Negotiation is a
dialogue
intended to
resolve disputes, to
produce an agreement upon courses of action, to bargain for
individual or
collective
advantage, or to craft outcomes to satisfy various interests.
It is the primary method of
alternative dispute
resolution.
Negotiation occurs in business, non-profit organizations,
government branches, legal proceedings, among nations and in
personal situations such as marriage, divorce, parenting, and
everyday life. The study of the subject is called
negotiation theory. Professional
negotiators are often specialized, such as
union
negotiators,
leverage buyout negotiators,
peace
negotiators,
hostage negotiators, or may work under
other titles, such as
diplomats,
legislators or
brokers.
Etymology
The word "negotiation" is from the Latin expression, "negotiatus",
past participle of negotiare which means "to carry on business".
"Negotium" means literally "not leisure".
Approaches to negotiation
Negotiation typically manifests itself with a trained negotiator
acting on behalf of a particular organization or position. It can
be compared to
mediation where a
disinterested third party listens to each sides' arguments and
attempts to help craft an agreement between the parties. It is also
related to
arbitration which, as with a
legal proceeding, both sides make an argument as to the merits of
their "case" and then the arbitrator decides the outcome for both
parties.
There are many different ways to segment negotiation to gain a
greater understanding of the essential parts. One view of
negotiation involves three basic elements:
process,
behavior and
substance. The process refers to how
the parties negotiate: the context of the negotiations, the parties
to the negotiations, the tactics used by the parties, and the
sequence and stages in which all of these play out. Behavior refers
to the relationships among these parties, the communication between
them and the styles they adopt. The substance refers to what the
parties negotiate over: the agenda, the issues (positions and -
more helpfully - interests), the options, and the agreement(s)
reached at the end.
Another view of negotiation comprises 4 elements:
strategy,
process and
tools, and
tactics. Strategy comprises the top level goals -
typically including relationship and the final outcome. Processes
and tools include the steps that will be followed and the roles
taken in both preparing for and negotiating with the other parties.
Tactics include more detailed statements and actions and responses
to others' statements and actions. Some add to this
persuasion
and influence, asserting that these have become integral to
modern day negotiation success, and so should not be omitted.
Skilled negotiators may use a variety of tactics ranging from
negotiation hypnosis, to a straight forward presentation of demands
or setting of preconditions to more deceptive approaches such as
cherry picking. Intimidation and
salami tactics may also play a part
in swaying the outcome of negotiations.
Another negotiation tactic is bad guy/good guy. Bad guy/good guy
tactic is when one negotiator acts as a bad guy by using anger and
threats. The other negotiator acts as a good guy by being
considerate and understanding. The good guy blames the bad guy for
all the difficulties while trying to get concessions and agreement
from the opponent.
The advocate's approach
In the advocacy approach, a skilled negotiator usually serves as
advocate for one party to the negotiation and attempts to obtain
the most favorable outcomes possible for that party. In this
process the negotiator attempts to determine the minimum outcome(s)
the other party is (or parties are) willing to accept, then adjusts
their demands accordingly. A "successful" negotiation in the
advocacy approach is when the negotiator is able to obtain all or
most of the outcomes their party desires, but without driving the
other party to permanently break off negotiations, unless the
best
alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) is
acceptable.
Traditional negotiating is sometimes called
win-lose
because of the assumption of a fixed "pie", that one person's gain
results in another person's loss. This is only true, however, if
only a single issue needs to be resolved, such as a price in a
simple sales negotiation.
During the 1960s,
Gerard I.
Nierenberg recognized the role
of negotiation in resolving disputes in personal, business and
international relations. He published
The Art of
Negotiating, where he states that the philosophies of the
negotiators determine the direction a negotiation takes. His
Everybody Wins philosophy assures that all parties benefit
from the negotiation process which also produces more successful
outcomes than the adversarial “winner takes all” approach.
Getting to
YES was published by Roger
Fisher and William Ury as part of
the Harvard
negotiation
project. The book's approach, referred to as Principled
Negotiation, is also sometimes called
mutual gains bargaining. The mutual
gains approach has been effectively applied in environmental
situations (see
Lawrence Susskind
and
Adil Najam) as well as
labor relations where the parties (e.g.
management and a
labor union) frame the negotiation as "problem
solving". If multiple issues are discussed, differences in the
parties' preferences make win-win negotiation possible. For
example, in a labor negotiation, the union might prefer job
security over wage gains. If the employers have opposite
preferences, a trade is possible that is beneficial to both
parties. Such a negotiation is therefore not an adversarial
zero-sum game.
There are a tremendous number of other scholars who have
contributed to the field of negotiation, including
Holly Schroth at UC Berkeley,
Gerard E. Watzke at Tulane University,
Sara Cobb at George Mason University,
Len Riskin at the University of Missouri,
Howard Raiffa at Harvard,
Robert McKersie and
Lawrence Susskind at MIT, and
Adil Najam and
Jeswald Salacuse at The Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy.
The new creative approach
Perhaps the most famous negotiation parable involves an argument
over an orange. The most obvious approach was to simply cut it in
half, each person getting a fair share. But, when the negotiators
began talking to each other, exchanging information about their
interests, a better solution to the problem became obvious. The
person wanting the orange for juice for breakfast took that part
and the person wanting the rind for making marmalade took that
part. Both sides ended up with more. Neither agreement is
particularly creative.The parable of the orange becomes a story
about creativity when both parties decide to cooperate in planting
an orange tree or even an orchard. In a similar way, Boeing buys
composite plastic wings for its new 787 Dreamliner designed and
manufactured by Japanese suppliers, and then sells the completed
787s back to Japanese airlines, all with a nice subsidy from the
Japanese government. This is what is meant by creativity in
negotiations.At business schools these days much is being learned
about creative processes. Courses are offered and dissertations
proffered with “innovation” as the key buzz word at academic
conferences and in corporate boardrooms. And, the more heard about
innovation and creative processes the greater is the appreciation
that the Japanese approach to negotiations, by nature, uses many of
the techniques commonly emphasized in any discussion of creative
processes. Indeed, there appears to be a deeply fundamental
explanation why the Japanese have been able to build such a
successful society despite their lack of natural resources and
relative isolation. While Japanese society does have its own
obstacles to creativity – hierarchy and collectivism are two – they
have developed a negotiation style that in many ways obviates such
disadvantages. Indeed, the ten new rules for global negotiations
advocated by Hernandez and Graham nicely coincide with an approach
that comes naturally to the Japanese:
- Accept only creative outcomes
- Understand cultures, especially your own.
- Don’t just adjust to cultural differences, exploit them.
- Gather intelligence and reconnoiter the terrain.
- Design the information flow and process of meetings.
- Invest in personal relationships.
- Persuade with questions. Seek information and
understanding.
- Make no concessions until the end.
