Afghanistan is, as of March, 2008, the
greatest illicit (in Western World standards) opium producer in the world, before Burma
(Myanmar
), part of
the so-called "Golden
Crescent". Opium production in
Afghanistan has been on the rise since the downfall of the
Taliban in 2001.
Based on UNODC
data, there
has been more opium poppy cultivation in each of the past four
growing seasons (2004-2007), than in any one year during Taliban
rule. Also, more land is now used for opium in Afghanistan,
than for coca cultivation in Latin America. In 2007, 93% of the
opiates on the world market originated in Afghanistan. This amounts
to an export value of about $64 billion, with a quarter being
earned by opium farmers and the rest going to district officials,
insurgents, warlords and drug traffickers.In the seven years
(1994-2000) prior to a Taliban opium ban, the Afghan farmers' share
of gross income from opium was divided among 200,000
families.
Afghanistan opium poppy cultivation,
1994-2007 (hectares)
A Taliban observed a poppy field in
Afghanistan, later he called their 20% tax at opium "zakat"
U.S.
Marines, from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit without
order, inspects only the poppy fields near the town of Garmser in
Helmand Province of Afghanistan Thursday May 1, 2008.
Background (1979-present)
Soviet period (1979-1989)
As the Afghan government began to lose control of provinces during
the Soviet invasion of 1979-80,
warlords
flourished and with it opium production as regional commanders
searched for ways to generate money to purchase weapons, according
to the UN. (At this time the US was pursuing an "arms-length"
supporting strategy of the Afghan freedom-fighters or
Mujahideen, the main purpose being to cripple the
USSR slowly into
withdrawal
through attrition rather than effect a quick and decisive
overthrow.)
U.S. officials had refused to investigate charges of
heroin dealing by its Afghan allies 'because U.S. narcotics policy
in Afghanistan has been subordinated to the war against Soviet
influence there.' In 1995, the former CIA director of the Afghan
operation, Charles Cogan, admitted the CIA had indeed sacrificed
the drug war to fight the Cold War. 'Our main mission was to do as
much damage as possible to the Soviets. We didn't really have the
resources or the time to devote to an investigation of the drug
trade,'... 'I don't think that we need to apologize for this. Every
situation has its fallout.... There was fallout in terms of drugs,
yes. But the main objective was accomplished. The Soviets left
Afghanistan.'
It was
alleged by the Soviets on multiple occasions that American CIA
agents were helping smuggle opium out of Afghanistan
, either into the West, in order to raise money for
the Afghan resistance or into the
Soviet
Union
in order to weaken it through drug
addiction. According to Alfred
McCoy, the CIA supported various Afghan drug lords, for
instance Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar.
Warlord period (1989-1994)
When the Red Army was forced to withdraw in 1989, a power vacuum
was created. Various Mujahideen factions started fighting against
each other for power. With the discontinuation of Western support,
they resorted ever more to poppy cultivation to finance their
military existence.
Rise of the Taliban (1994-2001)
During the Taliban rule, Afghanistan saw a bumper opium crop of
4,600 metric tons in 1999,. In July 2000, Taliban leader Mullah
Mohammed Omar declared that growing
poppies was un-Islamic, resulting in one of the world's most
successful anti-drug campaigns. As a result of this ban, opium
poppy cultivation was reduced by 91% from the previous year's
estimate of 82,172 hectares. The ban was so effective that Helmand
Province, which had accounted for more than half of this area,
recorded no poppy cultivation during the 2001 season.
Present War in Afghanistan
Opium production levels for
2005-2007
After the September 11, 2001
attacks, a combination of U.S. CIA and military forces (US and
allied powers), in support of the Northern Alliance, invaded
Afghanistan.
By November 2001, the collapse of the economy and the scarcity of
other sources of revenue forced many of the country's farmers to
resort back to growing opium for export.(1,300 km² in 2004
according to the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime.)
In December 2001, a number of prominent Afghans met in Bonn,
Germany, under United Nations (UN)
auspices to develop a plan to reestablish the State of Afghanistan,
including provisions for a new constitution and national elections.
