SMS Goeben was the second Moltke-class battlecruiser of the Kaiserliche Marine (German Navy), launched in 1911 and named after the Franco-Prussian War general August von Goeben. Her sister ship was the . Following the outbreak of World War I on July 28, 1914, Goeben (together with Breslau, renamed Midilli) was transferred to the Ottoman Empire on August 16, 1914, renamed Yavuz Sultan Selim, or frequently Yavuz for short, (after Sultan Selim I), and made the flagship of the Ottoman Navy. In 1936 she was officially renamed TCG Yavuz and remained the flagship of the Turkish Navy until 1950. The ship, the last of the Imperial German Navy, was scrapped in 1973, after the German government declined an invitation to buy it back and maintain it as a memorial.

Goeben/Yavuz is considered the longest-serving Dreadnought-type warship, spending nearly 50 years in active service until her decommissioning in 1960 (by comparison , the longest-serving , spent 21 years in active service between 1943 and 1991).

Service History

Goeben was launched on 28 March 1911 and christened by General Ploetz. The ship underwent sea trials in June of that year, and commissioned into the High Seas Fleet on 2 July. Goeben took part in the fleet manoeuvres conducted between 29 August to 24 September 1911.

Balkan Wars

The First Balkan War broke out in October 1912. The German General Staff determined that a naval Mediterranean Division was needed and so they dispatched Goeben and to Constantinople. They left Kiel on 4 November and arrived on 15 November 1912. From April 1913 Goeben started to visit many Mediterranean ports including Venice, Pula and Naples, before sailing into Albanian waters. Following this trip, Goeben returned to Pola and remained there from 21 August to 16 October for periodic maintenance.

On 29 June 1913, the Second Balkan War broke out. As a result, disbanding the Mediterranean Division was deemed to be out of the question. On 23 October 1913, Kontreadmiral Souchon assumed command of the squadron. Goeben and Breslau continued their activities in the Mediterranean, and visited some 80 ports before the outbreak of World War I.

Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo, Bosnia on 28 June 1914. Admiral Souchon correctly assessed that war was imminent between the Central Powers and the Triple Entente, and so he ordered his ships make for Pola for repairs. Goeben had 4,460 boiler tubes replaced, among other repairs. Upon completion, the ships departed for Messina.

World War One

The pursuit of Goeben and Breslau

First contact

Without specific orders, Souchon had decided to position his ships off the coast of Africa, ready to engage when hostilities commenced. He planned to bombard the embarkation ports of Bône and Philippeville in Algeria. Goeben was heading for Philippeville, while Breslau was detached to deal with Bône. At 6 p.m. on 3 August 1914, while still sailing west, he received word that Germany had declared war on France. Then, early on 4 August, Souchon received orders from Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz reading: "Alliance with government of CUP concluded August 3. Proceed at once to Constantinople." So close to his targets, Souchon pressed on and his ships, flying the Russian flag as he approached, carried out their bombardment at dawn before breaking off and heading back to Messina for more coal.

Under a pre-war agreement with Britain, France was able to concentrate her entire fleet in the Mediterranean, leaving the Royal Navy to ensure the security of France's Atlantic coast. Three squadrons of the French fleet were covering the transports. However, assuming that Goeben would continue west, the French commander, Admiral Augustin de Lapeyrère, sent no ships to make contact and so Souchon was able to slip away to the east.

In Souchon's path were the two Royal Navy battlecruisers of the Mediterraean Fleet under Admiral Archibald Milne: and , which made contact at 9.30 a.m. on 4 August, passing the German ships in the opposite direction. Unlike France, Britain was not yet at war with Germany: the declaration would not be made until later that day, following the start of the German invasion of neutral Belgium. Therefore the British ships started shadowing Goeben and Breslau and Milne reported the contact and position. He neglected to inform the Admiralty that the German ships were heading east, so Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty still expected them to threaten the French transports and he authorized Milne to engage the German ships if they attacked. However, a meeting of the British Cabinet decided that hostilities could not start before a declaration of war, and at 2.00 p.m. Churchill was obliged to cancel his authorisation to attack.

Pursuit

The rated speed of Goeben was 27 knot, but her boilers were damaged and as a result she could manage only 24 knots, and this only by working men and machinery to the limit: four stokers were killed by scalding steam. Fortunately for Souchon, both British battlecruisers were also having boiler problems and were unable to keep Goeben's pace. The light cruiser HMS Dublin maintained contact, while Indomitable and Indefatigable fell behind. In fog and fading light, Dublin lost contact off Cape San Vito on the north coast of Sicily at 7.37 p.m.. Goeben and Breslau returned to Messina the following morning, by which time Britain and Germany were at war.