- Use techniques of creativity
- Continue creativity after negotiations.
Beyond the practices of the Japanese, credit must also be given to
the luminaries in field that have long advocated creativity in
negotiations. Howard Raiffa and his colleagues recommend:…the teams
should think and plan together informally and do some joint
brainstorming, which can be thought of as “dialoguing” or
“prenegotiating.” The two sides make no tradeoffs, commitments, or
arguments about how to divide the pie at this early stage.Roger
Fisher and William Ury title their Chapter 4 in
Getting to
Yes, “Invent[ing] Options for Mutual Gain.” David Lax and
James Sebenius, in their important new book,
3D-Negotiations,go past getting to yes, and talk about
“creative agreements” and “great agreements.” Lawrence Susskind and
his associates recommend “parallel informal negotiations” toward
building creative negotiation outcomes.These ideas must be pushed
to the forefront in thinking about negotiations. The field
generally is still stuck in the past, talking about “making deals”
and “solving problems” as above. Even the use of terms like
“win-win” expose the vestiges of the old competitive thinking. The
point is that a negotiation is not something that can be won or
lost, and the competitive metaphor limits creativity. The
problem-solving metaphor does as well. Thus, the first rule of
negotiations is: Accept only creative outcomes!Lynda Lawrence at
IdeaWorks, a Newport Beach consulting firm (
[3562])
has developed a most useful list of ways to generate more ideas
during negotiations:
10 Ways to Generate More Ideas
- Establish common goals of what this "collaboration" would
create. A more workable deal? Some common long term goals? A closer
partnership?
- Establish the rules of engagement. The purpose of the exercise
is to resolve differences in creative ways that work better for
both parties. All ideas are possibilities, and research shows that
combining ideas from different cultures can result in better
outcomes than those from a single culture.
- Trust is key, and difficult to establish in many cultures.
Certain techniques might speed that process a little. Being
offsite, for example. Establishing physical proximity that
unconsciously signals intimacy.
- Add diversity (gender, culture, extroverts, different work
specialties, experts, outsiders) to the group. Indeed, the
diversity associated with international teams and alliances is the
real goldmine of creativity in negotiations.
- Use storytelling. This both helps establish who you are and
what point of view you are bringing to this collaboration.
- Work in small groups. Add physical movement. Tell the
participants to relax, play, sing, have fun, and silence is
ok.
- Work holistically and using visuals. If, for example, there are
three sticking points where neither side is happy, agree to work on
those points by spending a short time – 10 minutes – on each point
where both sides offer "crazy" suggestions. Use techniques of
improvisation. Neither side should be offended by the crazy ideas.
No one should criticize. Explain that by exploring crazy ideas that
better ideas are often generated.
- Sleep on it. This enables the unconscious to work on the
problems, and gives negotiators time to collect opinions before
meeting again the next day. Other kinds of breaks, coffee, etc. are
also helpful. The overnight part is particularly important.
Anthropologist and consumer expert Clotaire Rapaille suggests that
the transitions between wakefulness and sleep allow new kinds of
thinking “…calming their brainwaves, getting them to that tranquil
point just before sleep” (page 8).
- Doing this process over several sessions allows both sides to
feel that progress is being made, and actually generates better and
more polished ideas that both sides can invest in.
- It is the process of creating something together, rather than
the specific proposals, which creates bonding around a shared task
and establishes new ways of working together. Each side feels
honored and all can feel that something is being accomplished.
For the Japanese reader, some of these will be quite familiar. It’s
easy to get Japanese in close physical proximity (#3), they’ve been
living that way for millennia. In Japanese companies there are not
so much marketing specialists as different from engineers as
different from finance analysts. Each executive may have worked in
several functional areas, limiting the “chimney effect” often
associated disparagingly with American firms (#4). Physical
movement (#6) – picture the start of the day at the typical
Japanese factory. The Japanese also seem to work best in small
groups (#6). Silence is definitely ok (part of #6). The Japanese
invented karaoke (#6 and singing). The Japanese have difficulty
criticizing others, especially foreigners (#7). The use of visuals
and holistic thinking are natural for Japanese (#7). Breaks are
also a common procedure for Japanese (#8). Japanese will work
better with people with whom they are familiar (#9).
It should also be noted that some of these techniques will seem
foreign to Japanese negotiators. For example, diversity is not a
strong suit for Japanese – purposefully adding women and other
elements of diversity (#4) to their groups would seem odd. However,
the two key things the Japanese do in negotiation that others can
and should learn are: First, the Japanese are the absolute champion
information vacuums on the planet. They keep their mouths shut and
let everyone else do the talking. Thus, they use the diversity of
their international colleagues (customers, suppliers, competitors,
scientists, etc.) to a greater extent than any other society. Often
this is denigrated as copying and borrowing, but in fact being open
to everyone’s ideas has always been the key to creativity and human
progress. While the Japanese, like everyone else around the world,
are ethnocentric, they still very much respect foreign ideas.
Second, the Japanese will only work with dolphins (cooperative
negotiators), that is, when they have a choice. Trust and
creativity go hand-in-hand. And, they will work to train their
foreign counterparts to behave more cooperatively for the latter’s
own good. Witness the 25-year joint venture between Toyota and
General Motors for manufacturing small cars in Fremont, CA as a
prominent example.
Application of principles of creativity will be appropriate in at
least three points during negotiations. Above noted was Howard
Raiffa’s suggestion that they be used in pre-negotiation meetings.
Second, others advocate their use when impasses are reached. For
example, in the negotiations regarding the Rio Urubamba natural gas
project in Peru, the involved firms and environmentalist groups
reached what at the time seemed to be an irreconcilable difference
-- roads and a huge pipeline through the pristine forest would be
an ecological disaster. The creative solution? Think of the remote
gas field as an offshore platform, run the pipeline underground,
and fly in personnel and equipment as needed.
Finally, even when negotiators have arrived at “yes,” a scheduled
review of the agreement may actually move the relationship past
“yes” to truly creative outcomes. Perhaps such a review might be
scheduled six months after implementation of the agreement has
begun. But, the point is time must be set aside for a creative
discussion of how to improve on the agreed to relationship? The
emphasis of such a session should always be putting new ideas on
the table – the answers to the question “what haven’t we thought
of?”
Other Negotiation Styles
Shell identified five styles/responses to negotiation. Individuals
can often have strong dispositions towards numerous styles; the
style used during a negotiation depends on the context and the
interests of the other party, among other factors. In addition,
styles can change over time.
- Accommodating: Individuals who enjoy solving
the other party’s problems and preserving personal relationships.
Accommodators are sensitive to the emotional states, body language,
and verbal signals of the other parties. They can, however, feel
taken advantage of in situations when the other party places little
emphasis on the relationship.
