The Second Intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada ( , Intifā at El Aq a; , Intifādat El-Aqtzah) was the second Palestinian uprising, a period of intensified Palestinian-Israeli violence, which began in late September 2000. "Al-Aqsa" is the name of a prominent Muslim mosque, constructed in the 8th century CE at the Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem, a location considered the holiest site in Judaism and third holiest in Islam. "Intifada" (also transliterated Intifadah) is an Arabic word that literally translates into English as "shaking off". The death toll, including both military and civilian, is estimated to be 5,500 Palestinians and over 1,000 Israelis, as well as 64 foreign citizens. The name given to the events by the Israeli military was Tide events ( , lit. low and high tide events).

Background

Start of the Second Intifada

The starting date of the Second Intifada is disputed. Some sources record the start of the uprising as September 27, 2000, "when a Palestinian security officer on a joint patrol with Israeli forces turned his firearm on his Israeli counterpart and murdered him". More commonly cited is September 28, 2000, when Palestinian rioting erupted following Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount, an area known to Muslims as Al-Haram As-Sharif. Still others believe it started a day later on Friday September 29, a day of prayers, when an Israeli police and military presence was introduced and there were major clashes and deaths. Some Israelis believe that when Yassir Arafat walked out on negotiations at the Camp David Summit in July 2000, the Second Intifada started then. They note that there were Israeli casualties as early as September 27; this is the Israeli "conventional wisdom", according to Dr. Jeremy Pressman, and the view expressed by the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

"The wave of terrorism that began in September 2000 is the direct result of a strategic Palestinian decision to use violence - rather than negotiation - as the primary means to advance their agenda...."

"Indeed, the current wave of terrorism began shortly after intense high-level negotiations were conducted to find a permanent resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In July 2000, a Middle East peace summit was held at Camp David, hosted by U.S. President Bill Clinton and attended by Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Barak. During the summit, Israel expressed its willingness to make far-reaching and unprecedented compromises in order to arrive at a workable, enduring agreement. However, Yasser Arafat chose to break off the negotiations without even offering any proposals of his own. Consequently, the summit adjourned with President Clinton placing the blame for its failure squarely at Arafat's feet."

"It is clear that the current wave of Palestinian terrorism, which began in the wake of the Camp David summit failure, has nothing to do with a spontaneous Palestinian action to "resist the occupation." The Palestinian leadership had taken a strategic decision to abandon the path to peace and to use violence as their primary tactic for advancing their agenda. This decision undermined the bedrock foundation of the peace process - the understanding that a solution can only be reached through compromise rather than inflexibility, and through negotiation rather than violence. The Palestinian claim that Israel's presence in the territories caused the terrorism began as a desperate attempt to deflect criticism after Arafat rejected Israel's peace proposals. It quickly evolved into an excuse for the inexcusable - the indiscriminate murder of innocent civilians.Terrorist attacks can never be justified, and they are particularly tragic when the disputed issues could have been settled through negotiations. The Palestinian Authority had been given a real opportunity to end the conflict through negotiations. However, Israel's olive branch was met with a hail of gunfire and a barrage of suicide bombers. The greatest obstacle to peace is not the lack of a Palestinian state, rather it is the existence of Palestinian terrorism."

What caused the current wave of Palestinian terrorism? by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

"The events of last few days represent the latest and most severe developments in a wave of violence that has been building in recent weeks. Though some are inclined to assign exclusive responsibility to Israel for these acts of provocation, the present Palestinian escalation dates back to well before the Temple Mount disturbances, when, on 13 September, stones and Molotov cocktails were thrown at Israeli positions in the vicinity of the Netzarim junction in the Gaza Strip. This was followed by a number of increasingly violent incidents, including the killing of an Israeli soldier by a roadside bomb near Netzarim on September 27"

Palestinian terrorism since Sept 2000 by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sgt. David Biri. September 27, 2000. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Most mainstream media outlets have taken the view that the Sharon visit was the spark that triggered the rioting at the start of the Second Intifada. In the first five days of rioting and clashes after the visit, Israeli police and security forces killed 47 Palestinians and wounded 1885, while Palestinians killed 5 Israelis. B'Tselem - Statistics - Fatalities. Israeli security force personnel killed by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Detailed B'Tselem list. B'Tselem - Statistics - Fatalities. Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Detailed B'Tselem list.

Immediate background of the Second Intifada

The July 11-25 Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David was held between United States President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. The talks ultimately failed with both sides blaming the other. There were four principal obstacles to agreement: territory, Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, refugees and the 'right of return', and Israeli security concerns.

On September 13, 2000, Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian parliament postponed the planned unilateral declaration of an independent Palestinian state.

On September 27 Sergeant David Biri of the Israeli Defense Forces was critically injured in a bomb attack near Netzarim in the Gaza Strip. He died the next day.

Overview

Palestinians view the Second Intifada as part of their ongoing struggle for national liberation, justice, and an end to Israeli occupation, whereas many Israelis consider it to be a "wave of Palestinian terrorism" instigated and pre-planned by then Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.

Palestinian tactics have ranged from mass protests and general strikes, similar to the First Intifada, to armed attacks on Israeli soldiers, security forces, police, settlers, and civilians, suicide bombing attacks, and launching Qassam rockets into Israel.

Israeli tactics have included paralysing Palestinians' movements through the setting up of checkpoints and the enforcement of strict curfews in certain areas, as a means of economic warfare. Infrastructural attacks against Palestinian Authority targets such as police and prisons was another Israeli method to force the Palestinian Authority to follow Israel's demand that it repress the anti-Israeli protests, and later, the attacks on Israeli targets, though in so doing Israel bombed the police it demanded do its bidding and the prisons to house those the Israelis wanted imprisoned. Aggressive riot control was designed to "restore deterrence" believed to be lost when Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon - more than 300 were killed in the first months of the uprising through this method alone, during a time when most Israeli civilian fatalities were Israeli Arabs.

It is also called the Oslo War (מלחמת אוסלו) by Israelis who consider it to be the result of concessions made by Israel following the Oslo Accords, and Arafat's War, after the late Palestinian leader whom some blamed for starting it. Both Israelis and Palestinians have blamed each other for the failure of the Oslo peace process.

