Iranian militants escort a blindfolded
U.S. hostage to the media.
The
Iranian hostage crisis was a diplomatic crisis between Iran
and the
United
States
where 53 Americans were held hostage for 444 days
from November 4, 1979 to January 20, 1981, after a group of
Islamist students and militants took over
the American embassy in support of the Iranian Revolution.
The
episode reached a climax when, after failed attempts to negotiate a
release, the United States military attempted a rescue operation,
Operation Eagle
Claw
, on April 24, 1980, which resulted in a failed
mission, the crash of two aircraft and the deaths of eight American
servicemen and one Iranian civilian. It ended with the
signing of the Algiers Accords in
Algeria
on January 19, 1981. The hostages were
formally released into United States custody the following day,
just minutes after the new American president
Ronald Reagan was sworn in.
The crisis has been described as an entanglement of "vengeance and
mutual incomprehension". In Iran, despite freezing of all Iranian
assets held in US (Executive Order 12170), the hostage holding was
widely seen as a blow against the U.S., and its influence in Iran,
its perceived attempts to undermine the Iranian Revolution, and its
long-standing support of the recently overthrown government of the
Shah of Iran,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The Shah had
been restored to power in a 1953
coup against a
democratically-elected nationalist Iranian government organized
by the
CIA at the
American embassyand had recently been allowed into the United
States for medical treatment. In the United States, the
hostage-taking was seen as an outrage violating a centuries-old
principle of international law granting
diplomats immunity from arrest and
diplomatic compounds
sovereignty in
their embassies.
The crisis has also been described as the "pivotal episode" in the
history of U.S.-Iranian relations. In the U.S., some political
analysts believe the crisis was a major reason for
U.S. President Jimmy Carter's defeat in the November 1980
presidential
election. In Iran, the crisis strengthened the prestige of the
Ayatollah Khomeini and the
political power of those who supported theocracy and opposed any
normalization of relations with the West. The crisis also marked
the beginning of U.S. legal action, or economic
sanctions against Iran, that further
weakened economic ties between Iran and the United States.
Background
1953 coup
In February 1979, less than a year before the hostage crisis,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the
Shah of Iran, had been overthrown in a
revolution. For several decades before that, the United States had
been an
ally and backer
of the Shah.
During World War
II, Allied powers
Britain
and the
Soviet
Union
occupied Iran and installed Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
on the throne. The invasion was allegedly in fear that
Reza Shah was about to align his
petroleum-rich country with
Nazi Germany during the war: However, Reza
Shah's earlier Declaration of Neutrality and refusal to allow
Iranian territory to be used to train, supply, and act as a
transport corridor to ship arms to Russia for its war effort
against Germany, was the strongest motive for the allied invasion
of Iran. Because of its importance in the allied victory, Iran was
subsequently called
"The Bridge of Victory" by Winston
Churchill.
By the 1950's, the Shah was engaged in a power struggle with Prime
Minister
Mohammed Mosaddeq, an
immediate descendant of the previous monarchy, the
Qajar dynasty. In 1953, the British and U.S. spy
agencies deposed the
democratically-elected government of
Mossadegh in a military
coup d'état
codenamed
Operation Ajax, and
restored the Shah as an absolute monarch. The anti-democratic coup
d’état was a "a critical event in post-war world history" that
replaced Iran’s post-monarchic, native, and secular
parliamentary democracy with a
dictatorship. US support and funding
continued after the coup, with the CIA training the government's
secret police,
SAVAK. In subsequent decades
this foreign intervention, along with other economic, cultural and
political issues, united opposition against the Shah and led to his
overthrow.
Carter administration
Shortly before the revolution on New Year's Day 1979, American
president
Jimmy Carter further angered
anti-Shah Iranians with a televised toast to the Shah, declaring
how beloved the Shah was by his people. After the revolution in
February, the embassy had been occupied and staff held hostage
briefly. Rocks and bullets had broken enough of the embassy
front-facing windows for them to be replaced with bullet-proof
glass. Its staff was reduced to just over 60 from a high of nearly
1000 earlier in the decade.
The Carter administration attempted to mitigate the anti-American
feeling by finding a new relationship with the
de facto Iranian government and by continuing
military cooperation in hopes that the situation would stabilize.
However,
on October 22, 1979 the U.S. permitted the Shah - who was ill with
cancer - to attend the Mayo Clinic
for medical treatment. The American embassy
in Tehran
had
discouraged the request, understanding the political delicacy, but
after pressure from influential figures including former United States Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger and
Council on Foreign
Relations chairman David
Rockefeller, the Carter administration decided to grant the
Shah’s request.
The Shah's admission to the US intensified Iranian revolutionaries
anti-Americanism and spawned rumors of another U.S.-backed coup and
re-installation of the Shah.
Revolutionary leader
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini -
who had been exiled by the Shah for 15 years - heightened rhetoric
against the “Great Satan”, the United States, talking of what he
called “evidence of American plotting.”
"You have no right to complain, because you took our
whole country hostage in 1953.”
In addition to putting an end to what they believed was American
plotting and sabotage against the revolution, the hostage takers
hoped to depose the
provisional revolutionary
government of Prime Minister
Mehdi
Bazargan which they believed was plotting to normalize
relations with the United States and extinguish Islamic
revolutionary ardor in Iran.
