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RAF Bomber Command was the organisation that controlled the RAF's bomber forces from 1936 to 1968. During World War II, the command destroyed a significant proportion of Nazi Germany's industries and many German cities, and in the 1960s was at the peak of its postwar power with the V bombers and a supplemental force of Canberra light bombers. RAF Bomber Command had 19 Victoria Cross winners
NOTE: Seven of the VCs were to members of Dominion air forces and nine were posthumous. Two personnel from the same aircrew received the VC as a result of their actions on May 12, 1940. With the Germans breaking through, 12 Squadron, flying obsolete Fairey Battles, was ordered to attack two bridges on the Albert Canalmarker near Maastrichtmarker. The whole squadron volunteered and five aircraft, all that were available, took off. Four Battles were shot down by flak and German fighters, while the fifth staggered back to base heavily damaged. One of the four shot down was piloted by Flying Officer Donald Garland, who dived from in the face of intense fire, and succeeded in destroying one of the bridges. He and his observer, Sgt Tom Gray, both received the posthumous award of the Victoria Cross. and, in August 2006, a memorial was unveiled at Lincoln Cathedralmarker.

History 1936–45

When Bomber Command was formed, Giulio Douhet's slogan "the bomber will always get through" was popular, and was cited by figures like Stanley Baldwin. Until advances in radar technology in the late 1930s, this statement was effectively true. Attacking bombers could not be detected early enough to assemble fighters fast enough to prevent them reaching their targets. Some damage might be done to the bombers by AA guns, and by fighters as the bombers returned to base, but that was not the same as a proper defence. Consequently, the early conception of Bomber Command was in some ways akin to its later role as a nuclear deterrent force. It was seen as an entity that threatened the enemy with utter destruction, and thus prevented war. However, in addition to being made obsolete by technology, even if the bomber did always get through, its potential for damage to cities was massively overrated.

The problem was that the British Government was basing its data on a casualty rate of 50 per ton of bombs dropped. The basis for this assumption was a few raids on London in the later stages of World War I, by Zeppelins and Gotha bombers. Both the government and the general public viewed the bomber as a far more terrible weapon than it really was.

The early years of the war

At the start of World War II, Bomber Command was hampered by three problems. The first was lack of size; Bomber Command was not large enough to effectively attack the enemy as a pure, stand-alone strategic force. The second was rules of engagement; at the start of the war, the targets allocated to Bomber Command were not wide enough in scope. The third problem was the Command's lack of technology; specifically radio or radar derived navigational aids to allow accurate target location and thus bombing.

When the war began on 1 September 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the then-neutral United States, issued an appeal to the major belligerents to confine their air raids to military targets. The French, the British agreed to abide by the request which included the provision "that these same rules of warfare will be scrupulously observed by all of their opponents". The United Kingdom's policy was to restrict bombing to military targets and infrastructure such as ports and railways which were of military importance. While it was acknowledged bombing Germany would cause civilian casualties, the British government renounced deliberate bombing of civilian property, outside combat zones, as a military tactic. The British abandoned this policy at the end of the Phony War on 15 May 1940, one day after the Rotterdam Blitz.

The British Government did not want to violate its agreement by attacking civilian targets outside combat zones, and the French were even more concerned lest Bomber Command operations provoke a German bombing attack on France. Since the Armée de l'Air had few modern fighters, and no defence network comparable to the British chain of radar stations, France was effectively prostrate before the threat of a German bombing attack. The final problem was lack of good enough aircraft. The main Bomber Command workhorses at the start of the war had been designed as tactical support medium bombers, and none of them had enough range or ordnance capacity for anything more than a limited strategic offensive.

Bomber Command was further reduced in size after the declaration of war. No. 1 Group, with its squadrons of Fairey Battles, left for France to form the Advanced Air Striking Force. This was for two reasons; to give the British Expeditionary Force some air striking power, and to allow the Battle to operate against German targets, since it lacked the range to do so from British airfields.