- Avoiding: Individuals who do not like to
negotiate and don’t do it unless warranted. When negotiating,
avoiders tend to defer and dodge the confrontational aspects of
negotiating; however, they may be perceived as tactful and
diplomatic.
- Collaborating: Individuals who enjoy
negotiations that involve solving tough problems in creative ways.
Collaborators are good at using negotiations to understand the
concerns and interests of the other parties. They can, however,
create problems by transforming simple situations into more complex
ones.
- Competing: Individuals who enjoy negotiations
because they present an opportunity to win something. Competitive
negotiators have strong instincts for all aspects of negotiating
and are often strategic. Because their style can dominate the
bargaining process, competitive negotiators often neglect the
importance of relationships.
- Compromising: Individuals who are eager to
close the deal by doing what is fair and equal for all parties
involved in the negotiation. Compromisers can be useful when there
is limited time to complete the deal; however, compromisers often
unnecessarily rush the negotiation process and make concessions too
quickly.
Emotion in negotiation
Emotions play an important part in the
negotiation process, although it is only in recent years that their
effect is being studied. Emotions have the potential to play either
a positive or negative role in negotiation. During negotiations,
the decision as to whether or not to settle, rests in part on
emotional factors. Negative emotions can cause intense and even
irrational behavior, and can cause conflicts to escalate and
negotiations to break down, while positive emotions facilitate
reaching an agreement and help to maximize joint gains.
Affect effect:
Dispositional affects affect the
various stages of the negotiation process: which strategies are
planned to be used, which strategies are actually chosen, the way
the other party and its intentions are perceived, the willingness
to reach an agreement and the final outcomes. Positive affectivity
(PA) and negative affectivity (NA) of one or more of the
negotiating sides can lead to very different outcomes.
Positive affect in negotiation
Even before the negotiation process starts, people in a positive
mood have more confidence, and higher tendencies to plan to use a
cooperative strategy. During the negotiation, negotiators who are
in a positive mood tend to enjoy the interaction more, show less
contentious behavior, use less aggressive tactics and more
cooperative strategies. This in turn increases the likelihood that
parties will reach their instrumental goals, and enhance the
ability to find integrative gains. Indeed, compared with
negotiators with negative or natural affectivity, negotiators with
positive affectivity reached more agreements and tended to honor
those agreements more.Those favorable outcomes are due to better
decision making processes, such as
flexible thinking, creative
problem
solving, respect for others' perspectives, willingness to take
risks and higher confidence.Post negotiation positive affect has
beneficial consequences as well. It increases satisfaction with
achieved outcome and influences one’s desire for future
interactions. The PA aroused by reaching an agreement facilitates
the dyadic relationship, which result in affective commitment that
sets the stage for subsequent interactions.
PA also has its drawbacks: it distorts perception of self
performance, such that performance is judged to be relatively
better than it actually is. Thus, studies involving self reports on
achieved outcomes might be biased.
Negative affect in negotiation
Negative affect has detrimental effects on various stages in the
negotiation process. Although various negative emotions affect
negotiation outcomes, by far the most researched is
anger. Angry negotiators plan to use more competitive
strategies and to cooperate less, even before the negotiation
starts. These competitive strategies are related to reduced joint
outcomes.During negotiations, anger disrupts the process by
reducing the level of trust, clouding parties' judgment, narrowing
parties' focus of attention and changing their central goal from
reaching agreement to retaliating against the other side. Angry
negotiators pay less attention to opponent’s interests and are less
accurate in judging their interests, thus achieve lower joint
gains. Moreover, because anger makes negotiators more self-centered
in their preferences, it increases the likelihood that they will
reject profitable offers.Anger doesn’t help in achieving
negotiation goals either: it reduces joint gains and does not help
to boost personal gains, as angry negotiators don’t succeed in
claiming more for themselves. Moreover, negative emotions lead to
acceptance of settlements that are not in the positive
utility function but rather have a
negative
utility. However, expression of
negative emotions during negotiation can sometimes be beneficial:
legitimately expressed anger can be an effective way to show one's
commitment, sincerity, and needs. Moreover, although NA reduces
gains in integrative tasks, it is a better strategy than PA in
distributive tasks (such as
zero-sum). In
his work on negative affect arousal and white noise, Seidner found
support for the existence of a negative affect arousal mechanism
through observations regarding the devaluation of speakers from
other ethnic origins." Negotiation may be negatively affected, in
turn, by submerged hostility toward an ethnic or gender
group.
Conditions for emotion affect in negotiation
Research indicates that negotiator’s emotions do not necessarily
affect the negotiation process.Albarracın et al. (2003) suggested
that there are two conditions for emotional affect, both related to
the ability (presence of environmental or cognitive disturbances)
and the motivation:
- Identification of the affect: requires high motivation, high
ability or both.
- Determination that the affect is relevant and important for the
judgment: requires that either the motivation, the ability or both
are low.
According to this model, emotions are expected to affect
negotiations only when one is high and the other is low. When both
ability and motivation are low the affect will not be identified,
and when both are high the affect will be identify but discounted
as irrelevant for judgment.A possible implication of this model is,
for example, that the positive effects PA has on negotiations (as
described above) will be seen only when either motivation or
ability are low.
The effect of the partner’s emotions
Most studies on emotion in negotiations focus on the effect of the
negotiator’s own emotions on the process. However, what the other
party feels might be just as important, as
group emotions are known to affect processes
both at the group and the personal levels.When it comes to
negotiations, trust in the other party is a necessary condition for
its emotion to affect, and visibility enhances the effect.Emotions
contribute to negotiation processes by signaling what one feels and
thinks and can thus prevent the other party from engaging in
destructive behaviors and to indicate what steps should be taken
next: PA signals to keep in the same way, while NA points that
mental or behavioral adjustments are needed.
Partner’s emotions can have two basic effects on negotiator’s
emotions and behavior: mimetic/ reciprocal or complementary. For
example,
disappointment or
sadness might lead to
compassion and more cooperation. In a study by
Butt et al. (2005) which simulated real multi-phase negotiation,
most people reacted to the partner’s emotions in reciprocal, rather
than complementary, manner.Specific emotions were found to have
different effects on the opponent’s feelings and strategies chosen:
- Anger caused the opponents to place lower
demands and to concede more in a zero-sum
negotiation, but also to evaluate the negotiation less favorably.
It provoked both dominating and yielding behaviors of the
opponent..
- Pride led to more
integrative and compromise strategies by the partner.
- Guilt or regret expressed by the negotiator
led to better impression of him by the opponent, however it also
led the opponent to place higher demands.. On the other hand,
personal guilt was related to more satisfaction with what one
achieved.
- Worry or
disappointment left bad impression on the
opponent, but led to relatively lower demands by the opponent.