As part of
that agreement, the United Kingdom
(UK) was designated the lead country in addressing
counter-narcotics issues in
Afghanistan. Afghanistan subsequently implemented its new
constitution and held national elections. On December 7, 2004,
Hamid Karzai was formally sworn in as president of a democratic
Afghanistan."
Two of the following three growing seasons saw record levels of
opium poppy cultivation. Corrupt officials may have undermined the
government's enforcement efforts. Afghan farmers suggested that
"government officials take bribes for turning a blind eye to the
drug trade while punishing poor opium growers".
Another obstacle to getting rid of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan
is the reluctant collaboration between US forces and Afghan
warlords in hunting drug traffickers. In the absence of Taliban,
the warlords largely control the opium trade but are also highly
useful to the US forces in scouting, providing local intelligence,
keeping their own territories clean from Al-Qaeda and Taliban
insurgents, and even taking part in military operations.
Former U.S. State Department
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Thomas
Schweich, in a New York Times article
dated July 27, 2007, asserts that opium production is protected by
the government of Hamid Karzai as well
as by the Taliban, as all parties to
political conflict in Afghanistan as well as criminals benefit from
opium production, and, in Schweich's opinion, the U.S. military
turns a blind eye to opium production as not being central to its
anti-terrorism mission.
Foreign Involvement
Approximately 40,000 foreign troops help
manage security in Afghanistan, principally of 32,000 regular
soldiers from 37 North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
(NATO) forces: the International Security
Assistance Force. 8,000 US and other special operations
forces make up the balance. To manage this turmoil, over 40,000
foreign troops still occupy Afghanistan. There is significant
resistance, both from the ideological/theocratic Taliban, especially in southern Afghanistan, and
also independent local warlords and drug organizations.
Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director
of the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime
(UNODC), described the situation this way: "There
is no rule of law in most of the southern parts of Afghanistan—the
bullets rule."
The Afghan economy and opium
The 2004 United
Nations Development Programme ranked Afghanistan number 173 of
177 countries, using a human development index, with Afghanistan
near or at the bottom of virtually every development indicator
including nutrition, infant mortality, life expectancy, and
literacy. Several factors encourage opium production, the greatest
being economic: the high rate of return on investment from opium
poppy cultivation has driven an agricultural shift in Afghanistan
from growing traditional crops to growing opium poppy.
Opium cultivation on this scale is not traditional. "Despite the
fact that only 12 percent of its land is arable, agriculture is a
way of life for 70 percent of Afghans and is the country's primary
source of income. During good years, Afghanistan produced enough
food to feed its people as well as supply a surplus for export. Its
traditional agricultural products include wheat, corn, barley,
rice, cotton, fruit, nuts, and grapes. However, its agricultural
economy has suffered considerably […] Afghanistan's largest and
fastest cash crop is opium."
Poppy Cultivation and the Opium Trade have been said to have had a
more significant impact on the civilians in Afghanistan than the
impact of wheat farming and livestock trading. As farmers in
Afghanistan were once heavily reliant on wheat farming to make
sufficient income, the development of poppy cultivation has given
many of these farmers a boost in capital, even though the Opium
Trade may be a more dangerous product to distribute. In addition,
as the demand for Opium has elevated, women have more opportunity
to work in the same setting as their male counterpart.
Afghanistan's rugged terrain encourages local autonomy, which, in
some cases, means local leadership committed to an opium economy.
The terrain makes surveillance and enforcement difficult.
Afghanistan's economy has thus evolved to the point
where it is now highly dependent on opium.
Although less than 4 percent of arable land in
Afghanistan was used for opium poppy cultivation in 2006, revenue
from the harvest brought in over $3 billion—more than 35 percent of
the country's total gross national product (GNP).
According to Antonio Costa, "Opium poppy cultivation,
processing, and transport have become Afghanistan's top employers,
its main source of capital, and the principal base of its
economy."
Today, a record 2.9 million Afghanis from 28 of 34
provinces are involved in opium cultivation in some way, which
represents nearly 10 percent of the population.
