Reaganomics (a
portmanteau of
Reagan and
economics attributed to
Paul
Harvey) refers to the
economic
policies promoted by
United
States President Ronald Reagan
during the 1980s. The four pillars of Reagan's economic policy were
to:
- reduce government spending,
- reduce income and capital gains marginal tax rates,
- reduce government regulation of the economy,
- control the money supply to reduce inflation.
In his stated intention to cut back on domestic spending while
lowering taxes, Reagan's approach was a departure from his
immediate predecessors. Although his record is still debated,
Reagan succeeded with lower marginal tax rates in conjunction with
simplified income tax codes, and continued deregulation. However
government spending and deficits rose during his
administration.
Historical context
Prior to the Reagan Administration, the United States experienced a
decade of economic stagnation
and inflation, known as
stagflation. Political pressure favored
stimulus resulting in an expansion of the money supply. Nixon's
wage and price controls were
abandoned. Under Ford the problems continued. The
federal oil reserves were
created to ease any future short term shocks. Carter started
phasing out price controls on petroleum, but created the Department
of Energy. Much of the credit for the resolution of the stagflation
is given to two causes: a three year contraction of the money
supply by the
Federal Reserve under
Paul Volcker, initiated in the last
year of Carter's presidency, and to long term easing of supply and
pricing in oil during the
1980s oil
glut. By the time Reagan took office, stagflation was near its
end and for the remainder of his presidency the economy performed
well. There was a renewed emphasis on prudent macroeconomic policy;
Nixon's price controls and similar policies of government
intervention had fallen out of favor, while subtler forms of
monetary policy gained favor.
Policies
Reaganomics had its roots in two of Reagan's campaign promises:
lower taxes and a smaller government.
He lifted remaining domestic petroleum price and allocation
controls on January 28, 1981 and lowered the Oil
Windfall profits tax in August 1981,
helping to end the
1979 energy
crisis. He ended the Oil
Windfall profits tax in 1988 during the
1980s oil glut.
With the
Tax Reform Act of
1986, Reagan and Congress sought to broaden the tax base and
reduce perceived tax favoritism. In 1983, Democrats
Bill Bradley and
Dick
Gephardt had offered a proposal to clean up/broaden the tax
base; in 1984 Reagan had the Treasury Department produce its own
plan. The eventual bipartisan 1986 act aimed to be revenue-neutral:
while it reduced the top marginal rate, it also partially "cleaned
up" the tax base by curbing tax loopholes, preferences, and
exceptions, thus raising the effective tax on activities previously
specially favored by the code. Economists of most affiliations
favor cleaning up the tax code, since tax preferences and
exceptions distort economic decisions.
Nobel Prize-winning economist
Milton
Friedman has pointed to the number of pages added to the
Federal Register each year as
evidence of Reagan's anti-regulation presidency (the Register
records the rules and regulations that federal agencies issue per
year). The number of pages added to the Register each year declined
sharply at the start of the Ronald Reagan presidency breaking a
steady and sharp increase since 1960. The increase in the number of
pages added per year resumed an upward, though less steep, trend
after Reagan left office. In contrast, the number of pages being
added each year increased under Ford, Carter, George H.W. Bush,
Clinton, and others.
The question of how much of the overall trend of deregulation can
be credited to Reagan remains contentious. The economists
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales point out
that many of the major deregulation efforts had either taken place
or begun before Reagan (note the deregulation of airlines and
trucking under Carter, and the beginning of deregulatory reform in
railroads, telephones, natural gas, and banking). They argue for
this and other reasons that "the move toward markets preceded the
leader [Reagan] who is seen as one of their saviors." Economist
William Niskanen, a member of Reagan's Council of Economic Advisers
and later chairman of the libertarian
Cato Institute, writes that deregulation had
the "lowest priority" of the items on the Reagan agenda and that
Reagan "failed to sustain the momentum for deregulation initiated
in the 1970s." The apparent contradiction with Friedman's data may
be resolved by seeing Niskanen as referring to
statutory
deregulation and Friedman to
administrative deregulation.
In sum, a large study by economists Paul Joskow and Roger Noll
concludes that the changes in economic regulation
"simply do not reflect a sudden ideological change
in federal executive branch views....many of the significant
changes in economic regulation began during the Carter
administration and were initiated by liberal Democrats.... it is
not particularly productive to refer to a generic deregulation
movement or to think of it as a consequence of the election of
Ronald Reagan."