A later study found that there had been no plots for the overthrow
of the revolutionaries by the United States, and that a CIA
intelligence gathering mission at the embassy was “notably
ineffectual, gathering little information and hampered by the fact
that none of the three officers spoke the local language,
Farsi.” Its work was “routine, prudent espionage
conducted at diplomatic missions everywhere.”
Planning
The seizure of the American embassy was initially planned in
September 1979 by
Ebrahim
Asgharzadeh, a student at that time.
He consulted with the
heads of the Islamic associations of Tehran’s main universities,
including the University of
Tehran, Sharif University of Technology
, Amirkabir University of
Technology
(Polytechnic of Tehran) and Iran University of
Science and Technology. Their group was named
Muslim Student
Followers of the Imam's Line.
Asgharzadeh later said there were five students at the first
meeting, two of whom (including current Iranian president
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) wanted to target
the Soviet embassy because the USSR was “a
Marxist and anti-God regime.” But two others,
Mirdamadi and
Habibolah Bitaraf, supported Asgharzadeh’s
chosen target — the United States. "Our aim was to object against
the American government by going to their embassy and occupying it
for several hours," Asgharzadeh said. "Announcing our objections
from within the occupied compound would carry our message to the
world in a much more firm and effective way." Mirdamadi told an
interviewer, "we intended to detain the diplomats for a few days,
maybe one week, but no more."
Masoumeh
Ebtekar, spokeswoman for the Iranian students during the
crisis, said that those who rejected Asgharzadeh's plan did not
participate in the subsequent events.
The Islamist students observed the security procedures of the U.S.
Marine guards from nearby rooftops overlooking the embassy. They
also used experiences from the recent revolution, during which the
U.S. embassy grounds were briefly occupied. They enlisted the
support of police in charge of guarding the embassy and of Islamic
Revolutionary
Guards.
According to the group and other sources Khomeini did not know of
the plan beforehand. The Islamist students had wanted to inform him
but according to author Mark Bowden,
Ayatollah Musavi
Khoeyniha persuaded them not to. Khoeyniha feared the
government would use police to expel the Islamist students as they
had the last occupiers in February. The provisional government had
been appointed by Khomeini and so Khomeini was likely to go along
with their request to restore order. On the other hand, Khoeyniha
knew that if Khomeini first saw that the occupiers were his
faithful supporters (unlike the leftists in the first occupation)
and that large numbers of pious Muslims had gathered outside the
embassy to show their support for the takeover, it would be "very
hard, perhaps even impossible", for the Imam Khomeini to oppose the
takeover, and this would paralyze the Bazargan administration
Khoeyniha and the students wanted to eliminate.
Takeover
Around 6:30 a.m. on November 4, the ringleaders gathered between
300 and 500 selected students, thereafter known as
Muslim Student
Followers of the Imam's Line, and briefed them on the battle
plan. A female student was given a pair of metal cutters to break
the chains locking the embassy's gates, and she hid them beneath
her
chador.
At first the students' plan to only make a symbolic occupation,
release statements to the press and leave when government security
forces came to restore order, was reflected in placards saying
`Don't be afraid. We just want to set-in`. When the embassy guards
brandished firearms, the protesters retreated, one telling the
Americans, `We don't mean any harm.` But as it became clear the
guards would not use deadly force and that a large angry crowd had
gathered outside the compound to cheer the occupiers and jeer the
hostages, the occupation changed. According to one embassy staff
member, buses full of demonstrators began to appear outside the
embassy shortly after the
Muslim Student
Followers of the Imam's Line broke through the gates.
As Ayatollah Musavi Khoeyniha had hoped, Khomeini supported the
takeover.
According to Foreign Minister Ebrahim Yazdi, when he, Yazdi came to Qom
to tell The
Imam about the incident, Khomeini told the minister to "go and kick
them out." But later that evening, back in Tehran, the
minister heard on the radio that Imam Khomeini had issued a
statement supporting the seizure and calling it "the second
revolution," and the embassy an "American spy den in Tehran."
The occupiers bound and blindfolded the embassy soldiers and staff
and paraded them in front of photographers. In the first couple of
days many of the embassy staff who had snuck out of the compound or
not been there at the time of the takeover were rounded up by
Islamists and returned as hostages.
Six American diplomats did however avoid
capture and found refuge at the nearby Canadian
and Swiss
embassies in
Tehran for three months. (See "Canadian Caper", below.) They
fled Iran using Canadian passports on January 28, 1980.
Hostage-holding motivations
A group photograph of the former
hostages in the hospital.
The 52 hostages are spending a few days in the hospital after
their release from Iran prior to their departure for the United
States.
The Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line demanded that the
Shah return to Iran for trial and execution. The U.S. maintained
that the Shah, who died less than a year later in July 1980, had
come to America only for medical attention. The group's other
demands included that the U.S. government apologize for its
interference in the internal affairs of Iran and for the overthrow
of Prime Minister Mossadeq, and that Iran's frozen assets in the
U.S. be released.
The initial takeover plan was to hold the embassy for only a short
time, but this changed after it became apparent how popular the
takeover was and that Khomeini had given it his full support. Some
attribute the Iranian decision not to release the hostages quickly
to U.S. President Jimmy Carter's "blinking" or failure to
immediately deliver an ultimatum to Iran. His immediate response
was to appeal for the release of the hostages on humanitarian
grounds and to share his hopes of a strategic anti-communist
alliance with the Islamic Republic. As some of the student leaders
had hoped, Iran's moderate prime minister
Mehdi Bazargan and his cabinet resigned under
pressure just days after the event.
