The
Oslo Accords, officially called the
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements or
Declaration of Principles
(
DOP) became a milestone toward the resolution of
the
Palestinian - Israeli
conflict, one of the major continuing issues within the wider
Arab-Israeli conflict.
It was the
first direct, face-to-face agreement between the government of
Israel
and the PLO. It was
intended to be the one framework for future negotiations and
relations between Israel and the Palestinians, within which all
outstanding "final status issues" between the
two sides would
be addressed and resolved.
Negotiations concerning the agreements were
completed in Oslo
, Norway
on 20 August
1993, and the Accords was officially signed subsequently at a
public ceremony in Washington,
DC
on 13 September 1993 in the presence of Palestinian Liberation
Organisation (PLO) chairman Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and US President Bill Clinton. The documents were
signed by Mahmoud Abbas for the
Palestine Liberation
Organization, foreign
Minister Shimon Peres for Israel, Secretary of State Warren Christopher for the United States
and foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev for Russia
.
The Oslo Accords were a framework for the future relations between
the two parties. The Accords provided for the creation of a
Palestinian National
Authority (
PNA). The Palestinian Authority
would have responsibility for the administration of the territory
under its control.
The Accords also called for the withdrawal of
the Israel Defense Forces from
parts of the Gaza
Strip
and West
Bank
.
It was anticipated that this arrangement would last for a five-year
interim period during which a permanent agreement would be
negotiated (beginning no later than May 1996). Permanent issues
such as
Jerusalem,
Palestinian refugees,
Israeli settlements,
security and
borders were deliberately
left to be decided at a later stage. Interim self-government was to
be granted by Israel in phases.
Support for the Accords, of the concessions made and the process
were not free from criticism. The repeated public posturing of all
sides has discredited the process, and put the possibility of
achieving peace into question.
Further strain was put on the process after
Hamas won
2006 Palestinian
elections. Although it offered Israel a number of long term
ceasefires, Hamas has repeatedly refused
to recognize Israel, or accept agreements previously made by the
Palestinian Authority.
Background
From the
Rhodes conference
in 1949 to the
Madrid
Conference of 1991, there were many failed attempts for a
settlement to bring about a lasting end to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. However, what made the Oslo negotiations different was
the decision by Israel to at last hold direct, face-to-face talks,
with the
Palestinian
Liberation Organization.
A renewal of the Israeli-Palestinian quest for peace began at the
end of the
Cold War as the United States
took the lead in international affairs.
After the collapse of
the Soviet
Union
, Western observers were optimistic, as Francis Fukuyama wrote in an article,
titled "The End of
History". The hope was that the end of the Cold War
heralded the beginning of a new international order. President
George H. W. Bush,
in a speech on 11 September 1990, spoke of a "rare opportunity" to
move toward a "
New world
order" in which "the nations of the world, east and west, north
and south, can prosper and live in harmony," adding that "today the
new world is struggling to be born".
The optimism of the moment appealed to Israelis, and 60% of them
supported the Oslo Accords when they were first presented. Some
Israelis had become tired of the constant violence of the
First Intifada, and many were willing to take
risks for peace. Some wanted to realize the economic benefits in
the new global economy. The
Gulf War
(1990-1991) did much to persuade Israelis that the defensive value
of territory had been overstated, and that the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
psychologically reduced their sense of security. The Gulf War had
also shown that a superior air force and technology was more
important than territory in winning a war.
The
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) realized the loss of its
most important diplomatic patron, due to the deterioration of the
Soviet
Union that started in 1989, and Arafat's failing
relationship with Moscow
.
Another
factor which pushed the PLO to the accords was the fallout from the
Gulf War; because Arafat took a pro-Iraqi stand during the war, the
Arab Gulf states cut off financial assistance to the PLO, and the
PLO was not invited to the Madrid Conference of 1991 at which
Israel discussed peace with Syria
, Lebanon
, Jordan
and
Palestinian groups that were not associated with the
PLO.
In
December 1992, in the background of the official "Madrid
negotiations" in London
, Israeli
vice-minister of foreign affairs Yossi
Beilin and Norwegian researcher
Terje Rød-Larsen set up a
secret meeting for PLO representative Ahmed
Qurei and Israeli history professor Yair Hirschfeld. Qurei and Hirschfeld
made a connection and decided to meet again in what was going to be
a series of 14 meetings in Oslo. During the first few meetings, a
concept of an accord was discussed and agreed upon. The
Foreign Affairs Minister of
Israel,
Shimon Peres, was
interested and sent the highest-ranking non-political
representative and a military lawyer to continue the negotiations.