The Sitzkrieg (or Phony War) mainly affected the army. However, to an extent, Bomber Command was not properly at war during the first few months of hostilities either. Bomber Command flew many operational missions, and lost aircraft, but it did virtually no damage to the enemy. Most of the missions either failed to find their targets, or were leaflet dropping missions (the first flights by RAF bombers over the German homeland were only to drop propaganda leaflets at night). The attack in the west in May 1940 changed everything.

The Fairey Battles of the Advanced Air Striking Force were partially disabled by German strikes on their airfields at the opening of the invasion of France. However, far from all of the force was caught on the ground. The Faireys proved to be horrendously vulnerable to enemy fire. Many times, Battles would set out to attack, and be almost wiped out in the process. This was somewhat ironic given the fact that due to French paranoia about being attacked by German aircraft, during the Sitzkrieg, the Battle force had actually trained over German airspace at night.

Following the attack on Rotterdam, RAF Bomber Command was authorized to attack German targets east of the Rhine on May 15, 1940; the Air Ministry authorized Air Marshal Charles Portal to attack targets in the Ruhr, including oil plants and other civilian industrial targets which aided the German war effort, such as blast furnaces (which at night were self-illuminating). The first attack took place on the night of 15/16 May, with 96 bombers setting off to attack targets east of the Rhine, 78 of which were against oil targets. Of these, only 24 claimed to have found their targets. Bomber Command's strategic bombing campaign on Germany has thus begun.

Bomber Command itself soon fully joined in the action. With the immensely quick collapse of France, invasion seemed a clear and present danger. As its part in Battle of Britain, Bomber Command was assigned to pound the invasion barges and fleets assembling in the Channel ports. This was much less high profile than the battles of the Spitfires and Hurricanes of RAF Fighter Command, but still vital and dangerous work. From July 1940 to the end of the year, Bomber Command lost nearly 330 aircraft and over 1,400 aircrew killed, missing or PoW.

Bomber Command was also indirectly responsible, in part at least, for the switch of Luftwaffe attention away from Fighter Command to bombing civilian targets. A German bomber on a raid got lost due to poor navigation and bombed London. Churchill consequently ordered a retaliatory raid on the German capital of Berlin. The damage caused was minor, but the raid sent Hitler into a rage. He ordered the Luftwaffe to level British cities, thus precipitating the Blitz.

Like the United States Army Air Forces later in the war, Bomber Command had first concentrated on a doctrine of "precision" bombing in daylight. However, when several late 1939 raids were cut to pieces by the organised German defences, a switch to night attack tactics was forced upon the Command. The problems of enemy defences were then replaced with the problems of simply finding the target. It was common in the early years of the war for bombers relying on dead reckoning navigation to miss entire cities. Surveys of Bombing photographs and other sources published during August 1941 indicated that less than one bomb in ten fell within of its intended target. One of the most urgent problems of the Command was thus to develop technical navigational aids to allow accurate bombing.


Bomber Command was made up of a number of Groups. It began the war with Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 Groups. No. 1 Group was soon sent to France. It was, however, returned to Bomber Command control after the evacuation of France, and reconstituted. No. 2 Group consisted of light and medium bombers who, although operating both by day and night, remained part of Bomber Command until 1943, when it was removed to the control of Second Tactical Air Force, to form the light bomber component of that command. Bomber Command also gained two new groups during the war: the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) contributed No. 6 Group and a Pathfinder group, No. 8 Group was formed from existing squadrons.