The Admiralty ordered Milne to respect Italian neutrality and stay outside a six-mile limit from the Italian coast—which precluded entrance into the passage of the Straits of Messina. Consequently, Milne posted guards on the exits from the Straits. Still expecting Souchon to head for the transports and the Atlantic, he placed two battlecruisers, Inflexible and Indefatigable, to cover the northern exit (which gave access to the western Mediterranean), while the southern exit of the Straits was covered by a single light cruiser, HMS Gloucester. Milne sent Indomitable west to coal at Bizerte, instead of south to Malta.

Messina was no haven for Souchon. Italian authorities insisted he depart within 24 hours and delayed supplying coal. Provisioning his ships required ripping up the decks of German merchant steamers in harbour and manually shovelling their coal into his bunkers. By the evening of 6 August, and despite the help of 400 volunteers from the merchantmen, he had only taken on 1,500 tons which was insufficient to reach Istanbul. Further messages from Tirpitz made his predicament even more dire. He was told that Austria would provide no naval aid in the Mediterranean and that Ottoman Empire was still neutral and therefore he should no longer make for Istanbul. Faced with the alternative of seeking refuge at Pola, and probably remaining trapped for the rest of the war, Souchon chose to head for Istanbul anyway, his purpose being "to force the Ottoman Empire, even against their will, to spread the war to the Black Sea against their ancient enemy, Russia."

Milne was instructed on 5 August to continue watching the Adriatic for signs of the Austrian fleet and to prevent the German ships joining them. He chose to keep his battlecruisers in the west, dispatching Dublin to join Troubridge's cruiser squadron in the Adriatic, which he believed would be able to intercept Goeben and Breslau. Troubridge was instructed 'not to get seriously engaged with superior forces', once again intended as a warning against engaging the Austrian fleet. When Goeben and Breslau emerged into the eastern Mediterranean on 6 August, they were met by Gloucester which, being out-gunned, began to shadow the German ships.

Troubridge's squadron comprised the four armoured cruisers HMS Defence, Black Prince, Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh and eight destroyers armed with torpedoes. The cruisers had 9.2-inch (23,5 cm) guns versus the 28 cm (11-inch) guns of Goeben, so that Troubridge's squadron was out-ranged and he considered his only chance was to locate and engage Goeben in favourable light, at dawn, with Goeben east of his ships. At least five of the destroyers would also not have enough coal to keep up. By 4 a.m. on 7 August Troubridge realised he would not be able to catch the German ships before daylight. He signaled Milne with his intentions to break off the chase, but no reply was received until 10 a.m. By that time, mindful of Churchill's ambiguous order to avoid engaging a "superior force", he had withdrawn to Zante to refuel.

Escape

Milne ordered Gloucester to disengage, still expecting Souchon to turn west, but it was apparent to Gloucester's captain that Goeben was fleeing. Breslau attempted to harass Gloucester into breaking off — Souchon had a collier waiting off the coast of Greece and needed to shake his pursuer before he could rendezvous. Gloucester finally engaged Breslau, hoping this would compel Goeben to drop back and protect the light cruiser. According to Souchon, Breslau was hit, but no damage was done. The action then broke off without further hits being scored. Finally Milne ordered Gloucester to cease pursuit at Cape Matapan.

Shortly after midnight on 8 August, Milne took his three battlecruisers and the light cruiser HMS Weymouth east. At 2 p.m. he received an incorrect signal from the Admiralty stating that Britain was at war with Austria—war would not be declared until 12 August and the order was countermanded four hours later, but Milne chose to guard the Adriatic rather than seek Goeben. Finally on 9 August Milne was given clear orders to "chase Goeben which had passed Cape Matapan on the 7th steering north-east." Milne still did not believe that Souchon was heading for the Dardanelles, and so he resolved to guard the exit from the Aegean, unaware that the Goeben did not intend to come out.

Souchon had replenished his coal off the Aegean island of Donoussa on 9 August and the German warships resumed their voyage to Constantinople. At 5 p.m. on 10 August he reached the Dardanelles and awaited permission to pass through. Germany had for some time been courting the Committee of Union and Progress of the Ottoman imperial government, and they now used their influence to press the Turkish Minister of War, Enver Pasha, into granting the ships passage, an act that would outrage Russia which relied on the Dardanelles as its main all-season shipping route. In addition, the Germans managed to persuade Enver to order any pursuing British ships to be fired on. By the time Souchon received permission to enter the straits, his lookouts could see smoke on the horizon from approaching British ships.