The duration of the hostages' captivity has been blamed on internal
Iranian revolutionary politics. As Ayatollah Khomeini told Iran's
president:
This action has many benefits.
...
This has united our people.
Our opponents do not dare act against us.
We can put the constitution to the people's vote
without difficulty, and carry out presidential and parliamentary
elections.
Theocratic Islamists, as well as leftist political groups and
figures like leftist
People's
Mujahedin of Iran, supported the taking of American hostages as
an attack on "American imperialism" and its alleged Iranian "tools
of the West." Revolutionary teams displayed secret documents taken
from the embassy, sometimes painstakingly reconstructed after
shredding, to buttress their claim
that "the Great Satan" (the U.S.) was trying to destabilize the new
regime, and that Iranian moderates were in league with the U.S.
(The documents were published in a series of books called
"Documents from the US Espionage Den" ( ). These books included
telegrams, correspondence, and reports from the U.S.
State
Department
and Central
Intelligence Agency.)
By embracing the hostage-taking under the slogan "America can't do
a thing," Khomeini rallied support and deflected criticism from his
controversial
Islamic theocratic
constitution, which was due for a referendum vote in less than
one month. Following the successful referendum, both leftists and
theocrats continued to use the issue of alleged pro-Americanism to
suppress their opponents, the relatively moderate political forces,
which included the Iranian Freedom Movement, National Front, Grand
Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, and later President
Abolhassan Banisadr. In particular,
carefully selected diplomatic dispatches and reports discovered at
the embassy and released by the hostage takers led to the
disempowerment and resignations of moderate figures such as Premier
Mehdi Bazargan. The political danger in Iran of any move seen as
accommodating America, along with the failed rescue attempt,
delayed a negotiated release. After the hostages were released,
leftists and theocrats turned on each other, with the stronger
theocratic group decimating the left.
444 days hostage
Hostage conditions
The hostage-takers, declaring their solidarity with other
"oppressed minorities" and "the special place of
women in Islam," released 13 women and
blacks in the middle of November 1979, leaving only one black and
two women hostages. One more hostage,
Richard Queen, was released in July 1980 after
he became seriously ill with what was later diagnosed as
multiple sclerosis. The remaining 52
hostages were held captive until January 1981.
They were held first primarily in buildings at the embassy, but
after the failed rescue mission they were scattered to different
locations around Iran to make rescue even more difficult. Three
high level officials — Bruce Laingen, Victor Tomseth and Mike
Howland — were at the Foreign ministry at the time of the takeover.
They stayed there for some months, sleeping in the ministry's
formal dining room and washing their socks and underwear in the
bathroom. They were first treated as diplomats but after the
provisional government fell relations deteriorated and by March the
doors to their living space were kept "chained and
padlocked."
By midsummer 1980 the hostages had been moved to prisons in Tehran
which had the advantage of simplifying the logistics of guard
shifts, food delivery, and other services for the hostage takers,
and of course were designed to prevent either escape or rescue
attempts. The final holding area was the Teymour Bakhtiari mansion
in Tehran, a place of comparative "sheer luxury," with tubs,
showers and hot and cold running water, where the hostages were
held from Nov. 1980 until their release. Several foreign diplomats
and ambassadors - including Canadian ambassador
Ken Taylor prior to the Canadian Caper -
came to visit the hostages over the course of the crisis, relaying
information back to the US government - including the "Laingen
dispatches," made by hostage
Bruce
Laingen - to help the home country stay in contact.
Accounts of how the hostages were treated differ. Iranian hostage
takers and government officials often expressed the belief that the
hostages were "guests" treated with respect.
Ibrahim Asgharzadeh described the
original hostage taking plan as a nonviolent and symbolic action
where the gentle and respectful treatment of the hostages would
dramatize to the whole world the offended sovereignty and dignity
of Iran. In America, an Iranian charge d'affairs, Ali Agha,
indignantly stormed out of meeting with an American official,
exclaiming `We are not mistreating the hostages. They are being
very well taken care of in Tehran. They are our guests.`" In Iran
one guard told several hostages `We want you to feel that you are
our guests,` and complained that use of the word "guard" was `too
cruel.` Visiting Iranian officials asked hostages `What can I do
for you? We want to make you more comfortable.` and told another
surprised hostage that they, the hostages, should be grateful that
Iran was protecting them from attempts by the US government to kill
them.
In interviews and their accounts of captivity, however, many
hostages complained of beatings, theft, the fear of being paraded
blindfold before a large, angry chanting crowd outside the embassy
(Bill Belk) Kathryn Koob in), having their hands bound "day and
night" for days or even weeks, long periods of solitary confinement
and months of being forbidden to speak to one another or stand,
walk, and leave their space unless they were going to the bathroom.
In particular they felt the threat of trial and execution, as all
of the hostages "were threatened repeatedly with execution, and
took it seriously."
The most terrifying night for the hostages came on February 5,
1980, when guards in black ski masks rousted the 53 hostages from
their sleep and led them blindfolded to other rooms. They were
searched after being ordered to strip to their underwear and keep
their hands up. The mock execution ended after the guards cocked
their weapons and readied them to fire but finally ejected their
rounds and told the prisoners to pull up their pants. The hostages
were later told the exercise was "just a joke" and something the
guards "had wanted to do."
Michael Metrinko, the most disrespectful and poorly treated
hostage, was kept in solitary confinement for months. On two
occasion when he insulted the Ayatollah Khomeini he was punished
especially severely - the first time being kept in handcuffs for 24
hours a day for two weeks, and being beaten and kept alone in a
freezing cell for two weeks with a diet of bread and water the
second time.
