in Paris, which had admitted him
as a foreign member in 1700. The eulogy was composed at the behest
of the
Duchess of
Orleans, a niece of the Electress Sophia.
Leibniz never married. He complained on occasion about money, but
the fair sum he left to his sole heir, his sister's stepson, proved
that the Brunswicks had, by and large, paid him well. In his
diplomatic endeavors, he at times verged on the unscrupulous, as
was all too often the case with professional diplomats of his day.
On several occasions, Leibniz backdated and altered personal
manuscripts, actions which put him in a bad light during the
calculus controversy. On the other hand, he was charming,
well-mannered, and not without humor and imagination; he had many
friends and admirers all over Europe.
Philosopher
Leibniz's philosophical thinking appears fragmented, because his
philosophical writings consist mainly of a multitude of short
pieces: journal articles, manuscripts published long after his
death, and many letters to many correspondents. He wrote only two
philosophical treatises, of which only the
Théodicée of
1710 was published in his lifetime.
Leibniz dated his beginning as a philosopher to his
Discourse on Metaphysics,
which he composed in 1686 as a commentary on a running dispute
between
Malebranche and
Antoine Arnauld. This led to an extensive
and valuable correspondence with Arnauld; it and the
Discourse were not published until the 19th century. In
1695, Leibniz made his public entrée into European philosophy with
a journal article titled "New System of the Nature and
Communication of Substances". Between 1695 and 1705, he composed
his
New Essays on
Human Understanding, a lengthy commentary on
John Locke's 1690
An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, but upon learning of Locke's 1704
death, lost the desire to publish it, so that the
New
Essays were not published until 1765. The
Monadologie, composed in 1714 and published
posthumously, consists of 90 aphorisms.
Leibniz met
Spinoza in 1676, read some of
his unpublished writings, and has since been suspected of
appropriating some of Spinoza's ideas. While Leibniz admired
Spinoza's powerful intellect, he was also forthrightly dismayed by
Spinoza's conclusions, especially when these were inconsistent with
Christian orthodoxy.
Unlike Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz had a thorough university
education in philosophy.
His lifelong scholastic and Aristotelian turn of mind betrayed the
strong influence of one of his Leipzig
professors,
Jakob Thomasius, who also supervised
his BA thesis in philosophy. Leibniz also eagerly read
Francisco Suárez, a Spanish
Jesuit respected even in
Lutheran universities. Leibniz was deeply
interested in the new methods and conclusions of Descartes,
Huygens, Newton, and
Boyle, but viewed
their work through a lens heavily tinted by scholastic notions. Yet
it remains the case that Leibniz's methods and concerns often
anticipate the
logic, and
analytic and
linguistic philosophy of the 20th
century.
The Principles
Leibniz variously invoked one or another of seven fundamental
philosophical Principles:
- Identity/contradiction. If a proposition is true, then
its negation is false and vice versa.
- Identity of
indiscernibles. Two things are identical if and only if they
share the same and only the same properties. Frequently invoked in
modern logic and philosophy. The "identity of indiscernibles" is
often referred to as Leibniz's Law. It has attracted the most
controversy and criticism, especially from corpuscular philosophy
and quantum mechanics.
- Sufficient
reason. "There must be a sufficient reason [often known only to
God] for anything to exist, for any event to occur, for any truth
to obtain."
- Pre-established harmony.
"[T]he appropriate nature of each substance brings it about that
what happens to one corresponds to what happens to all the others,
without, however, their acting upon one another directly."
(Discourse on Metaphysics, XIV) A dropped glass shatters
because it "knows" it has hit the ground, and not because the
impact with the ground "compels" the glass to split.
- Continuity. Natura non
saltum facit. A mathematical analog to this principle would
proceed as follows: if a function describes a transformation of something to which
continuity applies, then its domain and range are both dense sets.
- Optimism. "God assuredly always chooses
the best."
- Plenitude. "Leibniz believed
that the best of all possible worlds would actualize every genuine
possibility, and argued in Théodicée that this best of all possible
worlds will contain all possibilities, with our finite experience
of eternity giving no reason to dispute nature's perfection."
Leibniz would on occasion give a speech for a specific principle,
but more often took them for granted.
The monads
Leibniz's best known contribution to
metaphysics is his theory of
monads, as exposited in
Monadologie. Monads are to the
metaphysical realm what
atoms are to the
physical/phenomenal. Monads are the ultimate elements of the
universe. The monads are "substantial forms
of being" with the following properties: they are eternal,
indecomposable, individual, subject to their own laws,
un-interacting, and each reflecting the entire universe in a
pre-established harmony (a
historically important example of
panpsychism). Monads are centers of
force; substance is force, while
space,
matter, and
motion are merely phenomenal.