Although Afghanistan's overall economy is being boosted
by opium profits, less than 20 percent of the $3 billion in opium
profits actually goes to impoverished farmers, while more than 80
percent goes into the pockets of Afghan's opium traffickers and
kingpins and their political connections.
Even heftier profits are generated outside of
Afghanistan by international drug traffickers and
dealers.
Traditionally, processing of Afghan's opium into heroin
has taken place outside of Afghanistan; however, in an effort to
reap more profits internally, Afghan drug kingpins have stepped up
heroin processing within their borders.
Heroin processing labs have proliferated in Afghanistan
since the late 1990s, particularly in the unstable southern region,
further complicating stabilization efforts.
With the reemergence of the Taliban and the virtual
absence of the rule of law in the countryside, opium production and
heroin processing have dramatically increased, especially in the
southern province of Helmand.
According
to the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) 2007 Afghanistan Opium Survey,
Afghanistan produced approximately 8,200 metric tonnes of opium —
nearly double the estimate of global annual consumption. In
an April 25, 2007 op-ed in the Washington Post, Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director
of UNODC, asked "Does opium defy the laws of economics?
Historically, no. In 2001, prices surged tenfold from 2000, to a
record high, after the Taliban all but eliminated opium poppy
cultivation across the Afghan territory under its control. So why,
with last year's bumper crop, is the opposite not occurring? Early
estimates suggest that opium cultivation is likely to increase
again this year. That should be an added incentive to sell.
He speculated, "So where is it? I fear there may be a more sinister
explanation for why the bottom has not fallen out of the opium
market: major traffickers are withholding significant
amounts.
"Drug traffickers have a symbiotic relationship with insurgents and
terrorist groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Instability
makes opium cultivation possible; opium buys protection and pays
for weapons and foot soldiers, and these in turn create an
environment in which drug lords, insurgents and terrorists can
operate with impunity.
"Opium is the glue that holds this murky relationship together. If
profits fall, these sinister forces have the most to lose. I
suspect that the big traffickers are hoarding surplus opium as a
hedge against future price shocks and as a source of funding for
future terrorist attacks, in Afghanistan or elsewhere."
How the opium economy has influenced villagers options for
generating income
Due to globalization and the development of trade, traditional ways
of sustaining life for villagers has been forced to change. Before
people relied on wheat farming and live stock whereas today poppy
cultivation is the most prominent economic activity. This can be
attributed due to higher profits from poppy cultivation and lack of
opportunity for other farming practices due to land scarcity and
more accessible loans from money providers for this activity.
War, economic instability, and poverty caused changes in the way
villagers maintained their villages. Competition for scarce land
and resources resulted in unsustainable practices, causing soil
erosion and therefore making the land less productive. The
cultivation of poppy, however, generated greater profits than wheat
farming for the farming villagers due to the higher yielding
possibilities with less land (less irrigation of poppies than wheat
is necessary), and greater demand for the profitable drug trade of
the highly-valued opium, prepared from poppies. Many migrants to
places such as Pakistan and Iran witnessed the profitability of
poppy cultivation in land development, through association with
local landowners and businessmen, and were inspired to bring about
the same economic improvement in their own lives and villages.
Also, opium trade proved to be more cost-efficient than livestock
trade, since large amounts of opium are easier to transport than
livestock. Local shopkeepers used capital, which was acquired from
buying opium resins from farmers and selling them to dealers at the
Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, to invest in their own small shops
thereby generating further income. Poor villagers saw this as a
good investment opportunity, as it meant more efficient farming of
one product, with the possibility of creating economic stability in
their villages.
Production and distribution regions
The following areas of Afghanistan play a role in the drug
traffic:
Production
- *"Southern region" of Helmand and Kandahar
provinces, on the border with Pakistan
, which are the highest-volume areas for drug
transactions. There is a traditional route from Helmand,
through Pakistan, to Iran
Smuggling
- *Herat
, in Herat
Province, the Northern Alliance stronghold, which borders Iran
- *Faizabad
, in Badakhshan province,
which has borders with Tajikstan
, Pakistan, and China
.