Problems with lab negotiation studies
Negotiation is a rather complex
interaction. Capturing all its complexity is a
very difficult task, let alone isolating and controlling only
certain aspects of it. For this reason most negotiation studies are
done under
laboratory conditions, and
focus only on some aspects. Although lab studies have their
advantages, they do have major drawbacks when studying emotions:
- Emotions in lab studies are usually manipulated and are
therefore relatively ‘cold’ (not intense). Although those ‘cold’
emotions might be enough to show effects, they are qualitatively
different from the ‘hot’ emotions often experienced during
negotiations.
- In real life there is self-selection to which negotiation one
gets into, which effects the emotional commitment, motivation and
interests. However this is not the case in lab studies.
- Lab studies tend to focus on relatively few well defined
emotions. Real life scenarios provoke a much wider scale of
emotions.
- Coding the emotions has a double catch: if done by a third
side, some emotions might not be detected as the negotiator
sublimates them for strategic reasons. Self report measures might
overcome this, but they are usually filled only before or after the
process, and if filled during the process might interfere with
it.
The pervasive impact of culture on international
negotiations
The primary purpose of this section is to demonstrate the extent of
cultural differences in
negotiation styles and how these differences can cause problems in
international business negotiations. The reader will note that
national culture does not determine negotiation behavior. Rather,
national culture is one of many factors that influence behavior at
the negotiation table, albeit an important one. For example,
gender, organizational culture, international experience, industry
or regional background can all be important influences as well. Of
course, stereotypes of all kinds are dangerous, and international
negotiators must get to know the people they are working with, not
just their culture, country, or company.
The material here is based on systematic study of international
negotiation behavior over the last three decades in which the
negotiation styles of more than 1,500 businesspeople in 17
countries (21 cultures) were considered. The work involved
interviews with experienced executives and participant observations
in the field, as well as behavioral science laboratory work
including surveys and analyses of videotaped negotiations. The
countries studied were Japan, S. Korea, China (Tianjin, Guangzhou,
and Hong Kong), Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Russia, Israel,
Norway, the Czech Republic, Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
Spain, Brazil, Mexico, Canada (English-speakers and
French-speakers), and the United States. The countries were chosen
because they constitute America’s most important present and future
trading partners.
Looking broadly across the several cultures, two important lessons
stand out. The first is that regional generalizations very often
are not correct. For example, Japanese and Korean negotiation
styles are quite similar in some ways, but in other ways they could
not be more different. The second lesson learned from the research
is that Japan is an exceptional place: On almost every dimension of
negotiation style considered, the Japanese are on or near the end
of the scale. For example, the Japanese use the lowest amount of
eye contact of the cultures studied. Sometimes, Americans are on
the other end. But actually, most of the time Americans are
somewhere in the middle. The reader will see this evinced in the
data presented in this section. The Japanese approach, however, is
most distinct, even
sui generis.
Cultural differences cause four kinds of problems in international
business negotiations, at the levels of:
- Language
- Nonverbal behaviors
- Values
- Thinking and decision-making processes
The order is important; the problems lower on the list are more
serious because they are more subtle. For example, two negotiators
would notice immediately if one were speaking Japanese and the
other German. The solution to the problem may be as simple as
hiring an interpreter or talking in a common third language, or it
may be as difficult as learning a language. Regardless of the
solution, the problem is obvious.
Cultural differences in nonverbal behaviors, on the other hand, are
almost always hidden below our awareness. That is to say, in a
face-to-face negotiation participants nonverbally—and more
subtly—give off and take in a great deal of information. Some
experts argue that this information is more important than verbal
information. Almost all this signaling goes on below our levels of
consciousness. When the nonverbal signals from foreign partners are
different, negotiators are most apt to misinterpret them without
even being conscious of the mistake. For example, when a French
client consistently interrupts, Americans tend to feel
uncomfortable without noticing exactly why. In this manner,
interpersonal friction often colors business relationships, goes
undetected, and, consequently, goes uncorrected. Differences in
values and thinking and decision-making processes are hidden even
deeper and therefore are even harder to diagnose and therefore
cure. These differences are discussed below, starting with language
and nonverbal behaviors.
Differences at the level of language
Translation problems are often substantial in international
negotiations. And, when languages are linguistically distant,
greater problems should be anticipated. Particularly daunting can
be work in global negotiation. Often the language used is English,
but it may be spoken as a second language by most executives at the
table. Indeed, native speakers from England, India, and the United
States often have trouble understanding one another. Exact
translations in international interactions are a goal almost never
attained.
Moreover, language differences are sometimes exploited in
interesting ways. Many senior executives in foreign countries speak
and understand some English, but prefer to speak in their
“stronger” native language and use an interpreter. Thus, we've see
a senior Russian negotiator asking questions in Russian. The
interpreter then translated the question for his American
counterpart. While the interpreter spoke, the American’s attention
(gaze direction) was given to the interpreter. However, the
Russian’s gaze direction was at the American. Therefore, the
Russian could carefully and unobtrusively observe the American's
facial expressions and nonverbal responses. Additionally, when the
American spoke, the senior Russian had twice the response time.
Because he understood English, he could formulate his responses
during the translation process.
What’s this extra response time worth in a strategic conversation?
What’s it worth to be carefully able to observe the nonverbal
responses of your top-level counterpart in a high-stakes business
negotiation? Simply stated, bilingualism is not a common
characteristic for Americans, and therefore competitors with
greater language skills are afforded a natural advantage in
international commerce.
Additionally, a common complaint heard from American managers
regards foreign clients and partners breaking into side
conversations in their native languages. At best, it is seen as
impolite, and quite often American negotiators are likely to
attribute something sinister to the content of the foreign
talk—“They’re plotting or telling secrets.” This is a frequent
American mistake.
The usual purpose of such side conversations is to straighten out a
translation problem. For instance, one Korean may lean over to
another and ask, “What’d he say?” Or, the side conversation can
regard a disagreement among the foreign team members. Both
circumstances should be seen as positive signs by Americans—that
is, getting translations straight enhances the efficiency of the
interactions, and concessions often follow internal disagreements.
But because most Americans speak only one language, neither
circumstance is appreciated. By the way, people from other
countries are advised to give Americans a brief explanation of the
content of their first few side conversations to assuage the
sinister attributions.
But, there are problems at the level of language beyond
translations and interpreters. Data from simulated negotiations are
informative. In the study, the verbal behaviors of negotiators in
15 of the cultures (six negotiators in each of the 15 groups) were
videotaped.Graham and his colleagues have completed similar sorts
of content analyses with 60 Americans and 52 Russian negotiators
and the correspondence of the findings between the larger and
smaller sample sizes is great (r > 0.9, p 0.05), see C. Roemer,
J. Neu, P. Garb, and J.L. Graham, “A Comparison of Russian and
American Negotiation Behaviors,”
Journal of International
Negotiation, 1999(4), pages 1-25. The numbers in the body of
Exhibit 1 represent the percentages of statements that were
classified into each category listed. That is, 7 percent of the
statements made by Japanese negotiators were classified as
promises, 4 percent as threats, 7 percent as recommendations, and
so on. The verbal bargaining behaviors used by the negotiators
during the simulations proved to be surprisingly similar across
cultures. Negotiations in all 15 cultures were composed primarily
of information-exchange tactics—questions and self-disclosures.
