The Full Wiki

Advertisements

More info on Iraq Resolution

Iraq Resolution: Map

Advertisements
  
  

Wikipedia article:

Map showing all locations mentioned on Wikipedia article:



The Iraq Resolution or the Iraq War Resolution (formally the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 , , ) is a joint resolution (i.e., a law) passed by the United States Congress in October 2002 as Public Law No: 107-243, authorizing the Iraq War.

Contents

The resolution cited many factors to justify the use of military force against Iraq:

The resolution "supported" and "encouraged" diplomatic efforts by President George W. Bush to "strictly enforce through the U.N. Security Council all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" and "obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion, and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq."

The resolution authorized President Bush to use the Armed Forces of the United States "as he determines to be necessary and appropriate" in order to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq."

Passage

An authorization by Congress was sought by President George W. Bush soon after his September 12, 2002 statement before the U.N. General Assembly asking for quick action by the Security Council in enforcing the resolutions against Iraq.

Of the legislation introduced by Congress in response to the President Bush's requests, sponsored by Sen. Daschle & Sen. Lott was based on the original White House proposal authorizing the use of force in Iraq, sponsored by Rep. Hastert & Rep. Gephardt and the substantially similar sponsored by Sen. Lieberman were modified proposals. sponsored by Rep. Hastings was a separate proposal never considered on the floor. Eventually, the Hastert-Gephardt proposal became the primary legislation that Congress began to focus working on.

Introduced in Congress on October 2, 2002 in conjunction with the Administration's proposals, passed the House of Representatives on Thursday afternoon at 3:05 p.m. EDT on October 10, 2002 by a vote of 296-133, and passed the Senate after midnight early Friday morning at 12:50 a.m. EDT on October 11, 2002 by a vote of 77-23. It was signed into law as by President Bush on October 16, 2002.

United States House of Representatives
{|  class="wikitable"


Party
Ayes
Nays
PRES
No Vote
Republican
215
6
0
2
Democratic
82
126
0
1
Independent
0
1
0
0
TOTALS
297
133
0
3


United States Senate



400 px


Amendments offered to the House Resolution

The Lee Amendment

Amendment in the nature of a substitute sought to have the United States work through the United Nations to seek to resolve the matter of ensuring that Iraq is not developing weapons of mass destruction, through mechanisms such as the resumption of weapons inspections, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, regional arrangements, and other peaceful means.
: Sponsored by Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA).


:: Failed by the Yeas and Nays: 72 - 355
'

The Spratt Amendment

Amendment in the nature of a substitute sought to authorize the use of U.S. armed forces to support any new U.N. Security Council resolution that mandated the elimination, by force if necessary, of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, long-range ballistic missiles, and the means of producing such weapons and missiles. Requested that the President should seek authorization from Congress to use the armed forces of the U.S. in the absence of a U.N. Security Council resolution sufficient to eliminate, by force if necessary, all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, long-range ballistic missiles, and the means of producing such weapons and missiles. Provided expedited consideration for authorization in the latter case.
: Sponsored by Rep. John Spratt (D-SC-5).


:: Failed by the Yeas and Nays: 155 - 270


The House Rules Amendment

An amendment considered as adopted pursuant to the provisions of


: Sponsored by House Rules.


:: Resolution (H.RES.574) agreed to by voice vote


Amendments offered to the Senate Resolution

The Byrd Amendments

To provide statutory construction that constitutional authorities remain unaffected and that no additional grant of authority is made to the President not directly related to the existing threat posed by Iraq.


: Sponsored by Sen. Robert Byrd (D-WV).


:: Amendment SA 4868 not agreed to by Yea-Nay Vote: 14 - 86


To provide a termination date for the authorization of the use of the Armed Forces of the United States, together with procedures for the extension of such date unless Congress disapproves the extension.
: Sponsored by Sen. Robert Byrd (D-WV).


:: Amendment SA 4869 not agreed to by Yea-Nay Vote: 31 - 66


The Levin Amendment

To authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces, pursuant to a new resolution of the United Nations Security Council, to destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons-usable material, long-range ballistic missiles, and related facilities, and for other purposes.
: Sponsored by Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI).