One hostage (Army medic Donald Hohman) went on a hunger strike for
several weeks and two attempted suicide. Steve Lauterbach became
despondent, broke a water glass and slashed his wrists after being
locked in a dark basement room of the chancery with his hand
tightly bound and aching badly. He was found by guards, rushed to
the hospital and patched up. Jerry Miele, an introverted CIA
communicator technician (not an officer who recruited Iranians),
smashed his head into the corner of a door, knocking himself
unconscious and cutting a deep gash from which blood poured.
"Naturally withdrawn", and looking "ill, old, tired, and
vulnerable" Miele had become the butt of his guards' jokes who
rigged up a mock electric chair with wires to emphasize the fate
that awaited him. After his fellow hostages applied first aid and
raised alarm - and only after what they thought was a long delay -
he was taken to a hospital.
Different hostages complained of threats to boil their feet in oil
(Alan B. Golacinski), cut their eyes out (Rick Kupke), or kidnap
and kill a disabled son in America and `start sending pieces of him
to your wife.` (David Roeder)
Four different hostages attempted to escape all being punished with
stretches of solitary confinement when their attempt was
discovered.
The hostage released for multiple sclerosis (Richard Queen) first
developed symptoms (wooziness and a numbness in his arm) six months
before his release. It was misdiagnosed by Iranians first as a
reaction to draft of cold air, and after warmer confinement didn't
help as "it's nothing, it's nothing," the symptoms of which would
soon disappear. Over the months the symptoms spread to his right
side and worsened until Queen "was literally flat on his back
unable to move without growing dizzy and throwing up."
Homesickness, boredom and the pain of "forcing grown men to live
together in a small space day and night, month after month" became
"a form of slow torture. ... opinions become deadly and anything
can provoke argument." Guards would often withhold mail from home,
telling one hostage (Charles W. Scott) "I don't see anything for
you, Mr. Scott. Are you sure your wife has not found another man?"
and hostages' possessions went missing.
As the hostages were taken to the plane that would fly them out of
Tehran, they were led through a gauntlet of students forming
parallel lines and shouting `Margbar Amrika`, (death to America)
When the pilot announced they were out of Iran the "freed hostages
went wild with happiness. Shouting, cheering, crying, clapping,
falling into one another's arms."
Impact in America
In the United States, the hostage-taking is said to have created "a
surge of patriotism" and left "the American people more united than
they have been on any issue in two decades." The action was seen
"not just as a diplomatic affront," but as a "declaration of war on
diplomacy itself." Television news gave daily updates. President
Carter applied economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran: oil
imports from Iran were ended on November 12, 1979, and through the
issuance of
Executive Order
12170, around
US$8 billion
of Iranian assets in the U.S. were frozen by the
Office of Foreign Assets
Control on November 14.
During the weeks leading up to Christmas in 1979, high school
students created Christmas cards that were delivered to the
hostages in Iran. This was then replicated by community groups
across the country, resulting in bales of Christmas cards delivered
to the hostages. The White House Christmas Tree that year was left
dark except for the top star.
A severe backlash against Iranians in the US developed. One Iranian
later complained, "I had to hide my Iranian identity not to get
beaten up, even at university." Many Iranians in the U.S. were also
expelled.
According to author/journalist Mark Bowden, a pattern developed in
Pres. Carter's attempts to negotiate a release of the hostages:
Carter would latch on to a deal proffered by a top
Iranian official and grant minor but humiliating concessions, only
to have it scotched at the last minute by Khomeini.
Canadian Caper
On the
day the hostages were seized, six American diplomats evaded capture
and remained in hiding at the Swiss and Canadian embassies. In 1979, the Canadian
Parliament
held a secret session for the first time since
World War II in order to pass special legislation allowing Canadian
passports to be issued to some American
citizens so that they could escape. Six American
diplomats boarded a flight to Zürich
, Switzerland, on January 28, 1980. Their escape and
rescue from Iran by Canadian ambassador
Ken Taylor has come to be known as the
Canadian Caper.
Negotiations for release
The first attempt to negotiate a release of the hostages involved
Hector Villalon and Christian Bourget, representing Iranian Foreign
Minister
Sadegh Ghotbzadeh.
They
"delivered a formal request to Panama
for
extradition of the Shah" which was "a pretext to cover secret
negotiations to free the American hostages." This happened
as the Soviets invaded Iran's neighbor Afghanistan, an event
America hoped would "illustrate the threat" of its superpower
neighbor and need for better relations with the Soviet's enemy,
America. Ghotbzadeh himself was eager to end the hostage taking, as
"moderates" were being eliminated from the Iranian government one
by one after being exposed by the Student hostage takers as
`traitors` and "spies" for having met as some time with an American
official.
Carter
aide Hamilton Jordan flew to
Paris
"wearing a disguise - a wig, false mustache and
glasses" to meet with Ghotbzadeh. After "weeks of
negotiation with ... emissaries, ... a complex multi-stepped plan"
was "hammered out" that included the establishment of a
international commission to study America's role in Iran. Rumours
of a release leaked to the American public and on February 19,
1980, the American Vice President
Walter
Mondale told an interviewer that "the crisis was nearing an
end." The plan fell apart however after Ayatollah Khomeini gave a
speech praising the embassy occupation as "a crushing blow to the
world-devouring USA" and announced the fate of the hostages would
be decided by the parliament (
Majlis), which
had yet to be seated or even elected. When the six-man
international UN commission came to Iran they were not allowed to
see the hostages, and President
Abolhassan Banisadr retreated from his
criticism of the hostage takers, praising them as `young
patriots.`
The next unsuccessful attempt occurred in April and called first
for the American president Carter to publicly promise not to
"impose additional sanctions" on Iran. In exchange custody of the
hostages would be transferred to the government of Iran, which
after a short period would release the hostages — the Iranian
president and foreign minister both opposing the continued holding
of the hostages. To the American's surprise and disappointment,
after Carter made his promise, President Bani-Sadr added additional
demands: official American approval of resolution of the hostage
question by Iran's parliament (which would leave the hostages in
Tehran for another month or two), and a promise by Carter to
refrain from making `hostile statements.` Carter also agreed to
these demands, but again Khomeini vetoed the plan. At this point
Bani-Sadr announced he was `washing his hands` of the hostage
mess."
The death of the Shah on July 27 and the
invasion of Iran by Iraq in September
1980 may have made Iran more receptive to the idea of resolving the
hostage crisis. Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter in the November
1980
presidential election but Carter continued to attempt to
negotiate the release of the hostages through Deputy Secretary of
State Warren Christopher, Algerian intermediaries and members of
the Iranian government in the final days of his presidency.
Talks that finally succeeded in bringing a release began secretly
in September 1980 and were initiated by
Sadegh Tabatabai, a brother-in-law of
Khomeini's son
Ahmad and "a mid-level
official" in the former-provisional revolutionary government. By
this time resolution of the crisis was made easier by the fact that
two of the hostage takers demands were moot — the Shah was dead and
"most" of his wealth had been "removed from American banks" - while
the threat of war with Iraq made availability of American-made
military spare parts for Iran's
materiel important.
Iranian demands for the release were now four: expression of
remorse or an apology for the US historical role in Iran, unlocking
of "Iranian assets in America and withdraw any legal claims against
Iran arising from the embassy seizure, and promise not to interfere
in the future." The demands were listed at the end of a speech by
Khomeini considered "a major shift on Iran's side of the impasse"
by journalists. Tabatabai, and Ahmad Khomeini secured the support
of
Akbar
Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Majlis.
The talks hammered out an agreement to bring to there higher-ups,
with the US agreeing to three demands but not to an apology. Talks
were stalled first by Iraq's invasion of Iran which Iranian
officialdom blamed on the United States. Rafsanjani delivered a
vote in parliament in favor of releasing the hostages. Then
negotiations began over how much money US businesses owed Iran —
Iran believing the sum to be $20 to $60 billion and the United
States estimating it at "closer to $20 to 60 million." — and how
much Iran owed US businesses. Negotiations continued through the
American elections (which President Carter lost) with pressure
being added by President elect Ronald Reagan's talk of not paying
`ransom for people who have been kidnapped by barbarians.` and a
New Years Day threat from Radio Tehran that if the US did not
accept Iran's demands the hostages would be tried as spies and
executed.
Algerian diplomat
Abdulkarim
Ghuraib's negotiations between the U.S. and Iran resulted in
the "
Algiers Accords" of January 19,
1981. The Algiers Accords called for Iran's immediate freeing of
the hostages, the unfreezing of $7.9 billion of Iranian assets and
immunity from lawsuits Iran might have faced in America, and a
pledge by the United States that "it is and from now on will be the
policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or
indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran's internal
affairs."
The release of the hostages came a day after President Carter's
term ended. While Carter had an "obsession" with finishing the
matter before stepping down," the hostage takers are thought to
have wanted the release delayed as punishment for his perceived
support for the Shah.
Rescue attempts
After
rejecting Iranian demands, Carter approved an ill-fated secret
rescue mission, Operation Eagle Claw. Late in the afternoon of April 24, eight
RH-53D helicopters flew from the
aircraft carrier USS Nimitz to a remote
road serving as an airstrip in the Great Salt Desert
of Eastern Iran, near Tabas
.
Early the next morning six of the eight
RH-53D helicopters met up with several
waiting
C-130 transport and refueling
airplanes at the landing site and refueling area, designated
"Desert One" by the mission.
Of the two helicopters that did not make it to Desert One, one
suffered avionics failures en route and returned to the
USS Nimitz, and the other had an indication that
one of its main rotor blades was fractured, and was abandoned in
the desert en route to Desert One. Its crew was seen and retrieved
by another helicopter that continued to Desert One. The helicopters
maintained strict radio silence under orders for the entire flight,
an issue which impacted their ability to maintain a cohesive flying
unit while en route, as they all arrived separately and behind
schedule. The strict radio silence also prevented them from
requesting permission to fly above the
sandstorm as the C-130s had done, and they flew the
entire route at hazardous low levels, even while inside the
sandstorm and with limited field of vision
and erratic instrumentation.
The mission plan called for a minimum of six helicopters but of the
six that made it to Desert One, one had a failed primary hydraulics
system and had flown on the secondary hydraulics system for the
previous four hours.
The failing helicopter's crew wanted to continue, but due to the
increased risk of not having a backup hydraulic system during
flight, the helicopter squadron's commander decided to ground the
helicopter. The Delta commander, Col. Beckwith, then recommended
the mission be aborted and his recommendation was approved by
President Carter. As the helicopters repositioned themselves for
refueling, one helicopter ran into a C-130 tanker aircraft and
crashed, killing eight U.S. servicemen and injuring several
more.