In contrast to the official negotiations in Madrid, where actual
meetings between the delegations were often limited to a few hours
a day, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations in Norway were
usually accommodated in the same residence, they had breakfast,
lunch and dinner at the same table, resulting in mutual respect and
close friendships. The Norwegian government covered the expenses,
provided security and kept the meetings away from the public eye,
using the research institute
Fafo as a
front.
In August 1993, the delegations had reached an agreement which was
signed in secrecy by Peres while visiting Oslo. Peres took the
agreement to the United States to the surprise of US negotiator
Dennis Ross.
However, the
Palestinians and Israelis had not yet agreed on the wording of the
agreement, in which the PLO would acknowledge the state of Israel
and pledge to reject violence, and Israel would recognize the
(unelected) PLO as the official Palestinian authority, allowing
Yasser Arafat to return to the West Bank. Most of the negotiations for this agreement
were carried out in a hotel in Paris
, now in full
view of the public and the press. An agreement was reached
and signed by Yasser Arafat and
Yitzhak
Rabin, just in time for the official signing in
Washington.
Principles of the Accords
In
essence, the accords called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces
from parts of the Gaza
Strip and West
Bank, and affirmed a Palestinian right of
self-government within those areas through the creation of a
Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority. Palestinian
rule was to last for a five-year interim period during which
"permanent status negotiations" would commence - no later than May
1996 - in order to reach a final agreement.
Major issues such as
Jerusalem
, Palestinian
refugees, Israeli
settlements, and security and borders were to be decided at
these permanent status negotiations (Article V). Israel was
to grant interim self-government to the Palestinians in
phases.
Along with the principles, the two groups signed
Letters
of Mutual Recognition - the
Israeli government recognized the PLO as
the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, while the
PLO again recognized the right of the state of Israel to exist and
renounced
terrorism as well as other
violence, and its desire for the destruction of the Israeli
state.
The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations was to establish a
Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, an elected Council,
for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for
a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a
permanent settlement based on
United Nations
Security Council Resolution 242, and
338, an
integral part of the whole peace process.
In order that the Palestinians govern themselves according to
democratic principles, free and general
political elections would be
held for the Council.
Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council would cover the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, except for issues that would be finalized in the
permanent status negotiations. The two sides viewed the West Bank
and Gaza as a single territorial unit.
The
five-year transitional period would commence with Israeli
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho
area. Permanent status negotiations would
begin as soon as possible between Israel and the Palestinians. The
negotiations would cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem,
Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security arrangements,
borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other
issues of common interest.
There would be a transfer of authority from the
Israel Defence Forces to the
authorized Palestinians, concerning education and culture,
health,
social
welfare, direct
taxation, and
tourism.
The Council would establish a strong police force, while Israel
would continue to carry the responsibility for defending against
external threats.
An
Israeli-Palestinian
Economic Cooperation Committee would be established in order to
develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs
identified in the protocols.
A redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip would take place.
The Declaration of Principles would enter into force one month
after its signing. All protocols annexed to the Declaration of
Principles and the Agreed Minutes pertaining to it, were to be
regarded as part of it.
Annexes of the accords
Annex 1: Conditions of Palestinian Elections
This annex covered
election
agreements, a system of
elections,
rules and regulations regarding
election campaigns, including agreed
arrangements for the organizing of
mass
media, and the possibility of licensing a
TV station. (Source: Reference.com)
Annex 2: Withdrawal of Israeli forces
An
agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli
military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include
comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the
Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.
Internal security and
public order by the Palestinian
police force consisting of police officers recruited locally
and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian
documents issued by Egypt
).
Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming
from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.
- A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed
upon.
- Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and
Cooperation Committee]] for mutual security purposes.
- Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation
between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
- Arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding
passages: Gaza - Egypt; and Jericho - Jordan.
Annex 3: Economic cooperation
The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing
Committee for economic cooperation, focusing, among other things,
on the following:
- Cooperation in the field of water
- Cooperation in the field of electricity
- Cooperation in the field of energy
- Cooperation in the field of finance
- Cooperation in the field of transport and communications
- Cooperation in the field of trade and commerce
- Cooperation in the field of industry
- Cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations
- Cooperation in social welfare issues
- An environmental protection plan
- Cooperation in the field of communication and media
Annex 4: Regional development
The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral
peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region,
including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the
G7.