The
ontological essence of a monad is its
irreducible simplicity. Unlike atoms, monads possess no material or
spatial character. They also differ from atoms by their complete
mutual independence, so that interactions among monads are only
apparent. Instead, by virtue of the principle of pre-established
harmony, each monad follows a preprogrammed set of "instructions"
peculiar to itself, so that a monad "knows" what to do at each
moment. (These "instructions" may be seen as analogs of the
scientific laws governing
subatomic particles.) By virtue of these
intrinsic instructions, each monad is like a little mirror of the
universe. Monads need not be "small"; e.g., each human being
constitutes a monad, in which case
free
will is problematic.
God, too, is a monad,
and the
existence of God can be
inferred from the harmony prevailing among all other monads; God
wills the pre-established harmony.
Monads are purported to having gotten rid of the problematic:
The monadology was thought arbitrary, even eccentric, in Leibniz's
day and since.
Theodicy and optimism
The
Théodicée tries to
justify the apparent imperfections of the world by claiming that it
is
optimal among all
possible worlds. It must be the best possible and most balanced
world, because it was created by a perfect God.
The statement that "we live in the best of all possible worlds"
drew scorn, most notably from
Voltaire, who
lampooned it in his comic novella
Candide by having the character Dr. Pangloss (a
parody of Leibniz and
Maupertuis) repeat it like a
mantra. Thus the adjective "
Panglossian", which describes one who
believes that the world about us is the best possible one.
The mathematician
Paul du
Bois-Reymond, in his "Leibnizian Thoughts in Modern Science",
wrote that Leibniz thought of God as a
mathematician:
As is well known, the theory of the maxima and minima of functions was indebted to him for the
greatest progress through the discovery of the method of tangents.
Well, he conceives God in the creation of the world
like a mathematician who is solving a minimum problem, or rather,
in our modern phraseology, a problem in the calculus of variations the question
being to determine among an infinite number of possible worlds,
that for which the sum of necessary evil is a minimum.
A cautious defense of Leibnizian optimism would invoke certain
scientific principles that emerged in the two centuries since his
death and that are now thoroughly established: the
principle of least action, the
conservation of mass, and the
conservation of energy. In
addition, the modern observations that lead to the
Fine-tuned Universe arguments seem to
support his view:
- The 3+1 dimensional structure of spacetime may be ideal. In order to sustain
complexity such as life, a universe probably
requires three spatial and one temporal dimension. Most
universes deviating from 3+1 either violate some fundamental
physical laws, or are impossible. The
mathematically richest number of spatial dimensions is also 3 (in
the sense of topological nontriviality).
- The universe, solar system, and Earth
are the "best possible" in that they enable intelligent life to
exist. Such life exists on Earth only because the Earth, solar system, and
Milky Way possess a number of unusual
characteristics.
- The most sweeping form of optimism
derives from the Anthropic
Principle. Physical reality can be seen as grounded in the
numerical values of a handful of dimensionless constants, the
best known of which are the fine
structure constant and the ratio of the rest mass of the proton to
the electron. Were the numerical values of
these constants to differ by a few percent from their observed
values, it is unlikely that the resulting universe would contain
complex structures.
Our
physical laws,
universe,
solar system,
and
home planet are all "best" in the sense
that they enable
complex structures such
as
galaxies,
stars, and,
ultimately,
intelligent life. On
the other hand, it is also reasonable to believe that life might be
more intelligent given some other set of circumstances.
Symbolic thought
Leibniz believed that much of human reasoning could be reduced to
calculations of a sort, and that such calculations could resolve
many differences of opinion:
The only way to rectify our reasonings is to make them
as tangible as those of the Mathematicians, so that we can find our
error at a glance, and when there are disputes among persons, we
can simply say: Let us calculate [calculemus], without
further ado, to see who is right.
Leibniz's
calculus
ratiocinator, which resembles
symbolic logic, can be viewed as a way of
making such calculations feasible. Leibniz wrote memoranda that can
now be read as groping attempts to get symbolic logic—and thus his
calculus—off the ground. But Gerhard and Couturat did not
publish these writings until modern formal logic had emerged in
Frege's Begriffsschrift and in writings by
Charles Sanders Peirce and
his students in the 1880s, and hence well after
Boole and
De
Morgan began that logic in 1847.
Leibniz thought
symbols were important for
human understanding. He attached so much importance to the
invention of good notations that he attributed all his discoveries
in mathematics to this. His notation for the
infinitesimal calculus is an example
of his skill in this regard.
C.S. Peirce, a 19th-century pioneer of
semiotics, shared Leibniz's passion for
symbols and notation, and his belief that these are essential to a
well-running logic and mathematics.
But Leibniz took his speculations much further. Defining a
character as any written sign, he then defined a
"real" character as one that represents an idea directly and not
simply as the word embodying the idea. Some real characters, such
as the notation of logic, serve only to facilitate reasoning. Many
characters well-known in his day, including
Egyptian hieroglyphics,
Chinese characters, and the symbols of
astronomy and
chemistry, he deemed not real. Instead, he
proposed the creation of a
characteristica universalis
or "universal characteristic", built on an
alphabet of human thought in which
each fundamental concept would be represented by a unique "real"
character:
It is obvious that if we could find characters or signs
suited for expressing all our thoughts as clearly and as exactly as
arithmetic expresses numbers or geometry expresses lines, we could
do in all matters insofar as they are subject to reasoning
all that we can do in arithmetic and geometry.
