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The My Lai Massacre ( ; , ) was the mass murder conducted by a unit of the U.S. Army on March 16, 1968 of 347 to 504 unarmed citizens in South Vietnam, all of whom were civilians and a majority of whom were women, children, and elderly people.

Many of the victims were sexually abused, beaten, tortured, and some of the bodies were found mutilated. The massacre took place in the hamlets of Mỹ Laimarker and My Khe of Sơn Mỹmarker village during the Vietnam War. While 26 US soldiers were initially charged with criminal offenses for their actions at My Lai, only William Calley was convicted. He served only three years of an original life sentence, while on house arrest.

When the incident became public knowledge in 1969, it prompted widespread outrage around the world. The massacre also reduced U.S. support at home for the Vietnam War. Three U.S. servicemen who made an effort to halt the massacre and protect the wounded were denounced by U.S. Congressmen, received hate mail, death threats and mutilated animals on their doorsteps. Only 30 years after the event were their efforts honored.

The massacre is also known as the Sơn Mỹ Massacre ( ) or sometimes as the Song My Massacre. The U.S. military codeword for the hamlet was Pinkville.

The incident

Background

Charlie Company of 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 11th Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division , arrived in South Vietnam in December 1967. Their first month in Vietnam passed without any direct enemy contact. Nevertheless, by mid-March the company had suffered 28 incidents involving mines or booby-traps which caused injuries and five deaths.



During the Tet Offensive of January 1968, attacks were carried out in Quảng Ngãimarker by the 48th Battalion of the NLF (National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, commonly referred to by the Americans as the Viet Cong or Victor Charlie). U.S. military intelligence postulated that the 48th NLF Battalion, having retreated, was taking refuge in the village of Sơn Mỹ, in Quang Ngai Provincemarker. A number of specific hamlets within that village — designated My Lai 1, 2, 3, and 4 — were suspected of harboring the 48th.

U.S. forces planned a major offensive against those hamlets. Colonel Oran K. Henderson urged his officers to "go in there aggressively, close with the enemy and wipe them out for good." Lieutenant-Colonel Frank A. Barker ordered the 1st Battalion commanders to burn the houses, kill the livestock, destroy foodstuffs, and perhaps maybe to close the wells.

On the eve of the attack, at the Charlie Company briefing, Captain Ernest Medina informed his men that nearly all the civilian residents of the hamlets in Sơn Mỹ village would have left for the market by 07:00 and that any who remained would be NLF or NLF sympathizers. He was also asked whether the order included the killing of women and children; those present at the briefing later gave different accounts of Medina's response. Some of the company soldiers, including platoon leaders, later testified that the orders as they understood them were to kill all guerrilla and North Vietnamese combatants and "suspects" (including women and children, as well as all animals), to burn the village, and pollute the wells. He was also quoted as saying "They're all V.C. now go and get them" and was heard saying "Who is my enemy?" and added "Anybody that was running from us, hiding from us, or appeared to be the enemy. If a man was running, shoot him, sometimes even if a woman with a rifle was running, shoot her"

Charlie Company was to enter the hamlet, spearheaded by its 1st Platoon. The other two companies that made up the task force were to cordon off the village.

Killings

Dead man and child.
Photo by Ronald L.
Haeberle


Charlie Company landed following a short artillery and helicopter gunship preparation. The Americans found no enemy fighters in the village on the morning of March 16. Many soldiers suspected there were NLF troops in the village, hiding underground in the homes of their elderly parents or their wives. The U.S. soldiers, one platoon of which was led by Second Lieutenant William Calley, went in shooting at a "suspected enemy position".

After the first civilians were wounded or killed by the indiscriminate fire, the soldiers soon began attacking anything that moved, humans and animals alike, with firearms, grenades and bayonets. The scale of the massacre only spiraled as it progressed, the brutality increasing with each killing. BBC News described the scene:

Dozens of people were herded into an irrigation ditch and other locations and killed with automatic weapons. A large group of about 70 to 80 villagers, rounded up by the 1st Platoon in the center of the village, were killed personally by Calley and by soldiers ordered to fire by Calley. Calley also shot two other large groups of civilians with a weapon taken from a soldier who had refused to do any further killing.