Economic record
During Reagan's tenure, income tax rates of the top personal tax
bracket dropped from 70% to 28% in 7 years, while social security
and medicare taxes increased. Real
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth
recovered strongly after the 1982 recession and produced five
straight quarters of growth averaging 8.5%. The GDP grew during
Reagan's remaining years in office at an annual rate of 3.4% per
year, slightly lower than the post-
World
War II average of 3.6%. Unemployment peaked at over 10.7%
percent in 1982 then dropped during the rest of Reagan's terms, and
inflation significantly decreased. A net job increase of about 16
million also occurred (about the rate of population growth).
The policies were derided by some as "
Trickle-down economics," due to the
significant cuts in the upper tax brackets. There was a massive
increase in
Cold War related defense
spending that caused large budget deficits, the U.S. trade deficit
expansion, and contributed to the
Savings and Loan crisis, In order to
cover new federal budget deficits, the United States borrowed
heavily both domestically and abroad, raising the
national debt from $700 billion to $3
trillion, and the United States moved from being the world's
largest international creditor to the world's largest debtor
nation. Reagan described the new debt as the "greatest
disappointment" of his presidency.
Donald Regan, the President's former
Secretary of the Treasury,
and later
Chief of Staff,
criticized Reagan for his lack of attention to economics: "In the
four years that I served as Secretary of the Treasury, I never saw
President Reagan alone and never discussed economic philosophy or
fiscal and monetary policy with him one-on-one....The President
never told me what he believed or what he wanted to accomplish in
the field of economics.” However, Reagan's chief economic adviser,
Martin Feldstein, argues the
opposite: "I briefed him on Third World debt; he didn't take notes,
he asked very few questions....The subject came up in a cabinet
meeting and he summarized what he had heard perfectly. He had a
remarkably good memory for oral presentation and could fit
information into his own philosophy and make decisions on
it."
Reagan himself claimed to be influenced by "classical economists"
such as
Frédéric Bastiat,
Ludwig von Mises,
Friedrich Hayek, and
Henry Hazlitt. Upon Reagan's death, a memo
released by
Jude Wanniski, economics
advisor to Reagan during his 1980 campaign, highlights Reagan's
firm grasp of economic concepts and his knack for conveying them so
a layperson could understand.
Tax receipts
According
to a United States Department of the
Treasury
economic study, the major tax bills enacted under
Reagan, in the short-term, significantly reduced (~-1% of GDP)
government tax receipts. Separated out, however, it is clear
that the
Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was a massive (~-3% of GDP) decrease
in revenues (the largest tax cuts ever enacted), while other tax
bills had neutral or, in the case of the
Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, significant (~+1% of GDP)
government revenue-enhancing effects. It should be however noted
that the study did not examine the longer-term impact of Reagan tax
policy, including sunset clauses and "the long-run, fully-phased-in
effect of the tax bills". The table below represents only a 4-year
average:
Short-term revenue effects of major tax bills enacted
under Reagan (as percentage of GDP)
|
Number of years after enactment |
|
| Tax bill |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
First 2-yr avg |
4-yr avg |
| Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 |
-1.21 |
-2.60 |
-3.58 |
-4.15 |
-1.91 |
-2.89 |
| Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 |
0.53 |
1.07 |
1.08 |
1.23 |
0.80 |
0.98 |
| Highway
Revenue Act of 1982 |
0.05 |
0.11 |
0.10 |
0.09 |
0.08 |
0.09 |
| Social Security Amendments of 1983 |
0.17 |
0.22 |
0.22 |
0.24 |
0.20 |
0.21 |
| Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance Act of
1983 |
-0.07 |
-0.06 |
-0.05 |
-0.04 |
-0.07 |
-0.05 |
| Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 |
0.24 |
0.37 |
0.47 |
0.49 |
0.30 |
0.39 |
| Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 |
0.02 |
0.06 |
0.06 |
0.06 |
0.04 |
0.05 |
| Tax Reform Act
of 1986 |
0.41 |
0.02 |
-0.23 |
-0.16 |
0.22 |
0.01 |
| Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 |
0.19 |
0.28 |
0.30 |
0.27 |
0.24 |
0.26 |
| Total |
0.33 |
-0.53 |
-1.63 |
-1.97 |
-0.10 |
-0.95 |
Theoretical justification
In his 1980 campaign speeches, Reagan presented his economic
proposals as merely a return to the free-enterprise principles that
had been in favor before the
Great
Depression. At the same time he attracted a following from the
supply-side economics
movement, formed in opposition to
Keynesian demand-stimulus economics. This movement
produced some of the strongest supporters for Reagan's policies
during his term in office.