:: Amendment SA 4862 not agreed to by Yea-Nay Vote: 24 - 75


The Durbin Amendment

To amend the authorization for the use of the Armed Forces to cover an imminent threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction rather than the continuing threat posed by Iraq.
: Sponsored by Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL).


:: Amendment SA 4865 not agreed to by Yea-Nay Vote: 30 - 70


Criticism

Weapons of mass destruction and Al-Qaeda

Two of the arguments used to justify the invasion of Iraq— the capability to produce and/or the possession of weapons of mass destruction and active links to al Qaeda — have been found to be incorrect according to all subsequent official reports. The post-invasion Duelfer Reportstated that Hussein had still not given up on trying to produce WMD in 2003. His strategy was to first bring UN sanctions to an end by demonstrating that he was cooperating with weapons inspectors and, once sanctions were lifted, to then revive Iraq's WMD program, including nuclear weapons. The report also stated that Hussein did not want to appear weak. To deter his enemies, he intentionally deceived the world into thinking he still had WMD. There was a "balancing act" between cooperating with the UN and keeping a "strategic deterrent".

A 2007 report by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, declassified and released at the request of Senator Carl M. Levin (D-Mich), asserted that the claims of an operational working relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, as put forth by a key Pentagon office in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq, were based on dubious or unconfirmed reports. President Bush has, since the invasion of Iraq, explicitly stated that that country was not involved in 9-11, which has also been concluded by subsequent reports, and any alleged contacts with al-Qaeda were in areas outside of Saddam Hussein's control. Also, the day before she voted on the resolution, Senator Hillary Rodham Clintonsaid during a speech on the Senate floor that there was no dispute that Hussein was not involved in the September 11th attacks. Floor Speech of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton10/10/2002. Retrieved 9/1/2007. "Now, I believe the facts that have brought us to this fateful vote are not in doubt. <...> He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including Al Qaeda members, though there is apparently no evidence of his involvement in the terrible events of September 11, 2001. <...> Now this much is undisputed."</...><...>Nevertheless, BBC News, The Christian Science Monitor, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Institute for Public Accuracy, and Media Matters for Americacontend that members of the administration repeatedly over the years made suggestive statements with the implied message there was a link between Saddam Hussein and the attacks.</...>

The Bush administration initially suggested the discrepancy between the allegations and the subsequent findings was due to failure by the intelligence community. However, it became apparent that, prior to the invasion, these allegations had already been widely disputed, which had purportedly been reported to the U.S. administration. An in-depth investigation into the nature of these discrepancies by the Senate Intelligence Committeewas frustrated, according to the New York Times. The Robb-Silberman Commissionstated that the President's Daily Briefsfrom the intelligence community tended to repeat information in a misleading way. The National Intelligence Estimate(NIE) provided to Congress was more "nuanced" and less "alarmist" than information given to the President. However, the vast majority of Senators did not read the NIE and relied on briefings by the administration. Among those who have stated they did not read the NIE and voted positively for the Iraq Resolution are the former Senatorand current United States Secretary of StateHillary Clinton, SenatorJohn McCain, and former SenatorJohn Edwards.

The assertion such weapons posed a threat towards the U.S. was not supported by the available evidence at the time, according to subsequent reports. The Bush administration asserted that two small trailers that had been found in Iraq were "weapons factories," despite the fact that U.S. intelligence officials possessed evidence to the contrary at that time. Weapon inspectors were given access to the alleged weapon factories, despite statements to the contrary by the Bush administration. Continuing these inspections was made impossible by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraqwhich forced the U.N. inspectors out, ignoring their requests for more time.

Skeptics argue that the administration knowingly distorted intelligence reports or ignored contrary information in constructing their case for the war. The Downing Street memoand the Bush-Blair memoare used to substantiate that allegation. Congressional Democrats sponsored both a request for documents and a resolution of inquiry.