Medical production
The Senlis Council has proposed
legalizing opium production for medical purposes. Opium can be
manufactured into codeine and morphine, both legal pain-killers. They reason that
this will not only solve the problem of illicit opium production in
Afghanistan, but that it will also lower the price of prescription
drugs worldwide, making healthcare more affordable for those
requiring morphine or codeine.
Others have argued that legalizing opium production would neither
solve the problem nor would it be workable in practice. They argue
that illegal diversion of the crop could only be minimised if the
Afghans had the necessary resources, institutional capacity and
control mechanisms in place to ensure that they were the sole
purchaser of opiate raw materials. For them, there is currently no
infrastructure in place to set up and administer such a scheme.
They reason that in the absence of an effective control system,
traffickers would be free to continue to exploit the market and
there would be a high risk that licit cultivation would be used for
illegal purposes and that the Afghan government would be in direct
competition with the traffickers, thereby driving up the price of
opium, and attracting more farmers to cultivate. The Afghan
government has ruled out licit cultivation as a means of tackling
the illegal drug trade: however in Turkey in the 1970s, legalising
opium production, with US support brought illicit trafficking under
control within four years. Afghan villages have strong local
control systems based around the village shura, which with the support of the Afghan government
and its international allies, could provide the basis for an
effective control system. This idea is developed in the recent
Senlis Council report "Poppy for
Medicine" which proposes a technical model for the implementation
of poppy licensing and the legal control of cultivation and
production of Afghan morphine.
Some believe that there is also little evidence to show that Afghan
opium would be economically competitive in a global market place.
Australia, France, India, Spain, and Turkey currently dominate the
export market for licit opiates. Due to the high cost of production
in countries where cultivation is undertaken on small landholdings,
such as India and Turkey, licit production requires market support
(the production costs for the equivalent of 1 kg of morphine
in 1999 was US$56 in Australia, US$159.77 in India and US$250 in
Turkey). The current cost of production of one kilogramme of
morphine equivalent in Afghanistan is approximately US$450 .
However,
a poppy for medicine project in Afghanistan could provide a cheap pain relief option for pain
sufferers who find morphine prices extremely elevated
The price of illicit opium far exceeds that of licit, (in India, in
2000, the price for licit opium was US$13–29 per kilo, but for
illicit US$155–206). Although there are many complex reasons behind
the decision to grow poppy, one of them is the current economic
dependence of poppy farmers on the illicit trade. Whilst
traffickers continue to be free to exploit the illicit market,
legalisation would not change this. Demand for illicit opiates
would not disappear even if Afghan opium were used for licit
purposes and a vacuum would open that traffickers could exploit.
However, currently 100% of Afghan opium is diverted to the illegal
opium trade and funds in some cases terrorist activities. Despite
eradication efforts since the international intervention in 2001,
poppy cultivation and illicit opium production has increased, as
UNODC figures show. A licensing system would bring farmers and
villages into a supportive relationship with the Afghan government,
instead of alienating the population by destroying their
livelihood, and provide the economic diversification that could
help cultivators break ties with the illicit opium trade.
The International
Narcotics Control Board states that an over production in licit
opiates since 2000 has led to stockpiles in producing countries
'that could cover demand for two years'. Thus, some say Afghan
opium would contribute to an already oversupplied market and would
potentially cause the supply and demand imbalance that the UN
control system was designed. However, the World Health Organisation points
out that there is an acute global shortage of poppy-based medicines
such as morphine and codeine. This is largely due to chronic
underprescription (especially in countries where morphine is
extremely highly priced). The International Narcotics
Control Board which regulates opium supply throughout the world
enforces the 1961 Single Convention on
Narcotics Drugs: this law provides that countries can only
demand the raw poppy materials corresponding to the use of
opium-based medicines over the last two years and thus limits
countries who have low levels of prescription in terms of the
amounts they can demand. As such, 77% of the world's opium supplies
are being used by only six countries, leaving the rest of the world
lacking in essential medicines such as morphine and codeine (See
Fischer, B J. Rehm, and T Culbert, "Opium based medicines: a
mapping of global supply, demand and needs" inSpivack D. (ed.)