Background

Under the Oslo Accords, Israel committed to the phased withdrawal of its forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and affirmed the Palestinian right to self-government within those areas through the creation of a Palestinian Authority. For their part, the Palestine Liberation Organization formally recognized Israel and committed to adopting responsibility for internal security in population centers in the areas evacuated. Palestinian self-rule was to last for a five-year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated. However, the realities on the ground left both sides deeply disappointed with the Oslo process.

In the five years immediately following the signing of the Oslo accords, 405 Palestinians were killed and 256 Israelis were killed, which for the latter represented a casualty count higher than that of the previous fifteen years combined (216, 172 of which were killed during the First Intifada).

In 1995, Shimon Peres took the place of Yitzhak Rabin, assassinated by Yigal Amir, a Jewish extremist opposed to the Oslo peace agreement. In the 1996 elections, Israelis elected a right-wing coalition led by the Likud candidate, Benjamin Netanyahu who was followed in 1999 by the Labor Party leader Ehud Barak.

While Rabin had limited settlement construction at the request of US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, Netanyahu continued construction within existing Israeli settlements, and put forward plans for the construction of a new neighborhood, Har Homa, in East Jerusalem. However, he fell far short of the Shamir government's 1991-92 level and refrained from building new settlements, although the Oslo agreements stipulated no such ban.Construction of Housing Units Before Oslo: 1991-92 13,960, After Oslo: 1994-95 3,840 1996-1997 3,570.

Barak courted moderate settler opinion, with the aim of marginalizing the more militant wing, securing agreement for the dismantlement of 12 new outposts that had been constructed since the Wye River Agreement of November 1998, but the continued expansion of existing settlements with plans for 3,000 new houses in the West Bank, drew strong condemnation from the Palestinian leadership. Though construction within existing settlements was permitted under the Oslo agreements, Palestinian supporters contend that any continued construction was contrary to its spirit, prejudiced the outcome of final status negotiations, and undermined confidence in Barak's desire for peace. The Palestinians not only built in areas A & B as well as State lands that Israel ceded, but throughout area C administered by Israel.

Some have claimed that Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA) had pre-planned the Intifada. They often quote a speech made in December 2000 by Imad Falouji, the PA Communications Minister at the time, where he explains that the violence had been planned since Arafat's return from the Camp David Summit in July, far in advance of Sharon's visit (view video [11023] of the speech). He stated that the Intifada "was carefully planned since the return of (Palestinian President) Yasser Arafat from Camp David negotiations rejecting the U.S. conditions." David Samuels quotes Mamduh Nofal, former military commander of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who supplies more evidence of pre-September 28 military preparations. Nofal recounts that Arafat "told us, Now we are going to the fight, so we must be ready".

Following Israel's pullout from Lebanon in May 2000, the PLO official Farouk Kaddoumi told reporters: "We are optimistic. Hezbollah's resistance can be used as an example for other Arabs seeking to regain their rights."

Starting as early as September 13, 2000, members of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement carried out a number of attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets, in violation of Oslo Accords. In addition, the Israeli agency Palestinian Media Watch alleged that the Palestinian official TV broadcasts became increasingly militant during the summer of 2000, as Camp David negotiations faltered.

In the Mitchell Report, (the investigatory committee set up to look into the causes behind the breakdown in the peace process), the government of Israel asserted that:

the immediate catalyst for the violence was the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations on 25 July 2000 and the "widespread appreciation in the international community of Palestinian responsibility for the impasse." In this view, Palestinian violence was planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at "provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative."

The Palestine Liberation Organization, according to the same report, denied that the Intifada was planned, and asserted that "Camp David represented nothing less than an attempt by Israel to extend the force it exercises on the ground to negotiations."The report also stated:

From the perspective of the PLO, Israel responded to the disturbances with excessive and illegal use of deadly force against demonstrators; behavior which, in the PLO’s view, reflected Israel’s contempt for the lives and safety of Palestinians.

For Palestinians, the widely seen images of Muhammad al-Durrah in Gaza on September 30, shot as he huddled behind his father, reinforced that perception.

The Mitchell report concluded:

The Sharon visit did not cause the "Al-Aqsa Intifada."

But it was poorly timed and the provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited.

and also:

We have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the [Government of Israel] to respond with lethal force.

Timeline

2000

The Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David from July 11 to July 25, 2000 took place between United States President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. It failed with both sides blaming the other for the failure of the talks. There were four principal obstacles to agreement: territory, Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, refugees and the 'right of return', and Israeli security concerns. Some sources cite this failure as one of the main reasons for the level of frustration and tension felt by many Palestinians and Israelis.

Sharon visits the Temple Mount

On September 28, the Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon together with a Likud party delegation surrounded by hundreds of Israeli riot police, visited the Temple Mount compound which is widely considered the third holiest site in Islam. Although the compound is under Israeli effective control and is the holiest site in Judaism, Sharon was only permitted to enter the compound after the Israeli Interior Minister had received assurances from the Palestinian Authority's security chief that no problems would arise if he made the visit. Sharon did not actually go into the al-Aqsa Mosque, and went during normal tourist hours.

The BBC reported: "Soon after Mr Sharon left the site, the angry demonstrations outside erupted into violence. Israeli police fired tear gas and rubber-coated metal bullets, while protesters hurled stones and other missiles. Police said 25 of their men were hurt by missiles thrown by Palestinians, but only one was taken to hospital. Israel Radio reported at least three Palestinians were wounded by rubber bullets."

The stated purpose for Sharon's visit of the compound was to assert the right of all Israelis to visit the Temple Mount; however, according to Likud spokesman Ofir Akounis, the purpose was to "show that under a Likud government [the Temple Mount] will remain under Israeli sovereignty." In response to accusations by Ariel Sharon of government readiness to concede "Israeli sovereignty" over the site to Palestinians, the Israeli government gave Sharon permission to visit the area. When alerted of his intentions, senior Palestinian figures, such as Yassir Arafat, Saeb Erekat, and Faisal Husseini all asked Sharon to call off his visit. The Palestinians, some 10 days earlier, had just observed their annual memorial day for the Sabra and Shatila massacre, conducted when Sharon was Defense Minister.