For all investigations which depend on reasoning would
be carried out by transposing these characters and by a species of
calculus.
Complex thoughts would be represented by combining characters for
simpler thoughts. Leibniz saw that the uniqueness of
prime factorization suggests a central
role for
prime numbers in the
universal characteristic, a striking anticipation of
Gödel numbering. Granted, there is no
intuitive or
mnemonic way to number any set
of elementary concepts using the prime numbers. Leibniz's idea of
reasoning through a universal language of symbols and calculations
however remarkably foreshadows great 20th century developments in
formal systems, such
Turing
completeness, where computation was used to define equivalent
universal languages (see
Turing
equivalence).
Because Leibniz was a mathematical novice when he first wrote about
the
characteristic, at first he did not conceive it as an
algebra but rather as a
universal language or script. Only
in 1676 did he conceive of a kind of "algebra of thought", modeled
on and including conventional algebra and its notation. The
resulting
characteristic included a logical calculus, some
combinatorics, algebra, his
analysis situs (geometry of
situation), a universal concept language, and more.
What Leibniz actually intended by his
characteristica universalis
and
calculus ratiocinator, and
the extent to which modern formal logic does justice to the
calculus, may never be established.
Formal logic
Leibniz is the most important logician between Aristotle and 1847,
when
George Boole and
Augustus De Morgan each published books
that began modern formal logic. Leibniz enunciated the principal
properties of what we now call
conjunction,
disjunction,
negation,
identity, set
inclusion, and the
empty
set. The principles of Leibniz's logic and, arguably, of his
whole philosophy, reduce to two:
- All our ideas are compounded from a very small number of simple
ideas, which form the alphabet
of human thought.
- Complex ideas proceed from these simple ideas by a uniform and
symmetrical combination, analogous to arithmetical
multiplication.
With regard to the first point, the number of simple ideas is much
greater than Leibniz thought. As for the second, logic can indeed
be grounded in a symmetrical combining operation, but that
operation is analogous to either of addition or multiplication. The
formal logic that emerged early in the 20th century also requires,
at minimum, unary
negation and
quantified variables ranging over some
universe of discourse.
Leibniz published nothing on formal logic in his lifetime; most of
what he wrote on the subject consists of working drafts. In his
book
History
of Western Philosophy,
Bertrand Russell went so far as to claim
that Leibniz had developed logic in his unpublished writings to a
level which was reached only 200 years later.
Mathematician
Although the mathematical notion of
function was implicit in
trigonometric and logarithmic tables, which existed in his day,
Leibniz was the first, in 1692 and 1694, to employ it explicitly,
to denote any of several geometric concepts derived from a curve,
such as
abscissa,
ordinate,
tangent,
chord, and the
perpendicular. In the 18th century,
"function" lost these geometrical associations.
Leibniz was the first to see that the coefficients of a system of
linear equations could be arranged
into an array, now called a
matrix, which can be manipulated to
find the solution of the system, if any. This method was later
called
Gaussian elimination.
Leibniz's discoveries of
Boolean
algebra and of
symbolic logic,
also relevant to mathematics, are discussed in the preceding
section. A comprehensive scholarly treatment of Leibniz's
mathematical writings has yet to be written.
Calculus
Leibniz is credited, along with Sir
Isaac
Newton, with the inventing of
infinitesimal calculus. According to
Leibniz's notebooks, a critical breakthrough occurred on 11
November 1675, when he employed integral calculus for the first
time to find the area under the graph of a function
y =
ƒ(
x). He introduced
several notations used to this day, for instance the
integral sign ∫ representing an elongated S,
from the Latin word
summa and the
d used for
differentials, from the
Latin word
differentia. This ingenious and suggestive
notation for the calculus is probably his most enduring
mathematical legacy. Leibniz did not publish anything about his
calculus until 1684. The
product rule
of
differential calculus is
still called "Leibniz's law". In addition, the theorem that tells
how and when to differentiate under the integral sign is called the
Leibniz integral rule.
Leibniz's approach to the calculus fell well short of later
standards of rigor (the same can be said of Newton's). We now see a
Leibniz "proof" as being in truth mostly a
heuristic hodgepodge mainly grounded in geometric
intuition. Leibniz also freely invoked mathematical entities he
called
infinitesimals, manipulating
them in ways suggesting that they had
paradoxical algebraic
properties.
George Berkeley, in a
tract called
The Analyst and elsewhere, ridiculed this and
other aspects of the early calculus, pointing out that natural
science grounded in the calculus required just as big of a leap of
faith as
theology
grounded in
Christian revelation.
From 1711 until his death, Leibniz's life was envenomed by
a long dispute with
John Keill, Newton, and others, over whether Leibniz had invented
the calculus independently of Newton, or whether he had merely
invented another notation for ideas that were fundamentally
Newton's.
