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National missile defense (NMD) as a generic term is a type of missile defense: a military strategy and associated systems to shield an entire country against incoming Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles or alternately more short-range ballistic missiles. The missiles could be intercepted by anti-ballistic missiles, or possibly by lasers. They could be intercepted near the launch point (boost phase), during flight through space (mid-course phase), or during atmospheric descent (terminal phase).

In its primary use, this term refers to the overall U.S. nationwide antimissile program in development since the 1990s. After the renaming in 2002, the term now refers to the entire program, not just the ground-based interceptors and associated facilities. This article focuses mainly on this system and a brief history of earlier systems which led to it.

Other elements yet to be integrated into NMD may include anti-ballistic missiles, or sea-based, space-based, laser, and high altitude missile systems. The NMD program is limited in scope and designed to counter a relatively small ICBM attack from a less sophisticated adversary. Unlike the earlier Strategic Defense Initiative program, it is not designed to be a robust shield against a large attack from a technically sophisticated adversary.


The term "national missile defense" has several meanings:

  • Most common, but now deprecated: U.S. National Missile Defense, the limited ground-based nationwide antimissile system in development since the 1990s. In 2002 this system was renamed to Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), to differentiate it from other missile defense programs, such as space-based, sea-based, laser, or high-altitude intercept programs. As of 2006, this system is operational with limited capability. It is designed to intercept a small number of nuclear-armed ICBMs in the mid-course phase, using interceptor missiles launched from Alaska. They use non-nuclear kinetic warheads.

  • Any national ICBM defense by any country, past or present. The U.S. Sentinel program was a planned national missile defense during the 1960s, but was never deployed. Elements of Sentinel were briefly deployed as the Safeguard Program, but it wasn't national in scope. The Russianmarker A-135 anti-ballistic missile system is currently operational around Moscowmarker, but it also isn't national in scope.

  • Any national missile defense (against any missile type) by any country. Israelmarker currently has a national missile defense against short and medium-range missiles using their Arrow missile system.

The role of defense against nuclear missiles has been a heated military and political topic for several decades. (See also nuclear strategy, Missile Defense Agency, and anti-ballistic missile.)

Current NMD program


In the 1990s and early 21st century, the stated mission of NMD has changed to the more modest goal of preventing the United States from being subject to nuclear blackmail or nuclear terrorism by a so-called rogue state. The feasibility of this more limited goal remains somewhat controversial. Under President Clinton some testing continued, but the project received little funding despite Clinton's supportive remarks on 5 September 2000 that "such a system, if it worked properly, could give us an extra dimension of insurance in a world where proliferation has complicated the task of preserving peace."

The system is administed by the Missile Defense Agency. There are several other agencies and military commands which play a role, such as the United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command and the Strategic Air Command.


The current NMD system consists of several components.

Ground-based interceptor missiles
One major component is Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, consisting of ground-based interceptor missiles and radar in Alaskamarker which would intercept incoming warheads in space. A limited number of interceptor missiles (about 10) are operational as of 2006. These would possibly be later augmented by mid-course SM-4 interceptors fired from Navy ships and by boost-phase interception by the Boeing YAL-1.

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System
A major component is a ship-based system, the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System. This was given major new importance by President Obama in September 2009, when he announced plans to scrap the plans for a missile defense site in Poland, in favor of missile defense systems located on US Navy warships. On 18 September 2009, Russian Prime Minister Putin welcomed Obama's plans for missile defense which may include stationing American Aegis armed warships in the Black Sea.

In 2009, several US Navy ships were fitted with SM-3 missiles to serve this function, which complements the Patriot systems already deployed by American units. Also, warships of Japan and Australia have been given weapons and technology to enable them to participate as well.

On November 12, 2009, the Missile Defense Agency announced that six additional US Navy destroyers would be upgraded to participate in the program. In fiscal 2012, , , and will be upgraded. , and will be upgraded in fiscal 2013. The goal of the program is to have 21 ships upgraded by the end of 2010; 24 in 2012; and 27 around 2013.

Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a program of the US Army, utilizing ground-based interceptor missiles which can intercept missiles in the upper part of the atmosphere.

Airborne systems
Several airborne systems are being examined, which would then be utilized by the US Air Force. One major object of study is a boost-phase defense, meaning a system to intercept missiles while they are in their boost phase. One potential system for this use might be an airborne laser, being tested on the Boeing YAL-1. Other ideas are also being studied.