Many squadrons and personnel from Commonwealth and other European countries were distributed throughout Bomber Command. No. 6 Group, which was activated on 1 January, 1943, was unique among Bomber Command groups, in that it was not an RAF unit; it was a Canadian unit attached to Bomber Command. At its peak strength, 6 Group consisted of 14 operational RCAF bomber squadrons, and 15 different squadrons served with the group. No. 8 Group, also known as the Pathfinder Force, was activated on 15 August 1942. It was a critical part of solving the navigational problems referred to above. The navigational problems of Bomber Command were solved by two methods. One was the use of a range of increasingly sophisticated electronic aids to navigation and the other was the use of specialist Pathfinder. The technical aids to navigation took two forms. One was external radio navigation aids, as exemplified by Gee and the later highly accurate Oboe systems. The other was the centimetric navigation equipment H2S radar which was carried in the bombers. The Pathfinders were a group of elite, specially trained and experienced crews who flew ahead of the main bombing forces, and marked the targets with flares and special marker bombs. No. 8 Group controlled the Pathfinder squadrons.

WWII RAF bombing priority

1941 early: Synthetic oil production

1941 March: U boat and long range bomber targets. 1941 November: ordered to halt offensive (conserve forces) while future "debated"

1942 February 14: industrial worker morale

1943 January 14: U-boat pens

1943 June 10: Combined Bomber Offensive

1943 August: Operation Crossbow

1945 January 27: troop movement, etc

By late 1941, RAF Bomber Command was regularly mounting raids by hundreds of aircraft.

Strategic bombing 1942-45

After the officially-commissioned 1941 Butt Report revealed bombing to be shockingly inaccurate (Churchill recognised "this is a very serious paper and seems to require urgent attention"), the February 14, 1942 Area Bombing Directive ordered Bomber Command to use area bombardment. Professor Frederick Lindemann's dehousing paper subsequently identified the expected effectiveness of carpet bombing of cities. Aerial bombing of cities such as the Operation Millennium raid on Cologne continued throughout WWII, with the controversial Bombing of Dresden in 1945.

In 1942, the main workhorse aircraft of the later part of the war came into service. The Halifax and Lancaster made up the backbone of the Command, and had a longer range, higher speed and much greater bomb load than the earlier aircraft. The classic aircraft of the Pathfinders, the de Havilland Mosquito, also made its appearance. By July 25, 1943, the Bomber Command headquarters was "a substantial set of red brick buildings, hidden in the middle of a forest on top of a hill in the English county of Buckinghamshire."

A prolonged offensive against the Rhine-Ruhr area (the "Armoury of the Third Reich" and called "Happy Valley" by aircrew) began on March 5/6 1943 with the first raid of the Battle of the Ruhr flew RAF Bomber Command's 100,000th sortie of WWII which destroyed and hit 53 Krupps buildings. The series of raids on Hamburg (the Battle of Hamburg) in mid 1943 was one of the most successful Command operations, although Harris' extension of the offensive into the Battle of Berlin failed to decimate the capital and cost his force over 1,000 crews through the winter of 1943-44. In August 1943, the RAF Operation Hydra preventative bombing of the Peenemündemarker V-2 rocket facility opened the secondary Operation Crossbow campaign against long range weapons.

By April 1944, Harris called off his strategic offensive as the bomber force was seconded (much to his annoyance) to tactical and communications targets in France prior to D-Day. The anti-transport offensive proved highly effective.By late 1944, bombing such as Operation Hurricane competed against the Defense of the Reich, and Bomber Command was capable of putting 1,000 aircraft over a target without extraordinary efforts. Ironically by this time the land battle through Northern Europe was making the Bomber Offensive increasingly meaningless.

The peak of Bomber Command's operations occurred in the raids of March 1945, when its squadrons dropped their highest amount of ordnance (by weight) for any month in the entire war. The last raid on Berlin took place on the night of 21-22 April, when 76 Mosquitos made six separate attacks just before Soviet forces entered the city centre. Most of the rest of the RAF bombing raids were tactical support attacks. The last major strategic raid was the destruction of the oil refinery at Tonsbergmarker in southern Norwaymarker by 107 Lancasters, on the night of 25-26 of April.

Once the surrender of Germany had occurred, plans were put in place to send the Tiger Force of about 30 British Commonwealth bomber squadrons to bases on Okinawamarker, and there was a reorganisation of groups within Bomber Command for the proposed invasion of Japan. However, the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki occurred before any part of the force had been transferred to the Pacific.