Legality

International law

Debate about the legality of the 2003 invasion of Iraq under international law centers around ambiguous language in parts of UN Resolution 1441(2002). World Press: "The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq"Retrieved 9/5/2007. "Resolution 1441 ultimately passed—by a vote of 15-0—because its ambiguous wording was able to placate all parties. <...> Resolution 1441 is ambiguous in two important ways. The first deals with who can determine the existence of a material breach. The second concerns whether another resolution, explicitly authorizing force, is needed before military action against Iraq may be taken."The UN Charter prohibits any war unless it is out of self-defense or when it is sanctioned by the UN security council.If these requirements are not met international law describes it a war of aggression.

The position of the US and UK is that the invasion was authorized by a series of UN resolutions dating back to 1990. Resolution 1441 declared that Iraq was in "material breach" of the cease-fire under UN Resolution 687(1991), which required cooperation with weapons inspectors. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatiesstates that under certain conditions, a party may invoke a "material breach" to suspend a multilateral treaty. Thus, the US and UK claim that they used their right to suspend the cease-fire in Resolution 687 and to continue hostilities against Iraq under the authority of UN Resolution 678 (1990), which originally authorized the use of force after Iraq invaded Kuwait. ASIL: Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq's Final Opportunity to Comply with Disarmament ObligationsNovember, 2002. Retrieved 9/5/2007. "The language of 'material breach' in Resolution 1441 is keyed to Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is the authoritative statement of international law regarding material breaches of treaties. Under Article 60 of the Vienna Convention, a material breach is an unjustified repudiation of a treaty or the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of a treaty. Article 60 provides that a party specially affected by a material breach of a multilateral treaty may invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting state. <...> Security Council Resolution 687, adopted at the end of the Gulf War, includes a provision declaring a formal cease-fire between Iraq, Kuwait and the member states (such as the United States) cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with Resolution 678 (1990). Resolution 678 authorized member states to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the area, and thus provided the basis under international law for the allies' military action in the Gulf War. The determination in Resolution 1441 that Iraq is already in material breach of its obligations under Resolution 687 provides a basis for the decision in paragraph 4 (above) of Resolution 1441 that any further lack of cooperation by Iraq will be a further material breach. If Iraq, having confirmed its intention to comply with Resolution 1441, then fails to cooperate fully with the inspectors, it would open the way to an argument by any specially affected state that it could suspend the operation of the cease-fire provision in Resolution 687 and rely again on Resolution 678."This is the same argument that was used for Operation Desert Foxin 1998.They also contend that, while Resolution 1441 required the UNSCto assemble and assess reports from the weapons inspectors, it was not necessary for the UNSC to reach an agreement on the course of action.If, at that time, it was determined that Iraq breached Resolution 1441, the resolution did not "constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq".

It remains unclear whether any party other than the Security Council can make the determination that Iraq breached Resolution 1441, as UN members commented that it is not up to one member state to interpret and enforce UN resolutions for the entire council. In addition, other nations have stated that a second resolution was required to initiate hostilities. ASIL: Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq's Final Opportunity to Comply with Disarmament ObligationsNovember, 2002. Retrieved 9/5/2007. "[T]he representative of Mexico (a current member of the Security Council) said after the vote on Resolution 1441 that the use of force is only valid as a last resort and with prior, explicit authorization from the Council. Mexico does not stand alone in taking that position. <...> It would be argued that, in light of the emphasis in the Charter on peaceful dispute settlement, Resolution 678 could not be used as an authorization for the use of force after twelve years of cease fire, unless the Security Council says so."John Conyers, Robert Parryand Marjorie Cohnassert that the Iraq war was a violation of the U.N.Charterand as such a war of aggression (a crime against peace) and therefore a war crime.Kofi Annantoo has said the war in Iraq is an "illegal act that contravened the UN charter."Some scholars, including Columbia law professor Michael Dorf, have argued that treaties are binding on the U.S. under international law.

U.S. law

In early 2003, the Iraq Resolution was challenged in court to stop the invasion from happening. The plaintiffs argued that the President does not have the authority to declare war. The final decision came from a three-judge panel from the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit which dismissed the case. Judge Lynchwrote in the opinion that the Judiciary cannot intervene unless there is a fully-developed conflict between the President and Congress or if Congress gave the President "absolute discretion" to declare war.