Modern, rigorous calculus emerged in the 19th century, thanks to
the efforts of
Augustin Louis
Cauchy,
Bernhard Riemann,
Karl Weierstrass, and others, who
based their work on the definition of a
limit and on a precise understanding of
real numbers. Their work discredited the
use of
infinitesimals to
justify calculus. Yet, infinitesimals survived in science
and engineering, and even in rigorous mathematics, via the
fundamental computational device known as the
differential. Beginning in 1960,
Abraham Robinson worked out a
rigorous foundation for Leibniz's infinitesimals, using
model theory. The resulting
nonstandard analysis can be seen as a
belated vindication of Leibniz's mathematical reasoning.
Topology
Leibniz was the first to use the term
analysis situs,
later used in the 19th century to refer to what is now known as
topology. There are two takes on this
situation. On the one hand, Mates, citing a 1954 paper in German by
Jacob Freudenthal, argues:
Although for Leibniz the situs of a sequence
of points is completely determined by the distance between them and
is altered if those distances are altered, his admirer Euler, in the famous 1736 paper solving the Königsberg
Bridge Problem
and its generalizations, used the term
geometria situs in such a sense that the situs remains
unchanged under topological deformations.
He mistakenly credits Leibniz with originating this
concept.
...it is sometimes not realized that Leibniz used the
term in an entirely different sense and hence can hardly be
considered the founder of that part of mathematics.
But
Hirano argues differently, quoting
Mandelbrot:
To sample Leibniz' scientific works is a sobering
experience.
Next to calculus, and to other thoughts that have been
carried out to completion, the number and variety of premonitory
thrusts is overwhelming.
We saw examples in 'packing,'...
My Leibniz mania is further reinforced by finding that
for one moment its hero attached importance to geometric
scaling.
In "Euclidis Prota"..., which is an attempt to tighten
Euclid's axioms, he states,...: 'I have diverse definitions for the
straight line.
The straight line is a curve, any part of which is
similar to the whole, and it alone has this property, not only
among curves but among sets.'
This claim can be proved today.
Thus the
fractal geometry promoted by
Mandelbrot drew on Leibniz's notions of
self-similarity and the principle of
continuity:
natura non facit saltus. We also see that when
Leibniz wrote, in a metaphysical vein, that "the straight line is a
curve, any part of which is similar to the whole", he was
anticipating
topology by more than two
centuries. As for "packing", Leibniz told to his friend and
correspondent Des Bosses to imagine a circle, then to inscribe
within it three congruent circles with maximum radius; the latter
smaller circles could be filled with three even smaller circles by
the same procedure. This process can be continued infinitely, from
which arises a good idea of self-similarity. Leibniz's improvement
of Euclid's axiom contains the same concept.
Scientist and engineer
Leibniz's writings are currently discussed, not only for their
anticipations and possible discoveries not yet recognized, but as
ways of advancing present knowledge. Much of his writing on physics
is included in Gerhardt's
Mathematical Writings.
Physics
Leibniz contributed a fair amount to the statics and dynamics
emerging about him, often disagreeing with
Descartes and
Newton.
He devised a new theory of
motion
(
dynamics) based on
kinetic energy and
potential energy, which posited space as
relative, whereas Newton felt strongly space was absolute. An
important example of Leibniz's mature physical thinking is his
Specimen Dynamicum of 1695.
Until the discovery of subatomic particles and the
quantum mechanics governing them, many of
Leibniz's speculative ideas about aspects of nature not reducible
to statics and dynamics made little sense. For instance, he
anticipated
Albert Einstein by
arguing, against Newton, that
space,
time and motion are relative, not absolute.
Leibniz's rule is an important, if often
overlooked, step in many proofs in diverse fields of physics. The
principle of sufficient
reason has been invoked in recent
cosmology, and his
identity of indiscernibles in
quantum mechanics, a field some
even credit him with having anticipated in some sense. Those who
advocate
digital philosophy, a
recent direction in cosmology, claim Leibniz as a precursor.
The vis viva
Leibniz's
vis viva (Latin for
living force) is
mv2, twice the modern
kinetic energy. He realized that the
total energy would be conserved in certain mechanical systems, so
he considered it an innate motive characteristic of matter. Here
too his thinking gave rise to another regrettable nationalistic
dispute. His
vis viva was seen as rivaling the
conservation of momentum championed
by Newton in England and by
Descartes in
France; hence
academics in those countries
tended to neglect Leibniz's idea.
Engineers
eventually found
vis viva useful, so that the two
approaches eventually were seen as complementary.
Other natural science
By proposing that the earth has a molten core, he anticipated
modern
geology. In
embryology, he was a preformationist, but also
proposed that organisms are the outcome of a combination of an
infinite number of possible microstructures and of their powers. In
the
life sciences and
paleontology, he revealed an amazing
transformist intuition, fueled by his study of comparative anatomy
and fossils. One of his principal works on this subject,
Protogaea , unpublished in his lifetime, has recently been
published in English for the first time. He worked out a primal
organismic theory. In medicine, he exhorted the physicians of his
time—with some results—to ground their theories in detailed
comparative observations and verified experiments, and to
distinguish firmly scientific and metaphysical points of
view.