The belief by some proponents of Reaganomics that the tax rate cuts
would more than pay for themselves was influenced by the
Laffer curve, a theoretical taxation model that
was particularly in vogue among some American conservatives during
the 1970s.
Arthur Laffer's model
predicts that excessive tax rates actually reduce potential tax
revenues, by lowering the incentive to produce; the model also
predicts that insufficient tax rates (rates below the optimum level
for a given economy) will also lead directly to a reduction in tax
revenues, although this point is often overlooked.
Before Reagan's election, Reaganomics was considered extreme by the
moderate wing of the
Republican Party. While
running against Reagan for the Presidential nomination in 1980,
George Bush had derided
Reaganomics as "voodoo economics". Similarly, in 1976,
Gerald Ford had severely criticized Reagan's
proposal to turn back a large part of the Federal budget to the
states. Since Reagan's presidency, however, Republican federal
politicians have for the most part continued to support his program
of low taxes and private sector growth.
Support
According to a 1996 study from the libertarian think tank
Cato Institute:
- On 8 of the 10 key economic variables examined, the American
economy performed better during the Reagan years than during the
pre- and post-Reagan years.
- Real median family income grew by $4,000 during the Reagan
period after experiencing no growth in the pre-Reagan years; it
experienced a loss of almost $1,500 in the post-Reagan years.
- Interest rates, inflation, and unemployment fell faster under
Reagan than they did immediately before or after his
presidency.
- The only economic variable that was worse in the Reagan period
than in both the pre- and post-Reagan years was the savings rate,
which fell rapidly in the 1980s.
- The productivity rate was higher in the pre-Reagan years but
much lower in the post-Reagan years.
In the last year of the Carter Administration (1980) the US
inflation rate climbed to a peak of 14.8%, the top individual tax
payer rate was 78%, unemployment was 7.4%, federal outlay was 17%
higher than the economy's growth rate, and the federal government
grew while enacting loads of new spending programs. During this
period, the US economy was the worst it had been since the Great
Depression of the 1930s. The nation was in quite a deep hole of
economic collapse when the new president Ronald Reagan took office
in January 1981. Reagan had to devise a constructive, sound tax and
monetary policy to pull the US out of its economic low point.
Stephen Moore of the Cato Institute stated that "no act in the last
quarter century had a more profound impact on the US economy of the
eighties and nineties than the Reagan tax cut of 1981." He claims
that Reagan's tax cuts, combined with an emphasis on federal
monetary policy, deregulation, and expansion of free trade created
a sustained economic expansion creating America's greatest
sustained wave of prosperity ever. The American economy grew by
more than a third in size, producing a $15 trillion increase in
American wealth. Every income group, from the richest, middle class
and poorest in this country, grew its income (1981-1989). Consumer
and investor confidence soared. Cutting federal income taxes,
cutting the US government spending budget, cutting useless
programs, scaling down the government work force, maintaining low
interest rates, and keeping a watchful inflation hedge on the
monetary supply was Ronald Reagan's formula for a successful
economic turnaround. The economic principle that business
expansion, jobs and wealth follow low tax rates is widely accepted.
The last principle Ronald Reagan incorporated was the realization
that immigrant workers are a key and vital component of the US
economy.
Criticisms
Reagan's
tax policies were accused of pushing
both the international transactions current account and the federal
budget into
deficit
and led to a significant increase in
public
debt. Debt more than tripled from 900 billion dollars to 2.8
trillion dollars during Reagan's tenure. Advocates of the
Laffer curve contend that the tax cuts did lead
to a near doubling of tax receipts ($517 billion in 1980 to $1.032
trillion in 1990) , so that the deficits were actually caused by an
increase in government spending. However,
according to the White House's Office of Management and
Budget, the doubling of revenue is significantly smaller when
looking at real inflation-adjusted figures ($1,077.4 billion in
1981 to $1,235.6 billion in 1988, measured in FY2000-dollars).
Furthermore, an analysis from the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities argues that "history shows that the large reductions in
income tax rates in 1981 were followed by abnormally slow growth in
income tax receipts, while the increases in income-tax rates
enacted in 1990 and 1993 were followed by sizeable growth in
income-tax receipts." Specifically, the analysis calculated that
the average annual growth rate of real income-tax receipts per
working-age person was 0.2% from 1981 to 1990 and a much higher
3.1% from 1990 to 2001.
