The
Iraq Resolution or the
Iraq War
Resolution (formally the
Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 , , ) is a
joint resolution (i.e., a law)
passed by the
United States
Congress in October 2002 as
Public
Law No: 107-243, authorizing the
Iraq
War.
Contents
The resolution cited many factors to justify the use of military
force against Iraq:
- Iraq's noncompliance with the conditions of the 1991 cease
fire, including interference with weapons inspectors.
- Iraq's
alleged weapons of mass
destruction, and programs to develop such weapons, posed a
"threat to the national security of the United States and
international peace and security in the Persian Gulf
region."
- Iraq's "brutal
repression of its civilian population."
- Iraq's "capability and willingness to use weapons of mass
destruction against other
nations and its own
people".
- Iraq's hostility towards the United States as demonstrated by
the alleged 1993 assassination
attempt of former President George
H. W. Bush, and firing on coalition aircraft
enforcing the no-fly zones
following the 1991 Gulf War.
- Members of al-Qaeda, an organization bearing responsibility
for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests,
including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq.
- Iraq's "continu[ing] to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations," including
anti-United States terrorist organizations.
- The efforts
by the Congress and the President to fight terrorists,
including the September 11th,
2001 terrorists and those who aided or harbored them.
- The authorization by the Constitution and the Congress for the President to fight
anti-United States terrorism.
- Citing the Iraq
Liberation Act of 1998, the resolution reiterated that it
should be the policy of the United States to remove the Saddam Hussein regime and promote a democratic replacement.
The resolution "supported" and "encouraged" diplomatic efforts by
President
George W. Bush to "strictly enforce through the
U.N. Security Council all relevant Security
Council resolutions regarding Iraq" and "obtain prompt and
decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq
abandons its strategy of delay, evasion, and noncompliance and
promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council
resolutions regarding Iraq."
The resolution authorized President Bush to use the
Armed Forces of the United
States "as he determines to be necessary and appropriate" in
order to "defend the
national
security of the United States against the continuing threat
posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations Security
Council Resolutions regarding Iraq."
Passage
An authorization by Congress was sought by President
George W. Bush
soon after his September 12, 2002 statement before the U.N. General
Assembly asking for quick action by the Security Council in
enforcing the resolutions against Iraq.
Of the legislation introduced by Congress in response to the
President Bush's requests, sponsored by
Sen. Daschle &
Sen. Lott was
based on the original White House proposal authorizing the use of
force in Iraq, sponsored by
Rep.
Hastert &
Rep. Gephardt and
the substantially similar sponsored by
Sen. Lieberman
were modified proposals. sponsored by
Rep. Hastings
was a separate proposal never considered on the floor. Eventually,
the Hastert-Gephardt proposal became the primary legislation that
Congress began to focus working on.
Introduced in Congress on October 2, 2002 in conjunction with the
Administration's proposals, passed the
House of
Representatives on Thursday afternoon at 3:05 p.m. EDT on
October 10, 2002 by a vote of 296-133, and passed the
Senate after midnight early Friday
morning at 12:50 a.m. EDT on October 11, 2002 by a vote of 77-23.
It was signed into law as by President Bush on October 16,
2002.
United States House of Representatives
{| class="wikitable"
|
| Party |
| Ayes |
| Nays |
| PRES |
| No Vote |
|
| Republican |
| 215 |
| 6 |
| 0 |
| 2 |
|
| Democratic |
| 82 |
| 126 |
| 0 |
| 1 |
|
| Independent |
| 0 |
| 1 |
| 0 |
| 0 |
|
| TOTALS |
| 297 |
| 133 |
| 0 |
| 3 |
United States Senate
- 21 (42%) of 50 Democratic Senators voted against the
resolution: Sens. Akaka (D-HI
), Bingaman (D-NM
), Boxer (D-CA
), Byrd (D-WV
), Conrad (D-ND
), Corzine (D-NJ
), Dayton (D-MN
), Durbin (D-IL
), Feingold (D-WI
), Graham (D-FL
), Inouye (D-HI
), Kennedy (D-MA
), Leahy (D-VT
), Levin (D-MI
), Mikulski (D-MD
), Murray (D-WA
), Reed (D-RI
), Sarbanes (D-MD
), Stabenow (D-MI
), Wellstone (D-MN
), Wyden (D-OR
).