Social science
In
psychology, he anticipated the
distinction between
conscious and
unconscious states. In public health, he
advocated establishing a medical administrative authority, with
powers over
epidemiology and
veterinary medicine. He worked to set up
a coherent medical training programme, oriented towards public
health and preventive measures. In economic policy, he proposed tax
reforms and a national insurance scheme, and discussed the
balance of trade. He even proposed
something akin to what much later emerged as
game theory. In
sociology he laid the ground for
communication theory.
Technology
In 1906, Garland published a volume of Leibniz's writings bearing
on his many practical inventions and engineering work. To date, few
of these writings have been translated into English. Nevertheless,
it is well understood that Leibniz was a serious inventor,
engineer, and applied scientist, with great respect for practical
life. Following the motto
theoria cum praxis, he urged
that theory be combined with practical application, and thus has
been claimed as the father of
applied
science. He designed wind-driven propellers and water pumps,
mining machines to extract ore, hydraulic presses, lamps,
submarines, clocks, etc. With
Denis
Papin, he invented a
steam engine.
He even proposed a method for desalinating water.
From 1680 to 1685, he
struggled to overcome the chronic flooding that afflicted the ducal
silver mines in the Harz Mountains
, but did not succeed.
Information technology
Leibniz may have been the first computer scientist and information
theorist. Early in life, he documented the
binary number system (base 2), which is used
on computers, then revisited that system throughout his career. He
anticipated
Lagrangian
interpolation and
algorithmic information
theory. His
calculus
ratiocinator anticipated aspects of the
universal Turing machine. In 1934,
Norbert Wiener claimed to have found
in Leibniz's writings a mention of the concept of
feedback, central to Wiener's later
cybernetic theory.
In 1671, Leibniz began to invent a machine that could execute all
four arithmetical operations, gradually improving it over a number
of years. This "
Stepped Reckoner"
attracted fair attention and was the basis of his election to the
Royal Society in 1673.
A number of such
machines were made during his years in Hanover
, by a craftsman working under Leibniz's
supervision. It was not an unambiguous success because it
did not fully mechanize the operation of carrying. Couturat
reported finding an unpublished note by Leibniz, dated 1674,
describing a machine capable of performing some algebraic
operations.
Leibniz was groping towards hardware and software concepts worked
out much later by
Charles Babbage
and
Ada Lovelace. In 1679, while
mulling over his binary arithmetic, Leibniz imagined a machine in
which binary numbers were represented by marbles, governed by a
rudimentary sort of punched cards. Modern electronic digital
computers replace Leibniz's marbles moving by gravity with shift
registers, voltage gradients, and pulses of electrons, but
otherwise they run roughly as Leibniz envisioned in 1679.
Librarian
While
serving as librarian of the ducal libraries in Hanover
and Wolfenbuettel
, Leibniz effectively became one of the founders of
library science. The latter
library was enormous for its day, as it contained more than 100,000
volumes, and Leibniz helped design a new building for it, believed
to be the first building explicitly designed to be a library.
He also
designed a book indexing
system in ignorance of the only other such system then extant,
that of the Bodleian
Library
at Oxford University
. He also called on publishers to distribute
abstracts of all new titles they produced each year, in a standard
form that would facilitate indexing. He hoped that this abstracting
project would eventually include everything printed from his day
back to
Gutenberg.
Neither proposal met
with success at the time, but something like them became standard
practice among English language publishers during the 20th century,
under the aegis of the Library of Congress
and the British Library
.
He called for the creation of an
empirical
database as a way to further all sciences.
His
characteristica
universalis,
calculus
ratiocinator, and a "community of minds"—intended, among other
things, to bring political and religious unity to Europe—can be
seen as distant unwitting anticipations of artificial languages
(e.g.,
Esperanto and its rivals),
symbolic logic, even the
World Wide Web.
Advocate of scientific societies
Leibniz emphasized that
research was a
collaborative endeavor. Hence he warmly advocated the formation of
national scientific societies along the lines of the British Royal
Society and the French Academie Royale des Sciences. More
specifically, in his correspondence and travels he urged the
creation of such societies in Dresden, Saint Petersburg, Vienna,
and Berlin. Only one such project came to fruition; in 1700, the
Berlin Academy of
Sciences was created. Leibniz drew up its first statutes, and
served as its first President for the remainder of his life. That
Academy evolved into the German Academy of Sciences, the publisher
of the ongoing critical edition of his works.
Lawyer, moralist
With the possible exception of
Marcus
Aurelius, no philosopher has ever had as much experience with
practical affairs of state as Leibniz. Leibniz's writings on law,
ethics, and politics were long overlooked by English-speaking
scholars, but this has changed of late.