See also



References

  1. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (pdf)
  2. Legislation related to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Congressional Record, Library of Congress.
  3. Major Congressional Actions of H.J.Res. 114, Congressional Record, Library of Congress
  4. 107th Congress-2nd Session 455th Roll Call Vote of by members of the House of Representatives
  5. 107th Congress-2nd Session 237th Roll Call Vote by members of the Senate
  6. H.AMDT.608 - Amendment in the nature of a substitute of H.J.RES.114, 107th Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
  7. On Agreeing to the Lee of California Substitute Amendment, 107th Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Clerk of the House, 2002-10-10
  8. H.AMDT.609 - Amendment in the nature of a substitute of H.J.RES.114, 107th Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
  9. On Agreeing to the Spratt of South Carolina Substitute Amendment, 107th Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Clerk of the House, 2002-10-10
  10. H.RES.574 - Providing for the consideration of the joint resolution (H.J.RES.114), 107th Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Library of Congress, 2002-10-08
  11. H.AMDT.610 - Amendment considered as adopted pursuant to the provisions of H.Res.574, 107th Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
  12. On Agreeing to Resolve H.RES.574, 107th Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Library of Congress, 2002-10-08
  13. S.AMDT.4868 - Providing for Statuary Construction in the Consideration of the Joint Resolution (S.J.RES.45), 107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
  14. On Agreeing to the Amendment (Byrd Amdt. No. 4868), 107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
  15. S.AMDT.4869 - Providing for Congresional Construction in the Consideration of the Joint Resolution (S.J.RES.45), 107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
  16. On Agreeing to the Amendment (Byrd Amdt. No. 4869), 107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
  17. S.AMDT.4862 - Providing for Congressional Construction in the Consideration of the Joint Resolution (S.J.RES.45), 107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
  18. On Agreeing to the Amendment (Levin Amdt. No. 4862), 107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
  19. S.AMDT.4865 - Providing for Congressional Amendment in the Consideration of the Joint Resolution (S.J.RES.45), 107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
  20. On Agreeing to the Amendment (Byrd Amdt. No. 4865), 107th Congress, U.S. Senate, Library of Congress, 2002-10-10
  21. No weapons of mass destruction * Iraq's WMD Plans Were Preliminary CBS News, January 7, 2004 * Kay: No evidence Iraq stockpiled WMDs CNN, January 26, 2004 * A Spy Speaks Out - Former Top CIA Official On "Faulty" Intelligence Claims CBS, 60 minutes, April 23, 2006 * Drumheller: 'Caught up in the march to war' - Two CIA operatives raise questions about use of pre-war intelligence Hardball, May 3, 2006 * WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications By Joseph Cirincione, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, George Perkovich, with Alexis Orton, Carnegie Endowment Report, January 2004 * In Their Own Words: Iraq's 'Imminent' Threat Center for American Progress, January 29, 2004 * Reports of Bush's Contrition Have Been Greatly Exaggerated Robert Schlesinger, Huffington Post, December 14, 2005
  22. No relation between Saddan Jussein and al-Qaeda * Hussein's Prewar Ties To Al-Qaeda Discounted - Pentagon Report Says Contacts Were Limited By R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, April 6, 2007 * Levin Releases Newly Declassified Intelligence Documents on Iraq-al Qaeda Relationship Documents show Administration claims were exaggerated, by Carl Levin, April 15, 2005 * Another Iraq story gets debunked By Dave Zweifel, The Capital Times * Report: No Proof Of Qaeda-Saddam Link - Senate Committee Finds Hussein Had No Relationship With Zarqawi CBS, September 8, 2006 * Report Warned Bush Team About Intelligence Suspicions By DOUGLAS JEHL, New York Times, November 6, 2005 * Bush Flatly Declares No Connection Between Saddam and al Qaeda The Memory Hole * Bush Speech Reveals Administration’s Ongoing Deceptions on Iraq By Stephen Zunes,Institute for Policy Studies, June 29, 2005