Members of the 2nd Platoon killed at least 60–70 Vietnamese people, as they swept through the northern half of My Lai 4 and through Binh Tay, a small subhamlet about 400 meters north of My Lai 4.

After the initial "sweeps" by the 1st and the 2nd Platoons, the 3rd Platoon was dispatched to deal with any "remaining resistance". They immediately began killing every still-living human and animal they could find, including shooting the Vietnamese who emerged from their hiding places, and finishing off the wounded found moaning in the heaps of bodies. The 3rd Platoon also rounded up and killed a group of seven to twelve women and children.

Since Charlie Company had encountered no enemy opposition, 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment, was moved into its landing zone between and attacked the subhamlet of My Khe 4, killing as many as 90 people. U.S. forces lost one man killed and seven wounded from mines and booby traps.

During the next two days, both battalions were involved in additional burning and destruction of dwellings, and in the mistreatment of Vietnamese detainees. Most of the soldiers had not participated in the crimes, but neither protested nor complained to their superiors.

Helicopter intervention

Warrant Officer One Hugh Thompson, Jr., a helicopter pilot from an aero-scout team, witnessed a large number of dead and dying civilians as he began flying over the village — all of them infants, children, women and old men, with no signs of draft-age men or weapons anywhere. Thompson and his crew witnessed an unarmed passive woman kicked and shot at point-blank range by Captain Medina (Medina later claimed that he thought she had a grenade). The crew made several attempts to radio for help for the wounded. They landed their helicopter by a ditch, which they noted was full of bodies and in which there was movement. Thompson asked a sergeant he encountered there (David Mitchell of the 1st Platoon) if he could help get the people out of the ditch, and the sergeant replied that he would "help them out of their misery". Thompson, shocked and confused, then had a conversation with Second Lieutenant Calley, Platoon Leader of 1st Platoon, who claimed to be "just following orders". As the helicopter took off, they saw Mitchell firing into the ditch.

Thompson then saw a group of civilians (again consisting of children, women and old men) at a bunker being approached by ground personnel. Thompson landed and told his crew that if the U.S. soldiers shot at the Vietnamese while he was trying to get them out of the bunker that they were to open fire at these soldiers. Thompson later testified that he spoke with a lieutenant (identified as Stephen Brooks of the 2nd Platoon) and told him there were women and children in the bunker, and asked if the lieutenant would help get them out. According to Thompson, "he [the lieutenant] said the only way to get them out was with a hand grenade". Thompson testified that he then told Brooks to "just hold your men right where they are, and I'll get the kids out". He found 12 to 16 people in the bunker, coaxed them out and led them to the helicopter, standing with them while they were flown out in two groups.

Returning to My Lai, Thompson and other air crew members noticed several large groups of bodies. Spotting some survivors in the ditch Thompson landed again and one of the crew members entered the ditch. The crew member returned with a bloodied but apparently unharmed child who was flown to safety. The child was thought to be a girl, but later investigation found that it was a 4-year-old boy. Thompson then reported what he had seen to his company commander, Major Frederic W. Watke, using terms such as "murder" and "needless and unnecessary killings". Thompson's reports were confirmed by other pilots and air crew.

In 1998, the three former U.S. servicemen who stopped their comrades from killing a number of villagers, significantly reducing casualties at My Lai, were awarded medals in Washington D.C. The veterans also made contact with the survivors of My Lai.

Aftermath

Dead bodies outside a burning dwelling.
Photo by Ronald L.
Haeberle


Owing to the chaotic circumstances and the Army's decision not to undertake a definitive body count, the number of civilians killed at My Lai cannot be stated with certainty. Estimates vary from source to source, with 347 and 504 being the most commonly cited figures. The memorial at the site of the massacre lists 504 names, with ages ranging from one to 82 years. A later investigation by the U.S. Army arrived at a lower figure of 347 deaths, the official U.S. estimate.