His visit was condemned by the Palestinians as a provocation and an incursion, as were his armed bodyguards that arrived on the scene with him. Critics claim that Sharon knew that the visit could trigger violence, and that the purpose of his visit was political. According to Yossef Bodansky,

Clinton's proposal [...] included explicit guarantees that Jews would have the right to visit and pray in and around the Temple Mount... Once Sharon was convinced that Jews had free access to the Temple Mount, there would be little the Israeli religious and nationalist Right could do to stall the peace process. When Sharon expressed interest in visiting the Temple Mount, Barak ordered GSS chief Ami Ayalon to approach Jibril Rajoub with a special request to facilitate a smooth and friendly visit [...] Rajoub promised it would be smooth as long as Sharon would refrain from entering any of the mosques or praying publicly [...] Just to be on the safe side, Barak personally approached Arafat and once again got assurances that Sharon's visit would be smooth as long as he did not attempt to enter the Holy Mosques [...]A group of Palestinian dignitaries came to protest the visit, as did three Arab Knesset Members. With the dignitaries watching from a safe distance, the Shahab (youth mob) threw rocks and attempted to get past the Israeli security personnel and reach Sharon and his entourage [...] Still, Sharon's deportment was quiet and dignified. He did not pray, did not make any statement, or do anything else that might be interpreted as offensive to the sensitivities of Muslims. Even after he came back near the Wailing Wall under the hail of rocks, he remained calm. "I came here as one who believes in coexistence between Jews and Arabs," Sharon told the waiting reporters. "I believe that we can build and develop together. This was a peaceful visit. Is it an instigation for Israeli Jews to come to the Jewish people's holiest site?"

Shlomo Ben-Ami, the then acting Israeli foreign minister, has maintained, however, that he received Palestinian assurances that no violence would occur, provided that Ariel Sharon not enter one of the mosques.

On September 29, 2000, the day after Sharon's visit, following Friday prayers, large riots broke out around the Old City of Jerusalem. After Palestinians on the Temple Mount threw rocks over the Western Wall at Jewish worshipers and tourists below, wounding the district police commander, Israeli police stormed the Temple Mount and fired rubber-coated steel bullets at the rioters, killing four Palestinian youths and wounding as many as 200. Another three Palestinians were killed in the Old City and on the Mount of Olives. By the end of the day, 7 Palestinians lay dead, and some 300 had been wounded. 70 Israeli policemen were also injured in the clashes.

In the days that followed, demonstrations erupted all over the West Bank and Gaza, as violence escalated. In the first five days, at least 47 Palestinians were shot dead, and 1885 were wounded, as a result of both live fire and rubber-coated steel bullets used by the Israeli police. In the West Bank city of Qalqilyah, a Palestinian police officer working with Israeli police on a joint patrol opened fire and killed his Israeli counterpart Supt. Yosef Tabeja, an Israel Border Police officer. During the first few days of riots, the IDF fired approximately 1.3 million bullets.

According to the New York Times, many in the Arab world, including Egyptians, Palestinians, Lebanese and Jordanians, point to Sharon's visit as the beginning of the Second intifada and derailment of the peace process.

October 2000 events

The 'October 2000 events' refers to several days of disturbances and clashes inside Israel, mostly between Arab citizens and Israel Police. 13 Arab citizens of Israel and a Palestinian from the Gaza Strip were killed by the Police, while a Jewish citizen was killed when his car was hit by a rock on the Tel-Aviv-Haifa freeway.

A general strike and demonstrations across northern Israel began on October 1 and continued for several days. In some cases, the demonstrations escalated into clashes with the Israeli Police involving rock-throwing, firebombing, and live-fire. Policemen used tear-gas and opened fire with rubber-coated bullets and later live ammunition in some instances, many times in contravention with police protocol governing riot-dispersion, which was directly linked with many of the deaths by the Or Commission.

On October 8, thousands of Jewish Israelis participated in violent acts in Nazareth and Tel Aviv, some throwing stones at Arabs, destroying Arab property and chanting "Death to Arabs".

Following the riots, there was a high degree of tension between Jewish and Arab citizens and distrust between the Arab citizens and police. An investigation committee, headed by Supreme Court Justice Theodor Or, reviewed the violent riots and found that the police were poorly prepared to handle such riots and charged major officers with bad conduct. The Or Commission reprimanded Prime Minister Ehud Barak and recommended Shlomo Ben-Ami (then the Internal Security Minister) not serve again as Minister of Public Security. The committee also blamed Arab leaders and Knesset members for contributing to inflaming the atmosphere and making the violence more severe.

Ramallah lynching and Israeli response

On October 12, PA police arrested two Israeli reservists who had accidentally entered Ramallah. Believing them from an elite undercover Israeli unit, an agitated Palestinian mob stormed the police station, beat the soldiers to death, and threw their mutilated bodies into the street from a second floor window. An Italian television crew captured the killings on video and then broadcasted internationally. The brutality of the killings shocked the Israeli public. In response, Israel launched a series of retaliatory air strikes against the Palestinian Authority targets in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The police station where the lynching took place was destroyed in these operations.

2001

The Taba Summit between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, was held from January 21 to January 27, 2001 at Taba in the Sinai peninsula. Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat came closer to reaching a final settlement than any previous or subsequent peace talks yet ultimately failed to achieve its goals.

Ariel Sharon, at the time from the Likud party, ran against Ehud Barak from the Labour party. Sharon was elected Israeli Prime Minister February 6, 2001 in the 2001 special election to the Prime Ministership. Sharon refused to meet in person with Yasser Arafat.

Through the first few months of Sharon's term, a systematic campaign was waged against Palestinian Authority targets, in particular the police and the prisons. The joint security mechanism between Israel and the Preventative Security organisation was dissolved by Sharon's order - this mechanism that helped to restrain Hamas and Islamic Jihad suicide bombings. With more Hamas prisoners released and this cooperation finished, and with the police subject to a relentless military campaign, the suicide bombers quickly and predictably made their way into Israel.