Turkey was still a neutral country bound by treaty to prevent German ships passing the straits. To get around this difficulty it was agreed that the ships should become part of the Turkish navy. On 16 August, having reached Constantinople, Goeben and Breslau were transferred to the Turkish Navy in a small ceremony, becoming respectively the Yavuz Sultan Selim and the Midilli, though they retained their German crews with Souchon still in command. The initial reaction in Britain was one of satisfaction, that a threat had been removed from the Mediterranean. On 23 September, Souchon was appointed commander in chief of the Ottoman Navy.

Black Sea operations

1914

On 29 October Yavuz bombarded Sevastopol, her first operation against Imperial Russia. The ship was hit in the after funnel by a shell, but it failed to detonate and so did minimal damage. As she returned to Turkish waters, Yavuz came across and sank the Russian minelayer Prut which had 700 mines on board. During the engagement the Russian destroyer Leiteneat Pushchin was hit by two of Yavuz s secondary battery shells.

Yavuz inadvertently engaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet 17 nautical miles off the Crimean coastline. An artillery duel at the relatively close range of 5,000–7,000 meters (5,470–7,7650 yards) ensued, during which Yavuz fired 19 shells and hit the Russian flagship Evstafi four times, killing 33 men and wounding 35. Yavuz was hit only once in the port third casemate. Three 15 cm shells exploded and 16 propellant cartridges were set on fire. 13 men were killed and 3 were wounded.

On 5–6 December, Yavuz and Midilli provided protection for troop transports and four days later on 10 December, Yavuz bombarded Batum. While returning from another transport escort operation on 26 December, Yavuz was mined twice in quick succession off the Bosphorus. The first mine exploded beneath the conning tower, on the starboard side. The explosion tore a 50-square-meter hole in the ship's hull, but the torpedo bulkhead held. Two minutes later, Yavuz struck a second mine on the port side, just forward of the main battery wing barbette; this tore open a 64-square-meter hole. The bulkhead bowed in but retained watertight protection of the ship's interior. However, some 600 tonnes of water flooded the ship. Two 360-tonne caissons were constructed in order to complete basic repairs.

1915

On 3 April Yavuz left the Bosphorus in company with Breslau to cover the withdrawal of the Turkish cruisers Hamidiye and Mecidiye, which had been sent to bombard Nikolayev. On her way to Nikolayev Mecidiye struck a mine and sank, so this attack had to be abandoned, but the two German ships appeared off Sevastopol and tempted out the Black Sea Fleet. Although six Russian battleships, supported by two cruisers and five destroyers, were bearing down upon them, Yavuz and Midilli sank two cargo steamers and then deliberately loitered about to draw on their pursuers. The Hamidiye had to be given time to return to the Bosphorus with survivors from the Mecidiye.

When the range had closed to about 15,000m Midilli slipped between her sister and the Russian squadron and laid a dense smoke screen. Under its cover the German ships turned away, but kept their speed down so as not to discourage pursuit. The Russians chased after them, with slower battleships at a maximum of 25 knots. At one point Midilli fell back far enough to draw fire from the Russian line, but she was able to move out of range before any hits were sustained. Darkness fell allowing Yavuz and Midilli to pull away from their pursuers. Hamidiye had radioed that she was almost home, but in the darkness Russian destroyers closed on Yavuz. The wireless chatter betrayed them and Yavuz's four 1.5 m stern searchlights illuminated the five destroyers only 200m astern.

Midilli's guns fired, and the first destroyer was mortally hit. The second in line suffered a similar fate, the remainder fled. None of their torpedoes had found a mark, and at noon the following day Yavuz and Midilli were once more off the Bosphorus.

On 10 May Yavuz encountered the Russian fleet who had blockaded the entrance of the Bosphorus, at 6.20 a.m. she openend fire at 16,000 m and the five pre-Dreadnought Battleships replied with very accurate fire. The big guns of the battleships fired, columns of water from exploding shells rising all around the Goeben. For over an hour she returned fire, one ship facing five, but could not break through. Yavuz turned away from the safety of home port and sailed out to sea. Two of the Russian battleships Tri Sviatitelia and Ioan Zlatoust, were badly damaged and pulled out of the line, but Yavuz was hit on the armoured belt and in the port II casemate.