Overall, Allied bombing of German cities claimed between 305,000 and 600,000 civilian lives. About two thirds of these civilians died during attacks by Bomber Command. One of the most controversial aspects of Bomber Command during World War II was the area bombing of cities. Until 1942 navigational technology did not allow for any more precise targeting than at best a district of a town or city by night bombing. All large German cities contained important industrial districts and so were considered legitimate targets by the Allies. Thus the attacks of the British Bomber Command were at times targeting highly populated city centres. The single most destructive raids in terms of absolute casualties were those on Hamburg (45,000 dead) in 1943 and Dresden (25,000–35,000 dead) in 1945. Each caused a firestorm and left tens of thousands dead. Other large raids on German cities which resulted in high civil casualties were Darmstadt (12,300 dead), Pforzheim (17,600 dead) and Kassel (10,000 dead).

Regarding the legality of the campaign, an article in the International Review of the Red Cross stated:
In examining these events [aerial area bombardment] in the light of international humanitarian law, it should be borne in mind that during the Second World War there was no agreement, treaty, convention or any other instrument governing the protection of the civilian population or civilian property, as the conventions then in force dealt only with the protection of the wounded and the sick on the battlefield and in naval warfare, hospital ships, the laws and customs of war and the protection of prisoners of war.

Bomber Command crews also suffered an extremely high casualty rate: 55,573 killed out of a total of 125,000 aircrew (a 44.4% death rate), a further 8,403 were wounded in action and 9,838 became prisoners of war. This covered all Bomber Command operations including tactical support for ground operations and mining of sea lanes. A Bomber Command crew member had a worse chance of survival than an infantry officer in World War I. By comparison, the US Eighth Air Force, which flew daylight raids over Europe, had 350,000 aircrew during the war, and suffered 26,000 killed and 23,000 POWs. Of the RAF Bomber Command personnel killed during the war, 72% were British, 18% were Canadian, 7% were Australian and 3% were New Zealanders.
The fatalities included over 38,000 RAF aircrew (of all nationalities), 9,900 Royal Canadian Air Force personnel, and over 1,500 aircrew from countries in occupied Europe. It is illustrative that members of the Australian squadrons of Bomber Command equalled only two percent of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel, but the 4,050 killed represented 23% of the total number of RAAF personnel killed in action during World War II. No. 460 Squadron RAAF, which had an aircrew establishment of about 200, experienced 1,018 combat deaths during 1942-45 and was therefore effectively wiped out five times over.

Taking an example of 100 airmen:[55146]

  • 55 killed on operations or died as result of wounds
  • three injured (in varying levels of severity) on operations or active service
  • 12 taken prisoner of war (some injured)
  • two shot down and evaded capture
  • 27 survived a tour of operations

In total 364,514 operational sorties were flown, 1,030,500 tons of bombs were dropped and 8,325 aircraft lost in action.

Harris was advised by an Operational Research Section (ORS) under a civilian, Basil Dickins, supported by a small team of mathematics and scientists. ORS2 (under Reuben Smeed) was concerned with analysing bomber losses. They were able to influence operations by identifying successful defensive tactics and equipment, though some of their more controversial advice (such as removing ineffectual turrets from bombers to increase defensive speed) was ignored.The very high casualty levels suffered give testimony to the dedication and courage of Bomber Command's aircrew in carrying out their orders. Statistically there was little prospect of surviving a tour of 30 operations, and by 1943 the odds against survival were pretty grim with only one in six expected to survive their first tour, while a slim one in forty would survive their second tour . For much of the war, the loss rate hovered around 5%, about 1 in 20 aircraft would, on average, be shot down although obviously there was great variation here, on some occasions the loss rate exceeded 10% sometimes much higher than that.