On May 7, 2001, the IDF naval commandos captured the vessel Santorini, which sailed in international waters towards Palestinian Authority-controlled Gaza. The ship was laden with weaponry. The Israeli investigation that followed alleged that the shipment had been purchased by Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC). The ship's value and that of its cargo was estimated at $10 million. The crew was reportedly planning to unload the cargo of weapons filled barrels — carefully sealed and waterproofed along with their contents — at a prearranged location off the Gaza coast, where the Palestinian Authority would recover them.

On May 18, 2001, Israel for the first time since 1967 used warplanes to attack targets in the territories. Prior to that, bombing had been carried out with helicopter gunships. 12 Palestinians were killed in these attacks on security forces-related targets.

On June 1, 2001, an Islamic Jihad suicide bomber detonated himself in the Tel Aviv coastline Dolphinarium dancing club. Twenty-one Israeli civilians, most of them high school students, were killed. The attack significantly hampered American attempts to negotiate cease-fire.

2002

In January, 2002, the IDF Shayetet 13 naval commando captured the Karine A, a large boat carrying weapons from Iran towards Israel, believed to be intended for Palestinian militant use against Israel. It was discovered that top officials in the Palestinian Authority were involved in the smuggling with the Israelis pointing the finger towards Yasser Arafat as also being involved.

A spate of suicide bombings and attacks, aimed mostly at civilians, was launched against Israel and elicited a military response. A suicide bombing dubbed the Passover Massacre (30 Israeli civilians were killed at Park hotel, Netanya) climaxed a bloody month of March 2002, in which more than 130 Israelis, mostly civilians, were killed in attacks. Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield. The operation led to the apprehension of many members of militant groups, as well as their weaponry and equipment.

The UN estimated that 497 Palestinians were killed and 1,447 wounded by the Israeli response(data from 1 March through 7 May) culminating with the recapturing of Palestinian Authority controlled areas.

Jenin

Between April 2 and 11th, a siege and fierce fighting took place in Jenin, a Palestinian refugee camp. The Jenin battle became a flashpoint for both sides. During the IDF's operations in the camp, Palestinian sources alleged that a massacre of hundreds of people had taken place. In the ensuing controversy, the United Nations issued a report that found no evidence of hundreds of deaths, and criticized both sides for placing Palestinian civilians at risk. However, based on their own investigations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch charged that IDF personnel in Jenin had committed war crimes. Both human rights organizations called for official inquiries; the IDF disputed the charges. After the battle, most sources, including the Palestinian Authority, placed the Palestinian death toll between 52 and 56. The IDF reported that 23 Israeli soldiers were killed. The U.N. Secretary General's report states: "Fifty-two Palestinian deaths had been confirmed by the hospital in Jenin by the end of May 2002. IDF also place the death toll at approximately 52. A senior Palestinian Authority official alleged in mid-April that some 500 were killed, a figure that has not been substantiated in light of the evidence that has emerged."

Bethlehem

From April 2 to May 10, a stand-off developed at the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. IDF soldiers surrounded the church while Palestinian civilians, militants, and priests were inside. During the siege, IDF snipers killed 7 people inside the church and wounded more than 40 people. The stand-off was resolved by the deportation of 13 Palestinian militants whom the IDF has identified as terrorists to Europe, and the IDF ended its 38 day stand-off with the militants inside the church.

2003

Following an Israeli intelligence report stating that Yasir Arafat paid $20,000 to al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, the United States demanded democratic reforms in the Palestinian Authority, as well the appointment of a prime minister independent of Arafat. On 13 March 2003, following U.S. pressure, Arafat appointed the moderate Mahmoud Abbas as Palestinian prime minister.

Following the appointment of Abbas, the U.S. administration promoted the Road map for peace — the Quartet's plan to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by disbanding militant organizations, halting settlement activity and establishing a democratic and peaceful Palestinian state. The first phase of the plan demanded that the Palestinian Authority suppress guerrilla and terrorist attacks and confiscate illegal weapons. Unable or unwilling to confront militant organizations and risk civil war, Abbas tried to reach a temporary cease-fire agreement with the militant factions and asked them to halt attacks on Israeli civilians.

On May 20, Israeli naval commandos intercepted another vessel, the Abu Hassan, on course to the Gaza Strip from Lebanon. It was loaded with rockets, weapons, and ammunition. Eight crew members on board were arrested including a senior Hezbollah member.

In June 2003, a temporary armistice was unilaterally declared by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which declared a ceasefire and halt to all attacks against Israel for a period of 45 days. Violence decreased somewhat in the following month but suicide bombings against Israeli civilians continued as well as Israeli operations against militants.

Four Palestinians, three of them militants, were killed in gun battles during an IDF raid of Askar near Nablus involving tanks and Armoured personnel carriers (APCs); an Israeli soldier was killed by one of the militants. B'Tselem - Statistics - Fatalities. Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces in the West Bank. Detailed B'Tselem list. Nearby Palestinians claimed a squad of Israeli police disguised as Palestinian labourers opened fire on Abbedullah Qawasameh as he left a Hebron mosque. YAMAM, the Israeli counter-terrorism police unit which performed the operation stated that Qawasemah opened fire on them as they attempted to arrest him.

On August 19, Hamas coordinated a suicide attack on a crowded bus in Jerusalem killing 23 Israeli civilians, including 7 children. Hamas claimed it was a retaliation for the killing of five Palestinians (including Hamas leader Abbedullah Qawasameh) earlier in the week. U.S. and Israeli media outlets frequently referred to the bus bombing as shattering the quiet and bringing an end to the ceasefire.

Following the Hamas bus attack, Israeli Defence Forces were ordered to kill or capture all Hamas leaders in Hebron and the Gaza Strip. The plotters of the bus suicide bombing were all captured or killed and Hamas leadership in Hebron was badly damaged by the IDF. Strict curfews were enforced in Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarem; the Nablus lockdown lasted for over 100 days. In Nazlet 'Issa, over 60 shops were destroyed by Israeli civil administration bulldozers. The Israeli civil administration explained that the shops were demolished because they were built without a permit. Palestinians consider Israeli military curfews and property destruction to constitute collective punishment against innocent Palestinians.