While Leibniz was no apologist for
absolute monarchy like
Hobbes, or for tyranny in any form, neither did he
echo the political and constitutional views of his contemporary
John Locke, views invoked in support of
democracy, in 18th-century America and later elsewhere. The
following excerpt from a 1695 letter to Baron J. C. Boineburg's son
Philipp is very revealing of Leibniz's political sentiments:
As for.. the great question of the power of sovereigns
and the obedience their peoples owe them, I usually say that it
would be good for princes to be persuaded that their people have
the right to resist them, and for the people, on the other hand, to
be persuaded to obey them passively.
I am, however, quite of the opinion of Grotius, that one ought to obey as a rule, the evil
of revolution being greater beyond comparison than the evils
causing it.
Yet I recognize that a prince can go to such excess,
and place the well-being of the state in such danger, that the
obligation to endure ceases.
This is most rare, however, and the theologian who
authorizes violence under this pretext should take care against
excess; excess being infinitely more dangerous than
deficiency.
In 1677, Leibniz called for a European confederation, governed by a
council or senate, whose members would represent entire nations and
would be free to vote their consciences; in doing so, he
anticipated the
European Union. He
believed that Europe would adopt a uniform religion. He reiterated
these proposals in 1715.
Ecumenism
Leibniz devoted considerable intellectual and diplomatic effort to
what would now be called
ecumenical
endeavor, seeking to reconcile first the
Roman Catholic and
Lutheran churches, later the Lutheran and
Reformed churches. In this respect, he followed the
example of his early patrons, Baron von Boineburg and the Duke
John
Frederick—both cradle Lutherans who converted to Catholicism as
adults—who did what they could to encourage the reunion of the two
faiths, and who warmly welcomed such endeavors by others. (The
House of
Brunswick remained
Lutheran because the Duke's children did not follow their father.)
These efforts included corresponding with the French bishop
Jacques-Bénigne
Bossuet, and involved Leibniz in a fair bit of theological
controversy. He evidently thought that the thoroughgoing
application of reason would suffice to heal the breach caused by
the
Reformation.
Philologist
Leibniz the
philologist was an avid
student of languages, eagerly latching on to any information about
vocabulary and
grammar that came his way. He refuted the belief,
widely held by Christian scholars in his day, that
Hebrew was the primeval language of the
human race. He also refuted the argument, advanced by Swedish
scholars in his day, that some sort of proto-
Swedish was the ancestor of the
Germanic languages. He puzzled over the
origins of the
Slavic languages,
was aware of the existence of
Sanskrit, and
was fascinated by
classical
Chinese.
He published the
princeps editio (first modern edition) of
the
late medieval Chronicon Holtzatiae, a Latin
chronicle of the
County of
Holstein.
Sinophile
Leibniz
was perhaps the first major European intellect to take a close
interest in Chinese
civilization, which he knew by corresponding with,
and reading other work by, European Christian missionaries posted
in China. He concluded that Europeans could learn much from
the
Confucian ethical tradition. He
mulled over the possibility that the
Chinese characters were an unwitting form
of his
universal
characteristic. He noted with fascination how the
I Ching hexagrams correspond to the
binary numbers from 0 to 111111, and
concluded that this mapping was evidence of major Chinese
accomplishments in the sort of philosophical mathematics he
admired.
As polymath
While
making his grand tour of European archives to research the
Brunswick family history that he never completed, Leibniz stopped
in Vienna
between May
1688 and February 1689, where he did much legal and diplomatic work
for the Brunswicks. He visited mines, talked with mine
engineers, and tried to negotiate export contracts for lead from
the ducal mines in the Harz mountains
. His proposal that the streets of Vienna be
lit with lamps burning
rapeseed oil was
implemented. During a formal audience with the
Austrian Emperor and in subsequent
memoranda, he advocated reorganizing the Austrian economy,
reforming the coinage of much of central Europe, negotiating a
Concordat between the
Habsburgs and the
Vatican,
and creating an imperial research library, official archive, and
public insurance fund. He wrote and published an important paper on
mechanics.
Leibniz also wrote a short paper, first published by
Louis Couturat in 1903, summarizing his views
on
metaphysics. The paper is undated;
that he wrote it while in Vienna was determined only in 1999, when
the ongoing critical edition finally published Leibniz's
philosophical writings for the period 1677–90. Couturat's reading
of this paper was the launching point for much 20th-century
thinking about Leibniz, especially among
analytic philosophers. But after a
meticulous study of all of Leibniz's philosophical writings up to
1688—a study the 1999 additions to the critical edition made
possible—Mercer (2001) begged to differ with Couturat's reading;
the jury is still out.
Posthumous reputation
As a mathematician
When Leibniz died, his reputation was in decline. He was remembered
for only one book, the
Théodicée, whose supposed central
argument
Voltaire lampooned in his
Candide. Voltaire's depiction of
Leibniz's ideas was so influential that many believed it to be an
accurate description. Thus Voltaire and his
Candide bear
some of the blame for the lingering failure to appreciate and
understand Leibniz's ideas. Leibniz had an ardent disciple,
Christian Wolff, whose
dogmatic and facile outlook did Leibniz's reputation much harm. In
any event, philosophical fashion was moving away from the
rationalism and system building of the 17th century, of which
Leibniz had been such an ardent proponent. His work on law,
diplomacy, and history was seen as of ephemeral interest. The
vastness and richness of his correspondence went
unrecognized.