- 1 of 49 Republican Senators voted against the resolution: Sen.
Chafee (R-RI
).
- The only Independent Senator voted against the resoution: Sen.
Jeffords (I-VT
)

400 px
Amendments offered to the House Resolution
The Lee Amendment
- Amendment in the nature of a substitute sought to have the
United States work through the United Nations to seek to resolve
the matter of ensuring that Iraq is not developing weapons of mass
destruction, through mechanisms such as the resumption of weapons
inspections, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, regional
arrangements, and other peaceful means.
- : Sponsored by Rep. Barbara Lee
(D-CA).
- :: Failed by the Yeas and Nays: 72 - 355
'
The Spratt Amendment
- Amendment in the nature of a substitute sought to authorize the
use of U.S. armed forces to support any new U.N. Security Council resolution that
mandated the elimination, by force if necessary, of all Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction, long-range ballistic missiles, and the
means of producing such weapons and missiles. Requested that the
President should seek authorization from Congress to use the armed
forces of the U.S. in the absence of a U.N. Security Council
resolution sufficient to eliminate, by force if necessary, all
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, long-range ballistic missiles,
and the means of producing such weapons and missiles. Provided
expedited consideration for authorization in the latter case.
- : Sponsored by Rep. John Spratt
(D-SC-5).
- :: Failed by the Yeas and Nays: 155 - 270
The House Rules Amendment
- An amendment considered as adopted pursuant to the provisions
of
- : Sponsored by House Rules.
- :: Resolution (H.RES.574) agreed to by voice vote
Amendments offered to the Senate Resolution
The Byrd Amendments
- To provide statutory construction that constitutional
authorities remain unaffected and that no additional grant of
authority is made to the President not directly related to the
existing threat posed by Iraq.
- : Sponsored by Sen. Robert Byrd
(D-WV).
- :: Amendment SA 4868 not agreed to by Yea-Nay Vote: 14 -
86
- To provide a termination date for the authorization of the use
of the Armed Forces of the United States, together with procedures
for the extension of such date unless Congress disapproves the
extension.
- : Sponsored by Sen. Robert Byrd
(D-WV).
- :: Amendment SA 4869 not agreed to by Yea-Nay Vote: 31 -
66
The Levin Amendment
- To authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces,
pursuant to a new resolution of the United Nations Security
Council, to destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction, nuclear weapons-usable material, long-range
ballistic missiles, and related facilities, and for other
purposes.
- : Sponsored by Sen. Carl Levin
(D-MI).
- :: Amendment SA 4862 not agreed to by Yea-Nay Vote: 24 -
75
The Durbin Amendment
- To amend the authorization for the use of the Armed Forces to
cover an imminent threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction rather than the continuing threat posed by Iraq.
- : Sponsored by Sen. Dick Durbin
(D-IL).
- :: Amendment SA 4865 not agreed to by Yea-Nay Vote: 30 -
70
Criticism
Weapons of mass destruction and Al-Qaeda
Two of the arguments used to justify the
invasion of Iraq— the capability to produce
and/or the possession of weapons of mass destruction and active
links to al Qaeda — have been found to be incorrect according to
all subsequent official reports. The post-invasion
Duelfer Reportstated that Hussein had still
not given up on trying to produce WMD in 2003. His strategy was to
first bring UN sanctions to an end by demonstrating that he was
cooperating with weapons inspectors and, once sanctions were
lifted, to then revive Iraq's WMD program, including nuclear
weapons. The report also stated that Hussein did not want to appear
weak. To deter his enemies, he intentionally deceived the world
into thinking he still had WMD. There was a "balancing act" between
cooperating with the UN and keeping a "strategic deterrent".