Unable to rule effectively under Arafat, Abbas resigned in September 2003. Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala) was appointed to replace him. The Israeli government gave up hope for negotiated settlement to the conflict and pursued a unilateral policy of physically separating Israel from Palestinian communities by beginning construction on the Israeli West Bank barrier. Israel claims the barrier is necessary to prevent Palestinian attackers from entering Israeli cities. Palestinians claim the barrier separates Palestinian communities from each other and that the construction plan is a de facto annexation of Palestinian territory.

Following an October 4 suicide bombing in Maxim restaurant, Haifa, which claimed the lives of 21 Israelis, Israel claimed that Syria and Iran sponsored the Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah, and were responsible for the terrorist attack. The day after the Maxim massacre, IAF warplanes bombed an alleged former terrorist training base at Ain Saheb, Syria (abandoned since the early 80s).

2004

In response to a repeated shelling of Israeli communities with Qassam rockets and mortar shells from Gaza, the IDF operated mainly in Rafah — to search and destroy smuggling tunnels used by militants to obtain weapons, ammunition, fugitives, cigarettes, car parts, electrical goods, foreign currency, gold, drugs, and cloth from Egypt. Between September 2000 and May 2004, ninety tunnels connecting Egypt and the Gaza Strip were found and destroyed. Raids in Rafah left many families homeless. Israel's official stance is that their houses were captured by militants and were destroyed during battles with IDF forces. Many of these houses are abandoned due to Israeli incursions and later destroyed. According to Human Rights Watch, over 1,500 houses were destroyed to create a large buffer zone in the city, many "in the absence of military necessity", displacing around sixteen thousand people.

On 2 February 2004, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced his plan to transfer all the Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli opposition dismissed his announcement as "media spin" but the Israeli Labour Party said it would support such a move. Sharon's right-wing coalition partners National Religious Party and National Union rejected the plan and vowed to quit the government if it were implemented. Yossi Beilin, peace advocate and architect of the Oslo Accords and the Geneva Accord, also rejected the proposed withdrawal plan. He claimed that withdrawing from the Gaza Strip without a peace agreement would reward terror.

Following the declaration of the disengagement plan by Ariel Sharon and as a response to suicide attacks on Erez crossing and Ashdod seaport (10 people were killed), the IDF launched a series of armored raids on the Gaza Strip (mainly Rafah and refugee camps around Gaza), killing about 70 Hamas militants. On March 22, 2004, an Israeli helicopter gunship killed Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and on April 17, after several failed attempts by Hamas to commit suicide bombings, his successor, Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi was killed by IDF helicopter gunship strike.

The fighting in Gaza Strip escalated severely in May 2004 after several failed attempts to attack Israeli checkpoints such as Erez crossing and Karni crossing. However, on May 11 and May 12, Palestinian militants destroyed two IDF M-113 APC, killing 13 soldiers and mutilating their bodies. The IDF launched two raids to recover the bodies in which about 20-40 Palestinians were killed and great damage was caused to structures in the Zaitoun neighbourhood in Gaza and in south-west Rafah.

Subsequently, on May 18 the IDF launched Operation Rainbow with a stated aim of striking the terror infrastructure of Rafah, destroying smuggling tunnels, and stopping a shipment of SA-7 missiles and improved anti-tank weapons. The operation ended after the IDF killed 40 Palestinian militants and 12 civilians and demolished about 45-56 structures. The great destruction and killing of 10 protesters led to a worldwide outcry against the operation.

On September 29, after a Qassam rocket hit the Israeli town of Sderot and killed two Israeli children, the IDF launched Operation Days of Penitence in the north of the Gaza Strip. The operation's stated aim was to remove the threat of Qassam rockets from Sderot and kill the Hamas militants launching them. The operation ended on October 16, leaving widespread destruction and more than 100 Palestinians dead, at least 20 of whom were under the age of 16. Thirteen-year-old Iman Darweesh Al Hams was killed by the IDF; some reports claimed a commander had deliberately fired his automatic weapon at her dead body, but the soldier was cleared of all charges. According to Palestinian medics, Israeli forces killed at least 62 militants and 42 other Palestinians believed to be civilians. According to a count performed by Haaretz, 87 combatants and 42 non-combatants were killed. Palestinian refugee camps were heavily damaged by the Israeli assault. The IDF announced that at least 12 Qassam launchings had been thwarted and many terrorists hit during the operation. Three Israelis also were killed, including one civilian.

On October 21, the Israeli Air Force killed Adnan al-Ghoul, a senior Hamas bomb maker and the inventor of the Qassam rocket.

On November 11, Yasser Arafat died of natural causes in Paris.

Escalation in Gaza began amid the visit of Mahmoud Abbas to Syria in order to achieve a Hudna between Palestinian factions and convince Hamas leadership to halt attacks against Israelis. Hamas vowed to continue the armed struggle sending numerous Qassam rockets into open fields near Nahal Oz, and hitting a kindergarten in Kfar Darom with an anti-tank missile.

On December 9 five weapon smugglers were killed and two were arrested in the border between Rafah and Egypt. Later that day, Jamal Abu Samhadana and two of his bodyguards were injured by a missile strike. In the first Israeli airstrike against militants in weeks, an unmanned Israeli drone plane launched one missile at Abu Samahdna's car as it traveled between Rafah and Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip. It was the fourth attempt on Samhadana's life by Israel. Samhadana is one of two leaders of the Popular Resistance Committees and one of the main forces behind the smuggling tunnels. Samhadana is believed to be responsible for the blast against an American diplomatic convoy in Gaza that killed three Americans.

On December 10, in response to Hamas firing mortar rounds into the Neveh Dekalim settlement in the Gaza Strip and wounding four Israelis (including an 8 year old boy), Israeli soldiers fired at the Khan Younis refugee camp (the origin of the mortars) killing a 7-year-old girl. An IDF source confirmed troops opened fire at Khan Younis, but said they aimed at Hamas mortar crews. The IDF insisted that it does its utmost to avoid civilian casualties.