Cover-up and investigations

The first reports claimed that "128 Viet Cong and 22 civilians" were killed in the village during a "fierce fire fight". General William C. Westmoreland, MACV commander, congratulated the unit on the "outstanding job". As related at the time by the Army's Stars and Stripes magazine, "U.S. infantrymen had killed 128 Communists in a bloody day-long battle."

Initial investigations of the My Lai operation were undertaken by the 11th Light Infantry Brigade's commanding officer, Colonel Henderson, under orders from the Americal Division's executive officer, Brigadier General George H. Young. Henderson interviewed several soldiers involved in the incident, then issued a written report in late April claiming that some 20 civilians were inadvertently killed during the operation. The army at this time was still describing the events at My Lai as a military victory that had resulted in the deaths of 128 enemy combatants.

Six months later, Tom Glen, a 21-year-old soldier of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade, wrote a letter to General Creighton Abrams, the new overall commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, accusing the Americal Division (and other entire units of the U.S. military) of routine and pervasive brutality against Vietnamese civilians. The letter was detailed and its contents echoed complaints received from other soldiers.

Colin Powell, then a 31-year-old Army Major, was charged with investigating the letter, which did not specifically reference My Lai (Glen had limited knowledge of the events there). In his report Powell wrote: "In direct refutation of this portrayal is the fact that relations between American soldiers and the Vietnamese people are excellent." Powell's handling of the assignment was later characterized by some observers as "whitewashing" the atrocities of My Lai. In May 2004, Powell, then United States Secretary of State, told CNN's Larry King, "I mean, I was in a unit that was responsible for My Lai. I got there after My Lai happened. So, in war, these sorts of horrible things happen every now and again, but they are still to be deplored."

The carnage at My Lai might have gone unknown to history if not for another soldier, Ron Ridenhour, a former member of Charlie Company, who, independently of Glen, sent a letter detailing the events at My Lai to President Richard M. Nixon, the Pentagonmarker, the State Departmentmarker, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and numerous members of Congress. The copies of this letter were sent in March 1969, a full year after the event. Most recipients of Ridenhour's letter ignored it, with the notable exception of Congressman Morris Udall (D-Arizona). Ridenhour learned about the events at My Lai secondhand, by talking to members of Charlie Company while he was still enlisted.

Eventually, Calley was charged with several counts of premeditated murder in September 1969, and 25 other officers and enlisted men were later charged with related crimes. It was another two months before the American public learned about the massacre and trials.

Independent investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, after extensive conversations with Calley, broke the My Lai story on November 12, 1969; on November 20, Time, Life and Newsweek magazines all covered the story, and CBS televised an interview with Paul Meadlo. The Clevelandmarker Plain Dealer published explicit photographs of dead villagers killed at My Lai.

In November 1969, General William R. Peers was appointed to conduct a thorough investigation into the My Lai incident and its subsequent cover-up. Peers' final report, published in March 1970, was highly critical of top officers for participation in a cover-up and the Charlie Company officers for their actions at My Lai 4. According to Peers's findings:

[The 1st Battalion] members had killed at least 175–200 Vietnamese men, women, and children. The evidence indicates that only 3 or 4 were confirmed as Viet Cong although there were undoubtedly several unarmed VC (men, women, and children) among them and many more active supporters and sympathizers. One man from the company was reported as wounded from the accidental discharge of his weapon.
However, critics of the Peers Commission pointed out that it sought to place thereal blame on four officers who were already dead, foremost among them being the CO ofTF Barker, LTC Frank Barker, who was killed in a mid air collision on June 13, 1968.

Court martial

On November 17, 1970, the United States Army charged 14 officers, including Major General Samuel W. Koster, the Americal Division's commanding officer, with suppressing information related to the incident. Most of those charges were later dropped. Brigade commander Henderson was the only officer who stood trial on charges relating to the cover-up; he was acquitted on December 17, 1971.