A 2007 report by the Inspector General of the Department of
Defense, declassified and released at the request of Senator Carl
M. Levin (D-Mich), asserted that the claims of an operational
working relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, as put forth by a
key Pentagon office in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq, were
based on dubious or unconfirmed reports. President Bush has, since
the invasion of Iraq, explicitly stated that that country was not
involved in 9-11, which has also been concluded by subsequent
reports, and any alleged contacts with al-Qaeda were in areas
outside of Saddam Hussein's control. Also, the day before she voted
on the resolution, Senator
Hillary Rodham Clintonsaid during a
speech on the Senate floor that there was no dispute that Hussein
was not involved in the September 11th attacks.
Floor Speech of Senator Hillary Rodham
Clinton10/10/2002. Retrieved 9/1/2007. "Now, I believe the
facts that have brought us to this fateful vote are not in doubt.
<...> He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to
terrorists, including Al Qaeda members, though there is apparently
no evidence of his involvement in the terrible events of September
11, 2001. <...> Now this much is
undisputed."</...><...>Nevertheless,
BBC News, The
Christian Science Monitor, the
New York Times, the Washington Post,
the
Institute for Public
Accuracy, and
Media
Matters for Americacontend that members of the administration
repeatedly over the years made suggestive statements with the
implied message there was a link between Saddam Hussein and the
attacks.</...>
The Bush administration initially suggested the discrepancy between
the allegations and the subsequent findings was due to failure by
the intelligence community. However, it became apparent that, prior
to the invasion, these allegations had already been widely
disputed, which had purportedly been reported to the U.S.
administration. An in-depth investigation into the nature of these
discrepancies by the
Senate Intelligence
Committeewas frustrated, according to the New York Times. The
Robb-Silberman
Commissionstated that the
President's Daily Briefsfrom the
intelligence community tended to repeat information in a misleading
way. The
National
Intelligence Estimate(NIE) provided to Congress was more
"nuanced" and less "alarmist" than information given to the
President. However, the vast majority of Senators did not read the
NIE and relied on briefings by the administration. Among those who
have stated they did not read the NIE and voted positively for the
Iraq Resolution are the former
Senatorand current
United States Secretary of
StateHillary Clinton,
SenatorJohn
McCain, and former
SenatorJohn
Edwards.
The assertion such weapons posed a threat towards the U.S. was not
supported by the available evidence at the time, according to
subsequent reports. The Bush administration asserted that two small
trailers that had been found in Iraq were "weapons factories,"
despite the fact that U.S. intelligence officials possessed
evidence to the contrary at that time. Weapon inspectors were given
access to the alleged weapon factories, despite statements to the
contrary by the Bush administration. Continuing these inspections
was made impossible by the U.S.-led
invasion of Iraqwhich forced the U.N.
inspectors out, ignoring their requests for more time.
Skeptics argue that the administration knowingly distorted
intelligence reports or ignored contrary information in
constructing their case for the war. The
Downing Street memoand the
Bush-Blair memoare used to substantiate that
allegation. Congressional Democrats sponsored both a request for
documents and a resolution of inquiry.
Legality
International law
Debate about the legality of the 2003 invasion of Iraq under
international law centers around ambiguous language in parts of
UN Resolution 1441(2002).
World Press: "The United Nations, International Law, and
the War in Iraq"Retrieved 9/5/2007. "Resolution 1441 ultimately
passed—by a vote of 15-0—because its ambiguous wording was able to
placate all parties. <...> Resolution 1441 is ambiguous in
two important ways. The first deals with who can determine the
existence of a material breach. The second concerns whether another
resolution, explicitly authorizing force, is needed before military
action against Iraq may be taken."The UN Charter prohibits any war
unless it is out of self-defense or when it is sanctioned by the
UN security council.If these
requirements are not met international law describes it a
war of aggression.
The position of the US and UK is that the invasion was authorized
by a series of UN resolutions dating back to 1990. Resolution 1441
declared that Iraq was in "material breach" of the cease-fire under
UN
Resolution 687(1991), which required cooperation with weapons
inspectors. The
Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treatiesstates that under certain conditions, a
party may invoke a "material breach" to suspend a multilateral
treaty. Thus, the US and UK claim that they used their right to
suspend the cease-fire in Resolution 687 and to continue
hostilities against Iraq under the authority of UN Resolution 678
(1990), which originally authorized the use of force after Iraq
invaded Kuwait.