The largest attack since the death of Yasser Arafat claimed the lives of five Israeli soldiers on December 12, wounding ten others. Approximately 1.5 tons of explosives were detonated in a tunnel under an Israeli military-controlled border crossing on the Egyptian border with Gaza near Rafah, collapsing several structures and damaging others. The explosion destroyed part of the outpost and killed three soldiers. Two Palestinian militants then penetrated the outpost and killed two other Israeli soldiers with gunfire. It is believed that Hamas and a new Fatah faction, the "Fatah Hawks," conducted the highly organized and coordinated attack. A spokesman, "Abu Majad," claimed responsibility for the attack in the name of the Fatah Hawks claiming it was in retaliation for "the assassination" of Yasser Arafat, charging he was poisoned by Israel.

2005

Palestinian presidential elections were held on January 9, and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was elected as the president of the PA. His platform was of a peaceful negotiation with Israel and non-violence to achieve Palestinian objectives. Although Abbas called on militants to halt attacks against Israel, he promised them protection from Israeli incursions and did not advocate disarmament by force.

Violence continued in the Gaza Strip, and Ariel Sharon froze all diplomatic and security contacts with the Palestinian National Authority. Spokesman Assaf Shariv declared that "Israel informed international leaders today that there will be no meetings with Abbas until he makes a real effort to stop the terror". The freezing of contacts came less than one week after Mahmoud Abbas was elected, and the day before his inauguration. Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, confirming the news, declared "You cannot hold Mahmoud Abbas accountable when he hasn't even been inaugurated yet".

Following international pressure and Israeli threat of wide military operation in the Gaza Strip, Abbas ordered Palestinian police to deploy in the northern Gaza Strip to prevent Qassam rocket and mortar shelling over Israeli settlement. Although attacks on Israelis did not stop completely, they decreased sharply. On February 8, 2005, at the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of 2005, Sharon and Abbas declared a mutual truce between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority. They shook hands at a four-way summit which also included Jordan and Egypt at Sharm al-Sheikh. However, Hamas and Islamic Jihad said the truce is not binding for their members. Israel has not withdrawn its demand to dismantle terrorist infrastructure before moving ahead in the Road map for peace.

Many warned that truce is fragile, and progress must be done slowly while observing that the truce and quiet are kept. On February 9-February 10 night, a barrage of 25-50 Qassam rockets and mortar shells hit Neve Dekalim settlement, and another barrage hit at noon. Hamas said it was in retaliation for an attack in which one Palestinian was killed near an Israeli settlement. As a response to the mortar attack, Abbas ordered the Palestinian security forces to stop such attacks in the future. He also fired senior commanders in the Palestinian security apparatus. On February 10, Israeli security forces arrested Maharan Omar Shucat Abu Hamis, a Palestinian resident of Nablus, who was about to launch a bus suicide attack in the French Hill in Jerusalem.

On February 13 2005, Abbas entered into talks with the leaders of the Islamic Jihad and the Hamas, for them to rally behind him and respect the truce. Ismail Haniyah, a senior leader of the group Hamas said that "its position regarding calm will continue unchanged and Israel will bear responsibility for any new violation or aggression".

In the middle of June, Palestinian factions intensified bombardment over the city of Sderot with improvised Qassam rockets. Palestinian attacks resulted in 2 Palestinians and 1 Chinese civilian killed by a Qassam, and 2 Israelis were killed. The wave of attacks lessened support for the disengagement plan among the Israeli public. Attacks on Israel by the Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades increased in July, and on July 12 a suicide bombing hit the coastal city of Netanya, killing 5 civilians. On July 14, Hamas started to shell Israeli settlements inside and outside the Gaza Strip with dozens of Qassam rockets, killing an Israeli woman. On July 15 Israel resumed its "targeted killing" policy, killing 7 Hamas militants and bombing about 4 Hamas facilities. The continuation of shelling rockets over Israeli settlements, and street battles between Hamas militants and Palestinian policemen, threatened to shatter the truce agreed in the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of 2005. The Israeli Defence Force also started to build-up armored forces around the Gaza Strip in response to the shelling.

2006

On January 25, 2006, the Palestinians held general elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council. The Islamist group Hamas won with an unexpected majority of 74 seats, compared to 45 seats for Fatah and 13 for other parties and independents. Hamas is officially declared as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union and its gaining control over the Palestinian Authority (such as by forming the government) would jeopardize international funds to the PA, by laws which forbid sponsoring of terrorist group.

On June 9, seven members of the Ghalia family were killed on a Gaza beach. The cause of the explosion remains uncertain. Nevertheless, in response, Hamas declared an end to its commitment to a ceasefire declared in 2005 and announced the resumption of attacks on Israelis. Palestinians blame an Israeli artillery shelling of nearby locations in the northern Gaza Strip for the deaths, while an Israeli military inquiry cleared itself from the charges.

On June 25 a military outpost was attacked by Palestinian militants and a gunbattle followed that left 2 Israeli soldiers and 3 Palestinian militants dead. Corporal Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier, was captured and Israel warned of an imminent military response if the soldier was not returned unharmed. In the early hours of June 28 Israeli tanks, APCs and troops entered the Gaza strip just hours after the air force had taken out two main bridges and the only powerstation in the strip, effectively shutting down electricity and water. Operation Summer Rains commenced, the first major phase of the Gaza-Israel conflict which continues to run independently of the intifada.

On November 26, 2006 a truce was implemented between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. A January 10, 2007 Reuters article reports: "Hamas has largely abided by a November 26 truce which has calmed Israeli-Palestinian violence in Gaza."

Gaza war

An intensification of the Gaza-Israel conflict, the Gaza war, occurred on 27 December 2008 (11:30 a.m. local time; 9:30 a.m. UTC) when Israel launched a military campaign codenamed Operation Cast Lead ( ) targeting the members and infrastructure of Hamas in response to the numerous rocket attacks upon Israel from the Gaza Strip. The operation has been termed the Gaza massacre ( ) by Hamas leaders and much of the media in the Arab World.On Saturday, January 17, Israel announced a unilateral ceasefire, conditional on elimination of further rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza, and began withdrawing over the next several days. Hamas later announced its own ceasefire, with its own conditions of complete withdrawal and opening of border crossings. A reduced level of mortar fire originating in Gaza continues, though Israel has so far not taken this as a breach of the ceasefire. The frequency of the attacks can be observed in the thumbnailed graph. The data corresponds to the article "Timeline of the 2008–2009 Israel–Gaza conflict", using mainly Haaretz news reports from the 1st of February up to the 28th . The usual IDF respones are airstrikes on weapon smuggling tunnels.