Note that the Israelis are on the low end of the continuum of
self-disclosures. Their 30 percent (near the Japanese, Spaniards,
and the English-speaking Canadians at 34 percent) was the lowest
across all 15 groups, suggesting that they are the most reticent
about giving (that is, communicating) information. Overall,
however, the patterns of verbal tactics used were surprisingly
similar across the diverse cultures.
Go to Exhibit 1, Verbal Negotiation Tactics, (the “what” of
communications) across 15 Cultures:
[3563]
Nonverbal behaviors
Anthropologist Ray L. Birdwhistell demonstrated that less than 35%
of the message in conversations is conveyed by the spoken word
while the other 65% is communicated nonverbally. Albert Mehrabian,
a UCLA psychologist, also parsed where meaning comes from in
face-to-face interactions. He reports:
- 7% of the meaning is derived from the words spoken
- 38% from paralinguistic channels, that is, tone of voice,
loudness, and other aspects of how things are said
- 55% from facial expressions
Of course, some might quibble with the exact percentages (and many
have), but our work also supports the notion that nonverbal
behaviors are crucial – how things are said is often more important
than what is said.
Exhibit 2 provides analyses of some linguistic aspects and
nonverbal behaviors for the 15 videotaped groups, that is, how
things are said. Although these efforts merely scratch the surface
of these kinds of behavioral analyses, they still provide
indications of substantial cultural differences. Note that, once
again, the Japanese are at or next to the end of the continuum on
almost every dimension of the behaviors listed. Their facial gazing
and touching are the least among the 15 groups. Only the Northern
Chinese used the word no less frequently, and only the Russians
used more silent periods than did the Japanese.
Go to Exhibit 2, Linguistic Aspects of Language and Nonverbal
Behaviors (“how” things are said) across 15 Cultures:
[3564]
A broader examination of the data in Exhibits 1 and 2 reveals a
more meaningful conclusion: The variation across cultures is
greater when comparing linguistic aspects of language and nonverbal
behaviors than when the verbal content of negotiations is
considered. For example, notice the great differences between the
Japanese and Brazilians in Exhibit 1 vis-à-vis Exhibit 2.
Distinctive negotiation behaviors of 15 cultural groups
Following are further descriptions of the distinctive aspects of
each of the 15 cultural groups videotaped. Certainly, conclusions
of statistical significant differences between individual cultures
cannot be drawn without larger sample sizes. But, the suggested
cultural differences are worthwhile to consider briefly.
Japan. Consistent with most descriptions of
Japanese negotiation behavior, the results of this analysis suggest
their style of interaction is among the least aggressive (or most
polite). Threats, commands, and warnings appear to be de-emphasized
in favor of the more positive promises, recommendations, and
commitments. Particularly indicative of their polite conversational
style was their infrequent use of
no and
you and
facial gazing, as well as more frequent silent periods.
Korea. Perhaps one of the more interesting aspects
of the analysis is the contrast of the Asian styles of
negotiations. Non-Asians often generalize about the Orient; the
findings demonstrate, however, that this is a mistake. Korean
negotiators used considerably more punishments and commands than
did the Japanese. Koreans used the word no and interrupted more
than three times as frequently as the Japanese. Moreover, no silent
periods occurred between Korean negotiators.
China (Northern). The behaviors of the negotiators
from Northern China (i.e., in and around Tianjin) were most
remarkable in the emphasis on asking questions (34 percent).
Indeed, 70 percent of the statements made by the Chinese
negotiators were classified as information-exchange tactics. Other
aspects of their behavior were quite similar to the Japanese,
particularly the use of
no and
you and silent
periods.
Taiwan. The behavior of the businesspeople in
Taiwan was quite different from that in China and Japan but similar
to that in Korea. The Chinese on Taiwan were exceptional in the
time of facial gazing—on the average, almost 20 of 30 minutes. They
asked fewer questions and provided more information
(self-disclosures) than did any of the other Asian groups.
Russia. The Russians’ style was quite different
from that of any other European group, and, indeed, was quite
similar in many respects to the style of the Japanese. They used
no and
you infrequently and used the most silent
periods of any group. Only the Japanese did less facial gazing, and
only the Chinese asked a greater percentage of questions.
Israel. The behaviors of the Israeli negotiators
were distinctive in three respects. As mentioned above, they used
the lowest percentage of self-disclosures, apparently holding their
cards relatively closely. Alternatively, they used by far the
highest percentages of promises and recommendations, using these
persuasive strategies unusually heavily. They were also at the end
of the scale on the percentage of normative appeals at 5 percent
with the most frequent reference to competitors’ offers. Perhaps
most importantly the Israeli negotiators interrupted one another
much more frequently than negotiators from any other group. Indeed,
this important nonverbal behavior is most likely to blame for the
“pushy” stereotype often used by Americans to describe their
Israeli negotiation partners.
Germany. The behaviors of the Germans are
difficult to characterize because they fell toward the center of
almost all the continua. However, the Germans were exceptional in
the high percentage of self-disclosures (47 percent) and the low
percentage of questions (11 percent).
United Kingdom. The behaviors of the British
negotiators were remarkably similar to those of the Americans in
all respects. Most British negotiators have a strong sense of the
right way to negotiate and the wrong. Protocol is of great
importance.
Spain. Diga is perhaps a good metaphor
for the Spanish approach to negotiations evinced in our data. When
you make a phone call in Madrid, the usual greeting on the other
end is not
hola (“hello”) but is, instead,
diga
(“speak”). It is not surprising, then, that the Spaniards in the
videotaped negotiations likewise used the highest percentage of
commands (17 percent) of any of the groups and gave comparatively
little information (self-disclosures, only 34 percent). Moreover,
they interrupted one another more frequently than any other group,
and they used the terms
no and
you very
frequently.
France. The style of the French negotiators was
perhaps the most aggressive of all the groups. In particular, they
used the highest percentage of threats and warnings (together, 8
percent). They also used interruptions, facial gazing, and
no and
you very frequently compared with the
other groups, and one of the French negotiators touched his partner
on the arm during the simulation.
Brazil. The Brazilian businesspeople, like the
French and Spanish, were quite aggressive. They used the
second-highest percentage of commands of all the groups. On
average, the Brazilians said the word
no 42 times,
you 90 times, and touched one another on the arm about 5
times during 30 minutes of negotiation. Facial gazing was also
high.
Mexico. The patterns of Mexican behavior in our
negotiations are good reminders of the dangers of regional or
language-group generalizations. Both verbal and nonverbal behaviors
were quite different than those of their Latin American (Brazilian)
or continental (Spanish) cousins. Indeed, Mexicans answer the
telephone with the much less demanding
bueno (short for
“good day”). In many respects, the Mexican behavior was very
similar to that of the negotiators from the United States.
French-Speaking Canada. The French-speaking
Canadians behaved quite similarly to their continental cousins.
Like the negotiators from France, they too used high percentages of
threats and warnings, and even more interruptions and eye contact.
Such an aggressive interaction style would not mix well with some
of the more low-key styles of some of the Asian groups or with
English speakers, including English-speaking Canadians.
English-Speaking Canada. The Canadians who speak
English as their first language used the lowest percentage of
aggressive persuasive tactics (threats, warnings, and punishments
totaled only 1 percent) of all 15 groups. Perhaps, as
communications researchers suggest, such stylistic differences are
the seeds of interethnic discord as witnessed in Canada over the
years. With respect to international negotiations, the
English-speaking Canadians used noticeably more interruptions and
no’s than negotiators from either of Canada’s major trading
partners, the United States and Japan.
United States. Like the Germans and the British,
the Americans fell in the middle of most continua. They did
interrupt one another less frequently than all the others, but that
was their sole distinction.
These differences across the cultures are quite complex, and this
material by itself should not be used to predict the behaviors of
foreign counterparts. Instead, great care should be taken with
respect to the aforementioned dangers of stereotypes. The key here
is to be aware of these kinds of differences so that the Japanese
silence, the Brazilian “no, no, no…,” or the French threat are not
misinterpreted.
Differences in managerial values as pertinent to
negotiations
Four managerial values—objectivity, competitiveness, equality, and
punctuality—that are held strongly and deeply by most Americans
seem to frequently cause misunderstandings and bad feelings in
international business negotiations.
Objectivity
“Americans make decisions based upon the bottom line and on cold,
hard facts.” “Americans don’t play favorites.” “Economics and
performance count, not people.” “Business is business.” Such
statements well reflect American notions of the importance of
objectivity.
The single most successful book on the topic of negotiation,
Getting to Yes, is highly recommended for both American
and foreign readers. The latter will learn not only about
negotiations but, perhaps more important, about how Americans think
about negotiations. The authors are quite emphatic about
“separating the people from the problem,” and they state, “Every
negotiator has two kinds of interests: in the substance and in the
relationship.” This advice is probably quite worthwhile in the
United States or perhaps in Germany, but in most places in the
world such advice is nonsense. In most places in the world,
particularly in collectivistic, high-context cultures,
personalities and substance are not separate issues and cannot be
made so.
For example, consider how important nepotism is in Chinese or
Hispanic cultures. Experts tell us that businesses don’t grow
beyond the bounds and bonds of tight family control in the
burgeoning “Chinese commonwealth.” Things work the same way in
Spain, Mexico, and the Philippines. And, naturally, negotiators
from such countries not only will take things personally but will
be personally affected by negotiation outcomes. What happens to
them at the negotiation table will affect the business relationship
regardless of the economics involved.
Competitiveness and Equality
Simulated negotiations can be viewed as a kind of experimental
economics wherein the values of each participating cultural group
are roughly reflected in the economic outcomes. The simple
simulation used in this part of our work represents the essence of
commercial negotiations—it has both competitive and cooperative
aspects. At least 40 businesspeople from each culture played the
same buyer-seller game, negotiating over the prices of three
products. Depending on the agreement reached, the “negotiation pie”
could be made larger through cooperation (as high as $10,400 in
joint profits) before it was divided between the buyer and seller.
The results are summarized in Exhibit 3.
Go to Exhibit 3, Cultural Differences in Competitiveness and
Equality in Negotiation Outcomes across 20 Cultures:
[3565]
The Japanese were the champions at making the pie big. Their joint
profits in the simulation were the highest (at $9,590) among the 21
cultural groups involved. The Chinese in Hong Kong and the British
businesspeople also behaved cooperatively in our negotiation game.
The Czechs and the Germans behaved more competitively. The American
pie was more average sized (at $9,030), but at least it was divided
relatively equitably (51.8 percent of the profits went to the
buyers). Conversely, the Japanese, and particularly the South
Korean, Mexican businesspeople split their pies in strange (perhaps
even unfair) ways, with buyers making higher percentages of the
profits (53.8 percent, 55.0 percent, and 56.7 percent,
respectively). The implications of these simulated business
negotiations are completely consistent with the comments of other
authors and the adage that in Japan (and apparently in Korea and
Meixco as well) the buyer is “kinger”. Americans have little
understanding of the Japanese practice of granting complete
deference to the needs and wishes of buyers. That is not the way
things work in America. American sellers tend to treat American
buyers more as equals, and the egalitarian values of American
society support this behavior. The American emphasis on competition
and individualism represented in these findings is quite consistent
with the work of Geert Hofstede, which indicated that Americans
scored the highest among all the cultural groups on the
individualism (versus collectivism) scale. Moreover, values for
individualism/collectivism have been shown to directly influence
negotiation behaviors in several other countries.
Finally, not only do Japanese buyers achieve higher results than
American buyers, but compared with American sellers ($4,350),
Japanese sellers also get more of the commercial pie ($4,430) as
well. Interestingly, when shown these results, Americans in
executive seminars still often prefer the American seller's role.
In other words, even though the American sellers make lower profits
than the Japanese, many American managers apparently prefer lower
profits if those profits are yielded from a more equal split of the
joint profits.
Time
“Just make them wait.” Everyone else in the world knows that no
negotiation tactic is more useful with Americans, because no one
places more value on time, no one has less patience when things
slow down, and no one looks at their wristwatches more than
Americans do. Edward T. Hall in his seminal writing is best at
explaining how the passage of time is viewed differently across
cultures and how these differences most often hurt Americans.
Even Americans try to manipulate time to their advantage, however.
As a case in point, Solar Turbines Incorporated (a division of
Caterpillar) once sold $34 million worth of industrial gas turbines
and compressors for a Russian natural gas pipeline project. Both
parties agreed that final negotiations would be held in a neutral
location, the south of France. In previous negotiations, the
Russians had been tough but reasonable. But in Nice, the Russians
were not nice. They became tougher and, in fact, completely
unreasonable, according to the Solar executives involved.