ASIL: Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq's
Final Opportunity to Comply with Disarmament
ObligationsNovember, 2002. Retrieved 9/5/2007. "The language of
'material breach' in Resolution 1441 is keyed to Article 60 of the
Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is the authoritative
statement of international law regarding material breaches of
treaties. Under Article 60 of the Vienna Convention, a material
breach is an unjustified repudiation of a treaty or the violation
of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or
purpose of a treaty. Article 60 provides that a party specially
affected by a material breach of a multilateral treaty may invoke
it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole
or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting
state. <...> Security Council Resolution 687, adopted at the
end of the Gulf War, includes a provision declaring a formal
cease-fire between Iraq, Kuwait and the member states (such as the
United States) cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with
Resolution 678 (1990). Resolution 678 authorized member states to
use all necessary means to restore international peace and security
in the area, and thus provided the basis under international law
for the allies' military action in the Gulf War. The determination
in Resolution 1441 that Iraq is already in material breach of its
obligations under Resolution 687 provides a basis for the decision
in paragraph 4 (above) of Resolution 1441 that any further lack of
cooperation by Iraq will be a further material breach. If Iraq,
having confirmed its intention to comply with Resolution 1441, then
fails to cooperate fully with the inspectors, it would open the way
to an argument by any specially affected state that it could
suspend the operation of the cease-fire provision in Resolution 687
and rely again on Resolution 678."This is the same argument that
was used for
Operation Desert
Foxin 1998.They also contend that, while Resolution 1441
required the
UNSCto assemble and assess reports
from the weapons inspectors, it was not necessary for the UNSC to
reach an agreement on the course of action.If, at that time, it was
determined that Iraq breached Resolution 1441, the resolution did
not "constrain any member state from acting to defend itself
against the threat posed by Iraq".
It remains unclear whether any party other than the Security
Council can make the determination that Iraq breached Resolution
1441, as UN members commented that it is not up to one member state
to interpret and enforce UN resolutions for the entire council. In
addition, other nations have stated that a second resolution was
required to initiate hostilities.
ASIL:
Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq's Final Opportunity to
Comply with Disarmament ObligationsNovember, 2002. Retrieved
9/5/2007. "[T]he representative of Mexico (a current member of the
Security Council) said after the vote on Resolution 1441 that the
use of force is only valid as a last resort and with prior,
explicit authorization from the Council. Mexico does not stand
alone in taking that position. <...> It would be argued that,
in light of the emphasis in the Charter on peaceful dispute
settlement, Resolution 678 could not be used as an authorization
for the use of force after twelve years of cease fire, unless the
Security Council says so."
John Conyers,
Robert Parryand
Marjorie Cohnassert that the Iraq war was a
violation of the
U.N.Charterand as such a war of
aggression (a
crime against
peace) and therefore a
war
crime.
Kofi Annantoo has said the war
in Iraq is an "illegal act that contravened the UN charter."Some
scholars, including Columbia law professor Michael Dorf, have
argued that treaties are binding on the U.S. under international
law.
U.S. law
In early 2003, the Iraq Resolution was challenged in court to stop
the invasion from happening. The plaintiffs argued that the
President does not have the authority to declare war. The final
decision came from a three-judge panel from the US Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit which dismissed the case.
Judge Lynchwrote in the opinion that the
Judiciary cannot intervene unless there is a fully-developed
conflict between the President and Congress or if Congress gave the
President "absolute discretion" to declare war.
See also
References
- Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution of 2002 (pdf)
- Legislation related to the Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq, Congressional Record, Library of
Congress.
- Major Congressional Actions of H.J.Res. 114,
Congressional Record, Library of Congress
- 107th Congress-2nd Session 455th Roll Call Vote of by
members of the House of Representatives
- 107th Congress-2nd Session 237th Roll Call Vote by
members of the Senate
- H.AMDT.608 - Amendment in the nature of a
substitute of H.J.RES.114, 107th Congress, U.S. House of
Representatives, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
- On Agreeing to the Lee of California Substitute
Amendment, 107th Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Clerk
of the House, 2002-10-10
- H.AMDT.609 - Amendment in the nature of a
substitute of H.J.RES.114, 107th Congress, U.S. House of
Representatives, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
- On Agreeing to the Spratt of South Carolina Substitute
Amendment, 107th Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Clerk
of the House, 2002-10-10
- H.RES.574 - Providing for the consideration of the joint
resolution (H.J.RES.114), 107th Congress, U.S. House of
Representatives, Library of Congress, 2002-10-08
- H.AMDT.610 - Amendment considered as adopted
pursuant to the provisions of H.Res.574, 107th Congress, U.S.