Feasibility Study on Opium Licensing in Afghanistan, Kabul, 2005.
p.85-86. ). A second-tier supply system, that complements the
current UN control system by supplying opium-based medicines to
countries currently not receiving the poppy-based pain relief
medicines needed, would maintain the balance established by the UN
system and provide a market to Afghan-made poppy-based
medicines.
Counter-narcotics policy
Given the fact that a third of the combined legal and illegal
Afghan economy is based on the illegal opium
industry, counter-narcotics policy is currently one of the most
important elements of domestic politics. Despite law enforcement
measures with a dominant focus on crop eradication programs, Afghan
opium production has doubled in just two years. This has shown that
currently there is no correlation between poppy crop eradication
and the level of poppy cultivation or opium production. The reason
for this is the underlying economic nature of the opium problem.
Poverty and structural employment are the main reason for 3.3
million Afghans' full dependence on poppies.
Poppy crop eradication could even have damaging side-effects for
Afghanistan's process of stabilization and reconstruction. Director
of policy research for the Senlis
Council, Jorrit Kamminga, says:
- the poppy eradication campaign has been ineffective,
counterproductive and could well give the Taliban the decisive
advantage in their struggle for the hearts and minds of the Afghan
people.
He is referring to US-inspired aerial fumigation campaigns, planned
for spring 2008. So far, crop eradication is done manually or
mechanically from the ground. Chemical spraying could further
destabilize rural areas and risk losing support for NATO's
stabilization mission.
Production and Afghan governance
While the Taliban were considered a threat both to the human rights
of Afghans, and to other areas of the world by providing a
sanctuary for transnational terrorists, they also demonstrated an
ability to strictly enforce a moratorium on opium production. Since
their overthrow in 2001, stopping their enforcement with methods
including beheading, opium poppy cultivation has been steadily
increasing for over the past two decades. There is evidence that
the Taliban ban carried the seeds of its own lack of
sustainability, due to a many-fold increase in the burden of
opium-related debt (locking many households into dependence on
future opium poppy cultivation), forcing asset sales to make ends
meet, etc. It also appears that the opium ban weakened the Taliban
politically. Thus the sustainability of the ban beyond the first
year was highly doubtful, even if theTaliban had not been
overthrown in late 2001.
"Even though the Karzai government made opium poppy cultivation and
trafficking illegal in 2002, many farmers, driven by poverty,
continue to cultivate opium poppy to provide for their families.
Indeed, poverty is the primary reason given by Afghan farmers for
choosing to cultivate opium poppy." With a farm gate price of
approximately $125 per kilogram fordry opium, an Afghan farmer can
make 17 times more profit growing opium poppy ($4,622 per hectare),
than by growing wheat ($266 per hectare). "Opium poppy is also
drought resistant, easy to transport and store, and, unlike many
crops, requires no refrigeration and does not spoil." With
Afghanistan's limited irrigation, transportation and other
agricultural infrastructure, growing alternative crops is not only
less profitable, but more difficult.
In 2006, opium production in the province increased over 162
percent and now accounts for 42 percent of Afghan's total opium
output. According to the UNODC, the opium situation in the southern
provinces is "out of control."
Corruption and the erosion of the rule of law
The Department of State (DoS), the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the
Department of Justice (DoJ) are the primary organizations involved
in carrying out this counternarcotics strategy for the US. The role
of the CIA has not been mentioned. UNODC's executive director
believes these measures are insufficient: "What can be done? Since
NATO forces are wary of making enemies out of opium farmers by
being associated with eradication, and since the Afghan government
is opposed to spraying poppy fields, rounding up the major
traffickers may be the best available option for disrupting
Afghanistan's lucrative opium market."
Both demand and supply reduction are important. "the consuming
countries need to get serious about curbing drug addiction. If
there was less demand for heroin, the bottom really would fall out
of the opium market." Farmers economically dependent on opium must
have viable alternatives that give sustainable income. On the
supply side, identifying the most-wanted traffickers and subjecting
them to international arrest warrants with extradition, asset
seizure, and travel bans could help. While it is not easy to
destroy opium storage and heroin production laboratories, it is far
easier to destroy drugs at the source than in transit.