After a four-month-long trial, in which he claimed that he was following orders from his commanding officer, Captain Medina, William Calley was convicted, on March 29, 1971, of premeditated murder for ordering the shootings. He was initially sentenced to life in prison. Two days later, however, President Nixon made the controversial decision to have Calley released from prison, pending appeal of his sentence. Calley's sentence was later adjusted, so that he would eventually serve four and one-half months in a military prison at Fort Benningmarker.

In a separate trial, Captain Medina denied giving the orders that led to the massacre, and was acquitted of all charges, effectively negating the prosecution's theory of "command responsibility", now referred to as the "Medina standard". Several months after his acquittal, however, Medina admitted that he had suppressed evidence and had lied to Colonel Henderson about the number of civilian deaths.

Most of the enlisted men who were involved in the events at My Lai had already left military service, and were thus legally exempt from prosecution. In the end, of the 26 men initially charged, Calley's was the only conviction.

Some have argued that the outcome of the My Lai courts-martial was a reversal of the laws of war that were set forth in the Nurembergmarker and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals. Secretary of the Army Howard Callaway was quoted in the New York Times as stating that Calley's sentence was reduced because Calley honestly believed that what he did was a part of his orders — a rationale that stands in direct contradiction of the standards set at Nuremberg and Tokyo, where German and Japanese soldiers were executed for similar acts.

Survivors

In the spring of 1972, the camp (at My Lai 2) where the survivors of the My Lai Massacre had been relocated was largely destroyed by Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) artillery and aerial bombardment. The destruction was officially attributed to "Viet Cong terrorists". However, the truth was revealed by Quaker service workers in the area, through testimony (in May 1972) by Martin Teitel at hearings before the Congressional Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees. In June 1972, Teitel's account of the events was published in the New York Times.

More than a thousand people turned out March 16, 2008, forty years after the massacre, to remember the victims of one of the most notorious chapters of the Vietnam War. The memorial drew the families of the victims and returning U.S. war veterans alike.

On August 19, 2009, Lt. Calley made his first public apology for the massacre in a speech to the Kiwanis club of Greater Columbus Georgia.[10614]
"There is not a day that goes by that I do not feel remorse for what happened that day in My Lai," William L.
Calley told members of a local Kiwanis Club.
"I feel remorse for the Vietnamese who were killed, for their families, for the American soldiers involved and their families.
I am very sorry."


Effects and analysis

The explosive news of the massacre fueled the outrage of the antiwar movement, which demanded the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. It also led more potential draftees to file for conscientious objector status. Those who had always argued against the war felt vindicated; those on the fringes of the movement became more vocal.

The more pivotal shift, however, was in the attitude of the general public toward the war. People who previously had not been interested in the peace/war debates began to analyze the issue more closely. The horrific stories of other soldiers began to be taken more seriously, and other abuses came to light.

Some military observers concluded that My Lai showed the need for more and better volunteers to provide stronger leadership for the troops. As the Vietnam conflict dragged on, the number of well trained and experienced career soldiers on the front lines dropped sharply as casualties and combat rotation took their toll. These observers claimed the absence of the many bright young men who avoided military service through college attendance or homeland service caused the talent pool for new officers to become very shallow. They pointed to Calley, a young, unemployed college dropout, as an example of the raw and inexperienced recruits being rushed through officer training. Others pointed out problems with the military's insistence on unconditional obedience to orders while at the same time limiting the doctrine of "command responsibility" to the lowest ranks. Others saw My Lai and related war crimes as a direct result of the military's attrition strategy, with its emphasis on "body counts" and "kill ratios". The fact that the massacre was successfully covered up for 18 months was seen as a prime example of the Pentagon's "Culture of Concealment" and of the lack of integrity that permeated the Defense establishment. The fact that Calley was the only officer convicted led many to see him as a scapegoat.