Agreed minutes of the accords
Minute A: General understandings
Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians
through the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of
the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to
Article IV, as set out in the agreed minutes below.
Minute B: Specific understandings
Article IV: Council's jurisdiction
It was to be understood that: Jurisdiction of the Council would
cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that
would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
Article VI (2): Transferring authority
It was agreed that the transfer of authority would be as follows:
The Palestinians would inform the Israelis of the names of the
authorized Palestinians who would assume the powers, authorities
and responsibilities that would be transferred to the Palestinians
according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields:
education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation,
tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.
Article VII (2): Cooperation
The Interim Agreement would also include arrangements for
coordination and cooperation.
Article VII (5): Israel's powers
The withdrawal of the military government would not prevent Israel
from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to
the Council.
Article VIII: Police
It was understood that the Interim Agreement would include
arrangements for cooperation and coordination. It was also agreed
that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian
police would be accomplished in a phased manner.
Article X: Designating officials
It was agreed that the Israeli and Palestinian delegations would
exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members
of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee which would
reach decisions by agreement.
Annex II: Israel's continuing responsibilities
It was understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal,
Israel would continue to be responsible for external security, and
for internal security and public order of
settlements and
Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians
would be allowed to continue using roads freely within the Gaza
Strip and the Jericho area.
Reaction
In Israel, a strong debate over the accords took place; the
left wing supported them, while the
right wing opposed them.
After a two-day
discussion in the Knesset
on the government proclamation in the issue of the
accord and the exchange of the letters, on 23 September 1993 a vote
of confidence was held in which 61 Knesset members voted for the
decision, 50 voted against and 8 abstained.
Palestinian reactions were also divided.
Fatah, the group that represented the Palestinians in
the negotiations, accepted the accords. But Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic
Jihad and the
Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (which were known as the "refusal
organizations") objected to the accords because their own charters
refuse to recognize Israel's
right to
exist in
Palestine.
On both sides there were fears of the other side's intentions.
Israelis suspected that the Palestinians were entering into a
tactical peace agreement, and that they were not sincere about
wanting to reach peace and coexistence with Israel. They saw it as
part of the
Ten Point
Program which calls for a national authority over any piece of
liberated Palestinian land, and for a secular democratic
bi-national state in Israel/Palestine with equal rights for all its
citizens. For evidence they brought statements by Arafat in
Palestinian forums, in which he compared the accord to the
Hudaibiya agreement that
Muhammad signed with the sons of the
tribe of Quraish. They understood those statements
as an attempt to justify the signing of the accords in accordance
with historical-religious precedent, with step agreements to reach
final goal.
After the signing of the agreements, Israel refrained from building
new settlements although the Oslo agreements stipulated no such
ban. However, it continued expanding existing settlements which
fell far short of the Shamir government's 1991-92 level.
Construction of Housing Units Before Oslo: 1991-92 14,320 units.
After Oslo: 1994-95 3,850 units; 1996-1997 3,570 units although the
settler population in the West Bank continued growing by around
10,000 per year. The Palestinians built throughout area C
administered by Israel without permit.
According to the Israeli government, the Israeli's trust in the
accords was undermined by the fact that after the signing, the
attacks against Israel intensified, which some explained as an
attempt by certain Palestinian organizations to thwart the peace
process. Others believed that the Palestinian Authority had no
interest in stopping these attacks and was instead endorsing them.
As evidence, they showed that when violence flared up in September
1996, Palestinian police turned their guns on the Israelis in
clashes which left 61 Palestinians and 15 Israeli soldiers dead.
Important sections of the Israeli public opposed the process;
notably, the Jewish settlers feared that it would lead to them
losing their homes.
Many Palestinians feared that Israel was not serious about
dismantling their settlements in the West Bank, especially around
Jerusalem. They feared they might even accelerate their settlement
program in the long run, by building more settlements and expanding
existing ones.
Criticisms
Legal scholar
Louis René Beres
has called the Oslo Accords "patently moribund", since they are
"ill-founded agreements unambiguously destroyed by persistent and
egregious Arab violations".
The Oslo Accords may appear not to have considered factors that
would influence its interpretation. For example, the
Cave of the Patriarchs
massacre, in which at least 39 Palestinians were killed, is
often blamed for undermining Palestinian trust in the process.