The "balance sheet"

Bomber Command was overwhelmingly committed to the strategic bombing offensive against Germany and its contribution to the Allied war effort must primarily be judged in that context. The ostensible aim of the offensive, breaking the morale of the German working class, must be considered a failure. The scale and intensity of the offensive was an appalling trial to the German people and the Hamburg attacks, particularly, profoundly shook the Nazi leadership. However, on balance, the indiscriminate nature of the bombing and the heavy civilian casualties and damage stiffened German resistance to fight to the end. In any case as Sir Arthur Harris put it, the Germans living under a savage tyranny were "not allowed the luxury of morale".

Sir Arthur Harris himself believed that there was a relationship between tonnage dropped, city areas destroyed, and lost production. The effect of Bomber Command's attacks on industrial production is not so clear cut. The British Bombing Survey at the end of the war was deliberately under-resourced, for Churchill wanted to put Dresden behind him. The much better provided US survey was little concerned with the RAF area bombing campaign. It pointed to the great success of the USAAF's attacks on Germany's synthetic oil plants starting in the spring of 1944 - this had a crippling effect on German transportation and prevented the Luftwaffe from flying to anything like the order of battle that the aviation engine plants, parts and sub-assembly fabrication and final assembly manufacturing facilities; Luftwaffe training and logistics could have otherwise sustained. Further, in going for targets they knew the Germans must defend, the American escort fighters were able to inflict crippling losses on the Luftwaffe's fighter force. However it should be pointed out that the RAF also made a great contribution to the oil offensive as its abilities to attack precision targets had greatly improved- by mid 1944 it was mounting huge bombing raids in daylight too.

Albert Speer, Hitler's Minister of Armaments noted that the larger British bombs did much more damage and so made repair more difficult, and sometimes impossible. Shortly after the war's end, Speer was unequivocal about the effect of this:

In terms of overall production decrease resulting from the RAF area attacks, the US survey, based upon limited research, found that in 1943 it amounted to 9% and in 1944 to 17%. Relying on US gathered statistics the British survey found that actual arms production decreases were a mere 3% for 1943, and 1% for 1944. However they did find decreases of 46.5% and 39% in the second half of 1943 and 1944 respectively in the metal processing industries. These losses resulted from the devastating series of raids the Command launched on the Ruhr Valleymarker at these times.

This apparent lack of success is accounted for in several ways. The German industrial economy was so strong, its industrial bases so widely spread, that it was a hopeless task to try and crush it by area bombing. Further, up until 1943 it is undoubtedly the case that Germany was not fully mobilised for war, Speer remarked that single shift factory working was commonplace, and so there was plenty of slack in the system. It has been argued that the RAF campaign placed a limit on German arms production. This may be true but it is also the case that the German forces did not run out of arms and ammunition and that it was manpower that was a key limiting factor, as well as the destruction of transport facilities and the fuel to move.

Having dealt with the negative side of the case it is now time to put the positive. The greatest contribution to winning the war made by Bomber Command was in the huge diversion of German resources into defending the homeland; this was very considerable indeed. By January 1943 some 1,000 Luftwaffe night fighters were committed to the defence of the Reich mostly twin engined Me 110 and Ju 88. Most critically, by September 1943, 8,876 of the deadly, dual purpose 88 mm guns were also defending the homeland with a further 25,000 light flak guns 20/37 mm. The 88mm gun was an effective AA weapon, it was a deadly destroyer of tanks and lethal against advancing infantry. These weapons would have done much to augment German anti-tank defences on the Russian front.

To man these weapons the flak regiments in Germany required some 90,000 fit personnel, and a further 1 million were deployed in clearing up and repairing the vast bomb damage caused by the RAF attacks. To put this into perspective General Erwin Rommel's German forces defending Normandy in 1944 comprised 50,000, and their resistance caused the Western Allies grave problems.

This diversion to defensive purposes of German arms and manpower was an enormous contribution made by RAF Bomber Command to winning the war. By 1944 the bombing offensive was costing Germany 30% of all artillery production, 20% of heavy shells, 33% of the output of the optical industry for sights and aiming devices and 50% of the country's electro-technical output which had to be diverted to the anti-aircraft role.