House of Representatives, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
- On Agreeing to Resolve H.RES.574, 107th Congress, U.S.
House of Representatives, Library of Congress, 2002-10-08
- S.AMDT.4868 - Providing for Statuary Construction
in the Consideration of the Joint Resolution (S.J.RES.45),
107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
- On Agreeing to the Amendment (Byrd Amdt. No.
4868), 107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress,
2002-10-10
- S.AMDT.4869 - Providing for Congresional
Construction in the Consideration of the Joint Resolution
(S.J.RES.45), 107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress,
2002-10-10
- On Agreeing to the Amendment (Byrd Amdt. No.
4869), 107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress,
2002-10-10
- S.AMDT.4862 - Providing for Congressional
Construction in the Consideration of the Joint Resolution
(S.J.RES.45), 107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress,
2002-10-10
- On Agreeing to the Amendment (Levin Amdt. No.
4862), 107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress,
2002-10-10
- S.AMDT.4865 - Providing for Congressional Amendment
in the Consideration of the Joint Resolution (S.J.RES.45),
107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
- On Agreeing to the Amendment (Byrd Amdt. No.
4865), 107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress,
2002-10-10
- No weapons of mass destruction * Iraq's WMD Plans Were Preliminary CBS News, January 7, 2004 *
Kay: No evidence Iraq stockpiled WMDs
CNN, January 26, 2004 * A Spy Speaks Out - Former Top CIA Official On
"Faulty" Intelligence Claims CBS, 60
minutes, April 23, 2006 * Drumheller:
'Caught up in the march to war' - Two CIA operatives raise
questions about use of pre-war intelligence Hardball, May 3, 2006 * WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications By
Joseph Cirincione, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, George Perkovich, with
Alexis Orton, Carnegie Endowment Report, January
2004 * In Their Own Words: Iraq's 'Imminent' Threat
Center for American Progress,
January 29, 2004 * Reports of Bush's Contrition Have Been Greatly
Exaggerated Robert Schlesinger, Huffington Post,
December 14, 2005
- No relation between Saddan Jussein and al-Qaeda * Hussein's Prewar Ties To Al-Qaeda Discounted -
Pentagon Report Says Contacts Were Limited By R. Jeffrey Smith,
Washington
Post, April 6, 2007 * Levin Releases Newly Declassified Intelligence Documents
on Iraq-al Qaeda Relationship Documents show Administration
claims were exaggerated, by Carl Levin, April 15, 2005 * Another Iraq story gets debunked By Dave
Zweifel, The Capital Times * Report: No Proof Of Qaeda-Saddam Link - Senate
Committee Finds Hussein Had No Relationship With Zarqawi CBS,
September 8, 2006 * Report Warned Bush Team About Intelligence
Suspicions By DOUGLAS JEHL, New York Times, November 6, 2005 * Bush Flatly Declares No Connection Between Saddam and al
Qaeda The Memory Hole * Bush Speech Reveals Administration’s Ongoing Deceptions on
Iraq By Stephen Zunes,Institute for Policy Studies,
June 29, 2005
- Link with Al Qaeda * Levin Releases Newly Declassified Intelligence Documents
on Iraq-al Qaeda Relationship Documents show Administration
claims were exaggerated, by Carl Levin, April 15, 2005 * Another Iraq story gets debunked By Dave
Zweifel, The Capital Times * Bush Flatly Declares No Connection Between Saddam and al
Qaeda The Memory Hole
- Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the
DCI on Iraq's WMD: Volume 1; Regime Strategic Intent Page 1.
