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Iran Air Flight 655, also known as IR655, was a civilian airliner shot down by the United States Navy on Sunday 3 July 1988, over the Strait of Hormuzmarker.

The aircraft, an Airbus A300B2 operated by Iran Air as IR655, was flying from Bandar Abbasmarker, Iranmarker, to Dubaimarker, UAEmarker, when it was destroyed by the U.S. Navy's guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes, killing all 290 passengers and crew aboard, including 66 children, ranking it the seventh among the deadliest airliner fatalities. It was the highest death toll of any aviation incident in the Indian Oceanmarker and the highest death toll of any incident involving an Airbus A300 anywhere in the world. The Vincennes was traversing the Straits of Hormuzmarker inside Iranian territorial waters and at the time of the attack, IR655 was within Iranian airspace.

According to the US government, the crew mistakenly identified the Iranian Airbus A300 as an attacking F-14 Tomcat fighter. The Iranian government maintained that the Vincennes knowingly shot down the civilian aircraft. The event generated a great deal of controversy and criticism of the United Statesmarker.

Some analysts have blamed US military commanders and the captain (William C. Rogers III) of the Vincennes for reckless and aggressive behavior in a tense and dangerous environment. Commander David Carlson, commanding officer of the USS Sides, the warship stationed near to the Vincennes at the time of the incident, said (Fisk, 2005) that the destruction of the aircraft "marked the horrifying climax to Captain Rogers' aggressiveness, first seen four weeks ago."

In 1996, the United States and Iran reached "an agreement in full and final settlement of all disputes, differences, claims, counterclaims" relating to the incident at the International Court of Justicemarker. As part of the settlement, the United States agreed to pay US$61.8 million in compensation for the people killed.

Nationalities of the victims

Nationality Passengers Crew Total
238 16 254
13 0 13
10 0 10
6 0 6
6 0 6
1 0 1
Total 274 16 290
According to the documents submitted to the International Court of Justicemarker by Iran, the aircraft was carrying 290 people: 274 passengers and a crew of 16. Of these 290, 254 were Iranian nationals, 13 were nationals of the United Arab Emiratesmarker, ten of Indiamarker, six of Pakistanmarker, six of Yugoslavia and one of Italymarker.


Starting in September 1980 Iran-Iraq War had begun to involve attacks against petroleum tankers and merchant shipping of neighboring countries. On 29 April 1988 the US government expanded the scope of the US Navy's protection to all friendly neutral shipping in the Persian Gulfmarker outside of declared exclusion zones, which set the military scene of the shootdown incident. At about the same time, Vincennes was rushed to the area on a short-notice deployment, as a result of high-level decisions, to compensate for the lack of AWACS coverage which hampered US monitoring of the southern Persian Gulf. Vincennes departed San Diegomarker on 25 April and arrived in Bahrainmarker on 29 May, under the command of Captain William C. Rogers III and fitted with the then-new Aegis combat system.

Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz

As the Strait of Hormuzmarker at its narrowest is just wide, in order to traverse the Strait ships stay within sea lanes that pass through the territorial waters of Iranmarker and Omanmarker under the transit passage provisions of customary Law of the Sea. It is therefore normal for ships, including warships, entering or leaving the Persian Gulfmarker to transit Iranian territorial waters. During the Iran–Iraq War the Iranian forces would, as they were entitled to, board and inspect neutral cargo ships in the Strait of Hormuz area in search of contraband destined for Iraq; this added to the tensions in the area.


Locator map depicting Iran Air 655's origination point, destination and approximate location of the shootdown.
(The air corridor is not necessarily a direct path)
The plane, an Airbus A300B2, registered as EP-IBU and flown by Captain Mohsen Rezaian, a veteran pilot with 7,000 hours of flight time, left Bandar Abbas at 10:17 am Iran time (UTC +03:30), 27 minutes after its scheduled departure time. It should have been a 28-minute flight. After takeoff, it was directed by the Bandar Abbas tower to turn on its transponder and proceed over the Persian Gulfmarker. The flight was assigned routinely to commercial air corridor Amber 59, a twenty-mile (32 km)-wide lane on a direct line to Dubai airport. The short distance made for a simple flight pattern: climb to , cruise for a short time, and descend into Dubai. The airliner was transmitting a friend-or-foe identification code for a civilian aircraft and maintained English-speaking radio contact to civil flight control.

On the morning of 3 July, the Vincennes was passing through the Strait of Hormuzmarker returning from an escort duty. A helicopter from the USS Vincennes received small arms fire from Iranian patrol vessels, as it observed at a high altitude. The Vincennes moved to engage the Iranian vessels, in the course of which they all violated Omanimarker waters, which they all left when challenged and ordered to leave by a Royal Navy of Oman warship. The Vincennes then pursued the Iranian gunboats crossing into Iranian territorial waters to open fire. The USS Sides and USS Elmer Montgomery were nearby.

It was shortly after this gunfire exchange that Iran Air Flight 655 approached to begin its transit of the Straits. The USS Vincennes fired missiles at the airliner, destroying it, causing it to fall into the waters of the Persian Gulfmarker and killing everyone aboard.

The event triggered an intense international controversy, with Iran condemning the US attack as a "barbaric act." In mid-July 1988, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati asked the United Nations Security Council to condemn the United States saying the US attack "could not have been a mistake" and was a "criminal act," an "atrocity" and a "massacre." George H. W. Bush, at the time Vice President in the Reagan Administration, defended his country at the United Nations by arguing that the US attack had been a wartime incident and that the crew of the Vincennes had acted appropriately to the situation at the time; in August 1988 Bush said of the incident: "I'll never apologize for the United States of America, ever. I don't care what the facts are."

Bush used the phrase frequently during the 1988 campaign. The Soviet Union asked the US to withdraw from the area and supported efforts made by the Security Council to end the Iran-Iraq war. Most of the 13 delegates who spoke echoed the US position, saying one of the problems was that a 1987 resolution to end the Iran-Iraq war had been ignored. Following the debate, Security Council Resolution 616 was passed expressing "deep distress" over the US attack, "profound regret" for the loss of human lives, and stressed the need to end the Iran-Iraq war as resolved in 1987.

Ronald Reagan, the President at the time, stated in a public paper "We deeply regret any loss of life."

US government accounts

A missile departs the forward launcher of Vincennes during a 1987 exercise.
The forward launcher was also used in the downing of Iran Air 655.

According to the US government, the Vincennes mistakenly identified the Iranian airliner as an attacking military fighter. The officers identified the flight profile being flown by the Airbus A300B2 as being similar to that of an F-14A Tomcat during an attack run. The commercial flight had originated at Bandar Abbasmarker, which served dual roles as a base for Iranian F-14 operations and as a hub for commercial, civilian flights. According to the same reports, the Vincennes tried unsuccessfully to contact the approaching aircraft, four times on the military emergency frequency and three times on the civilian emergency frequency, but never on air traffic control frequencies.

At 10:24 am, with the civilian jet away, the Vincennes fired two SM-2MR surface-to-air missiles which both hit Flight 655. After the attack, the Vincennes' crew realised that the plane had been a civilian airliner.

This version was finalised in a report by Admiral William Fogarty, entitled Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988. Only parts of this report have been released (part I in 1988 and part II in 1993), which has drawn criticism from many observers. The Fogarty report stated, "The data from USS Vincennes tapes, information from USS Sides and reliable intelligence information, corroborate the fact that [Iran Air Flight 655] was on a normal commercial air flight plan profile, in the assigned airway, squawking Mode III 6760, on a continuous ascent in altitude from take-off at Bandar Abbas to shoot-down."

When questioned in a 2000 BBC documentary, the US government stated in a written answer that they believed the incident may have been caused by a simultaneous psychological condition amongst the 18 bridge crew of the Vincennes called 'scenario fulfillment', which is said to occur when persons are under pressure. In such a situation, the men will carry out a training scenario, believing it to be reality while ignoring sensory information that contradicts the scenario. In the case of this incident, the scenario was an attack by a lone military aircraft.

The United States government issued notes of regret for the loss of human lives and in 1996 paid reparations to settle a suit brought in the International Court of Justicemarker with respect to the incident; they have however never admitted wrongdoing, nor apologised for the incident.