The My Lai massacre reflected the war of attrition in which military success, for lack of terrain objective was measured statistically by counting corpses. While casualty counts are valid measurements of war, in Vietnam, they unfortunately became the yardstick used to gauge the battlefield. Rather than means of determination, they became objectives in themselves. The process became so ghoulish that individual canteens were accepted substitutes if bodies were too dismembered to estimate properly. This appalling practice produced body counts that were largely unquestioned and were readily rewarded by promotions, medals, commendations and time off from field duty. General Westmoreland had issued a special commendation to the 11th Infantry Brigade based on the claims of 128 enemy killed in My Lai

Participants

Commanders

  • Frank A. Barker — Lieutenant Colonel, commander of the Task Force Barker, ordered the destruction of the village, controlled the artillery preparation and combat assault from his helicopter, was killed in Vietnam on June 13 1968, before the investigation had begun.
  • Stephen Brooks — Lieutenant, Platoon Leader of 2nd Platoon, Charlie Company.
  • William L. Calley — 2nd Lieutenant, Platoon Leader of 1st Platoon, Charlie Company, the only person convicted of murder. On August 19 2009 Calley became the first person ever to apologize for the massacre. “There is not a day that goes by that I do not feel remorse for what happened that day in My Lai,” Calley told members of the Kiwanis Club of Greater Columbus, “I feel remorse for the Vietnamese who were killed, for their families, for the American soldiers involved and their families. I am very sorry.”
  • Oran K. Henderson — Colonel, brigade commander who ordered the attack, had been in the helicopter over My Lai.
  • Samuel W. Koster — Major General, commanding officer of the Americal Division, charged with cover-up of the incident.
  • Eugene Kotouc — Captain from military intelligence, provided some of the information on which the My Lai combat assault was based; together with Medina and a Vietnamese police officer, tortured and executed suspects later that day.
  • Ernest Medina — Captain, company commander of Charlie Company, who planned, ordered, and supervised the execution of the operation in Sơn Mỹ village.


1st Platoon

Some of the soldiers of the 1st Platoon, Charlie Company, included:
  • Michael Bernhardt — a sergeant, refused to participate in the killing of civilians and was threatened by Medina to not attempt to expose the massacre by writing to his congressman, and as a result he was allegedly given more dangerous duties such as point duty on patrol. Later he would help expose and detail the massacre in numerous interviews with the press, and also served as a prosecution witness in the trial of Ernest Medina where he was subjected to intense cross examination by defense council F. Lee Bailey. Recipient of 1970 'Ethical Humanist Award'.
  • Herbert Carter — platoon tunnel rat, claimed he shot himself in the foot in order to be MEDEVACed out of the village.
  • Dennis Conti — testified he initially refused to shoot but later fired some M79 grenade launcher rounds at a group of fleeing people with unknown effect.
  • James Dursi — killed a mother and child, refused to kill anyone else even when ordered.
  • Ronald Grzesik — a team leader, said he followed orders to round up civilians but refused to kill them.
  • Robert Maples — stated to have refused to participate.
  • Paul Meadlo — said he was afraid of being shot if he did not participate. Lost his foot to a land mine the next day, later publicly admitted his part in the massacre.
  • David Mitchell — a sergeant, accused by witnesses of shooting people at the ditch site; pleaded not guilty. Mitchell was acquitted. His attorney was Ossie Brown of Baton Rougemarker, thereafter the district attorney of East Baton Rouge Parish.
  • Varnado Simpson — committed suicide in 1997, citing guilt over several murders committed in My Lai.
  • Charles Sledge — radio operator, later prosecution witness.
  • Harry Stanley — claimed to have refused to participate.
  • Esequiel Torres — previously had tortured and hanged an old man because Torres found his bandaged leg suspicious; he and Roschevitz were involved in the shooting of a group of ten women and five children in a hut, later he was ordered by Calley to shoot a number of people with M60 machine gun and he fired a burst before he refused to fire again, after which Calley took his weapon and opened fire himself.
  • Frederick Widmer - Frederick Widmer, who has been the subject of pointed blame, is quoted as saying, "The most disturbing thing I saw was one boy—and this was something that, you know, this what haunts me from the whole, the whole ordeal down there. And there was a boy with his arm shot off, shot up half, half hanging on and he just had this bewildered look in his face and like, What did I do, what's wrong? He was just, you know, it's, it's hard to describe, couldn't comprehend. I, I shot the boy, killed him and it's—I'd like to think of it more or less as a mercy killing because somebody else would have killed him in the end, but it wasn't right."