It took a couple of discouraging days before the Americans
diagnosed the problem, but once they did, a crucial call was made
back to headquarters in San Diego. Why had the Russians turned so
cold? They were enjoying the warm weather in Nice and weren’t
interested in making a quick deal and heading back to Moscow! The
call to California was the key event in this negotiation. Solar’s
headquarters people in San Diego were sophisticated enough to allow
their negotiators to take their time. From that point on, the
routine of the negotiations changed to brief, 45-minute meetings in
the mornings, with afternoons at the golf course, beach, or hotel,
making calls and doing paperwork. Finally, during the fourth week,
the Russians began to make concessions and to ask for longer
meetings. Why? They could not go back to Moscow after four weeks on
the Mediterranean without a signed contract. This strategic
reversal of the time pressure yielded a wonderful contract for
Solar.
Differences in thinking and decision-making processes
When faced with a complex negotiation task, most Westerners (notice
the generalization here) divide the large task up into a series of
smaller tasks. Issues such as prices, delivery, warranty, and
service contracts may be settled one issue at a time, with the
final agreement being the sum of the sequence of smaller
agreements. In Asia, however, a different approach is more often
taken wherein all the issues are discussed at once, in no apparent
order, and concessions are made on all issues at the end of the
discussion. The Western sequential approach and the Eastern
holistic approach do not mix well.
That is, American managers often report great difficulties in
measuring progress in negotiations, particularly in Asian
countries. After all, in America, you are half done when half the
issues are settled. But in China, Japan, or Korea nothing seems to
get settled. Then, surprise, you are done. Often, Americans make
unnecessary concessions right before agreements are announced by
the other side. For example, one American department store
executive traveling to Japan to buy six different consumer products
for her chain lamented that negotiations for the first product took
an entire week. In the United States, such a purchase would be
consummated in an afternoon. So, by her calculations, she expected
to have to spend six weeks in Japan to complete her purchases. She
considered raising her purchase prices to try to move things along
faster. But before she was able to make such a concession, the
Japanese quickly agreed on the other five products in just three
days. This particular manager was, by her own admission, lucky in
her first encounter with Japanese bargainers.
This American executive’s near blunder reflects more than just a
difference in decision-making style. To Americans, a business
negotiation is a problem-solving activity, the best deal for both
parties being the solution. To a Japanese businessperson, on the
other hand, a business negotiation is a time to develop a business
relationship with the goal of long-term mutual benefit. The
economic issues are the context, not the content, of the talks.
Thus, settling any one issue really is not that important. Such
details will take care of themselves once a viable, harmonious
business relationship is established. And, as happened in the case
of the retail goods buyer above, once the relationship was
established—signaled by the first agreement—the other “details”
were settled quickly.
American bargainers should anticipate such a holistic approach to
be common in Asian cultures and be prepared to discuss all issues
simultaneously and in an apparently haphazard order. Progress in
the talks should not be measured by how many issues have been
settled. Rather, Americans must try to gauge the quality of the
business relationship. Important signals of progress can be the
following:
- Higher-level executives from the other side being included in
the discussions
- Their questions beginning to focus on specific areas of the
deal
- A softening of their attitudes and position on some of the
issues—“Let us take some time to study this issue”
- At the negotiation table, increased talk among themselves in
their own language, which may often mean they’re trying to decide
something
- Increased bargaining and use of the lower-level, informal, and
other channels of communication
Implications for managers and negotiators
Considering all the potential problems in cross-cultural
negotiations, particularly when you mix managers from
relationship-oriented cultures with those from information-oriented
ones, it is a wonder that any international business gets done at
all. Obviously, the economic imperatives of global trade make much
of it happen despite the potential pitfalls. But an appreciation of
cultural differences can lead to even better international
commercial transactions—it is not just business deals but creative
and highly profitable business relationships that are the real goal
of international business negotiations.
See also
Notes
- Churchman, David. 1993. Negotiation Tactics. Maryland:
University Press of America. Pg 13.
- Copyright (c) 2009 John L. Graham. Permission is granted to
copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the
GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or any later version
published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant
Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of
the license is included in the section entitled "GNU Free
Documentation License".
- William Hernandez Requejo and John L. Graham, Global
Negotiation: The New Rules, Palgrave Macmillan: New York,
2008; also see [1]
- Howard Raiffa with John Richardson and David Metcalfe,
Negotiation Analysis, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2002
- Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes, New
York: Penguin, 1981
- David J. Lax and James K. Sebenius, 3-D Negotiations,
Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2006
- Lawrence Susskind, Sarah McKearnan, and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer,
The Consensus-Building Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to
Reaching Agreement, Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage, 1999
- William Hernandez Requejo and John L. Graham, Global
Negotiation: The New Rules, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008
- Clotaire Rapaille, The Culture Code, New York:
Broadway Books, 2006
- Shell, R.G. (2006). Bargaining for advantage. New York, NY:
Penguin Books.
- Forgas, J. P. (1998) "On feeling good and getting your way:
Mood effects on negotiator cognition and behavior". Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 565–577.
- Van Kleef, G.A., De Dreu, C.KW., & Manstead, A.S.R. (2006)
"Supplication and Appeasement in Conflict and Negotiation: The
Interpersonal Effects of Disappointment, Worry, Guilt, and Regret".
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(1), 124–142
- Butt AN, Choi JN, Jaeger A (2005) "The effects of self-emotion,
counterpart emotion, and counterpart behavior on negotiator
behavior: a comparison of individual-level and dyad-level
dynamics". Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26(6), 681 -
704
- Kramer, R. M., Newton, E. & Pommerenke, P. L. (1993)
"Self-enhancement biases and negotiator judgment: Effects of
self-esteem and mood". Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 56, 110-133.
- Maiese, Michelle "Emotions" Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and
Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of
Colorado, Boulder. Posted: July 2005 downloaded: 30.08.2007
- Carnevale, P. J. D. & Isen, A. M. (1986) "The
influence of positive affect and visual access on the discovery of
integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation". Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 37, 1-13.
- Barry, B., Fulmer, I. S., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2004) I
laughed, I cried, I settled: The role of emotion in
negotiation. In M. J. Gelfand & J. M. Brett (Eds.), The
handbook of negotiation and culture (pp. 71–94). Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
- Allred, K. G., Mallozzi, J. S., Matsui, F., & Raia, C. P.
(1997) "The influence of anger and compassion on negotiation
performance". Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
70, 175–187.
- Davidson, M. N., & Greenhalgh, L. (1999) "The role of
emotion in negotiation: The impact of anger and race". Research on
Negotiation in Organizations, 7, 3–26.
- Albarracin D. & Kumkale, G.T. (2003) "Affect as Information
in Persuasion: A Model of Affect Identification and Discounting".
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(3) 453-469.
- Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, A. S. R.
(2004). "The interpersonal effects of anger and happiness
in negotiations". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
86, 57–76.
- Bazerman, M. H., Curhan, J. R., Moore, D. A., & Valley, K.
L. (2000) "Negotiation". Annual Review of Psychology, 51,
279–314.
- Copyright (c) 2009 John L. Graham. Permission is granted to
copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the
GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or any later version
published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant
Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of
the license is included in the last section below entitled "GNU
Free Documentation License".