End of the Intifada

The ending date of the Second Intifada is also disputed, as there was no definite event that brought it to an end. Some commentators such as Sever Plocker consider the intifada to have ended in late 2004. With the sickness and then death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, the Palestinians lost their internationally recognised leader of the previous three decades, after which the intifada lost momentum and lead to internal fighting between Palestinian factions (most notably the Hamas-Fatah Conflict), as well as conflict within Fatah itself. Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip, announced in June 2004 completed in August 2005, is also cited, for instance by Ramzy Baroud, as signalling the end of the intifada. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas vowed in the days leading to the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit in February 2005 that it would mark the end of the intifada. The summit resulted in Abbas declaring violence would come to an end, and Ariel Sharon agreed to release 900 Palestinian prisoners and withdraw from West Bank towns, some consider this to be the 'official' end of the Second Intifada, although sporadic violence still continued outside PA control or condolence.

Tactics

The tactics of the two sides in the conflict are largely based upon their resources and goals.

Palestinians

Militant groups involved in violence include Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. They have waged a high-intensity campaign of guerrilla warfare and suicide bombing against Israel. Military equipment is mostly imported light arms and homemade weapons, such as hand grenades and explosive belts, assault rifles, and the Qassam rockets. They also have increased use of remote-controlled landmines, a tactic which has become increasingly popular among the poorly armed groups. Car bombs were often used against "lightly hardened" targets such as Israeli armored jeeps and checkpoints.

Palestinians also adopted the tactic of suicide bombing (see List). Conducted as a single or double bombing, suicide bombings are generally conducted against "soft" targets (civilians) or "lightly hardened" targets (such as checkpoints) to try to raise the cost of the war to Israelis and demoralize the Israeli society. Most suicide bombing attacks (although not all) are targeted against civilians, and conducted on crowded places in Israeli cities, such as public transport, restaurants and markets.

One recent development is the use of suicide bombs carried by children. Unlike most suicide bombings, the use of these not only earned condemnation from the United States and from human rights groups such as Amnesty International, but also from many Palestinians and much of the Middle East press. The youngest Palestinian suicide bomber was 16-year-old Issa Bdeir, a high school student from the village of Al Doha, who shocked his friends and family when he blew himself up in a park in Rishon LeZion, killing a teenage boy and an elderly man. The youngest attempted suicide bombing was by a 14 year old captured by soldiers at the Huwwara checkpoint before managing to do any harm.

In May 2004, Israel Defence minister Shaul Mofaz claimed that United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East's ambulances were used to take the bodies of dead Israeli soldiers in order to prevent the Israel Defense Forces from recovering their dead. Reuters has provided video of healthy armed men entering ambulance with UN markings for transport. UNRWA initially denied that its ambulances carry militants but later reported that the driver was forced to comply with threats from armed men. UNRWA still denies that their ambulances carried body parts of dead Israeli soldiers.

In August 2004, Israel said that an advanced explosives-detection device employed by the IDF at the Hawara checkpoint near Nablus discovered a Palestinian ambulance had transported explosive material.

Some of the Palestinian reaction to Israeli policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has consisted of non-violent protest. Groups such as the Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement which works out of Beit Sahour formally encourage and organize non-violent resistance. Other groups, such as the International Solidarity Movement openly advocate for both violent and non-violent resistance. Some of these activities are done in cooperation with internationals and Israelis, such as the weekly protests against the Israeli West Bank Barrier carried out in villages like Bi'lin, Biddu and Budrus. This model of resistance has spread to other villages like Beit Sira, Hebron, Saffa, and Ni'lein. Even during the Israeli reinvasion of Jenin and Nablus, "A Call for a Non-violent Resistance Strategy in Palestine" was issued by two Palestinian Christians in May 2002.

Non-violent tactics have sometimes been met with Israeli military force. For example, Amnesty International notes that "10-year-old Walid Naji Abu Qamar, 11-year old Mubarak Salim al-Hashash and 13-year-old Mahmoud Tariq Mansour were among eight unarmed demonstrators killed in the early afternoon of 19 May 2004 in Rafah, in the Gaza Strip, when the Israeli army open fire on a non-violent demonstration with tank shells and a missile launched from a helicopter gunship. Dozens of other unarmed demonstrators were wounded in the attack.". According to Israeli army and government officials, the tanks shelled a nearby empty building and a helicopter fired a missile in a nearby open space in order to deter the demonstrators from proceeding towards Israeli army positions.

Israel

The IDF adopted tactics appropriate to the enclosed, urban environment in which the IDF is frequently fighting. The Israeli Defense Forces stress the safety of their troops, using such heavily armored equipment as the Merkava tank and various military aircraft including F-16, drone aircraft and helicopter gunships. Sniper towers were used extensively in the Gaza Strip before the Israeli pullout . Heavily armored IDF Caterpillar D9 bulldozers were routinely employed to detonate booby traps and IEDs, and clear houses along the border with Egypt used to fire at Israeli troops, in "buffer zones", and during military operations in the West Bank. Until February 2005, Israel had in place a policy to demolish the family homes of suicide bombers. Due to the considerable number of Palestinians living in single homes, the large quantity of homes destroyed, and collateral damage from house demolitions, it become an increasingly controversial tactic. Families have provided timely information to Israeli forces regarding suicide bombing activities in order to prevent the demolition of their houses, although families doing so risk being executed or otherwise punished for collaboration, either by the Palestinian Authority or extrajudicially by Palestinian militants. The IDF committee studying the issue recommended ending the practice because the policy was not effective enough to justify its costs to Israel's image internationally and the backlash it created among Palestinians.