"Key Findings". Retrieved 8/31/2007. "He sought to balance the need
to cooperate with UN inspections—to gain support for lifting
sanctions—with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual
capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of
face." "Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was
essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and
Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of
capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to
develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion,
irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic
risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical
chemical warfare (CW) capabilities."
- Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the
DCI on Iraq's WMD: Volume 1; Regime Strategic Intent Page 34.
"WMD Possession—Real or Imagined—Acts as a Deterrent". Retrieved
8/31/2007. "In order to counter these threats, Saddam continued
with his public posture of retaining the WMD capability. This led
to a difficult balancing act between the need to disarm to achieve
sanctions relief while at the same time retaining a strategic
deterrent. The Regime never resolved the contradiction inherent in
this approach. Ultimately, foreign perceptions of these tensions
contributed to the destruction of the Regime."
- Hussein's Prewar Ties To Al-Qaeda Discounted -
Pentagon Report Says Contacts Were Limited By R. Jeffrey Smith,
Washington Post, April 6, 2007
- Key Bush Intelligence Briefing Kept From Hill
Panel By Murray
Waas, National Journal, November 22, 2005
- Linking Iraq and September 11 * The impact of Bush linking 9/11 and Iraq American
attitudes about a connection have changed, firming up the case for
war By Linda Feldmann, The Christian Science Monitor, March
14, 2003 * USA Today uncritically reported Bush's denial that
he linked Iraq with 9-11 attacks Media
Matters for America, March 22, 2006 * Bush administration on Iraq 9/11 link BBC News,
September 18, 2003 * News Release - Interviews Available: Bush vs. Facts by
the Institute for Public Accuracy,
October 29, 2003 * Bush Distorts Qaeda Links, Critics Assert by Michael
R. Gordon and Jim Rutenberg, Media
Matters for America, July 13, 2007 * A Disconnect on the Al Qaeda LinkBy
Dan Froomkin,
Washington Post, June 17, 2004 * President Again Seeks to Link Qaeda of Iraq to
Qaeda of 9/11 By JIM RUTENBERG AND MARK MAZZETTI; RICHARD A.
OPPEL JR. CONTRIBUTED REPORTING FROM BAGHDAD, The New York Times,
July 25, 2007
- Blowing Cheney's Cover Ray McGovern, April 10,
2006
- The Intelligence Business editorial, The
New York
Times, May 7, 2006
- Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: Overview Page 14.
3/31/2005. Retrieved 9/1/2007. "As problematic as the October 2002
NIE was, it was not the Community’s biggest analytic failure on
Iraq. Even more misleading was the river of intelligence that
flowed from the CIA to top policymakers over long periods of
time—in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and in its more widely
distributed companion, the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief
(SEIB). These daily reports were, if anything, more alarmist and
less nuanced than the NIE."
- Few senators read Iraq NIE report The Hill
Published 6/19/2007. Retrieved 9/1/2007. "'It’s probably pretty
hard to say with 100 percent certainty how many read it,' the
senior staffer said. 'You can say with 100 percent certainty that
it’s less than 10.'"
- Decoding Mr. Bush's Denials The New York
Times Editorial, November 15, 2005
- Lacking Biolabs, Trailers Carried Case for War
By Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, April 12, 2006
- Weapons inspectors * Timeline: the road to war in Iraq by Oliver
King and Paul Hamilos, Guardian Unlimited, February 2, 2006 *
We all now know the war would not stand up in court
- The cabinet must never again take a major decision without
crucial advice by Robin Cook, The Guardian, April 29, 2005
- Selectively disseminating information * Why 'leaker in chief' charge harms the president By
Linda Feldmann, The Christian Science Monitor, April
10, 2006
- Misrepresenting the facts surrounding Iraq * The Impeachment of George W. Bush, by Elizabeth
Holtzman, The Nation, January 11, 2006 * A Firm Basis
for Impeachment By Robert Scheer, AlterNet, July 18, 2003 * The Case for
Impeachment By John
Dean, FindLaw.com, June 11, 2003 * In Their Own Words: Iraq's 'Imminent' Threat
Center for American Progress,
January 29, 2004] * Millions Protest Possible War with Iraq
February 19, 2003
- Downing Street memo * Another Iraq Memo Revealed: Colin Powell Opposed War
Without Second U.N. Resolution Posted by Think Progress March
28, 2006 * The secret Downing Street memo SECRET AND STRICTLY
PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY DAVID MANNING, The Times, July 23, 2002
- FOIA request * Just hearsay, or the new Watergate tapes? By
David Paul, Salon,
June 6, 2005 * 52 House members file FOIA request seeking
documents related to Downing Street minutes Raw Story, June 30,
2005
- Iraq impeachable offense? * Is lying about the reason for a war an impeachable
offense? by John W. Dean, CNN * George W. Bush: Legal Arguments for Impeachment by
Marcus Raskin and Joseph A. Vuckovich, Institute for Policy
Studies
- World Press: "The United Nations, International Law, and
the War in Iraq" Retrieved 9/5/2007. "[On Dec. 16, 1998], U.S.