  23. Link with Al Qaeda * Levin Releases Newly Declassified Intelligence Documents on Iraq-al Qaeda Relationship Documents show Administration claims were exaggerated, by Carl Levin, April 15, 2005 * Another Iraq story gets debunked By Dave Zweifel, The Capital Times * Bush Flatly Declares No Connection Between Saddam and al Qaeda The Memory Hole
  24. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD: Volume 1; Regime Strategic Intent Page 1. "Key Findings". Retrieved 8/31/2007. "He sought to balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections—to gain support for lifting sanctions—with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face." "Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities."
  25. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD: Volume 1; Regime Strategic Intent Page 34. "WMD Possession—Real or Imagined—Acts as a Deterrent". Retrieved 8/31/2007. "In order to counter these threats, Saddam continued with his public posture of retaining the WMD capability. This led to a difficult balancing act between the need to disarm to achieve sanctions relief while at the same time retaining a strategic deterrent. The Regime never resolved the contradiction inherent in this approach. Ultimately, foreign perceptions of these tensions contributed to the destruction of the Regime."
  26. Hussein's Prewar Ties To Al-Qaeda Discounted - Pentagon Report Says Contacts Were Limited By R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, April 6, 2007
  27. Key Bush Intelligence Briefing Kept From Hill Panel By Murray Waas, National Journal, November 22, 2005
  28. Linking Iraq and September 11 * The impact of Bush linking 9/11 and Iraq American attitudes about a connection have changed, firming up the case for war By Linda Feldmann, The Christian Science Monitor, March 14, 2003 * USA Today uncritically reported Bush's denial that he linked Iraq with 9-11 attacks Media Matters for America, March 22, 2006 * Bush administration on Iraq 9/11 link BBC News, September 18, 2003 * News Release - Interviews Available: Bush vs. Facts by the Institute for Public Accuracy, October 29, 2003 * Bush Distorts Qaeda Links, Critics Assert by Michael R. Gordon and Jim Rutenberg, Media Matters for America, July 13, 2007 * A Disconnect on the Al Qaeda LinkBy Dan Froomkin, Washington Post, June 17, 2004 * President Again Seeks to Link Qaeda of Iraq to Qaeda of 9/11 By JIM RUTENBERG AND MARK MAZZETTI; RICHARD A. OPPEL JR. CONTRIBUTED REPORTING FROM BAGHDAD, The New York Times, July 25, 2007
  29. Blowing Cheney's Cover Ray McGovern, April 10, 2006
  30. The Intelligence Business editorial, The New York Times, May 7, 2006
  31. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: Overview Page 14. 3/31/2005. Retrieved 9/1/2007. "As problematic as the October 2002 NIE was, it was not the Community’s biggest analytic failure on Iraq. Even more misleading was the river of intelligence that flowed from the CIA to top policymakers over long periods of time—in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and in its more widely distributed companion, the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB). These daily reports were, if anything, more alarmist and less nuanced than the NIE."
  32. Few senators read Iraq NIE report The Hill Published 6/19/2007. Retrieved 9/1/2007. "'It’s probably pretty hard to say with 100 percent certainty how many read it,' the senior staffer said. 'You can say with 100 percent certainty that it’s less than 10.'"
  33. Decoding Mr. Bush's Denials The New York Times Editorial, November 15, 2005
  34. Lacking Biolabs, Trailers Carried Case for War By Joby Warrick, The Washington Post, April 12, 2006
  35. Weapons inspectors * Timeline: the road to war in Iraq by Oliver King and Paul Hamilos, Guardian Unlimited, February 2, 2006 * We all now know the war would not stand up in court - The cabinet must never again take a major decision without crucial advice by Robin Cook, The Guardian, April 29, 2005
  36. Selectively disseminating information * Why 'leaker in chief' charge harms the president By Linda Feldmann, The Christian Science Monitor, April 10, 2006
  37. Misrepresenting the facts surrounding Iraq * The Impeachment of George W. Bush, by Elizabeth Holtzman, The Nation, January 11, 2006 * A Firm Basis for Impeachment By Robert Scheer, AlterNet, July 18, 2003 * The Case for Impeachment By John Dean, FindLaw.com, June 11, 2003 * In Their Own Words: Iraq's 'Imminent' Threat Center for American Progress, January 29, 2004] * Millions Protest Possible War with Iraq February 19, 2003