Much of Europe came to doubt that Leibniz had discovered the
calculus independently of Newton, and hence his whole work in
mathematics and physics was neglected. Voltaire, an admirer of
Newton, also wrote
Candide at least in part to discredit
Leibniz's claim to having discovered the calculus and Leibniz's
charge that Newton's theory of universal gravitation was incorrect.
The rise of relativity and subsequent work in the history of
mathematics has put Leibniz's stance in a more favorable
light.
Leibniz's long march to his present glory began with the 1765
publication of the
Nouveaux Essais, which
Kant read closely. In 1768, Dutens edited the first
multi-volume edition of Leibniz's writings, followed in the 19th
century by a number of editions, including those edited by Erdmann,
Foucher de Careil, Gerhardt, Gerland, Klopp, and Mollat.
Publication of Leibniz's correspondence with notables such as
Antoine Arnauld,
Samuel Clarke,
Sophia of Hanover, and her daughter
Sophia Charlotte of
Hanover, began.
In 1900,
Bertrand Russell published
a critical study of Leibniz's
metaphysics. Shortly thereafter,
Louis Couturat published an important study
of Leibniz, and edited a volume of Leibniz's heretofore unpublished
writings, mainly on logic. While their conclusions, especially
Russell's, were subsequently challenged and often dismissed, they
made Leibniz somewhat respectable among 20th-century
analytical and
linguistic philosophers in the
English-speaking world (Leibniz had already been of great influence
to many Germans such as
Bernhard
Riemann). For example, Leibniz's phrase
salva veritate, meaning
interchangeability without loss of or compromising the truth,
recurs in
Willard Quine's writings.
Nevertheless, the secondary English-language literature on Leibniz
did not really blossom until after World War II. This is especially
true of English speaking countries; in
Gregory Brown's bibliography fewer than 30 of
the English language entries were published before 1946. American
Leibniz studies owe much to
Leroy
Loemker (1904–85) through his translations and his interpretive
essays in LeClerc (1973).
Nicholas Jolley has surmised that
Leibniz's reputation as a philosopher is now perhaps higher than at
any time since he was alive. Analytic and contemporary philosophy
continue to invoke his notions of
identity,
individuation, and
possible worlds, while the doctrinaire
contempt for
metaphysics, characteristic
of analytic and linguistic philosophy, has faded. Work in the
history of 17th- and 18th-century
ideas has revealed more clearly the
17th-century "Intellectual Revolution" that preceded the
better-known
Industrial and
commercial revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. The 17th-
and 18th-century belief that natural science, especially physics,
differs from philosophy mainly in degree and not in kind, is no
longer dismissed out of hand. That modern science includes a
"
scholastic" as well as a "radical
empiricist" element is more accepted now
than in the early 20th century. Leibniz's thought is now seen as a
major prolongation of the mighty endeavor begun by
Plato and
Aristotle: the
universe and man's place in it are amenable to human
reason.
In 1985, the German government created the
Leibniz Prize, offering an
annual award of 1.55 million
euros for
experimental results and 770,000 euros for theoretical ones. It is
the world's largest prize for scientific achievement.
Leibniz biscuits
Leibniz-Keks, a popular brand of
biscuits in Germany, are named after Gottfried Leibniz. These
biscuits honour Leibniz because he was a resident of Hanover, where
the company is based.
Writings and edition
Leibniz mainly wrote in three languages: scholastic
Latin,
French and
German. During his lifetime, he
published many pamphlets and scholarly articles, but only two
"philosophical" books, the
Combinatorial Art and the
Théodicée. (He
published numerous pamphlets, often anonymous, on behalf of the
House of
Brunswick-Lüneburg,
most notably the "De jure suprematum" a major consideration of the
nature of
sovereignty.) One substantial
book appeared posthumously, his
Nouveaux essais sur
l'entendement humain, which Leibniz had withheld from
publication after the death of
John
Locke. Only in 1895, when Bodemann completed his catalogues of
Leibniz's manuscripts and correspondence, did the enormous extent
of Leibniz's
Nachlass become
clear: about 15,000 letters to more than 1000 recipients plus more
than 40,000 other items. Moreover, quite a few of these letters are
of essay length. Much of his vast correspondence, especially the
letters dated after 1685, remains unpublished, and much of what is
published has been so only in recent decades. The amount, variety,
and disorder of Leibniz's writings are a predictable result of a
situation he described in a letter as follows:
I cannot tell you how extraordinarily distracted and
spread out I am.
I am trying to find various things in the archives; I
look at old papers and hunt up unpublished documents.
From these I hope to shed some light on the history of
the [House of] Brunswick.
I receive and answer a huge number of
letters.
At the same time, I have so many mathematical results,
philosophical thoughts, and other literary innovations that should
not be allowed to vanish that I often do not know where to
begin.
The extant parts of the critical edition of Leibniz's writings are
organized as follows:
- Series 1. Political, Historical, and General
Correspondence. 21 vols., 1666–1701.
- Series 2. Philosophical Correspondence. 1 vol.,
1663–85.
- Series 3. Mathematical, Scientific, and Technical
Correspondence. 6 vols., 1672–96.
- Series 4. Political Writings. 6 vols., 1667–98.
- Series 5. Historical and Linguistic Writings.
Inactive.
- Series 6. Philosophical Writings. 7 vols., 1663–90,
and Nouveaux essais sur
l'entendement humain.
- Series 7. Mathematical Writings. 3 vols.,
1672–76.
- Series 8. Scientific, Medical, and Technical Writings.
In preparation.
The systematic cataloguing of all of Leibniz's
Nachlass
began in 1901. It was hampered by two world wars, the Nazi
dictatorship (with the Holocaust, which affected a Jewish employee
of the project, and other personal consequences), and decades of
German division (two states with the cold war's "iron curtain" in
between, separating scholars and also scattered portions of his
literary estates). The ambitious project has had to deal with seven
languages contained in some 200,000 pages of written and printed
paper. In 1985 it was reorganized and included in a joint program
of German federal and state (
Länder) academies.
Since
then the branches in Potsdam
, Münster
, Hannover
and Berlin
have jointly
published 25 volumes of the critical edition, with an average of
870 pages, and prepared index and concordance works.
Selected works
The year given is usually that in which the work was completed, not
of its eventual publication.
- 1666. De Arte Combinatoria (On the Art of
Combination); partially translated in Loemker §1 and Parkinson
(1966).
- 1671. Hypothesis Physica Nova (New Physical
Hypothesis); Loemker §8.I (partial).
- 1673 Confessio
philosophi (A Philosopher's Creed); an English translation is
available.
- 1684. Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis (New
method for maximums and minimums); translated in Struik, D.
J., 1969. A Source Book in Mathematics, 1200–1800. Harvard
University Press: 271–81.
- 1686. Discours
de métaphysique; Martin and Brown (1988), Ariew and Garber
35, Loemker §35, Wiener III.3, Woolhouse and Francks 1. An online translation by Jonathan Bennett is
available.
- 1703. Explication de l'Arithmétique Binaire
(Explanation of Binary Arithmetic); Gerhardt,
Mathematical Writings VII.223. An online translation by Lloyd Strickland is
available.
- 1710. Théodicée;
Farrer, A.M., and Huggard, E.M., trans., 1985 (1952). Wiener III.11
(part). An online translation is available at Project Gutenberg.
- 1714. Monadologie;
translated by Nicholas Rescher,
1991. The Monadology: An Edition for Students. University
of Pittsburg Press. Ariew and Garber 213, Loemker §67, Wiener
III.13, Woolhouse and Francks 19. Online translations: Jonathan Bennett's translation; Latta's translation; French,
Latin and Spanish edition, with facsimile of Leibniz's
manuscript.
- 1765. Nouveaux essais sur
l'entendement humain; completed in 1704. Remnant, Peter,
and Bennett, Jonathan, trans., 1996. New Essays on Human
Understanding. Cambridge University Press. Wiener III.6
(part). An online translation by Jonathan Bennett is
available.
Collections
Four important collections of English translations are Wiener
(1951), Loemker (1969), Ariew and Garber (1989), and Woolhouse and
Francks (1998). The ongoing critical edition of all of Leibniz's
writings is
Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe.
Famous quotes
For indeed, there is nothing in the intellect which was not in
the senses, except the intellect itself.Music is the
pleasure the human mind experiences from counting without being
aware that it is counting.Nothing exists and nothing
happens without a reason why it is so, and not
otherwise.
See also
Notes
References
- Aiton, Eric J., 1985. Leibniz: A Biography. Hilger
(UK).
- Alexander, H G (ed) The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956.
- Ariew, R & D Garber, 1989. Leibniz: Philosophical
Essays. Hackett.
- Barrow, John D. and Frank J. Tipler, 1986. The Anthropic Cosmological
Principle. Oxford Univ. Press.
- Cook, Daniel, and Rosemont, Henry Jr., 1994. Leibniz:
Writings on China. Open Court.
- Couturat, Louis, 1901. La
Logique de Leibniz. Paris: Felix Alcan.
- Davis, Martin, 2000. The
Universal Computer: The Road from Leibniz to Turing. WW
Norton.
- Du Bois-Reymond, Paul,
18nn. "Leibnizian Thoughts in Modern Science".
- Grattan-Guinness, Ivor,
1997. The Norton History of the Mathematical Sciences. W W
Norton.
- Hall, A. R., 1980. Philosophers at War: The Quarrel between
Newton and Leibniz. Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Hirano, Hideaki, 1997. "Cultural Pluralism And Natural Law."
Unpublished.
- Hostler, J., 1975. Leibniz's Moral Philosophy. UK:
Duckworth.
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