As of 2009, the only anti-ballistic missile defense system with a boost-phase capability is the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System. There are several benefits to a sea-based boost-phase system, as it is fully mobile and has greater security by operating in international waters.

Shorter-range anti-ballistic missiles

Three shorter range tactical anti-ballistic missile systems are operational currently: the U.S. Army Patriot, U.S. Navy Aegis combat system/Standard SM-3, and the Israeli Arrow missile. In general short-range tactical ABMs cannot intercept ICBMs, even if within range. The tactical ABM radar and performance characteristics do not allow it, as an incoming ICBM warhead moves much faster than a tactical missile warhead. However it is possible the better-performance Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile could be upgraded to intercept ICBMs.

Latest versions of the U.S. Hawk missile have a limited capability against tactical ballistic missiles, but is not usually described as an ABM. Similar claims have been made about the Russian long-range surface-to-air S-300 and S-400 series.

Multilateral and international participation

Several aspects of the defense program have either sought or achieved partipation and assistance from other nations. Several foreign navies are participating in the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, including Japan and Australia. Also, the United States has considered establishing radar sites and missile sites in other nations as part of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense. A missile defense site in Poland received much media attention when it was cancelled in favor of the Aegis BMD. A radar site in the United Kingdom is being upgraded, and another one is being built in Greenland. Other countries have contributed technological developments and various locations.

Deployment process

NMD deployment is planned in three phases. The first phase is called Capability 1 (C1), and was originally designed to counter a limited threat from up to about five warheads with either simple or no countermeasures. More recently this phase has been upgraded to include the deployment of up to 100 interceptors and would be aimed at countering tens of warheads. This would require radar upgrades. Since North Koreamarker is perceived to be the earliest missile threat, the interceptors and radar would be deployed in Alaska.

The second phase is called C2 and designed to counter an attack by warheads with more complex countermeasures. It would deploy additional radars and more interceptors, plus a missile-tracking satellite system. The C3 phase is supposed to counter threats consisting of many complex warheads. It would deploy additional radars as well as additional interceptors, including some at a second site, bringing the total to 200 or more. Although the C3 system is the current final deployment goal, the system design permits further expansion and upgrades beyond the C3 level. A Pentagon study concluded that the NMD system could be upgraded by integrating the hundreds of interceptors to be deployed as part of the ship-based Navy Theater Wide missile defense system. These interceptors would be integrated into the sensor infrastructure of the NMD system.

History of national missile defense systems

In the late 1950s, the Nike-Zeus program investigated the use of Nike nuclear missiles as interceptors against Sovietmarker ICBMs. A Nike warhead would be detonated at high altitudes (over 100 km, or 60 statute miles) above the polar regions in the near vicinity of an incoming Soviet missile. While rocket technology offered some hope of a solution, the problem of how to quickly identify and track incoming missiles proved intractable, especially in light of easily envisioned countermeasures such as decoys and chaff. The Nike-Zeus project was canceled in 1961.

Project Defender

The Nike-Zeus use of nuclear warheads was necessary given the available missile technology. However, it had significant technical limitations such as blinding defensive radars to subsequent missiles. Also, exploding nuclear warheads over friendly territory (albeit in space) was not ideal. In the 1960s Project Defender and the Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept (BAMBI) concept replaced land-launched Nike missiles with missiles to be launched from satellite platforms orbiting directly above the USSR. Instead of nuclear warheads, the BAMBI missiles would deploy huge wire meshes designed to disable Soviet ICBMs in their early launch phase (the "boost phase"). No solution to the problem of how to protect the proposed satellite platforms against attack was found, however, and the program was canceled in 1968.

The Sentinel Program

In 1963, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara announced the Sentinel Program, providing a defense against attack for most of the continental United States. The system consisted of a long range Spartan missile, the short range Sprint missile, and associated radar and computer system. However, U.S. military and political strategists recognized several problems with the system:
  • Deployment of even a limited defensive ABM system might invite a preemptive nuclear attack before it could be implemented
  • Deploying ABM systems would likely invite another expensive arms race for defensive systems, in addition to maintaining existing offensive expenditures
  • Then-current technology did not permit a thorough defense against a sophisticated attack
  • Defended coverage area was very limited due to the short range of the missiles used
  • Use of nuclear warheads on antimissile interceptors would degrade capability of defensive radar, thus possibly rendering defense ineffective after the first few interceptions
  • Political and public concern about detonating defensive nuclear warheads over friendly territory
  • An ICBM defense could jeopardize the Mutual Assured Destruction concept, thus being a destabilizing influence

The Safeguard Program

The Institute of Heraldry approved the shoulder sleeve insignia for Safeguard.