Other soldiers

Charlie Company, the unit deployed in My Lai 4 on the day of the massacre led by 2LT Calley, was one of at least three that swept My Lai 4.
  • William Doherty and Michael Terry — soldiers in the 3rd Platoon who killed the wounded in the ditch.
  • Ronald L. Haeberle — photographer attached to the 11th Brigade information office who accompanied C Company.
  • Nicholas Capezza — chief medic in Charlie Company, insisted he saw nothing unusual.
  • Sergeant Minh — ARVN interpreter confronted CPT Medina when he entered the hamlet on why so many civilians had been killed. CPT Medina replied: "Sergeant Minh, don’t ask anything — those were the orders."
  • Gary Roschevitz — grabbed an M16 rifle from Varnado Simpson to kill 5 Vietnamese prisoners, later according to various witnesses he forced seven women to undress with the intention of them performing sex with him, when the women refused he reportedly shot them.


Rescue helicopter

Intervention helicopter's crew consisted of:

30 years later the crew was decorated for their actions at My Lai with Soldier's Medals, the U.S. non-combat heroism awards (Andreotta, who was killed in action over Vietnam shortly after the events at My Lai, received the medal posthumously).

Photographs

The massacre, like many other operations in Vietnam, was captured by photography by U.S. Army personnel. The most published and graphic photos were taken by Ronald Haeberle, a U.S Army 'Public Information Detachment' photographer who accompanied the men of Charlie company that day. Some of the (black and white) photographs he took were made using an Army camera and were either subject to censorship or did not depict any Vietnamese casualties when published in an Army newspaper. On the other hand, Haeberle took color photographs with his own camera while on duty the same day, which he kept and later sold to the media.

Another soldier, John Henry Smail, 3rd Platoon, took at least 16 color photographs depicting U.S. Army personnel, helicopters, and aerial views of My Lai. These, along with Haeberle's photographs were included in the 'Report of the Department of the Army review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident'. Roger Louis Alaux, artillery lieutenant who was with CPT Medina during the massacre, also took some photographs that day, including aerial views of My Lai from a helicopter and of the LZ.

Image:Deadwoman.jpg|Unidentified dead Vietnamese woman.Image:Deadman.jpg|Unidentified dead Vietnamese man.Image:MyLai Haeberle P37 BodyInWell.jpg|Unidentified dead body thrown down a well.Image:Burningdwelling2.jpg|SP5 Capezza burning a dwelling.Image:Haeberlewounded.jpg|PFC Mauro, PFC Carter, and SP4 Widmer (Carter shot himself in the foot with a .45 pistol during the My Lai Massacre (either accidentally or intentionally)).Image:Haeberlehutonfire.jpg|SP4 Dustin setting fire to a dwelling.Image:Mylaiman.jpg|Unidentifed Vietnamese man.Image:Deadwoman2.jpg|More victims at My Lai. Photo by Ronald L. Haeberle

Media

In 1989 the Britishmarker television station Yorkshire Television broadcast the documentary Four Hours in My Lai as part of the ITV networked series First Tuesday. Using eyewitness statements from both Vietnamese and Americans the programme revealed new evidence about the massacre.

Oliver Stone planned to start production on a film titled Pinkville about the investigation of General Peers into the My Lai Massacre, featuring Bruce Willis (as General William Peers), Woody Harrelson (as Col. Henderson). However, United Artists halted its December 2007 production start because of the 2007–2008 Writers Guild of America strike. An earlier film of Stone’s, Platoon, dealt with an incident similar to the massacre.

On March 15, 2008 the British Broadcasting Corporation broadcast a documentary, The My Lai Tapes on Radio 4, and subsequently on the BBC World Service in both English and Vietnamese that used never before heard audio recordings of testimony taken at The Pentagonmarker during the 1969-1970 Peers Inquiry.

See also



References

  1. At the time of the original revelations of the massacre, My Lai was pronounced like the English words "my lay". Later, the pronunciation "me lie" became commonly used.
  2. Summary report from the report of General Peers.
  3. Department of the Army. Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident ( The Peers Report), Volumes I-III (1970).
  4. My Lai Pilot Hugh Thompson
  5. My Lai was one of four hamlets associated with the village of "Son My". Americal Division Veterans Association.
  6. The My Lai Massacre: Seymour Hersh's Complete and Unabridged Reporting for the St. Louis Post Dispatch, November 1969 /Candide's Notebooks
  7. "Report of the Department of Army review of the preliminary investigations into the My Lai incident. Volume III, Exhibits, Book 6 — Photographs, 14 March 1970". From the Library of Congress, Military Legal Resources.[1]
  8. "My Lai: A Question of Orders". Jan. 25, 1971. Time .
  9. Summary of Peers Report. Significantly, he gave no instructions for segregating and safeguarding non-combatants. My Lai: An American Tragedy. © William George Eckhardt 2000.
  10. Peers Report: The Omissions and Commissions Of Cpt. Ernest L. Medina.
  11. "American soldiers testify in My Lai court martial". By Karen D. Smith. Dec. 6, 2000. Amarillo Globe-News.
  12. Michael Walzer: Just and Unjust Wars, New York: Basic Books Publishing, p. 310.
  13. My Lai: An American Tragedy
  14. Hugh Thompson | Times Online Obituary
  15. Thompson's own testimony before a conference at the University of Tulane in 1994[2] and from the Peers Report summary.
  16. Heroes of My Lai honoured. March 7, 1998. BBC News.
  17. My Lai Massacre
  18. "The 23rd Infantry Division , more commonly known as the Americal Division of the United States Army was formed in May 1949 on the island of New Caledonia."
  19. "Behind Colin Powell's Legend -- My Lai" by Robert Parry and Norman Solomon, The Consortium for Independent Journalism, July 22, 1996.
  20. Text of Ron Ridenhour's 1969 letter
  21. Mo Udall, The Education of a Congressman
  22. Biography of General William R. Peers
  23. "Biography of Oran Henderson"
  24. Neier, A. War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice, Random House, p. 95
  25. "An Introduction to the My Lai Courts-Martial"
  26. My Lai survivors gather to pray for victims
  27. Siegel, R. "My Lai Officer Apologizes for Massacre" All Things Considered, NPR, Aug 21, 2009
  28. http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009709373_apusmylaimassacre.html
  29. PBS/The American Experience. The My Lai Massacre
  30. The "culture of concealment" was often referred to as the "second war" during the Vietnam War, one fought between the media and the government. Huffington, Arianna (21 April 1999) "Washington's culture of concealment" The San Diego Union-Tribune page B-8
  31. (Shelby Stanton: The Rise and Fall of an American Army, Dell Publishing: New York, 1988).
  32. Ltc Frank Akeley Barker
  33. Associate Press
  34. Peers Report: Captain Ernset Medina
  35. http://books.google.ca/books?id=1wisoI-wP5MC&pg=PA34&lpg=PA34&dq=michael+bernhardt+medina&source=web&ots=CnXD8WToZF&sig=zwCitz8NCEzd9erflJROVcDqESg&hl=en
  36. The Ethical Humanist Award: New York Society for Ethical Culture
  37. The My Lai Trials Begin - TIME
  38. " Remember My Lai". WGBH Educational Foundation, May 23 1989. Retrieved on June 28, 2009.
  39. Four Hours in My Lai: A Case Study
  40. Star.Vietnam.Edu
  41. Trin Yarborough book: Surviving Twice: Amerasian Children of the Vietnam War. 2005. Page 19. ISBN 1574888641.
  42. LHCMA Catalogue: FOUR HOURS IN MY LAI television documentary archive, 1964-1992
  43. Pinkville (2008) at IMDB.
  44. The My Lai Tapes, 1968 Myth or Reality, BBC Radio 4
  45. The My Lai Tapes, audio file in English
  46. The My Lai Tapes, audio file and transcript in Vietnamese


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