A
recession occurred in 1982, his second
year in office. This was central to Volcker's campaign against
inflation: applying either the
Phillips Curve or the
NAIRU theory, high
unemployment (more than 10 % of the labor force
in both 1982 and 1983) undercuts inflation. Reagan benefited from
the fact that Volcker relented (shifting to more expansionary
monetary policy) after inflation had
largely been beaten. Further, the sudden fall in oil prices around
1986 helped the economy attain demand growth without inflation in
the late 1980s.
The job growth under the Reagan administration was an average of
2.1% per year, which is in the middle of the pack of
twentieth-century Presidents. Comparing the recovery from the
1981-82 recession (1983-1990) with the years between 1971 (end of a
recession) and 1980 shows that the rate of growth of real GDP per
capita averaged 2.77 under Reagan and 2.50% under Nixon, Ford and
Carter. However, the unemployment rate averaged higher under Reagan
(6.75% vs. 6.35%), average productivity growth was slower under
Reagan (1.38% vs. 1.92%) and private investment as a percentage of
GDP also averaged lower under Reagan (16.08% vs. 16.86%).
Furthermore, real wages declined during the Reagan Presidency. What
makes this comparison so significant is that between 1971 and 1980
the economy suffered a severe recession in 1975 whereas during the
Reagan recovery there was no such interruption.
Another recent critique of Reagan's policies stem from
Tax Reform Act of 1986 and its impact
on the
Alternative Minimum
Tax (AMT). The tax reform was ostensibly to reduce or eliminate
tax deductions. This legislation expanded the AMT from a law for
untaxed rich investors to one refocused on middle class Americans
who had children, owned a home, or lived in high tax states. This
parallel tax system hits middle class Americans the hardest by
reducing their deductions and effectively raising their taxes.
Meanwhile, the highest income earners (with incomes exceeding
$1,000,000) are proportionately less affected thereby shifting the
tax burden away from the richest 0.5%. In 2006, the IRS's National
Taxpayer Advocate's report highlighted the AMT as the single most
serious problem with the tax code. As of 2007, the AMT brought in
more tax revenue than the regular tax which has made it difficult
for Congress to reform.
See also
Footnotes
- Saving Capitalism from
the Capitalists p. 268.
- Reaganomics by William A. Niskanen
- American Economic Policy in the 1980s, ed. Martin
Feldstein, NBER 1994, pp. 371-72.
- Page not found 2008-05-24
- .
- Cannon, Lou (2001) p. 128
- Regan, Donald T. (1988), p. 142
- Lee, Susan. 1996. Hands Off: Why the Government is a Menace to
Economic Health. Simon & Schuster. p. 223
- Note that this table does not include the impact of changes to
the Alternative Minimum Tax from 1995
onward.
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laffer_curve.
- Reagonomics or 'voodoo economics'?
- Supply-Side Tax Cuts and the Truth about the Reagan
Economic Record, by William A. Niskanen and Stephen Moore
-
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/pdf/hist.pdf#page=29
- Richard Kogan: WILL THE TAX CUTS ULTIMATELY PAY FOR
THEMSELVES? March 3, 2003
- What's Happening with Real Wages
- Meeropol, Michael (2000), p. 168
References
- Bienkowski Wojciech, Brada Josef, Radlo Mariusz-Jan eds. (2006)
Reaganomics Goes Global. What Can the EU, Russia and
Transition Countries Learn from the USA?, Palgrave
Macmillan.
- Boskin Michael J. (1987)
Reagan and the US Economy. The Successes, Failures,
and Unfinished Agenda, ICEG.
- Niskanen, William A. (1988)
Reaganomics: An Insider's Account of the Policies and the
People, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Igor M. Sill, (2009) Reaganomics yet again.... Wikipedia
"Support" additions
Further reading
- Lekachman, Robert (1982)
Greed is not enough : Reaganomics, New York : Pantheon
Books. ISBN 0394510232
- Meeropol, Michael (2000) "Surrender: How the Clinton
Administration Completed the Reagan Revolution." (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2000 pbk edition) ISBN
0-472-08676-6
- Sill, Igor (2009) "Looking at Reaganomics, Yet One More Time"
(Topix)
External links
Online Debate between Proponent and Opponent:
Proponent Papers:
Opponent Papers:
Mixed Assessment:
The President Reagan Information Page
PBS Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy
Encyclopedia articles from the
Concise Encyclopedia of
Economics on
Econlib: