Joseph Eugene Stiglitz (born
February 9, 1943) is an American economist and a professor at Columbia University.
He is a
recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize
in Economic Sciences
) and the
John Bates Clark Medal
). He is also the former Senior Vice
President and Chief
of the World Bank
known for his critical view of the management of globalization, free-market economists (whom he
calls "free market
fundamentalists") and some international institutions like the
Monetary Fund and the World
In 2000, Stiglitz founded the Initiative for Policy
(IPD), a think tank
international development based at Columbia University. Since 2001,
he has been a member of the Columbia faculty, and has held the rank
since 2003. He also chairs the University of
World Poverty Institute and is a member of the Pontifical
Academy of Social Sciences.
"Stiglitz's work is cited by more
economists than anyone else's in the world."
was born in Gary, Indiana, to Jewish parents, Charlotte and Nathaniel
Stiglitz. From 1960 to 1963, he studied at Amherst College, where he was a highly active member of the debate
team and President of the Student Government. He went to the
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) for his fourth year as an undergraduate,
where he later pursued graduate work.
degree was awarded from Amherst College. From 1965 to 1966, he
moved to the University of Chicago to do research under Hirofumi Uzawa who had received an NSF grant.
He studied for his PhD from MIT from
1966 to 1967, during which time he also held an MIT assistant
professorship. The particular style of MIT economics suited him
well - simple and concrete models, directed at answering important
and relevant questions. From 1969 to 1970, he was a Fulbright research fellow at the University of
Cambridge. In subsequent years, he held professorships
University and Princeton University.
Stiglitz is now a Professor at Columbia University
, with appointments
at the Business School
Department of Economics
and the School of
International and Public Affairs
(SIPA), and is editor of
The Economists' Voice
journal with J. Bradford DeLong
and Aaron Edlin
. He also gives classes for a double-degree
program between Sciences
Po Paris and Ecole Polytechnique in 'Economics and Public Policy'.
As of 2005
he chairs The Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of
Manchester. Stiglitz is generally considered to be a New-Keynesian
In addition to making numerous influential contributions to
, Stiglitz has played a
number of policy roles. He served in the Clinton Administration
as the chair of the
President's Council of
). At the World Bank,
he served as Senior Vice President and Chief Economist (1997 – 2000), in the time when
unprecedented protest against international economic organizations
started, most prominently with the Seattle WTO meeting
He was fired by the World Bank for expressing
dissent with its policies. He was a lead author for the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change
He is a member of Collegium
, an organization of leaders with political,
scientific, and ethical expertise whose goal is to provide new
approaches in overcoming the obstacles in the way of a peaceful,
socially just and an economically sustainable world.
Stiglitz has advised American President Barack Obama
, but has also been sharply
critical of the Obama
's financial-industry rescue plan. Stiglitz said
that whoever designed the Obama administration's bank rescue plan
is “either in the pocket of the banks or they’re
Contributions to economics
Stiglitz's most famous research was on screening
, a technique used by one
economic agent to extract otherwise private information from
another. It was for this contribution to the theory of information asymmetry
that he shared
the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2001 "for laying the
foundations for the theory of
markets with asymmetric information
" with George A. Akerlof
and A. Michael
literature assumes that markets are always efficient
except for some limited and well defined market failures
. More recent studies by
Stiglitz and others reverse that presumption: It is only under
exceptional circumstances that markets are efficient. Stiglitz has
shown (together with Bruce
) that "whenever markets are incomplete and /or
information is imperfect (which are true in virtually all
economies), even competitive market allocation is not constrained
". In other words,
there almost always exists schemes of government intervention which
can induce Pareto superior
, thus making everyone better off. Although these
conclusions and the pervasiveness of market failures do not
necessarily warrant the state intervening broadly in the economy,
it makes clear that the "optimal" range of government recommendable
interventions is definitely much larger than the traditional
"market failure" school recognizes For Stiglitz there is no such
thing as an "invisible
- :Whenever there are “externalities”—where the actions of an
individual have impacts on others for which they do not pay or for
which they are not compensated—markets will not work well. But
recent research has shown that these externalities are pervasive,
whenever there is imperfect information or imperfect risk
markets—that is always.
- :The real debate today is about finding the right balance
between the market and government. Both are needed. They can each
complement each other. This balance will differ from time to time
and place to place.
In the opening remarks for his prize acceptance "Aula Magna",
STIGLITZ, Joseph E. Prize Lecture:
Information and the Change in the Paradigm in
Economics. Joseph E. Stiglitz held his Prize
Lecture December 8, 2001, at Aula Magna, Stockholm
University. He was presented by Lars E.O. Svensson, Chairman of the
- :"I hope to show that Information Economics represents a
fundamental change in the prevailing paradigm within economics.
Problems of information are central to understanding not only
market economics but also political economy, and in the last
section of this lecture, I explore some of the implications of
information imperfections for political processes."
Stiglitz, Aula Magna
In an interview, Stiglitz explained further:
- :"The theories that I (and others) helped develop explained why
unfettered markets often not only do not lead to social justice,
but do not even produce efficient outcomes. Interestingly, there
has been no intellectual challenge to the refutation of Adam
Smith’s invisible hand: individuals
and firms, in the pursuit of their self-interest, are not
necessarily, or in general, led as if by an invisible hand, to economic efficiency".
Efficiency wages: the Shapiro-Stiglitz model
Stiglitz also did some research on efficiency wages
, and helped create what
became know as the "Shapiro-Stiglitz model"
to explain why
there is unemployment
, why wages are
not bid down sufficiently by job seekers (in the absence of minimum
wages) so that everyone who wants a job finds one, and to question
whether the neoclassical
could explain involuntary unemployment. The answer to
these puzzles was proposed by Shapiro
and Stiglitz in 1984: "Unemployment is driven by the information
structure of employment". Two basic observations undergird their
- Unlike other forms of capital, humans can choose their level of
- It is costly for firms to determine how much effort workers are
A full description of this model can be found at the links provided
. Some key implications of this model
- Wages do not fall enough during recessions to prevent
unemployment from rising. If the demand for labour falls, this
lowers wages. But because wages have fallen, the probability of
'shirking' (workers not exerting effort) has risen. If employment
levels are to be maintained, through a sufficient lowering of
wages, workers will be less productive than before through the
shirking effect. As a consequence, in the model wages do not fall
enough to maintain employment levels at the previous state, because
firms want to avoid excessive shirking by their workers. So,
unemployment must rise during recessions, because wages are kept
- Possible corollary: Wage sluggishness. Moving from one private
cost of hiring to another private cost of hiring will require each
firm to repeatedly re-optimize wages in response to shifting
unemployment rate. Firms cannot cut wages until unemployment rises
sufficiently (a coordination problem).
The outcome is never Pareto efficient.
- Each firm employs too few workers because it faces private cost
of hiring rather than the social cost — which is equal to and [ w∗
> e' ] in all cases.
- There are also negative externalities. Each firm increases the
asset value of unemployment for all other firms by hiring. But the
first problem clearly dominates since the 'natural rate of
unemployment' is always too high.
Some possible practical implications of Stiglitz theorems
While the mathematical validity of Stiglitz et al.
theorems are not in question, their practical implications in
application in real life economic
have been subject to considerable debates and
disagreements. Stiglitz himself seems to be continuously adapting
his own political-economic discourse, as we can see from the
evolution in his positions as initially stated in Whither
(1994) to his own new positions held on his most
- :Once incomplete and imperfect information are introduced,
of the market system cannot sustain descriptive claims of the
Pareto efficiency of the real
world. Thus, Stiglitz's use of rational-expectations equilibrium
assumptions to achieve a more realistic understanding of capitalism
than is usual among rational-expectations theorists leads,
paradoxically, to the conclusion that capitalism deviates from the
model in a way that justifies state action—socialism—as a remedy.
- :The effect of Stiglitz's influence is to make economics even
more presumptively interventionist than Samuelson preferred. Samuelson treated market
failure as the exception to the general rule of efficient markets.
But the Greenwald-Stiglitz theorem posits market failure as the
norm, establishing "that government could potentially almost always
improve upon the market's resource allocation." And the
Sappington-Stiglitz theorem "establishes that an ideal government
could do better running an enterprise itself than it could through
privatization" (Stiglitz 1994, 179).
The objections to the wide adoption of these positions suggested by
Stiglitz's discoveries do not come from economics
itself but mostly from political
scientists and are in the fields of sociology
. As David L. Prychitko discusses in his
"critique" to Whither Socialism?
(see below), although
Stiglitz's main economic insight seems generally correct, it still
leaves open great constitutional questions such as how the coercive
institutions of the government should be constrained and what the
relation is between the government and civil society. PRYCHITKO, David L. Book Reviews, Whither
Socialism?, The Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 16, no. 2.
David L. Prychitko is the Head of the
Department of Economics (Northern Michigan University), a Faculty
Affiliate in the Program on Markets and Institutions at the James
M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy (George Mason University)
and the author of over a dozen socio-economic books mainly on
Marxism and socialism
Clinton administration, 1993 - 1997
Stiglitz joined the Clinton
in 1993, serving first as a member during
1993-1995, and then as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
during 1995-1997, in which capacity he also served as a member of
the cabinet. He became deeply involved in environmental issues,
which included serving on the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change
, and helping draft a new law for toxic
wastes (which was never passed).
Stiglitz's most important contribution in this period was helping
define a new economic philosophy, a "third way", which recognized
the important, but limited, role of government, that unfettered
markets often did not work well, but that government was not always
able to correct the limitations of markets. The academic research
that he had been conducting over the preceding 25 years provided
the intellectual foundations for this "third way".
When President Bill Clinton
re-elected, he asked Stiglitz to continue to serve as Chairman of
the Council of Economic
for another term. But he had already been approached
by the World Bank
, to be its senior vice
president for development policy and its chief economist.
World Bank began its ten-year review of the transition of the
former Communist countries to the market economy it unveiled failures of the
countries that had followed the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) shock therapy policies - both in terms of the
declines in GDP and increases in poverty - that were even worse than the worst that
most of its critics had envisioned at the onset of the
Clear links existed between the dismal
performances and the policies that the IMF had advocated, such as
the voucher privatization schemes and excessive monetary
stringency. Meanwhile, the success of a few countries that had
followed quite different strategies suggested that there were
alternatives that could have been followed. The U.S. Treasury had put enormous pressure on the World Bank to silence his criticisms of the
policies which they and the IMF had pushed.
Stiglitz always had a poor relationship with Treasury Secretary
. In 2000, Summers
successfully petitioned for Stiglitz's removal, supposedly in
exchange for World Bank President James
's re-appointment – an exchange that Wolfensohn
denies took place. Whether Summers ever made such a blunt demand is
questionable – Wolfensohn claims he would "have told him to fuck
Stiglitz resigned from the World Bank in January 2000, a month
before his term expired. The Bank's
, James Wolfensohn, announced Stiglitz's resignation
in November 1999 and also announced that Stiglitz would stay on as
"special advisor to the president"
, and would chair the
search committee for a successor.
- "Joseph E. Stiglitz said today [Nov. 24, 1999] that he would
resign as the World Bank's chief economist after using the position
for nearly three years to raise pointed questions about the
effectiveness of conventional approaches to helping poor
In this role, he continued criticism of the IMF, and, by
implication, the US Treasury Department. In April 2000, in an
article for The New
, he wrote:
- "They’ll say the IMF is arrogant. They’ll say the
IMF doesn’t really listen to the developing countries it is
supposed to help. They’ll say the IMF is secretive and
insulated from democratic accountability. They’ll say the
IMF’s economic ‘remedies’ often make things worse – turning
slowdowns into recessions and recessions into depressions.
And they’ll have a point. I was chief economist at the
World Bank from 1996 until last November, during the gravest global
economic crisis in a half-century. I saw how the IMF, in
tandem with the U.S. Treasury Department, responded.
And I was appalled."
The article was published a week before the annual meetings of the
World Bank and IMF and provoked a strong response. It proved too
strong for Summers and, yet more lethally, Stiglitz's
protector-of-sorts at the World Bank, Wolfensohn. Wolfensohn had
privately empathised with Stiglitz's views, but this time was
worried for his second term, which Summers had threatened to veto.
Stanley Fisher, deputy managing director of the IMF, called a
special staff meeting and informed at that gathering that
Wolfensohn had agreed to fire Stiglitz. Meanwhile, the Bank's
External Affairs department told the press that Stiglitz had not
been fired, his post had merely been abolished.
September 19, 2008 radio interview with Aimee Allison and Philip Maldari on Pacifica Radio's KPFA
94.1 FM in Berkeley,
California, Stiglitz implied that President Clinton and his
economic advisors would not have backed the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) had they been aware of stealth provisions,
inserted by lobbyists, that they overlooked.
Initiative for Policy Dialogue
In July 2000 Stiglitz founded the Initiative for Policy
), with support of the Ford,
Rockefeller, McArthur, and Mott Foundations and the Canadian and
Swedish governments, to enhance democratic processes for
decision-making in developing countries and to ensure that a
broader range of alternatives are on the table and more
stakeholders are at the table.
Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International Monetary
and Financial System
Stiglitz chaired the
Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International Monetary and
Financial System, informally known as the Stiglitz Commission,
which was convened by the President of
the United Nations General Assembly "to review the workings of
the global financial system,
including major bodies such as the World
Bank and the IMF, and to suggest steps to be taken by Member States
to secure a more sustainable and
just global economic
Along with his technical economic publications (he has published
over 300 technical articles), Stiglitz is the author of books on
issues from patent law to abuses in international trade.
Stability with Growth: Macroeconomics, Liberalization and
In Stability with Growth: Macroeconomics, Liberalization and
(2006), Stiglitz, José Antoni Ocampo (United
Nations Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs),
Shari Spiegel (Managing Director, Initiative for Policy Dialogue -
IPD), Ricardo Ffrench-Davis (Main Adviser, Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean - ECLAC) and Deepak Nayyar (Vice
Chancellor, University of Delhi) discuss the current debates on
macroeconomics, capital market liberalization and development, and
develop a new framework within which one can assess alternative
policies. They explain their belief that the Washington Consensus
narrow goals for development (with a focus on price stability) and
prescribed too few policy instruments (emphasizing monetary and
fiscal policies), and places unwarranted faith in the role of
markets. The new framework focuses on real stability and long-term
sustainable and equitable growth, offers a variety of non-standard
ways to stabilize the economy and promote growth, and accepts that
market imperfections necessitate government interventions.
Policy-makers have pursued stabilization goals with little concern
for growth consequences, while trying to increase growth through
structural reforms focused on improving economic efficiency.
Moreover, structural policies, such as capital market
liberalization, have had major consequences for economic stability.
This book challenges these policies by arguing that stabilization
policy has important consequences for long-term growth and has
often been implemented with adverse consequences. The first part of
the book introduces the key questions and looks at the objectives
of economic policy from different perspectives.The third part
presents a similar analysis for capital market
Making Globalization Work
(2006) surveys the inequities of the global economy,
and the mechanisms by which developed countries exert an excessive
influence over developing nations. Dr. Stiglitz argues that through
tariffs, subsidies, an overly-complex patent system and pollution,
the world is being both economically and politically destabilised.
Stiglitz argues that strong, transparent institutions are needed to
address these problems. He shows how an examination of incomplete
markets can make corrective government policies desirable.
Stiglitz argues that economic opportunities are not widely enough
available, that financial crises are too costly and too frequent,
and that the rich countries have done too little to address these
problems. Making Globalization Work
had sold more than two
The Roaring Nineties
In 2003, Stiglitz published The Roaring Nineties
analysis of the boom and bust of the 1990s. In 2004 he published
New Paradigm for Monetary Economics
Press) and in 2005, Oxford University Press published his book
Fair Trade for All
Globalization and Its Discontents
and Its Discontents
(2002), Stiglitz argues that what are
often called "developing economies" are, in fact, not developing at
all, and puts much of the blame on the IMF.
Stiglitz bases his argument on the themes that his decades of
theoretical work have emphasized: namely, what happens when people
lack the key information that bears on the decisions they have to
make, or when markets for important kinds of transactions are
inadequate or don't exist, or when other institutions that standard
economic thinking takes for granted are absent or flawed. Stiglitz
stresses the point: "Recent advances in economic theory" (in part
referring to his own work) "have shown that whenever information is
imperfect and markets incomplete, which is to say always, and
especially in developing countries, then the invisible hand works
most imperfectly." As a result, Stiglitz continues, governments can
improve the outcome by well-chosen interventions. Stiglitz argues
that when families and firms seek to buy too little compared to
what the economy can produce, governments can fight recessions and
depressions by using expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to
spur the demand for goods and services. At the microeconomic level,
governments can regulate banks and other financial institutions to
keep them sound. They can also use tax policy to steer investment
into more productive industries and trade policies to allow new
industries to mature to the point at which they can survive foreign
competition. And governments can use a variety of devices, ranging
from job creation to manpower training to welfare assistance, to
put unemployed labor back to work and cushion human hardship.
Stiglitz complains bitterly that the IMF has done great damage
through the economic policies it has prescribed that countries must
follow in order to qualify for IMF loans, or for loans from banks
and other private-sector lenders that look to the IMF to indicate
whether a borrower is creditworthy. The organization and its
officials, he argues, have ignored the implications of incomplete
information, inadequate markets, and unworkable institutions—all of
which are especially characteristic of newly developing countries.
As a result, Stiglitz argues, the IMF has often called for policies
that conform to textbook economics but do not make sense for the
countries to which the IMF is recommending them. Stiglitz seeks to
show that these policies have been disastrous for the countries
that have followed them.
Socialism? is based on Stiglitz's Wicksell Lectures,
presented at the Stockholm School of Economics in 1990 and presents a summary of information economics and the theory
of markets with imperfect information and imperfect competition, as
well as being a critique of both free market and market socialist
approaches (see Roemer critique, op. cit.).
explains how the neoclassical
, or Walrasian model
refers to the result of the process which has given
birth to a formal representation of Adam
's notion of the "invisible hand", along the lines put
forward by Leon Walras
in the general equilibrium model of Arrow-Debreu
), may have wrongly
encouraged the belief that market
could work. Stiglitz proposes an alternative model,
based on the information
established by the Greenwald-Stiglitz theorems.
One of the reasons Stiglitz sees for the critical failing in the
standard neoclassical model
on which market socialism
built, is its failure to consider the problems that arise from lack
of perfect information and from the costs of acquiring information.
He also identifies problems arising from its assumptions concerning
Whither Socialism? has been subject
to various critiques such as those of the Yale professor
Roemer, Peter Boettke, the Deputy Director of the
for Political Economy
(1996), as well as David L. Prychitko, a
professor of economics at Northern Michigan University.
According to Prychitko:
"Stiglitz's main insight is generally correct– that the
state cannot be ruled out or that it should be ruled in– but leaves
open the grand constitutional questions: How will the coercive
institutions of the state be constrained?
What is the relation between the state and civil
His book fails on these political aspects because it
has not addressed the broader constitutional concerns that James McGill Buchanan Jr. (1975) and other
economists have raised."
Papers and conferences
Stiglitz wrote a series of papers and held a series of conferences
explaining how such information uncertainties may have influence on
everything from unemployment to lending shortages. As the chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton
Administration and former chief economist at the World Bank
, Stiglitz was able to put some of his
views into action. For example, he was an outspoken critic of
quickly opening up financial markets in developing countries. These
markets rely on access to good financial data and sound bankruptcy
laws, but he argued that many of these countries didn't have the
regulatory institutions needed to ensure that the markets would
Stiglitz married for the third time on October 28, 2004, to
, who works at the
School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia
- 2006, Stability with Growth: Macroeconomics,
Liberalization, and Development ISBN 0-19-928814-3 (Initiative
for Policy Dialogue Series C); by Joseph E. Stiglitz, Jose Antonio
Ocampo, Shari Spiegel, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, and Deepak Nayyar;
Oxford University Press 2006
- 2000, Frontiers of Development Economics: The Future in
Perspective, edited with Gerald M. Meier, World Bank, May
- 2001, Rethinking the East Asian Miracle, edited with
Shahid Yusuf, World Bank and Oxford University Press.
- 2002, Principles of Macroeconomics, third edition,
with Carl E. Walsh, W.W. Norton & Company, March
- 2002, Economics, Third Edition, with Carl E. Walsh,
W.W. Norton & Company, April 2002.
- 2002, Peasants Versus City-Dwellers: Taxation and the
Burden of Economic Development, with Raaj K. Sah, Oxford
University Press, April 2002.
- Towards a New Paradigm in Monetary Economics, with
Bruce Greenwald, Cambridge University Press.
- 2003, The Roaring Nineties, W.W. Norton & Company,
forthcoming in October 2003.
- Fair Trade for All: How Trade Can Promote Development
(Initiative for Policy Dialogue Series C)– by Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Andrew Charlton; Hardcover
- Economics of the Public Sector. by Joseph E.
- 2002, The Rebel Within: Joseph Stiglitz and the World
Bank by Joseph E. Stiglitz (Editor), Ha-Joon Chang (Editor),
ISBN 1-898855-91-9, Anthem Press, Wimbledon Publishing Company
(Paperback - February 25, 2002)
- 2005, The Development Round Of Trade Negotiations In The
Aftermath Of Cancun by Joseph E. Stiglitz, Andrew Charlton
(Paperback - January 30, 2005)
- 2005, A Chance For The World Bank by Joseph P Stiglitz
(Foreword), Jozef Ritzen, ISBN 1-84331-162-3, Anthem Press,
Wimbledon Publishing Company (Paperback - May 30, 2005)
- 1986, 'Economics of the Public Sector' by J.E.Stiglitz ISBN
0-393-96651-8, W.W.Norton, New York. (Re-printed 1988, 2000)
- 1981, 'Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization' by David M.G.