"Afghanistan's neighbors are either accomplices or victims in the
opium trade, so they need to be part of the solution. They could,
for example, improve intelligence-sharing and border security to
ensure that more opium is seized. At the moment, less than a
quarter of the world's opium is intercepted, compared with around
half of global cocaine output." This complicates, of course, the
complex US relations with Pakistan and Iran.
The nexus between the drug industry and Hawala
There is an important nexus between drugs and hawala (informal money transfer system) in
Afghanistan. The UN analysis is based on interviews with a sample
of 54 hawala dealers in the main centers of hawala activity of
Afghanistan as well as during a visit to Peshawar, Pakistan. In
addition, interviews were conducted with users of the hawala system
(drug dealers, businessmen, traders, international aid workers),
regulators (government officials, central bank personnel), and
formalservice providers (bankers, accountants). In addition to
hawala, they found protection payments and connections, by which
the drug industry has major linkages with local administration as
well as high levels of the national government.
See informal
money transfer systems to support clandestine activity,
including terrorism, drug trade, and intelligence collection.
Different localities studied by the UNODC give different views of
the laundering of drug funds. It is
difficult to get a solid sense of the overall economy. In Faizabad, for example, indicated that during certain times
of the year close to 100% of the liquidity of the hawala system in
the province is derived from drugs, whereas in Herat,the Northern Alliance stronghold, it was
estimated that only 30% of the hawala market's overall transaction
volume is directly linked to drugs. Analysis of data
gathered in places like Herat was complicated by confirmed links
between drug money and legitimate imports. The southern region
(Helmand and Kandahar provinces) is also a key centre for money
laundering in Afghanistan (about 60% of the funds are drug related
and 80-90% of the hawala dealers in Kandahar [the former Taliban
stronghold] and Helmand are involved in money transfers related to
narcotics).
Helmand has emerged as a key facilitator of the opium trade, both
between provinces and exports, while overall estimates of the local
hawala markets' drug-related component are of a similar order of
magnitude to those in Kandahar. This findingadds weight to the
notion that the major trading centers in these two neighboring
provinces should be treated as essentially one market. Bearing this
in mind, the study calculated that Helmand could account for
roughly US$ 800 million of Afghanistan's drug-related hawala
business and that Herat is the second largest contributor, with in
the range of US$300-500 million of drug money laundered
annually.
Furthermore, Dubai
appears to
be a central clearing house for international hawala
activities. In addition, various cities in Pakistan,
notably Peshawar
, Quetta
, and
Karachi
, are major transaction centers. It appears
that even in the case of drug shipments to Iran, payments for them
come into Afghanistan from Pakistan...the hawala system has been
key to the deepening and widening of the "informal economy" in
Afghanistan, where there is anonymity and the opportunity to
launder money.
Hawala, however, also contributes positively to the regional
economy. It has been central to the survival of Afghanistan's
financial system through war. According to Maimbo (2003), "integral
to processes of early developmentand vital for the continued
delivery of funds to the provinces.""The hawala system also plays
an important role in currency exchange. It participates in the
Central Bank's regular foreign currency auctions, and was
instrumental in the successful introduction of a new currency for
Afghanistan in 2002-2003."
Opium addiction within Afghan society
Afghanistan has seen a high rate of opium addiction among refugees
returning from Iran and Afghanistan. Afghan filmmaker Jawed Taiman
in his film Addicted In Afghanistan attributes this to the
presence of U.S. troops, claiming that opium addiction was
significantly lower under Communist and Taliban rule.
Impacts of opium production within Afghan villages
Aside from the obvious threat of addiction, opium production is
changing the dynamic of many Afghan villages. Wealth distribution,
for example, has changed significantly as the opium economy has
created a “new rich” in which young men have control. This new
found wealth for the young men of Afghanistan is troubling to many
of the village leaders as before they were revered for their
wisdom, and now are given little if any respect. It has also been
noted that relationships among fathers and sons, neighbours, and
family in general, are drastically changing as leadership roles in
the economy continue to shift.