From the British perspective it should be noted that the RAF offensive made a great contribution in sustaining morale during the dark days of the war, especially during the bleak winter of 1941-42. It was the only means that Britain possessed of taking the war directly to the enemy at that time.

History 1946–68

To significantly expand its delivery capabilities, Bomber Command acquired B-29 Superfortresses, known to the RAF as Boeing Washingtons. These aircraft added another level of capability to a fleet dominated by Avro Lincolns, an update of the Lancaster.

The first jet bomber was the English Electric Canberra light bomber, some of which remained in RAF service up to 2006 as photo reconnaissance aircraft. The Canberra proved to be an extremely successful aircraft, being exported to many countries and being license-built in the United States. The joint US-UK Project E was pushed through to make nuclear weapons available to Bomber Command in an emergency, with the Canberras the first aircraft to benefit. The next jet bomber to enter service was the Vickers Valiant in 1955, the first of the V bombers.

The V bombers were conceived as the replacement for the wartime Lancasters and Halifaxes. Three advanced aircraft were developed, along with the Short Sperrin fall-back design, from 1946 which many argue was a waste of resources. They contend that one design should have been pursued enabling a larger production run, but this is with 20/20 hindsight, it not being possible to predict which designs would be successful at the time. The V bombers became the backbone of the British nuclear forces. The Valiant, Handley Page Victor (in service in 1958) and Avro Vulcan (1956) were classic designs of British aviation.

In 1956, Bomber Command faced its the first operational test since World War II, and its last major action in anger. The Egyptian Government nationalised the Suez Canalmarker during that year, and the British Government decided to take military action. During the Suez Crisis, Bomber Command Canberras were deployed to Cyprusmarker and Maltamarker and Valiants were deployed to Maltamarker. The Canberra performed well, but the Valiant had problems. Since the Valiant had just been introduced into service, this was hardly surprising. The Canberras were also vulnerable to attack by the Egyptian Air Force, which fortunately did not choose to attack the crowded airfields of Cyprusmarker (RAF Akrotirimarker and RAF Nicosiamarker holding nearly the whole RAF strike force, with a recently reactivated and poor quality airfield taking much of the French force). Over 100 Bomber Command aircraft took part in operations against Egypt. By World War II standards, the scale of attack was light.

During the following twelve years, Bomber Command aircraft frequently deployed overseas to the Far East and Middle East. They were particularly used as a deterrent to Sukarno's Indonesiamarker during the Konfrontasi. A detachment of Canberras was also permanently maintained at Akrotiri in Cyprus in support of CENTO obligations.

As the remaining V bombers came into service in the late 1950s, the British nuclear deterrent was gaining notice. The first British atomic bomb was tested in 1952, with the first hydrogen bomb being exploded in 1957. Operation Grapple saw Valiant bombers dropping hydrogen bombs over Christmas Islandmarker.

Nuclear annihilation came dramatically to world attention during 1962. The Cuban missile crisis was one of the nearest brushes with nuclear conflict the world has seen. During that tense period, Bomber Command aircraft maintained continuous strip alerts, ready to take off at a moment's notice. Heavy bombers were effectively doing what Fighter Command had done in 1940 in terms of reaction time. However, at no time did the Prime Minister take the decision to disperse the Bomber Command aircraft to satellite airfields, lest that be viewed as an aggressive step.

By the early 1960s, doubts were surfacing about the ability of Bomber Command to pierce the defences of the Soviet Union. The shooting down of a U-2 spyplane in 1960 confirmed that the Soviet Union did have surface-to-air missiles capable of reaching the heights that bombers operated at. Since WWII, the philosophy of bombers had been to go higher and faster. That found its ultimate expression in the XB-70 Valkyrie, developed for the USAF. With the deprecation of high and fast tactics, the new mantra became ultra low level attack. However, since the Bomber Command aircraft had not originally been designed for that kind of attack profile, problems were caused. Those problems were primarily airframe fatigue. The Valiant was the first to suffer. Severe airframe fatigue meant that all Valiants were grounded in October 1964, and permanently withdrawn from service in January 1965. Low level operations also reduced the lifespan of the Victors and Vulcans.

Bomber Command's other main function was to provide tanker aircraft to the RAF. The Valiant was the first bomber used as a tanker operationally. Trials had been carried out with air to air refuelling using Lincolns and Meteors, and had proved successful, so many of the new bombers were designed to be able to be used in the tanker role. Indeed, some Valiants were produced as a dedicated tanker variant. As high level penetration declined as an attack technique, the Valiant saw more and more use as a tanker. With the introduction of the Victor B2, the earlier models of that aircraft were also converted to tankers. The withdrawal of the Valiant from service caused the conversion of many of the Victors to tankers to be greatly speeded up. The Vulcan also saw service as a tanker, but not until an improvised conversion during the Falklands War. Ironically, in the tanker role, the Victor not only outlived Bomber Command, but also all the other V bombers by nine years.

In a further attempt to make the operation of the bomber force safer, attempts were made to develop stand-off weapons. With a stand-off capability, the bombers would not have to penetrate Soviet airspace. However, efforts to do so had only limited success. The first attempt was the Blue Steel missile. It worked, but its range meant that bombers still had to enter Soviet airspace. Longer range systems were developed, but failed and/or were cancelled. This fate befell the Mark 2 of the Blue Steel, its replacement, the American Skybolt ALBM and the ground-based Blue Streak program.

However, attempts to develop a stand-off nuclear deterrent were eventually successful. The American Polaris missile was procured, and Royal Navy submarines built to carry them. The modern form of the British nuclear force was thus essentially reached. Royal Navy submarines relieved the RAF of the nuclear deterrent mission in 1969. However, by that point, Bomber Command was no more.

In the postwar period, the RAF slowly declined in strength, and by the mid-1960s, it was clear that the home command structure needed rationalisation. To that end, RAF Fighter Command and Bomber Command were merged in 1968 to form Strike Command. RAF Coastal Command also followed shortly thereafter.

Bomber Command had a successful period of existence. Its early potential was at first not realised, but with the development of better navigation and aircraft, it carried the war to the enemy in spectacular fashion. Postwar, it carried Britain's nuclear deterrent through a difficult period, and continued the fine traditions existing in 1945.


At any one time several air officers served on the staff of Bomber Command and so the overall commander was known as the Air Officer Commander-in-Chief, the most well-known being Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris. The commanders-in-chief and their dates of appointment are listed below with the rank which they held whilst in post.

Battle honours

  • Honour: "Berlin 1940-1945": For bombardment of Berlin by aircraft of Bomber Command.
  • Honour: "Fortress Europe 1940-1944": For operations by aircraft based in the British Isles against targets in Germany, Italy and enemy-occupied Europe, from the fall of France to the invasion of Normandy.

See also


  1. President Franklin D. Roosevelt Appeal against aerial bombardment of civilian populations, 1 September 1939
  2. Taylor (2005), Chapter "Call Me Meier", p. 105
  3. A.C. Grayling (Bloomsbury 2006), p. 24.
  4. Hastings 1979, p. 6
  5. Taylor References Chapter "Call Me Meier", Page 111
  6. Richards 1953, p.124.
  7. Hinchliffe, 2000. p. 44
  8. Milberry, Larry (General Editor). Sixty Years - The RCAF and CF Air Command 1924 - 1984. Toronto: Canav Books, 1984. (p. 166)
  9. Dunmore, Spencer and Carter, William. Reap the Whirlwind: The Untold Story of 6 Group, Canada's Bomber Force of World War II. Toronto: McLelland and Stewart Inc., 1991.(p. 375).
  10. Alan J. Levine The strategic bombing of Germany 1940-1945 p29
  12. NOTE: In April, 1944, at the request of the British Cabinet Eisenhower ruled that attacks on long-range weapon targets take precedence over everything except the urgent requirements of the battle across the Channel.
  13. [1]
  14. Bishop, Patrick. Bomber Boys - Fighting Back 1940-1945. ISBN 978-0007192151.
  15. German Deaths by aerial bombardment (It is not clear if these totals includes Austrians, of whom about 24,000 were killed (see Austrian Press & Information Service, Washington, D.C) and other territories in the Third Reich but not in modern Germany) * 600,000 about 80,000 were children in Hamburg, Juli 1943 in Der Spiegel Online 2003 (in German) * Twentieth Century Atlas - Death Tolls lists the following totals and sources: ** more than 305,000 (1945 Strategic Bombing Survey); ** 400,000 Hammond Atlas of the 20th Century (1996) ** 410,000 R. J. Rummel, 100% democidal; ** 499,750 Michael Clodfelter Warfare and Armed Conflict: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1618-1991; ** 593,000 John Keegan The Second World War (1989); ** 593,000 J. A. S. Grenville citing "official Germany" in A History of the World in the Twentieth Century (1994) ** 600,000 Paul Johnson Modern Times (1983)
  16. Bergander, Götz , Dresden im Luftkrieg: Vorgeschichte-Zerstörung-Folgen (Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, Munich, 1977)
  17. The Bombing of Dresden in 1945:Falsification of statistics, by Richard J. Evans, Professor of Modern History, University of Cambridge, a detailed critique of problems with David Irving's book .
  18. Pforzheim - 23 February 1945 by Christian Groh. In German. translates the web page from German into a form of English which can be used to verify facts.
  19. International Review of the Red Cross no 323, p.347-363 The Law of Air Warfare (1998)
  20. A Failure of Intelligence Freeman Dyson, MIT Technology Review
  21. Falconer, Jonathan Bomber Command Handbook 1939-1945 pp.51


  • Bergander, Götz , Dresden im Luftkrieg: Vorgeschichte-Zerstörung-Folgen (in German). München, Germany: Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, 1977.
  • Bishop, Patrick. Bomber Boys - Fighting Back 1940-1945. ISBN 978-0007192151.
  • Carter, Ian Bomber Command 1939 - 1945. ISBN 978-0711026995.
  • Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. Action Stations: Military Airfields of Yorkshire v. 4. ISBN 978-0850595321.
  • Falconer, Jonathan. Bomber Command Handbook 1939-1945. Sutton Publishing Limited. ISBN 0-7509-3171-X.
  • Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. Action Stations: Wartime Military Airfields of Lincolnshire and the East Midlands v. 2. ISBN 978-0850594843.
  • Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. Bomber Aircrew of World War II: True Stories of Frontline Air Combat. ISBN 978-1844150663.
  • Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. English Electric Canberra: The History and Development of a Classic Jet. Pen & Sword, 2005. ISBN 978-1844152421.
  • Halpenny, Bruce Barrymore. To Shatter the Sky: Bomber Airfield at War. ISBN 978-0850596786.
  • Harris, Arthur. Despatch on War Operations (Cass Studies in Air Power). ISBN 978-0714646923.
  • Hastings, Max (1979). RAF Bomber Command. Pan Books. ISBN 0330392042
  • Middlebrook, Martin. The Peenemünde Raid: The Night of 17-18 August 1943. New York: Bobs-Merrill, 1982.
  • Momyer, William M. Air power in three wars, DIANE Publishing, ISBN 1428993967.
  • Neufeld, Michael J. The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era. New York: The Free Press, 1995.
  • Peden, Murray. A Thousand Shall Fall. ISBN 0-7737-5967-0.
  • Taylor, Frederick. (2005) Dresden: Tuesday, 13 February, 1945. Bloomsbury. ISBN 0-7475-7074-1
  • Speer, Albert. Spandau, The Secret Diaries, New York: MacMillian and Company, 1976.

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