After the mission and its failure were made known, Khomeini's
prestige skyrocketed in Iran as he credited divine intervention on
behalf of Islam for the result. Iranian officials who favored
release of the hostages, such as President
Bani Sadr, were weakened. In America, President
Carter's political popularity and prospects for being reelected in
1980 were further damaged after a April 25 television address in
which he explained the rescue operation.
A second rescue attempt that was planned but never attempted used
highly modified
YMC-130H Hercules
aircraft. Outfitted with rocket thrusters fore and aft to allow an
extremely short landing and takeoff in the Shahid Shiroudi soccer
stadium located close to the embassy, three aircraft were modified
under a rushed super-secret program known as
Operation Credible Sport.
One
aircraft crashed during a demonstration at Duke Field at Eglin Air
Force Base
Auxiliary Field 3 on October 29, 1980, when its
landing braking rockets were fired too soon. The misfire
caused a hard touchdown that tore off the starboard wing and
started a fire; all on board survived.
The impending change
in the White
House
following the November election led to an
abandonment of this project. The two surviving airframes
were returned to regular duty with the rocket packages removed.
One is on
display at the Museum of Aviation located next to Robins Air
Force Base
in Georgia
.
The aforementioned failed rescue attempt led to the creation of the
160th S.O.A.R., a helicopter aviation
special forces group in the
United
States Army.
Release
At the end of the Iran hostage crisis,
Vice President George H.
Bush and other VIPs wait to welcome hostages home
The hostages disembark Freedom One, an
Air Force VC-137 Stratoliner aircraft, upon their arrival at the
base.
On January 20, 1981, 20 minutes after Reagan was sworn in as
President, the American hostages were released by Iran into U.S.
custody, having spent 444 days in captivity. The hostages were
flown to Algeria as a symbolic gesture for the help of that
government in resolving the crisis.
The flight continued to Rhein-Main
Air Base
in West
Germany
, where former President Carter, acting as emissary,
received them. After medical check-ups and debriefings,
they took a second flight to Stewart Air
National Guard Base
in Newburgh, New York
, with a refueling stop in Shannon
, Ireland
, where they were greeted by a large crowd.
From
Newburgh they traveled by bus to the United
States Military Academy
, receiving a heroes' welcome all along the
route. Ten days after their release, the former
hostages were given a ticker tape
parade through the Canyon of
Heroes in New York
City
.
Aftermath
Iran–Iraq War
The
Iraq invasion of Iran
occurred less than a year after the embassy employees were taken
hostage. At least one observer (
Stephen
Kinzer) believes the dramatic change of US-Iranian relations
from ally to enemy played a part in emboldening
Saddam Hussein to invade, and US anger with
Iran led the US to
aid
Iraq after the war turned against Iraq. The US supplied Iraq
with, among other things, "helicopters and satellite intelligence
that was used in selecting bombing targets".
In turn, this aid and
the shooting down of Iran Air Flight 655
in the Persian Gulf by the USS Vincennes "deepened
and widened anti-American feeling in Iran."
Iran
The hostage taking was unsuccessful for the Islamic Republic in
some respects. Iran lost international support for its war against
Iraq, and the settlement was considered almost wholly favorable to
the United States since it did not meet any of Iran's original
demands. But the crisis strengthened Iranians who supported the
hostage taking. Anti-Americanism became even more intense, and
anti-American rhetoric continued unabated. Politicians such as
Mohammad Mousavi
Khoeiniha and
Behzad Nabavi were
left in a stronger position, while those associated or accused of
association with America were removed from the political picture.
Khomeini biographer
Baqer Moin describes
the incident as "a watershed in Khomeini's life" transforming him
from a "cautious, pragmatic politician" into "a modern
revolutionary, single-mindedly pursing a dogma". In his statements,
"imperialism, liberalism, democracy" were "negative words", while
"revolution ... became a sacred word, sometimes more important than
Islam."Iranian government commemorates the event every year by
demonstration at the embassy and burning US flag but on November
4th 2009, when pro-democracy protesters and reformists demonstrated
in the streets of Tehran, despite Iranian government authorities
encouraging people to chant "Death to America," protesters instead
chanted "Death to the Dictator" (referring to Iranian Supreme
Leader
Ali Khamenei) and other
anti-government slogans.
America
In America, gifts were showered upon the hostages upon their
return, including lifetime passes to any
minor league or
Major League Baseball game.
In 2000, the hostages and their families tried to sue Iran,
unsuccessfully, under the
Antiterrorism
Act.
They originally won the case when Iran
failed to provide a defense, but the U.S.
State Department tried to put an end to the suit, fearing that it
would make international relations difficult. As a result, a
federal judge ruled that nothing could be done to repay the damages
the hostages faced because of the agreement the U.S. made when the
hostages were freed.
The US embassy building is used by Iran's government and its
affiliated groups.
The Guardian
reported in 2006 that a group called
The Committee for the
Commemoration of Martyrs of the Global Islamic Campaign used
the US embassy to recruit "martyrdom seekers", volunteers to carry
out operations against Western and Jewish targets. Mohammad Samadi,
a spokesman for the group, signed up several hundred volunteers in
a few days.