Opium trade with Iran
While Herat is not the highest-volume area of opium trade, Herat,
and the other Iranian border areas of Farah, and Nimroz, have some
of the highest prices, presumably due to demand from the Iranian
market. "Opium prices are especially high in Iran, where law
enforcement is strict and where a large share of the opiate
consumption market is still for opium rather than heroin. Not
surprisingly, it appears that very significant profits can be made
by crossing the Iranian border or by entering Central Asian
countries like Tajikistan."
"The UNODC estimates 60 percent of Afghanistan's opium is
trafficked across Iran's border (much of it in transit to Europe).
Seizures of the narcotic by Iranian authorities in the first half
of this year are up 29 percent from the same period last year,
according to the country's police chief, as reported by Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)...The Washington Post reports that
Iran has the world's highest per capita number of opium addicts ...
Experts say those affected most are the millions of unemployed
Iranians and youth chafing under the restrictions placed on them
from the Islamic government and basij, or civilian morals police.
The Iranian government has gone through several phases in dealing
with its drug problem.
First, during the 1980s, its approach was supply-sided:
"Law-and-order policies with zero tolerance led to the arrest of
tens of thousands of addicts and the execution of thousands of
narcotics traffickers." "There are an estimated 68,000 Iranians
imprisoned for drug trafficking and another 32,000 for drug
addiction (out of a total prison population of 170,000, based on
2001 statistics)"
Beehner said "Tehran also has spent millions of dollars and
deployed thousands of troops to secure its porous 1,000-mile border
with Afghanistan and Pakistan... a few hundred Iranian drug police
die each year in battles with smugglers. Referring to the head of
the UNODC office in Iran, Roberto Arbitrio, Beehner quoted Arbitrio
in an interview with The Times.
"You have drug groups like guerrilla forces, [who] ... shoot with
rocket launchers, heavy machine guns, and Kalashnikovs."
A second-phase strategy came under then-President Mohammad Khatami, focused more on
prevention and treatment. Drug traffic is considered a security
problem, and much of it is associated with Baluchi tribesmen, who recognize traditional
tribal rather than national borders. Current (2007) reports cite
Iranian concern with ethnic guerillas on the borders, possibly
supported by the CIA.
Iranian drug strategy changed again under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who took office in
2005. Iran's drug policy has been reconsidered and shifted back
toward supply interdiction and boosting border security. It is
unclear if this is connected to more wide-ranging concerns with
border security, perhaps in relation to
Baluchi guerillas in Iran.
Samii's 2003 paper described Iran's "primary approach to the
narcotics threat [as] interdiction. Iran shares a 936 kilometer
border with Afghanistan and a 909 kilometer border with Pakistan,
and the terrain in the two eastern provinces—Sistan va Baluchistan
and Khorasan—is very rough. The Iranian government has set up
static defenses along this border. This includes concrete dams,
berms, trenches, and minefields...
Intersection with the War on Terror
A small
number of Guantanamo
detainees in the Guantanamo Bay detainment
camp
claim that they were not terrorists and were in
Afghanistan because they were involved in the drug trade.
However, almost none of the Afghans in Guantanamo acknowledges
growing opium.
| ISN |
Name |
Nationality |
Notes |
| 555 |
Abdul Majid Muhammed |
Iran |
- Captured by the Northern Alliance on his first trip to
Afghanistan because he is a drug dealer.
- Had been a street level drug dealer, and drug addict, in
Iran.
- The only Christian held in Guantanamo
|
| 586 |
Karam Khamis Sayd
Khamsan |
Yemen |
- Served as a hostage for a Yemeni drug dealer. He was to be set
free when his boss had sold the drugs and given the Afghan drug
cartel their cut.
|
| 664 |
Rashid Awad Rashid Al
Uwaydah |
Saudi Arabia |
- Testified that the purpose of his travel to Afghanistan was to
export illicit drugs.