Similarly, the expansion of
Israeli
settlements and blockades caused the deterioration of economic
conditions, and much frustration for Palestinians. These factors
caused a drop in support for the accord and for those who supported
it. However, the PA acknowledges that the settlements have actually
provided 12,000 temporary jobs to Palestinian construction
workers.
There have been suggested alternatives to boundary setting and
creating principles that divide Israelis and Palestinians. One
alternative is to move a peace process towards the creation of a
bi-national state, a "
one-state
solution", that promotes co-existence rather than to continuing
to divide. An argument for this as a possible way of reconciliation
is that neither side can wholly justify a claim for homogeneity.
Palestine has a varied history of occupancy, such as the
Canaanites,
Hittites and
Ammonites in
ancient
times. Also, some Israeli and Palestinian thinkers have previously
argued for a bi-national state as a more attractive alternative to
separatism.
Norwegian academics, including Norway's leading authority on the
negotiations,
Hilde Henriksen
Waage, have focused on the flawed role of Norway during the
Oslo process. In 2001, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) commissioned Waage to produce an official, comprehensive
history of the Norwegian-mediated back channel negotiations. In
order to do the research, she was given privileged access to all
relevant, classified files in the ministry's archives. The MFA had
been at the heart of the Oslo process. Waage was surprised to
discover "not a single scrap of paper for the entire period from
January to September 1993 - precisely the period of the back
channel talks". Waage has written that, "Had the missing documents
been accessible, there seems no doubt they would have shown the
extent to which the Oslo process was conducted on Israel’s
premises, with Norway acting as Israel's helpful errand boy".
Subsequent negotiations
In addition to the first accord, namely the
Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government, other more specific
accords are often informally also known as "Oslo":
Oslo 2
Additional agreements
Additional Israeli-Palestinian documents related to the Oslo
Accords are:
Loss of credibility
Since the start of the
al-Aqsa
Intifada, the Oslo Accords are viewed with increasing disfavor
by both the Palestinian and Israeli public.
In May 2000, seven
years after the Oslo Accords and five months before the start of
the al-Aqsa Intifada, a survey by
the Tami
Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at the University
of Tel Aviv
found that 39% of all Israelis supported the
Accords and that 32% believed that the Accords would result in
peace in the next few years. By contrast, the May 2004
survey found that 26% of all Israelis supported the Accords and 18%
believed that the Accords would result in peace in the next few
years. Many Palestinians believed that the Oslo Accords had turned
the PLO leadership into a tool of the Israeli state in suppressing
their own people. While benefiting a small elite, the conditions of
most Palestinians worsened. This was seen as one of the causes for
the al-Aqsa Intifada.
Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties
References
- Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements
- Dershowitz, Alan. The Case for
Israel. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003. p. 3.
- Israel-Egypt Armistice Agreement Jewish Virtual
Library
- Madrid Peace Conference, 1991 Palestine
Facts
- President Bush's speech to Congress al-bab.com
- A Chronological History of the New World Order
Constitution Society
- The Israel-Palestine Conflict, James L. Gelvin
- the gulf conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and war in the new world
order, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh
- Gaza First: the secret Norway channel to peace between Israel
and the PLO, Jane Corbin
- Foundation for Middle East Peace
- Foundation for Middle East Peace,
statistics
- http://imra.org.il/story.php3?id=1127 Independent Media Review
Analysis
- In 5 Years Since Oslo, More Israelis Have Been
Killed by Palestinian Terrorists than in the 15 Years Prior to the
Accord Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 September
1998
- The Palestinian Army Christians for Israel
- Existential Threats to Israel and Palestine:
Suicides and Settlements Al-Ittihad, 26 May 2002 (republished
on the Nixon Center website)
- Louise René Beres: Why Palestinian Demilitarization Won`t Work
United Coalition for Israel, June 15, 2009.
-
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1245924932645
- R. Garaudy ‘The Case of Israel’ London, Shorouk
International. p 32.
- Truth and reconciliation Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue
412
- Postscript to Oslo: The Mystery of Norway's Missing
Files, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.
XXXVIII, No. 1 (Autumn 2008)
- Statistics on Israeli support of the Oslo Accords
by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research
- Bregman, Ahron Elusive Peace:
How the Holy Land Defeated America.
- Clinton, Bill (2005). My Life. Vintage. ISBN
1-4000-3003-X.
- Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." The Continuum
Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002.
See also
Issues
People
, Hebron
, Jenin
, Nablus
, Qalqilya
, Ramallah
, Tulkarm
, and some 450 villages.
on 27 August 1995
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