and British warplanes launched air strikes against Iraq after
learning that Iraq was continuing to impede the work of UNSCOM, the
weapons inspectors sent to Iraq at the close of the Gulf War, and
thus was not in compliance with Resolution 687. When the Security
Council met that night to discuss whether individual member states
could resort to force without renewed Security Council consent, it
was clear that the Security Council members did not all agree on
the legality of the U.S. and British resort to force. According to
the press release from that meeting, the U.S. representative
claimed his country's actions were authorized by previous council
resolutions (as many in the Bush administration are arguing again
today). The British delegate similarly argued that because Iraq had
not complied with the terms of Resolution 687, military force was
justified."
- World Press: "The United Nations, International Law, and
the War in Iraq" Retrieved 9/5/2007. "At that time, U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N. John Negroponte said: 'This resolution
contains no 'hidden triggers' and no 'automaticity' with respect to
the use of force. If there is a further Iraqi breach, reported to
the council by UNMOVIC, the IAEA, or a Member State, the matter
will return to the council for discussion….[But] if the Security
Council fails to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi
violations, this resolution does not constrain any member state
from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to
enforce the relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world
peace and security.' The British ambassador, Sir Jeremy Greenstock,
agreed."
- US not allowed to speak for the entire council * The
United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq Rachel
S. Taylor, World Press Review * UN RESOLUTION 1441: COMPELLING SADDAM, RESTRAINING
BUSH Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell, Moritz School
of Law, Ohio State University, JURIST, November 21, 2002 * Iraq war illegal, says Annan BBC News, September 16, 2004
- War of aggression * War Crimes: Goose and Gander By Marjorie Cohn,
Truthout, March 13, 2006 * Could Bush
Be Prosecuted for War Crimes? By Jan Frel July 10, 2006
- Iraq war illegal, says Annan BBC News, September 16, 2004
- WHEN AMERICAN STATES EXECUTE CITIZENS OF FOREIGN
COUNTRIES: The Case of Gerardo Valdez By MICHAEL C. DORF,
FindLaw, July 24, 2001
- Doe v. Bush Opinion by Judge Lynch 3/13/2003 Pages
3,4,23,25,26. Retrieved 8/7/2007.
External links
- * Statement by President George W. Bush on his signing the resolution into
law
- * October 16, 2002 Press Briefing by Ari
Fleischer
- * Floor Speech of Sen Hillary Clinton
(clinton.senate.gov)
- * Floor Speech of Sen Russ Feingold
(feingold.senate.gov)
- * Floor Speech of Sen Jay Rockefeller
(rockefeller.senate.gov)
- * Floor Speech of Rep Ron
Paul (www.house.gov/paul)
- * Floor Speech of Rep
Pete Stark
- * Floor Speech of Rep Dennis Kucinich
- * Congressional Records related to the Congress' consent to
the Authorization of the Use of Military Force in Iraq
|
| Party |
| Ayes |
| Nays |
| No Vote |
|
| Republican |
| 48 |
| 1 |
| 0 |
|
| Democratic |
| 29 |
| 21 |
| 0 |
|
| Independent |
| 0 |
| 1 |
| 0 |
|
| TOTALS |
| 77 |
| 23 |
| 0 |