Newbery and Joseph E. Stiglitz ISBN 0198284179 ISBN 978-0198284178,
Oxford University Press [Hardcover: 512 pages]
- Readings in the Modern Theory of Economic Growth by
Joseph E. Stiglitz (Editor), Hirofumi Uzawa (Editor)
- Articles, conferences, papers, videos:
- 2009, "Wall Street’s Toxic Message", Vanity Fair,
- 2009, "America's socialism for the rich", The
Guardian, June 2009
- 2009, "Regulation and Failure", in David Moss and
John Cisternino (eds.), New Perspectives on Regulation. Cambridge:
The Tobin Project
- 2009, "Capitalist Fools", Vanity Fair, January 2009
- 2008, The Three Trillion Dollar War a panel
discussion with Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes regarding their
new book, `The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the
Iraq Conflict.` Feb 28, 2008 at Columbia University.
- 2007, "The Economic Consequences of Mr. Bush", Vanity Fair,
December 2007 Issue
- 2007, Where
is the World Going To, Mr. Stiglitz? directed by Jacques
Sarasin, First Run Features.
- 2002, "Implications of the New Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Risk-based Capital Standard", for FannieMae Volume I, Issue 2 March
- 2001, New Ideas About Old Age Security: Toward Sustainable
Pension Systems in the 21st Century , edited with Robert Holzmann,
World Bank, January 2001.
- 1998, Redefining the Role of the State - What should
it do ? How should it do it ? And how should these decisions be
made? Paper presented at the Tenth Anniversary of MITI
Research Institute, Tokyo, March 1998.
- 1996, The World Bank Research Observer: No 2: August 1996 by
- 1993, “Post Walrasian and post Marxian economics,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives, vol. 7, pp. 109–14
- 1993, “Market socialism and neoclassical economics,” in
Bardhan, P. K. and Roemer, J. E. (eds.), Market Socialism. The
Current Debate, New York: Oxford University Press
- 1989, “Principal and agent,” in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P.
Newman (eds.), The New Palgrave. Allocation, Information and
Markets. New York: W. W. Norton
- 1987, “The causes and consequences of the dependence of quality
on prices”, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 25,
- 1981, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,
The American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No.3 (June
1981),pp. 393–410, by Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss
- 1974, Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping, The Review
of Economic Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, 219-255.
- World Bank Video presentation
- Online access to Stiglitz published papers, at his own
- "I Dissent: Uncommon Economic Wisdom", A monthly
column for Project Syndicate.
- Joseph Stiglitz's homepage
- Chair Profile, Committee on Global Thought at Columbia
- STIGLITZ, Joseph E. Prize Lecture: Information and the
Change in the Paradigm in Economics. Joseph E. Stiglitz held his Prize Lecture December 8,
2001, at Aula Magna, Stockholm University.
He was presented by Lars E.O.
Svensson, Chairman of the Prize
- Joseph Stiglitz– A Dangerous Man, A World Bank
Insider Who Defected., HAGE, Dave, Minneapolis Star-Tribune,
October 11, 2000
- Audio of Stglitz's lecture in The Hindu Public
Lecture Series at Chennai
- Efficiency wages, the Shapiro-Stiglitz Model
a lecture by Leszek Wincenciak, Ph.D., Warsaw University,
May 22, 2007
- Stiglitz explains how the IMF destroys nations
- Autobiographical essay in acceptance of the Bank of
Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
- "More instruments and broader goals: Moving toward
the post-Washington Consensus" (PDF 287KB) The (freely)
published UNU-WIDER 1998 Annual Lecture
- "The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three
Years After the Beginning of the Conflict" - A paper that
estimates the total cost to the U.S. of the second Iraq War to be
$1–2 trillion. Co-authored with Linda Bilmes.
- Download MP3 Joseph Stiglitz interview by The
Progressive magazine on Nov. 1, 2006
- The Poor Get Poorer, review of Fair
Trade for All by Robert B.
Reich in The New York Times, April 2,
- « The Free Market Does Not Work » Joseph E.
- The Most Misunderstood Man in America by Michael
Hirsh, Newsweek, July 18, 2009
- Video lectures