Conspiracy theories
Alleged Rockefeller plot
One conspiratorial explanation for the hostage taking is that David
Rockefeller plotted to allow the Shah to enter America knowing this
would provoke the Islamic revolutionaries into "some kind of
outrageous" response, which in turn would provoke a retaliation by
the American government of freezing Iranian assets kept in
Rockefeller's Chase Manhattan Bank. This would help replace loans
made by Chase Manhattan to the Shah that the Islamic government had
no intention of repaying. The theory is mentioned by roozonline and
in the book
Taken Hostage, by
David Farber.
Other alleged plots
In Iran the failed rescue attempt was described by revolutionaries
not as an attempt to free the hostages but as a `secret invasion`
by hundreds of American troops "to murder Khomeini and destroy the
revolution." American hostages were told that the U.S. had sent
commandos to Iran to kill them, and that the hostages had been
moved to prison cells for their own protection.
Alleged CIA plot
Journalist
Mark Bowden writes that since
the hostage taking "helped prompt the disastrous Iran-Iraq War and
25 years of international troubles for Iran" it is now much less
popular in Iran. Conspiracy theorists such as Reza Ghapour,
described as "a young fundamentalist scholar" and
Abolhassan Banisadr, argue the hostage
taking "was a secret CIA plot" and that the student hostage takers
were "either stooges or, at worst, American agents." In Iran their
theories are "taken seriously" by "even well-educated
people."
October Surprise conspiracy theory
The October Surprise theory refers to a purported deal between
high-level Reagan campaign operatives and representatives of the
Iranian Islamic government to delay the release of the hostages
until after the November 1980 U.S. elections. The ongoing hostage
crisis had substantially harmed incumbent President Carter's
popularity, and a "surprise" release of the hostages shortly before
the election could have substantially improved his reelection
prospects, at Reagan's expense. Although investigations by the
United States Senate and
House of
Representatives in the 1990s declared the allegations to be
unfounded, the conspiracy's existence or lack thereof remains a
subject of debate. The main cause for suspicion was the timing of
the hostages' release six minutes after Reagan was sworn into
office on January 20, 1981, as well as the Reagan administration's
later decision to provide arms to the anti-U.S. Iranian government,
allegedly in return for delaying the release of the hostages,
rather than for freeing them.
However, special ops personnel involved in the preparations for the
second rescue attempt believed that incoming President Ronald
Reagan was involved in the planning and timing of the second rescue
attempt, and that these intentions were either implied or made
known to the de facto Iranian government, leading to the hostages'
release just minutes after Reagan's inauguration.
Long Term effect
Some doubt the hostage crisis will have a long term effect on
US-Iranian relations. Journalist
Robert
Kaplan argues that those who believe relations between the two
countries "will never be restored because of the hostage crisis
.... ignore history," and compares the hostage taking to a 19th
century Iranian attack on the Russian embassy.
In 1829, ...
Iranians ... stormed and destroyed the Russian embassy
and decapitated the Russian ambassador, Alexander Griboyedov.
But Russian-Iranian relations were eventually
restored.
Who, now, even remembers the incident?
Hostages
November 4, 1979 - January 20, 1981: 66 original captives, 63 taken
at the Embassy, three captured and held at Foreign Ministry
Office.
At least three of the hostages were operatives of the CIA.
Thirteen hostages were released from November 19-20, 1979, and one
was released on July 11, 1980. Fifty-two remaining hostages endured
444 days of captivity until their release January 20, 1981.
Six diplomats who evaded capture
- Robert Anders, 34 - Consular Officer
- Mark J. Lijek, 29 - Consular Officer
- Cora A. Lijek, 25 - Consular Assistant
- Henry L. Schatz, 31 - Agriculture Attaché
- Joseph D. Stafford, 29 - Consular Officer
- Kathleen F. Stafford, 28 - Consular Assistant
13 hostages released
From November 19-20, 1979, thirteen women and men who had been
captured and held hostage were released:
- Kathy Gross, 22 - Secretary
- Sgt. James Hughes, 30 - USAF Administrative Manager
- Lillian Johnson, 32 - Secretary
- Sgt. Ladell Maples, 23 - USMC Embassy Guard
- Elizabeth Montagne, 42 - Secretary
- Sgt. William Quarles, 23 - USMC Embassy Guard
- Lloyd Rollins, 40 - Administrative Officer
- Capt. Neal (Terry) Robinson, 30 - Administrative Officer
- Terri Tedford, 24 - Secretary
- Sgt. Joseph Vincent, 42 - USAF Administrative Manager
- Sgt. David Walker, 25 - USMC Embassy guard
- Joan Walsh, 33 - Secretary
- Cpl. Wesley Williams, 24 - USMC Embassy Guard
Richard I. Queen released
On July 11. 1980, 28-year-old Vice Consul
Richard I. Queen, who had been captured and held
hostage, was released after becoming seriously ill. He was later
diagnosed with
multiple
sclerosis. (Died August 14, 2002.)
52 remaining hostages released
The following fifty-two remaining hostages were held captive until
January 20, 1981.
- Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., - Narcotics Control Officer (later
identified as CIA station chief)
- Clair Cortland Barnes, 35 - Communications Specialist
- William E. Belk, 44 - Communications and Records Officer
- Robert O. Blucker, 54 - Economics Officer Specializing in Oil
(Died 4/3/2003)
- Donald J. Cooke, 26 - Vice Consul
- William J. Daugherty, 33 - 3rd Secretary of U.S. Mission
- Lt. Cmdr. Robert Englemann, 34 - U.S. Navy Attaché
- Sgt. William Gallegos, 22 - USMC Guard
- Bruce W. German, 44 - Budget Officer
- Duane L. Gillette, 24 - USN Communications and Intelligence
Specialist
- Alan B. Golacinski, 30 - Chief of Embassy Security
- John E. Graves, 53 - Public Affairs Officer (Died
4/27/2001)
- Joseph M. Hall, 32 - CWO Military Attaché
- Sgt. Kevin J. Hermening, 21 - USMC Guard
- Sgt. 1st Class Donald R. Hohman, 38 - U.S. Army Medic
- Col. Lee J. Holland, 53 - Military Attaché (Died
10/2/1990)
- Michael Howland, 34 - Assistant Chief of Security, held at
Iranian Foreign Ministry Office
- Charles A. Jones, Jr., 40 - Communications Specialist, Teletype
Operator. (The only African American hostage not released in
November 1979)
- Malcolm Kalp, 42 - Commercial Officer (Died 4/7/2002)
- Moorhead C. Kennedy Jr., 50 - Economic and Commercial
Officer
- William F. Keough, Jr., 50 - Superintendent of American
School in Islamabad
, Pakistan
, visiting Tehran at time of embassy seizure (Died
11/27/1985)
- Cpl. Steven W. Kirtley - USMC Guard
- Capt. Eric M. Feldman, 24 - Military officer
- Kathryn L. Koob, 42 - Embassy Cultural Officer; one of two
female hostages
- Frederick Lee Kupke, 34 - Communications Officer and
Electronics Specialist
- L. Bruce
Laingen, 58 - Chargé d'Affaires, held at Iranian Foreign
Ministry Office
- Steven Lauterbach, 29 - Administrative Officer
- Gary E. Lee, 37 - Administrative Officer
- Sgt. Paul Edward Lewis, 23 - USMC Guard
- John W. Limbert, Jr., 37 - Political Officer
- Sgt. James M. Lopez, 22 - USMC Guard
- Sgt. John D. McKeel, Jr., 27 - USMC Guard (Died 11/1/1991)
- Michael J. Metrinko, 34 - Political Officer
- Jerry J. Miele, 42 - Communications Officer
- Staff Sgt. Michael E. Moeller, 31 - Head of USMC Guard Unit at
Embassy
- Bert C. Moore, 45 - Counselor for Administration (Died
6/8/2000)
- Richard H. Morefield, 51 - U.S. Consul General in Tehran
- Capt. Paul M. Needham, Jr., 30 - USAF Logistics Staff
Officer
- Robert C. Ode, 65 - Retired Foreign Service Officer on
Temporary Duty in Tehran (Died 9/8/1995)
- Sgt. Gregory A. Persinger, 23 - USMC Guard
- Jerry Plotkin, 45 - civilian businessman visiting Tehran (Died
6/6/1996)
- MSgt. Regis Ragan, 38 - US Army NCO assigned to Defense
Attaché's Office
- Lt. Col. David M. Roeder, 41 - Deputy USAF Attaché
- Barry M. Rosen, 36 - Press Attaché
- William B. Royer, Jr., 49 - Assistant Director of Iran-American
Society
- Col. Thomas E. Schaefer, 50 - USAF Attaché
- Col. Charles W. Scott, 48 - US Army Officer, Military
Attaché
- Cmdr. Donald A. Sharer, 40 - USN Air Attaché
- Sgt. Rodney V. (Rocky) Sickmann, 22 - USMC Guard
- Staff Sgt. Joseph Subic, Jr., 23 - Military Police, US Army,
Defense Attaché's Staff
- Elizabeth Ann Swift, 40 - Chief of Embassy's Political Section;
1 of 2 female hostages (Died 5/7/2004)
- Victor L. Tomseth, 39 - Senior Political Officer, held at
Iranian Foreign Ministry Office
- Phillip R. Ward, 40 - TDY Communications officer CIA, Assigned
to Brandy Station, Va.
Servicemen awarded
For their service during the hostage crisis, the US military later
awarded the 20 servicemen who were among the hostages the
Defense Meritorious Service
Medal. The only hostage serviceman not to be issued the medal
was Staff Sgt. Joseph Subic, Jr. The reason given was that Subic
"did not behave under stress the way noncommissioned officers are
expected to act
[33327]," i.e. he cooperated with the hostage
takers according to other hostages.
For their part in the mission, the
Humanitarian Service Medal was
awarded to the servicemen of Joint Task Force (JTF) 1-79 (the
planning authority for Operation Rice Bowl/Eagle Claw) who
participated in the rescue attempt.
Also, the USAF special ops component of the mission was awarded the
AF Outstanding Unit award for that year for performing their part
of the mission flawlessly, to include accomplishing the evacuation
of the entire Desert One site after the accident and under extreme
conditions.
Civilian hostages
A small number of hostages were not connected to the diplomatic
staff. All had been released by late 1981.
Notable hostage takers, guards, interrogators
See also
Notes
CNN-
Former hostages allege Iran's new president was
captor
References
- Bakhash, Shaul, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the
Islamic Revolution, Basic Books, 1984
- Moin, Baqer, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah, Thomas
Dunne Books, c2000
- Ebtekar,Masoumeh and Fred Reed
(January 20, 2001). Takeover in
Tehran: The Inside Story of the 1979 U.S. Embassy
Capture (Paperback), Publisher: Talonbooks; ISBN
0-88922-443-9
- 444 Days to Freedom: What Really Happened in Iran
(1997). DVD UPC 033909253390
Further reading
External links
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