The USS Stark attack by Iraqi jet fighters had occurred only a year ago.

Iranian government account

According to the Iranian government, the shooting down of IR 655 by the Vincennes was an intentionally performed and unlawful act. Even if there was a mistaken identification, which Iran has not accepted, it argues that this constituted gross negligence and recklessness amounting to an international crime, not an accident.(§4.52-4.54.)

In particular, Iran expressed skepticism about claims of mis-identification, noting that the Vincennes had advanced Aegis radar that correctly tracked the flight and its Mode III beacon; two other U.S. warships in the area, Sides andMontgomery, identified the aircraft as civilian; and the flight was well within a recognised international air corridor. It also noted that the crew of the Vincennes was trained to handle simultaneous attacks by hundreds of enemy aircraft. (ibid. §4.50) Iran found it more plausible that the Vincennes "hankered for an opportunity to show its stuff". (§4.52)

According to Iran, the U.S. had previously issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) warning aircraft that they were at risk of "defensive measures" if they had not been cleared from a regional airport and if they came within 5 nauticalmiles of a warship at an altitude of less than 2000 feet." IR 655 had been cleared from a regional airport and was well outside those limits when it was attacked. (§4.62)

Even if the aircraft had been an Iranian F-14, Iran argued, the U.S. would have had no right to shoot it down.
aircraft was flying within Iranian airspace and did not, in fact, follow a path that could be considered an attack profile, nor did it illuminate the Vincennes with radar. (§4.60-4.61) Furthermore, regardless of any mistakes made by the crew, the U.S. was fully responsible for the actions of its warship under international law. (§4.56)

Iran pointed out that in the past "the United States has steadfastly condemned the shooting down of aircraft, whether civil or military, by the armed forces of another State" and cited El Al Flight 402, Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 114 and Korean Air Lines Flight 007marker, among other incidents. (§4.66-4.70) Iran also noted that when Iraq attacked the USS Stark, United States found Iraq fully responsible on the grounds that the Iraqi pilot "knew or should have known" that he was attacking a U.S. warship. (§4.49)

On 11 August, a month after the shoot down, the Iranian government released a stamp illustrating the event and depicting a ship firing a missile painted in the colors of the US flag over a map of the Persian Gulf coast burning in the background.

Independent sources

National Geographic Channel broadcast a documentary on this incident titled "Mistaken Identity" as an episode of its Mayday (aka: Air Emergency) series (Season 3, Episode 5); the documentary confirmed that the airliner was transmitting an Identification friend or foe code for a civilian aircraft, but Captain William C. Rogers III in an interview insisted that the code alone did not mean the aircraft was non-hostile. Captain Rogers described the attack as a self-defence measure to save his life and ship. The U.S. 'Surface Commander' at the time of the incident, Captain Richard McKenna, stated that following a request by Rogers to assist the USS Montgomery which lay much further north of his position, he had only authorised the use of a helicopter. McKenna was startled later to find that Rogers had in fact turned the Vincennes around and was closing on the Montgomery's position. He stated that he ordered Rogers to leave the helicopter in place and turn back immediately. McKenna also stated that Rogers was, "Looking for action" and, "they went looking for trouble" as they had been assigned another station. Investigative journalist and former Marine officer, Lt Col Roger Charles, stated that, "If Rogers had not taken the Vincennes up to attack the gunboats there would have been no shootdown of IR 655..that's clear".

US Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Crowe brief media representatives at the Pentagon about the shootdown on August 19, 1988.
Barry and Roger Charles of Newsweek wrote that Captain William C. Rogers III acted recklessly and without due care in their 13 July 1992 article. They also accused the U.S. government of a cover-up which Admiral Crowe denied.

An analysis of the events by the International Strategic Studies Association described the deployment of an Aegis cruiser in the zone as irresponsible and felt that the expense of the ship had played a major part in the setting of a low threshold for opening fire. The Vincennes had been nicknamed 'RoboCruiser' by crew members and other US Navy ships, in reference to the movie RoboCop where human reasoning is replaced by machine logic in the decision to kill, drawing a parallel to the Aegis system and to the supposed aggressive tendencies of its captain.

On 22 February 1996, the International Court of Justicemarker dismissed the case relating to the Airbus attack, "the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988, (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)", following settlement and reparations by the United States.

Three years after the incident, Admiral William J. Crowe admitted on American television show Nightline that the Vincennes was inside Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles. This contradicted earlier Navy statements that were misleading if not incorrect.

Commander David Carlson, commanding officer of the USS Sides, the warship stationed near to the Vincennes at the time of the incident, is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have said that the destruction of the aircraft "marked the horrifying climax to Captain Rogers' aggressiveness, first seen four weeks ago." His comment referred to incidents on 2 June, when Rogers had sailed the Vincennes too close to an Iranian frigate undertaking a lawful search of a bulk carrier, launched a helicopter within of an Iranian small craft despite rules of engagement requiring a four-mile (6.4 km) separation, and opened fire on a number of small Iranian military boats. Of those incidents, Carlson commented, "Why do you want an Aegis cruiser out there shooting up boats? It wasn't a smart thing to do." He also said of Iranian forces he'd encountered in the area a month prior to the incident that they were, "...pointedly non-threatening" and professional. At the time of Rogers' announcement to higher command that he was going to shoot down the plane, Carlson is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have been thunderstruck: "I said to folks around me, 'Why, what the hell is he doing?' I went through the drill again. F-14. He’s climbing. By now this damn thing is at 7,000 feet." However, Carlson thought the Vincennes might have more information, and was unaware that Rogers had been wrongly informed that the plane was diving.

Craig, Morales & Oliver, in a slide presentation published in M.I.T.'s Spring 2004 Aeronautics & Astronautics, as the "USS Vincennes Incident," commented that Captain Rogers had "an undeniable and unequivocal tendency towards what I call 'picking a fight.'" On his own initiative, Rogers moved the Vincennes northeast to join the USS Montgomery. An angry Captain McKenna ordered Rogers back to Abu Musa, but the Vincennes helicopter pilot, Lt Mark Collier, followed the Iranian speedboats as they retreated north, eventually taking some fire:
"...the Vincennes jumps back into the fray. Heading towards the majority of the speedboats, he is unable to get a clear target. Also, the speedboats are now just slowly milling about in their own territorial waters. Despite clear information to the contrary, Rogers informs command that the gunboats are gathering speed and showing hostile intent and gains approval to fire upon them at 0939. Finally, in another fateful decision, he crosses the limit off the coast and enters illegally into Iranian waters."

Radio communication

Throughout its final flight IR655 was in radio contact with various air traffic control services using standard civil aviation frequencies, and had spoken in English to Bandar Abbas Approach Control seconds before the Vincennes launched its missiles. According to the U.S. Navy investigation the Vincennes at that time had no equipment suitable for monitoring civil aviation frequencies, other than the International Air Distress frequency. Subsequently U.S. Navy warships in the area were equipped with dialable VHF radios, and access to flight plan information was sought, to better track commercial airliners.

The official ICAOmarker report stated that ten attempts were made to contact Iran Air flight 655: seven on military frequencies and three on commercial frequencies, addressed to an "unidentified Iranian aircraft" and giving its speed as . Indeed both Sides and Vincennes tried contacting flight 655 on several civilian and military frequencies.

IR655 crew may have considered the plane as not concerned by the calls when comparing the ground speed given by the ship with the plane's airspeed, the rest of the description being vague. International investigations concluded that the crew of IR655 assumed that the three calls that they received before the missiles struck must have been directed at an Iranian P-3 Orion (see below).

Potential factors

  • The ship's crew did not efficiently consult commercial airliner schedules, due to confusion over which time zone the schedules referred to. The schedules flight times used Bandar Abbasmarker airport time while the Vincennes was on Bahrain time. The airliner's departure was 27 minutes later than scheduled. "The CIC was also very dark, and the few lights that it did have flickered every time the Vincennes fired at the speedboats. This was of special concern to Petty Officer Andrew Anderson, who first picked up Flight 655 on radar and thought that it might be a commercial aircraft. As he was searching in the Navy's listing of commercial flights, he apparently missed Flight 655 because it was so dark."
  • An Iranian P-3 was in the area some time before the attack, thought to be flying a "classic targeting profile", and in some reports providing an explanation no radar signals were detected from Iran Air Flight 655. Other reports state that the Airbus was immediately detected after takeoff by Vincennes's AN/SPY-1 radar at a range of .
  • The crew of the Vincennes Combat Information Center (CIC) confusingly reported the plane as ascending and descending at the same time (there were two "camps"). This seems to have happened because the Airbus' original CIC track, number 4474, had been replaced by the Sides track, number 4131, when the computer recognised them as one and the same. Shortly thereafter, track 4474 was re-assigned by the system to an American F-14, several hundred miles away, which was following a descending course at the time. Apparently not all the crew in the CIC realized the track number had been switched on them.
  • The psychology and mindset after engaging in a battle with Iranianmarker gunboats. There are claims that Vincennes was engaged in an operation using a decoy cargo ship to lure Iranian gunboats to a fight. However, those claims are denied by Fogarty in "Hearing Before The Investigation Subcommittee and The Defense Policy Panel of The Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, 21 July 1992". Also, the initial claims of Vincennes being called for help by a cargo ship attacked by Iranian gunboats have been ruled out. That leads to claims that the Iranian gunboats were provoked by helicopters inside Iranian waters and not the other way around. This might have contributed to the mistakes made. The actual reasons for the Vincennes' engagement with gunboats is not so clear to this date.
  • Software development book author Steve McConnell said:
  • A lack of training contributed to the disaster.

Post incident events

Medals awarded

Scott Lustig, the air-warfare coordinator, received the Navy Commendation Medal, often given for acts of heroism or meritorious service, but a not-uncommon end-of-tour medal for a second tour division officer. According to the History Channel, the medal citation noted his ability to "quickly and precisely complete the firing procedure." In 1990, the Washington Post listed Lustig's awards as one being for his entire tour from 1984 to 1988 and the other for his actions relating to the surface engagement with Iranian gunboats.

In 1990, Rogers was awarded the Legion of Merit "for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service as commanding officer ... from April 1987 to May 1989."
The Rogers Toyota minivan in flames following the pipe bomb attack in 1989.
award was given for his service as the Commanding Officer of the Vincennes, and the citation made no mention of the downing of Iran Air 655. The Legion of Merit is often awarded to high-ranking officers upon successful completion of especially difficult duty assignments and/or last tours of duty before retirement.

Possible retaliation against Rogers

On 10 March 1989, some nine months after the downing of Iran Air Flight 655, Mrs Rogers escaped serious injury when a pipe bomb attached to the underside of the family minivan exploded whilst she was driving it to school. The security implications relating to the incident led to her temporary removal from the La Jolla Country Day School in San Diego where she taught. That in turn led to a White Housemarker statement to the effect that it was "very disturbing" to see Americans bowing to perceived international terrorism. A week after the bombing, the Rogers' son was moved off campus from his Colgate Universitymarker dormitory so that he could be protected from possible retaliation. Five months later, the Associated Press reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigationmarker's most likely suspect had a personal vendetta against Capt. Rogers, with a motive unrelated to terrorist activity. It has never been determined who carried out the bombing.

Pan Am Flight 103

Dore Gold, former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, argues in his 2009 book, "The Rise of Nuclear Iran" that Ali Akbar Mohtashemipur, advisor to Mir Hossein Mousavi, paid $10 million dollars to the PFLP-GC cell to bomb Pan Am Flight 103 in retaliation for the U.S. shoot-down of the Iranian Airbus. According to Gold, Libyan terrorists took up the plot after the PFLP-GC cell was broken up by the Germans. Iran has denied involvement in the bombing of the Pan Am airliner.


In February 1996 the United States agreed to pay Iran US$131.8 million in settlement to discontinue a case brought by Iran in 1989 against the U.S. in the International Court of Justicemarker relating to this incident, together with other earlier claims before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. US$61.8 million of the claim was in compensation for the 248 Iranians killed in the shootdown ($300,000 per wage-earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage-earner). It was not disclosed how the remaining $70 million of the settlement was apportioned. Further compensation was paid for the 38 non-Iranian deaths. The payment of compensation was explicitly characterised by the US as being on an ex gratia basis, and the U.S. denied having any responsibility or liability for what had occurred.

See also


  1. Nancy J. Cook,"Stories of Modern Technology Failures and Cognitive Engineering Successes",CRC Press, 2007, PP77.
  2. The world's deadliest air disasters Al-Jazeera 10/24/2005
  3. Islamic Republic of Iran. Memorial of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America). p. 15. 24 July 1990.
  4. Butterfield, Fox Iran Falls Short in Drive at U.N. To Condemn U.S. in Airbus Case New York Times1988-04-15 retrieved 2008-01-10
  5. Kingsley, Michael Rally Round the Flag, Boys 12 September 1988, retrieved 21 August 2009
  6. PAULA ZAHN NOW Aired 5 May 2004 - 20:00 ET MORTON: ...On the other hand, when the US shot down an Iranian airliner in 1989, the first President Bush said, "I will never apologize for the United States of America. I don't care what the facts are."
  7. [WW II] helped formulate his view of America as a military power: clearly in the right, with no shades of gray or accountability. "I will never apologize for the United States of America", Mr. Bush has said frequently. The 1988 Elections man in the news: George Herbert Walker Bush; A Victor Free to Set His Own Course. By Gerald M. Boyd, Special to the New York Times, Published: 9 November 1988
  8. Butterfield, Fox Soviets in U.N. Council Ask For U.S. Pullout From Persian Gulf New York Times1988-05-16
  9. Security Council Resolutions - 1988.
  10. 1988-89 PPPUS 920 (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1988-89 (book 2), SuDoc: AE 2.114:988-89/BK.2, ISSN: 0079-7626, LCCN: 58061050, DL, WorldCat}
  11. Military Blunders
  12. The Other Lockerbie, BBC, 17 April 2000
  13. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) — Iranian submission: Part IV B, The shooting down of flight IR 655, International Court of Justice. retrieved 2007-01-20
  14. "... contrary to Koppel's very serious charge of some type of conspiracy, the appropriate committees of Congress were kept informed throughout." Crowe Refutes ABC/Newsweek Charges on Vincennes
  15. Evans, David Vincennes - A Case Study (
  16. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) International Court of Justice. retrieved 2006-12-12
  17. " 'The Vincennes Incident' letter by Commander David R Carlson, US Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1989"
  18. USS Vincennes Incident, Aeronautics & Astronautics, Spring 2004, MIT, MA, USA.
  19. Iran Air 655, House Armed Services Hearing, 21 July 1992
  20., Military Blunders Retrieved September 13, 2006
  26. Gertz, Bill, "Inside the Ring: Iranian Advisor", Washington Times, Sep 10, 2009, p. B1.

Additional resources

  1. Nunn Wants to Reopen Inquiry into Vincennes’ Gulf Location. Washington Times, 4 July 1992. Abstract: Senator Sam Nunn called on the Pentagon to probe allegations that the Navy "deliberately misled Congress" about the location of the USS Vincennes when it shot down an Iranian civilian airliner four years ago.

  1. Fisk, Robert. The Great War for Civilisation — The Conquest of the Middle East. London: Fourth Estate, 2005. 318–328. ISBN 1-84115-007-X
  2. Marian Nash Leich, "Denial of Liability: Ex Gratia Compensation on a Humanitarian Basis" American Journal of International Law Vol. 83 p. 319 (1989)
  3. USS Vincennes Incident; Dan Craig, Dan Morales, Mike Oliver; M.I.T. Aeronautics & Astronautics, Spring 2004

Further reading

  • Fogarty, William M., (1988) Investigation report: Formal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988, United States Department of Defense, ASIN: B00071EGY8.
  • International Court of Justice, (2001), Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988: v. 1: Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, United Nations, ISBN 9210708458.
  • Rogers, Sharon, (1992) Storm Center: The USS Vincennes and Iran Air Flight 655 : A Personal Account of Tragedy and Terrorism, US Naval Institute Press, ISBN 1557507279.

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