1916

A shortage of coal precluded operations for Yavuz and it was not until 9-11 August and 5-6 September 1915 that she sortied again. Her next encounter with the Russian fleet was on 8 January when she engaged the Russian Dreadnought Imperatritsa Ekaterina Velikaya. Yavuz fired five salvos at maximum range but these fell short. However the Russian continued on firing for 30 minutes and the last of her 12in shells was ranged at 22,500 meters. Yavuz escaped with only splinter damage.

On 4-6 February Yavuz covered a troop transfer and on 4 July she bombarded Tuapse. Yavuz did not sortie again until 1918.

1918

After the Dardanelles Campaign, Britain had maintained a flotilla in the Aegean, waiting for Yavuz and Midilli to make a sortie. On 10 January 1918 the two ships emerged from the Dardanelles and encountered British ships near the island of Imbros. Unfortunately for the British, the two ships capable of countering Yavuz -- the pre-Dreadnought battleships HMS Agamemnon and HMS Lord Nelson -- were absent, and the remainder of the force, consisting of destroyers and monitor, were outgunned. In the ensuing battle the monitors M28 and HMS Raglan were sunk at a range of 9,300m. However, the Turkish ships ran into a minefield at about 0610hrs, Breslau hit 5 mines and sank immediately, but Yavuz, which struck three mines at 0610hrs, 0855hrs and 0948hrs and was badly holed in III, IV, X and XI compartments, was attacked by about 10 British aircraft and in the confusion, she ran aground on the Nagara Bank and was unable to get free. She remained stranded until 26 January when Turgut Reis (ex-SMS Weißenburg) towed Goeben off and took her to Constantinople. The mine damage was not repaired until after the war.

Post War Service

Goeben, as Yavuz Selim (until 1936) and later as simply Yavuz, continued active service in the Turkish navy until well after World War II. Her war damage rendered her practically useless until 1926, when repairs were begun. She was finally fit for service again in 1930 and recommissioned. In 1938 she carried the coffin of the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, from Istanbul to the Anatolian port of Izmit.

Practically unchanged from her World War I configuration and still coal powered, she was given NATO pennant number B70 in 1952, although she was used since 1948 only for representational purposes. In 1954 Yavuz was decommissioned and placed in reserve.

The West German government offered to purchase Yavuz in 1963, but Turkey declined. The Turkish government later changed its mind, and placed the battlecruiser up for sale in 1966. However, the political climate of West Germany in the late 1960s and early 1970s was not conducive to the military, particularly for a practically unchanged remnant of the country's imperial past. Yavuz was finally purchased for scrapping in 1971, and was towed from her berth on 7 June 1973. The last surviving battlecruiser was broken up between July 1973 and February 1976.

The ship also became a kind of popular idol among the Turkish population. Pictures of it can still be seen on the walls of small town coffee shops all over Turkey. People also have a great respect for the ship because she carried Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's remains to Izmit in 1938.

Significance of Yavuz's activities

The activities of Goeben and Breslau helped to bring Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers. Turkey's direct military contribution was of some value, but most important was the loss of the easiest route (via the Dardanelles) for Britain and France to ship aid to their Russian ally, and for Russia to ship out its grain, one of the main sources of its foreign exchange. Combined with the German blockade of the Baltic, this to a large extent cut off Russia from the outside world, if one excepts the difficult and underdeveloped routes through Archangelsk and Vladivostok. This in turn led to great difficulties in supplying the Russian army, substantially weakening Russia as a military partner for the Allies.

The presence of Yavuz in particular was a major obstacle to Russian plans in the Black Sea. As of 1914, all of the Russian Black Sea battleships were pre-dreadnoughts. Before the arrival of Yavuz, they dominated the Black Sea, and a Bosphorus landing was under consideration. The arrival of Yavuz dramatically changed the situation - and even shore bombardment had to be conducted by almost the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, since a smaller force could fall victim to Yavuz.

A decisive Russian strike south, for the Bosphorus, would have knocked out the Ottoman Empire from the war, preventing the British and French disaster of the Battle of Gallipoli, and possibly changing the course of the war and the history of the region. The presence of Yavuz effectively prevented it. This presence also helped the future success of the Bolshevik Revolution due to the lack of any major Russian victories in 18 months and general public unrest.

Footnotes

1. Staff, p. 17
2. Staff, p. 18
3. Massie, p. 34
4. Massie, p. 36
5. Massie, p. 39
6. Massie, p. 39
7. Massie, pp. 40–41
8. Massie, p. 44
9. Massie, pp. 48–49
10. Staff, p. 19
11. Massie, p. 71
12. Massie, p. 71

References