In 1967 McNamara announced that the U.S. would instead be installing the Safeguard, a scaled-down version of Sentinel designed to defend U.S. cities from a "limited" attack such as those from the People's Republic of Chinamarker. Growing public pressure led to a changing of the goals of the system. It was from then on dedicated to the protection of some of the U.S. ICBM-silo areas from attack, promoting their ability to mount a retaliatory missile attack. Safeguard used the same Spartan and Sprint missiles, and the same radar technology as Sentinel. Safeguard solved some problems of Sentinel:

  • It was less expensive to develop due to its limited geographic coverage and fewer required missiles.
  • It avoided a lot of hazards to the public of defensive nuclear warheads detonated in the atmosphere nearby, since the Safeguard system was located in and near sparsely-populated areas of the Dakotas, Montana, Manitobamarker, Saskatchewanmarker, and Albertamarker.
  • It provided better interception probabilities due to dense coverage by the shorter-range Sprint missiles, which were unable to cover the entire defended area under the larger and earlier proposed Sentinel program.

However Safeguard still retained several of the previously-listed political and military problems.

ABM treaty

These above issues drove the United Statesmarker and the USSRmarker to sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. Under the ABM treaty and the 1974 revision of it, each country was allowed to deploy a single ABM system with only 100 interceptors to protect a single target. The Soviets deployed a system named the A-35 "Galosh" missile system, and it was deployed to protect Moscowmarker, its capital city. The U.S. deployed the Safeguard system to defend the ICBM launch sites around the Grand Forks Air Force Basemarker, North Dakota, in 1975. The American Safeguard system was only briefly operational (for a matter of several months). The Sovietmarker system (now called A-135 "Galosh") has been improved over the decades, and it is still operational around Moscow.

In December, 1999, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution aimed at pressing the United States to abandon its plans to build an anti-missile missile defense system. Voting against the draft, along with the United States, were just three other countries, Albaniamarker, Israelmarker, and the Federated States of Micronesiamarker. Thirteen of the 15 members of the European Union abstained, but Francemarker and Irelandmarker voted in favor of this resolution. The resolution called for continued efforts to strengthen and preserve the treaty. On 15 December 2001, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty.

Homing Overlay Experiment

Homing Overlay Experiment open web.
Given concerns about the previous programs using nuclear tipped interceptors, in the 1980s the U.S. Army began studies about the feasibility of hit-to-kill vehicles, where an interceptor missile would destroy an incoming ballistic missile just by colliding with it.

The first program, which actually tested a hit-to-kill missile interceptor, was the Army's HOE (Homing Overlay Experiment) which used a Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV) . The KKV was equipped with an infrared seeker, guidance electronics and a propulsion system. Once in space, the KKV could extend a folded structure similar to an umbrella skeleton of 4 m (13 ft) diameter to enhance its effective cross section. This device would destroy the ICBM reentry vehicle on collision. After test failures with the first three flight tests, the fourth and final test on 10 June 1984 was successful, intercepting the Minuteman RV with a closing speed of about 6.1 km/s at an altitude of more than 160 km.

The Strategic Defense Initiative

SDI insignia.

On March 23, 1983 President Reagan announced a new national missile defense program formally called the Strategic Defense Initiative but soon nicknamed "Star Wars" by detractors. President Reagan's stated goal was not just to protect the U.S. and its allies, but to also provide the completed system to the USSR, thus ending the threat of nuclear war for all parties. SDI was technically very ambitious and economically very expensive. It would have included many space-based laser battle stations and nuclear-pumped X-ray laser satellites designed to intercept hostile ICBMs in space, along with very sophisticated command and control systems. Unlike the previous Sentinel program, the goal was to totally defend against a robust, all out nuclear attack by the USSR.

A partisan debate ensued in Congress, with Democrats questioning the feasibility and strategic wisdom of such a program, while Republicans talked about its strategic necessity and provided a number of technical experts who argued that it was in fact feasible (including Manhattan Project physicist Edward Teller). Advocates of SDI prevailed and funding was initiated in fiscal year 1984. The motivation behind this effort largely collapsed with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Program planning, goals and discussions

On 14 October 2002, a ground based interceptor launched from the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Site destroyed a mock warhead 225 km above the Pacific. The test included three decoy balloons.

On 16 December 2002 President George W. Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 23 which outlined a plan to begin deployment of operational ballistic missile defense systems by 2004. The following day the U.S. formally requested from the UKmarker and Denmarkmarker use of facilities in Fylingdalesmarker, Englandmarker, and Thulemarker, Greenlandmarker, respectively, as a part of the NMD program. The projected cost of the program for the years 2004 to 2009 will be $53 billion, making it the largest single line in The Pentagonmarker's budget.

Since 2002, the US has been in talks with Polandmarker and other European countries over the possibility of setting up a European base to intercept long-range missiles. A site similar to the US base in Alaska would help protect the US and Europe from missiles fired from the Middle East or North Africa. Poland's prime minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz said in November 2005 he wanted to open up the public debate on whether Poland should host such a base.

In 2002, NMD was changed to Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), to differentiate it from other missile defense programs, such as space-based, sea-based, and defense targeting the boost phase and the reentry phase (see flight phases).

On 22 July 2004, the first ground-based interceptor was deployed at Ft. Greely, Alaskamarker ( ). By the end of 2004, a total of six had been deployed at Ft. Greely and another two at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Two additional were installed at Ft. Greely in 2005. The system will provide "rudimentary" protection.

On 15 December 2004, an interceptor test in the Marshall Islandsmarker failed when the launch was aborted due to an "unknown anomaly" in the interceptor, 16 minutes after launch of the target from Kodiak Islandmarker, Alaskamarker.

"I don't think that the goal was ever that we would declare it was operational. I think the goal was that there would be an operational capability by the end of 2004," Pentagon representative Larry DiRita said on 2005-01-13 at a Pentagon press conference. However, the problem is and was funding. "There has been some expectation that there will be some point at which it is operational and not something else these expectations are not unknown, if Congress pours more attention and funding to this system, it can be operational relatively quick."

On 18 January 2005, the Commander, United States Strategic Command issued direction to establish the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense. JFCC IMD, once activated, will develop desired characteristics and capabilities for global missile defense operations and support for missile defense.

On 14 February 2005, another interceptor test failed due to a malfunction with the ground support equipment at the test range on Kwajalein Island, not with the interceptor missile itself.

On 24 February 2005, the Missile Defense Agency, testing the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, successfully intercepted a mock enemy missile. This was the first test of an operationally configured RIM-161 Standard missile 3 (SM-3) interceptor and the fifth successful test intercept using this system. On 10 November 2005, the USS Lake Erie detected, tracked, and destroyed a mock two-stage ballistic missile within two minutes of the ballistic missile launch.

On 1 September 2006, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System was successfully tested. An interceptor was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Basemarker to hit a target missile launched from Alaskamarker, with ground support provided by a crew at Colorado Springsmarker. This test was described by Missile Defense Agency director Lieutenant General Trey Obering as "about as close as we can come to an end-to-end test of our long-range missile defense system." The target missile carried no decoys or other countermeasures.

Deployment of the Sea-based X-band Radar system is presently underway.

On 24 February 2007, The Economist reported that the United Statesmarker ambassador to NATOmarker, Victoria Nuland, had written to her fellow envoys to advise them regarding the various options for missile-defense sites in Europe. She also confirmed that “The United States has also been discussing with the UK further potential contributions to the system.”

On February 23, 2008, the United States successfully shot down a malfunctioning American spy satellite.

The Ustka-Wicko base of the Polish Army is mentioned as a possible site of US missile interceptors. Russia objects; its suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe may be related.

Russiamarker threatened to place short-range nuclear missiles on the Russia’s border with NATO if the United States refuses to abandon plans to deploy 10 interceptor missiles and a radar in Polandmarker and the Czech Republicmarker. In April 2007, Putin warned of a new Cold War if the Americans deployed the shield in Central Europe. Putin also said that Russia is prepared to abandon its obligations under a Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 with the United States.

John McCain is a strong supporter of missile defense. In October 2007, McCain said: "And the first thing I would do is make sure that we have a missile defense system in place in Czechoslovakiamarker [sic] and Poland, and I don't care what his [Putin's] objections are to it."

Barack Obama said he supported shifting federal resources away from an “unproven missile defense system” to proven technologies. “I will cut tens of billions of dollars in wasteful spending. I will cut investments in unproven missile defense systems. I will not weaponize space. I will slow our development of future combat systems,” Obama said.

See also Anti-ballistic missile#European front.

Michael Cantrell, a former engineer at the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command headquarters in Huntsville, Ala., along with his deputy, Doug Ennis, pleaded guilty this year to taking $1.6 million in contractor kickbacks after arranging $350 million in funding for the Pentagon's missile defense program, The New York Times reported on October 11, 2008.

Missile defense of Eastern Europe

In February 2007, the US started formal negotiations with Polandmarker (in April 2007 57% of Poles opposed the plan) and Czech Republicmarker concerning construction of missile shield installations in those countries for a Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System. According to press reports the government of the Czech Republic agreed (while 67% Czechs disagree and only about 15% support it) to host a missile defense radar on its territory while a base of missile interceptors is supposed to be built in Poland. The objective is reportedly to protect most of Europe from long-range missile strikes from Iran. More than 130,000 Czechs signed petition for referendum about the base, which is by far the largest citizen initiative (Ne základnám - No to Bases) since the Velvet Revolution.

The Ustkamarker-Wickomarker base of the Polish Army is mentioned as a possible site of US missile interceptors. Russia objects; its suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe may be related.

Russiamarker threatened to place short-range nuclear missiles on the Russia’s border with NATO if the United States refuses to abandon plans to deploy 10 interceptor missiles and a radar in Polandmarker and the Czech Republicmarker. In April 2007, Putin warned of a new Cold War if the Americans deployed the shield in Central Europe. Putin also said that Russia is prepared to abandon its obligations under a Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 with the United States.

On July 4, 2008, Poland did not agree on the United States conditions and installation of anti-ballistic missile on its territory.

On July 8, 2008, The Russian Foreign Ministry stated that if the missile defense system is okayed, "we will be forced to react not with diplomatic, but with military-technical methods." On July 8, 2008 US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg signed in Prague the "Agreement Between the United States and the Czech Republic on Establishing a United States Ballistic Missile Defense Radar Site in the Czech Republic".

On August 14, 2008, The United States of America and Polandmarker announced a deal to implement the missile defense system in Polish territory, with a tracking system placed in the Czech Republic. The Russians responded by saying such action "cannot go unpunished." "The fact that this was signed in a period of very difficult crisis in the relations between Russia and the United States over the situation in Georgiamarker shows that, of course, the missile defense system will be deployed not against Iranmarker but against the strategic potential of Russiamarker," Dmitry Rogozin, Russia's NATOmarker envoy, said.

Russia warned Poland that it is exposing itself to attack — even a nuclear one —by accepting a U.S. missile interceptor base on its soil. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn the deputy chief of staff of Russia's armed forces warned Poland, that Poland, by deploying (the system) is exposing itself to a strike — 100 percent.

On August 20, 2008, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski signed in Warsaw the "Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Poland Concerning the Deployment of Ground-Based Ballistic Missile Defense Interceptors in the Territory of the Republic of Poland".

In September 2009, President Obama announced plans to scrap the plans for missile defense sites in East Europe, in favor of missile defense systems located on US Navy warships. On 18 September 2009, Russian Prime Minister Putin welcomed Obama's plans for missile defense which may include stationing American Aegis armed warships in the Black Sea.

This deployment began to occur that same month, with the deployment of Aegis-equipped warships with the RIM-161 SM-3 missile system, which complements the Patriot systems already deployed by American units.

Technical criticism

There has been controversy among experts about whether it is technically feasible to build an effective missile defense system and, in particular, if the ground-based midcourse NMD will work.

An April 2000 study by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technologymarker concluded that “[a]ny country capable of deploying a long-range missile would also be able to deploy countermeasures that would defeat the planned NMD system.”Countermeasures studied in detail were bomblets containing biological or chemical agents, aluminized balloons to serve as decoys and to disguise warheads, and cooling warheads to reduce the kill vehicle’s ability to detect them.

In April 2004, a General Accounting Office report concluded that “MDA does not explain some critical assumptions—such as an enemy’s type and number of decoys—underlying its performance Goals.” It recommended that “DOD carry out independent, operationally realistic testing of each block being fielded” but DOD responded that “formal operational testing is not required before entry into full-rate production.”

Proponents did not suggest how to discriminate between empty and warhead-enclosing balloons, for instance, but said that these “simple” countermeasures are actually hard to implement, and that defense technology is rapidly advancing to defeat them. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) said decoy discrimination techniques were classified, and emphasized its intention to provide future boost and terminal defense to diminish the importance of midcourse decoys. In summer 2002 MDA ceased providing detailed intercept information and declined to answer technical questions about decoys on grounds of national security.

A July 2003 study by the American Physical Society (APS) focused on the feasibility of intercepting missiles in the boost phase, which the current NMD system does not yet attempt.

The study found it might be possible to develop a limited system capable of destroying a liquid-fuel propelled ICBM during the boost phase. This system could also possibly destroy some solid-propellant missiles from Iran, but not those from North Korea, because of differences in the boost time and range to target. However, there is a trend toward using solid-fueled ICBMs which are harder to intercept during boost phase.

Using orbital launchers to provide a reliable boost-phase defense against solid fuel missiles from Iran or North Korea was found to require at least 1,600 interceptors in orbit.Intercepting liquid-fueled missiles would require 700 interceptors. Using two or more interceptors per target would require many more orbital launchers.

The only boost phase systems the U.S. contemplates for near term use are the Airborne laser (ABL) and Kinetic Energy Interceptors. The study found the ABL possibly capable of intercepting missiles if within 300 km for solid fuel missiles or 600 km for liquid fuel missiles.

While the APS report did not address the current U.S. mid-course NMD system, it concluded that were the U.S. in the future to develop a boost-phase ABM defense, there could be significant technical problems limiting effectiveness.

See also the article on anti-ballistic missiles for further discussion on the feasibility of NMD-like systems.

See also


  1. Begich, Gates visit Alaska missile defense base By Tim Bradner, Alaska Journal of Commerce June 5, 2009.
  2. Northrop Grumman Contribution to Support Missile Defense Workforce in Alaska, Fri Oct 30, 2009.
  3. Commanding Alaska's Guard w/ 24/7 missile defense
  4. New missile defences in Europe:Shooting down a plan, Economist, Sept 24th 2009.
  5. RIM-161 SM-3 (AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense),
  6. NY Times article, 9/18/09.
  7. Russia's Putin praises Obama's missile defense decision, LA Times, 9/19/09.
  8. No missile defense in Eastern Europe,, 9/17/09.
  9. Obama sharply alters missile defense plans By William H. McMichael, Sep 19, 2009,
  10. Article on Sm-3 missile system,, 10/4/09.
  11. "MDA announces next 6 BMD ships", Navy Times, 12 November 2009.
  12. BMD Strategies: Multilayered Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Part 2 and 3, by Daniel Goure, Arlington, Va.,, April 21, 2009.
  13. Q&A: US missile defence, BBC, 9/20/09.
  14. Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR), Official briefing document, Missile Defense Agency website, 9/20/09.
  15. International Cooperation, official briefing document, Missile Defense Agency website, 9/20/09.
  16. Air Defense Artillery Magazine, May - June 1995 issue Vigilant and Invincible
  17. Federation of American Scientists: Ballistic Missile Defense
  18. Missile Defence: International, Regional and National Implications, edited by Bertel Heurlin, et al
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  21. US Department of Defense. MISSILE INTERCEPT TEST SUCCESSFUL. October 14, 2002.
  22. Federation of American Scientists. National Security Presidential Directive 23. December 16, 2002.
  23. BBC. US considers Polish missile base. November 17, 2005
  24. Missile Defense Agency. Missile Defense Flight Test Conducted. (PDF).February 14, 2005.
  25. Missile Defense Agency. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test Successful. (PDF). February 24, 2005.
  26. US Department of Defense. DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Obering from the Pentagon. September 1, 2006.
  27. Center for Defense Information Flight Tests for Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System, June 18, 2007 . (PDF).
  28. UPI via Space Daily. Analysis: Missile Defense Semantics. January 17, 2005.
  29. Russia piles pressure on EU over missile shield, Telegraph
  30. China, Russia sign nuclear deal, condemn US missile defense plans, International Herald Tribune
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  32. U.S., Russia no closer on missile defense,
  33. John McCain 2008 - Effective Missile Defense
  34. Republican Debate Offers Internal Jabs, Pack Attack on Hillary Clinton,
  35. Obama's Missile Defenses - Early Warning
  36. Obama's Defense Plan Leaves Us Vulnerable,
  37. Poland Avoids Missile Defense Topic With Obama, CBS News
  38. Insider’s Projects Drained Missile-Defense Millions,, October 11, 2008
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  43. Ne základnám | Více jak 130 000 podpisů pro referendum
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  50. - Russia Warns of Military Response If U.S.-Czech Missile Defense Agreement Approved - International News | News of the World | Middle East News | Europe News
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  58. NY Times article, 9/18/09.
  59. Russia's Putin praises Obama's missile defense decision, LA Times, 9/19/09.
  60. No missile defense in Eastern Europe,, 9/17/09.
  61. Obama sharply alters missile defense plans By William H. McMichael, Sep 19, 2009,
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