- Responded to the allegation that he had stayed in terrorist safehouses and that his name
was found on various computer media found in al Qaeda safe houses
by testifying that none of the places in which he stayed was
terrorist safe houses. Every house he stayed in was operated by his
contacts in the illicit drug trade and none of them used
computers.
|
| 703 |
Ahmed Bin Kadr Labed |
Algeria |
- Claims he traveled to Afghanistan to smuggle heroin.
|
| 798 |
Sahib Rohullah Wakil |
Afghanistan |
- A senior tribal leader, who had fought against the Taliban,
both before September 11, 2001, and after, who had worked with British and
American officials to destroy the poppy crop.
|
| 831 |
Khandan Kadir |
Afghanistan |
|
| 919 |
Faizullah |
Afghanistan |
- Believes he was falsely denounced to the Americans as a
terrorist after he complained to local officials that the growers
of illegal opium were using all the water legal farmers needed to
irrigate their crops.
|
| 1094 |
Saifullah Paracha |
Pakistan |
- A Pakistani business-man who testified he invested $1 million
in a project to provide alternate jobs for those employed in the
poppy industry.
|
Arrest of Baz Mohammed
The
United
States Department of State
issued a press release that stated the arrest of
Baz Mohammed: "... demonstrated a
strengthening collaboration between the United States and the newly
democratic Afghanistan."
See also
References
- UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs website -
Bitter-Sweet Harvest: Afghanistan's New War
- "Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?" by Thomas Schweich,
July 27, 2008, New York Times
- "Combating Synthetic Drugs, A Global Challenge:
U.S. and International Responses", by Thomas A. Schweich, Joseph T.
Rannazzisi, James O'Gara, U.S. State Department
- Goodhand, Jonathan. 2000. From holy war to opium war? A case
study of the opium economy in North Eastern Afghanistan. CENTRAL
ASIAN SURVEY 19 (2): 265-280.
- Goodhand, J. 1999. From Holy War to Opium War?: a Case Study of
the Opium Economy in North Eastern Afghanistan. PEACE BUILDING AND
COMPLEX POLITICAL EMERGENCY. Working Paper Series. Paper No 5.
- Goodhand, Jonathan. 2000. From holy war to opium war? A case
study of the opium economy in North Eastern Afghanistan. Central
Asian Survey 19 (2):265-280.
-
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/documents/poppy_medicine_technical_dossier
-
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/008_publication
- "AFGHANISTAN: IRIN Focus on drug addiction", "UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs", May 28,
2001
- [http://www.vimeo.com/774707 "Addicted In Afghanistan", Jawed
Taiman, Vimeo
- Goodhand, Jonathan. 2000. From holy war to opium war? A case
study of the opium economy in North Eastern Afghanistan. Central
Asian Survey 19 (2):256-280
- Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from
Abdul Majid Muhammed's
Combatant Status Review
Tribunal - pages 107-121
- Summarized transcript (.pdf), from
Abdul Majid Muhammed's
Administrative Review Board
hearing - pages 90-97
- Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from
Karam Khamis Sayd Khamsan's
Combatant Status Review
Tribunal - - mirror - pages 12-18
- Summarized transcript (.pdf), from
Rashid Awad Rashid Al
Uwaydah's Administrative Review Board
hearing - pages 46-60
- Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from
Ahmed Bin Kadr Labed's
Combatant Status Review
Tribunal - pages 1-12
- Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from
Sahib Rohullah Wakil's
Combatant Status Review
Tribunal - pages 16-25
- Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from
Khandan
Kadir's Combatant Status Review
Tribunal - pages 9-31
- Summarized transcript (.pdf), from
Khandan
Kadir's Administrative Review Board
hearing - pages 1-21
- Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from
Faiz Ullah's
Combatant Status Review
Tribunal - pages 28-37
- documents (.pdf) from Saifullah Paracha's
Combatant Status Review
Tribunal - - mirror pages 1-19
External links
branch of the anti-narcotics branch of the new Afghan Intelligence Service, denounced by renegade warlords Pasha Khan Zadran and Jan Baz Khan.
Wikis
Quiz
Map
Search