  38. Downing Street memo * Another Iraq Memo Revealed: Colin Powell Opposed War Without Second U.N. Resolution Posted by Think Progress March 28, 2006 * The secret Downing Street memo SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY DAVID MANNING, The Times, July 23, 2002
  39. FOIA request * Just hearsay, or the new Watergate tapes? By David Paul, Salon, June 6, 2005 * 52 House members file FOIA request seeking documents related to Downing Street minutes Raw Story, June 30, 2005
  40. Iraq impeachable offense? * Is lying about the reason for a war an impeachable offense? by John W. Dean, CNN * George W. Bush: Legal Arguments for Impeachment by Marcus Raskin and Joseph A. Vuckovich, Institute for Policy Studies
  41. World Press: "The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq" Retrieved 9/5/2007. "[On Dec. 16, 1998], U.S. and British warplanes launched air strikes against Iraq after learning that Iraq was continuing to impede the work of UNSCOM, the weapons inspectors sent to Iraq at the close of the Gulf War, and thus was not in compliance with Resolution 687. When the Security Council met that night to discuss whether individual member states could resort to force without renewed Security Council consent, it was clear that the Security Council members did not all agree on the legality of the U.S. and British resort to force. According to the press release from that meeting, the U.S. representative claimed his country's actions were authorized by previous council resolutions (as many in the Bush administration are arguing again today). The British delegate similarly argued that because Iraq had not complied with the terms of Resolution 687, military force was justified."
  42. World Press: "The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq" Retrieved 9/5/2007. "At that time, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Negroponte said: 'This resolution contains no 'hidden triggers' and no 'automaticity' with respect to the use of force. If there is a further Iraqi breach, reported to the council by UNMOVIC, the IAEA, or a Member State, the matter will return to the council for discussion….[But] if the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violations, this resolution does not constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to enforce the relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security.' The British ambassador, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, agreed."
  43. US not allowed to speak for the entire council * The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq Rachel S. Taylor, World Press Review * UN RESOLUTION 1441: COMPELLING SADDAM, RESTRAINING BUSH Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell, Moritz School of Law, Ohio State University, JURIST, November 21, 2002 * Iraq war illegal, says Annan BBC News, September 16, 2004
  44. War of aggression * War Crimes: Goose and Gander By Marjorie Cohn, Truthout, March 13, 2006 * Could Bush Be Prosecuted for War Crimes? By Jan Frel July 10, 2006
  45. Iraq war illegal, says Annan BBC News, September 16, 2004
  46. WHEN AMERICAN STATES EXECUTE CITIZENS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES: The Case of Gerardo Valdez By MICHAEL C. DORF, FindLaw, July 24, 2001
  47. Doe v. Bush Opinion by Judge Lynch 3/13/2003 Pages 3,4,23,25,26. Retrieved 8/7/2007.


External links

* Statement by President George W. Bush on his signing the resolution into law
* October 16, 2002 Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer


  • Floor speeches
* Floor Speech of Sen Hillary Clinton (clinton.senate.gov)
* Floor Speech of Sen Russ Feingold (feingold.senate.gov)
* Floor Speech of Sen Jay Rockefeller (rockefeller.senate.gov)
* Floor Speech of Rep Ron Paul (www.house.gov/paul)
* Floor Speech of Rep Pete Stark
* Floor Speech of Rep Dennis Kucinich
* Congressional Records related to the Congress' consent to the Authorization of the Use of Military Force in Iraq


Party
Ayes
Nays
No Vote
Republican
48
1
0
Democratic
29
21
0
Independent
0
1
0
TOTALS
77
23
0

Embed code:
Advertisements






Got something to say? Make a comment.
Your name
Your email address
Message