- See William Hernandez Requejo and John L. Graham, Global
Negotiation: The New Rules, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008, Chapter 5 for an extensive discussion of such factors; also
see [2]
- John L. Graham, “The Japanese Negotiation Style:
Characteristics of a Distinct Approach,” Negotiation
Journal, April 1993, 123-140
- William Hernandez Requejo and John L. Graham, Global
Negotiation: The New Rules, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008
- John L. Graham, Cross-Cultural Sales Negotiations: A
Multilevel Analysis, dissertation University of California,
Berkeley, 1980
- For a complete discussion of the concept of “linguistic
distance” please see Joel West and John L. Graham, “A
Linguistics-Based Measure of Cultural Distance and Its Relationship
to Managerial Values,” Management International Review,
2004, 4(3), 239-260.
- Roger O. Crockett, “The 21st Century Meeting,”
BusinessWeek, February 26, 2007, pages 72-80.
- Albert Mehrabian, Silent Messages: Implicit Communication
of Emotions and Attitudes (2nd edition, Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 1980).
- Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, Getting to
Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In (New York:
Penguin, 1991).
- John L. Graham, Alma Mintu-Wimsatt, and Wayne Rodgers,
“Explorations of Negotiation Behaviors in Ten Foreign Cultures
Using a Model Developed in the United States,” Management
Science, January 1994, 72-95.
- Geert Hofstede, Cultures Consequences (2nd edition,
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001).
- Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language (New York:
Doubleday, 1959), The Hidden Dimension (New York:
Doubleday, 1966), and Beyond Culture (New York: Anchor, 1981).
- N. Mark Lam and John L. Graham, China Now: Doing Business
in the World’s Most Dynamic Market, New York: McGraw-Hill,
2007
- James Day Hodgson, Yoshihiro Sano, and John L. Graham,
Doing Business in the New Japan, Boulder, CO: Rowman &
Littlfield, 2008.
- See Philip R. Cateora, Mary C. Gilly, and John L. Graham,
International Marketing (14th edition, McGraw-Hill, 2009),
Chapter 5 for a description of the distinction between
information-oriented and relationship-oriented cultures.
- See [3] for information about negotiation styles in 50
countries. Several excellent books have been published on the topic
of international business negotiations. Among them are Lothar Katz,
Negotiating International Business and Principles of
Negotiating International Business (both Charleston, SC:
Booksurge LLC, 2008); Camille Schuster and Michael Copeland,
Global Business, Planning for Sales and Negotiations (Fort
Worth, TX: Dryden, 1996); Robert T. Moran and William G. Stripp,
Dynamics of Successful International Business Negotiations
(Houston: Gulf, 1991); Pervez Ghauri and Jean-Claude Usunier
(eds.), International Business Negotiations (Oxford:
Pergamon, 1996); Donald W. Hendon, Rebecca Angeles Hendon, and Paul
Herbig, Cross-Cultural Business Negotiations (Westport,
CT: Quorum, 1996); Sheida Hodge, Global Smarts (New York:
Wiley, 2000); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Making, Managing, and
Mending Deals around the World in the 21st Century (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Michelle Gelfand and Jeanne Brett
(eds.), The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture (Stanford,
CA: Stanford Business Books, 2004); and Jeanne M. Brett,
Negotiating Globally (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001).
In addition, Roy J. Lewicki, David M. Saunders, and John W.
Minton’s, Negotiation: Readings, Exercises, and Cases, 3rd
ed. (New York: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 1999), is an important book on
the broader topic of business negotiations. The material from this
chapter draws extensively on William Hernandez Requejo and John L.
Graham, Global Negotiation: The New Rules (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); James Day Hodgson, Yoshihiro Sano, and
John L. Graham, Doing Business with the New Japan
(Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008); N. Mark Lam and John
L. Graham, China Now: Doing Business in the World’s Most
Dynamic Market (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007); and Philip R.
Cateora, Mary C. Gilly, and John L. Graham, International
Marketing (14th edition, Burr Ridge, IL: McGraw-Hill,
2009).
References and further reading
- Roger Dawson, "Secrets of Power Negotiating - Inside Secrets
from a Master Negotiator" Career Press, 1999.
- Ronald M. Shapiro and Mark A. Jankowski,
The Power of Nice: How to Negotiate So Everyone Wins - Especially
You!, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1998, ISBN
0-471-08072-1
- David Lax and James Sebenius, 3D
Negotiation, Harvard Business School Press, 2006.
- Roger Fisher and Daniel Shapiro, Beyond Reason:
Using Emotions as You Negotiate, Viking/Penguin,
2005.
- Douglas Stone, Bruce Patton, and Sheila Heen, foreword by Roger
Fisher, Difficult
Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most, Penguin,
1999, ISBN 0-14-028852-X
- Catherine Morris, ed. Negotiation in Conflict Transformation and
Peacebuilding: A Selected Bibliography. Victoria, Canada:
Peacemakers Trust.
- Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of
Negotiation, Belknap Press 1982, ISBN 0-674-04812-1
- William Ury, Getting Past
No: Negotiating Your Way from Confrontation to
Cooperation, revised second edition, Bantam, January 1, 1993,
trade paperback, ISBN 0-553-37131-2; 1st edition under the title,
Getting Past No: Negotiating with Difficult People,
Bantam, September, 1991, hardcover, 161 pages, ISBN
0-553-07274-9
- William Ury, Roger Fisher and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without
Giving in, Revised 2nd edition, Penguin USA, 1991, trade
paperback, ISBN 0-14-015735-2; Houghton Mifflin, April, 1992,
hardcover, 200 pages, ISBN 0-395-63124-6. The first edition,
unrevised, Houghton Mifflin, 1981, hardcover, ISBN
0-395-31757-6
- The political philosopher Charles
Blattberg has advanced a distinction between negotiation and
conversation and criticized those
methods of conflict-resolution which give too much weight to the
former. See his From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics: Putting
Practice First, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
2000, ISBN 0-19-829688-6, a work of political philosophy; and his
Shall We Dance? A Patriotic Politics for Canada,
Montreal and Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press, 2003, ISBN
0-7735-2596-3, which applies that philosophy to the Canadian
case.
- Leigh L. Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the
Negotiator 3rd Ed., Prentice Hall 0ct.2005.
- Nicolas Iynedjian, Négociation - Guide pratique, CEDIDAC 62,
Lausanne 2005, ISBN 2-88197-061-3
- Michele J. Gelfand and Jeanne M. Brett, ed. ‘’Handbook of negotiation and culture’’, 2004. ISBN
0804745862
- Emotion and conflict from the ‘’Beyond
Intractability’’ Database
- Gerard I. Nierenberg, The
Art of Negotiating: Psychological Strategies for Gaining
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