With complete ground and air superiority, mass detentions are regularly conducted; at any given time, there are about 6,000 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, about half of them held temporarily without a final indictment, in accordance with Israeli law. Security Checkpoints divide most Palestinian cities and interconnections between cities. The Israeli position is that those checkpoints are necessary to stop militants and limit the ability to move weapons around, while Palestinians and Israeli and International observers and organizations perceive those checkpoints as excessive, humiliating, and a major cause of the severe humanitarian situation in the Occupied Territories. Transit across checkpoints can take several hours, depending on the current security situation in Israel. Palestinian metalworking shops and other business facilities suspected by Israel of being used to manufacture weapons are regularly destroyed by airstrikes. The tactic of military "curfew" - long-term lockdown of civilian areas - has been used routinely. Nablus was kept under curfew for over 100 consecutive days, with generally under two hours per day allowed for people to get food or conduct other business.

Although these tactics also have been condemned internationally, Israel insists they are vital for security reasons in order to thwart terrorist attacks. Some cite figures, such as those published in Haaretz newspaper, to prove the effectiveness of these methods ( Graph 1: Thwarted attacks (yellow) vs successful attacks (red) - Graph 2: Suicide bombing within the "green line" per quarter). The Israeli secret services Shabak enable the Israeli Security Forces (IDF, Magav, police YAMAM and Mistaravim SF units) to thwart suicide bombings by providing real-time warnings and reliable intelligence reports.

Israel also pursues a policy of "targeted killings", the killing of militants and especially prominent leaders who are involved in perpetrating attacks against Israelis, to eliminate imminent threats and to deter others from following suit. This tactic has been condemned as extrajudicial assassination by some international human rights organizations and the United Nations, while others (such as the United States) see it as a legitimate measure of self-defense against terrorism. Many criticize the targeted killings for placing civilians at risk, though its supporters believe it reduces civilian casualties on both sides. Israel has been criticized for the use of helicopter gunship missiles in urban assassinations which often results in civilian casualties. Israel in turn has criticized what it describes as a practice of militant leaders hiding among civilians in densely populated areas, thus turning them into unwitting human shields. Regardless of the would be ethical problems, targeted assassinations have been extensively employed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and some other armies in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq since Israel has begun using this technique.

International involvement

The international community has long taken an involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and this involvement has only increased during the al-Aqsa Intifada. Israel annually receives $1.2 billion in economic aid and $1.8 billion in military aid from the United States, excluding loan guarantees. The Palestinian Authority generally receives about $100 million in economic aid from the United States, and the Palestinian territories are among the major humanitarian aid recipients.

Additionally, private groups have become increasingly involved in the conflict, such as the International Solidarity Movement on the side of the Palestinians, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee on the side of the Israelis.

In the 2001 and 2002 Arab League Summits, the Arab states pledged support for the Second Intifada just as they had pledged support for the First Intifada in two consecutive summits in the late 1980s.

Effects on Oslo Accords

Since the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada and its emphasis on suicide bomber deliberately targeting civilians riding public transportation (buses), the Oslo Accords are viewed with increasing disfavor by the Israeli public.

In May 2000, seven years after the Oslo Accords and five months before the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a survey by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at the Tel Aviv University found that 39% of all Israelis support the Accords and that 32% believe that the Accords will result in peace in the next few years. In contrast, the May 2004 survey found that 26% of all Israelis support the Accords and 18% believe that the Accords will result in peace in the next few years; decreases of 13% and 16% respectively. Furthermore, later survey found that 80% of all Israelis believe the Israel Defense Forces have succeeded in dealing with the al-Aqsa Intifada militarily.

A survey of Palestinian political attitudes conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre in August 1998 found that over 60% of Palestinians either cautiously (50%+) or strongly (about 10%) supported the Oslo peace process. In 2006, 51.7% thought a government headed by Hamas should continue with the Oslo Agreement, while 42% said Hamas does not have to. When asked if a Hamas led government should continue with the political negotiations that the PA is committed to, 66.3% agreed and 29.6% disagreed.

Casualties

The casualty data for the Second Intifada has been reported by a variety of sources and though there is general agreement regarding the overall number of dead, the statistical picture is blurred by disparities in how different types of casualties are counted and categorized.

The sources do not vary widely over the data on Israeli casualties. B'Tselem reports that 1,053 Israelis were killed by Palestinian attacks through April 30, 2008. Israeli journalist Zeev Schiff reported similar numbers citing the Shin Bet as his source in an August 2004 Haaretz article where he notes that:

The number of Israeli fatalities in the current conflict with the Palestinians exceeded 1,000 last week. Only two of the country's wars - the War of Independence and the Yom Kippur War - have claimed more Israeli lives than this intifada, which began on September 29, 2000. In the Six-Day War, 803 Israelis lost their lives, while the War of Attrition claimed 738 Israeli lives along the borders with Egypt, Syria and Lebanon.

There is little dispute as to the total number of Palestinians killed by Israelis. B'Tselem reports that through April 30, 2008, there were 4,745 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces, and 44 Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians. B'Tselem also reports 577 Palestinians killed by Palestinians through April 30, 2008.

Between September 2000 and January 2005, 69 percent of Israeli fatalities were male, while over 95 percent of the Palestinian fatalities were male. "Remember These Children" reports that as of 1 February 2008, 119 Israeli children, age 17 and under, had been killed by Palestinians. Over the same time period, 982 Palestinian children, age 17 and under, were killed by Israelis. Remember these Children. This is a comprehensive list of all Israeli and Palestinian child casualties, age 17 and under, listed since September 2000 along with what is known about the circumstances of their deaths.

Combatant versus noncombatant deaths

Regarding the numbers of Israeli civilian versus combatant deaths, B'Tselem reports that through April 30, 2008 there were 719 Israeli civilians killed and 334 Israeli security force personnel killed. In other words, 31.7% of those killed were Israeli security force personnel, while 68.3% were civilians.

The number of noncombatant casualties among Palestinians is more difficult to determine, due to the different criteria applied by various institutes to determine who and who is not to be considered a civilian or non-combatant.

[[Image:Intifada deaths.svg|thumb|400px|
The chart is based on B'Tselem casualty numbers. It does not include the 577 Palestinians killed by Palestinians.]]The Israeli non-governmental human rights organization B'Tselem reports that through April 30, 2008, out of 4,745 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces, there were 1,671 "Palestinians who took part in the hostilities and were killed by Israeli security forces," or 35.2%. According to their statistics, 2,204 of those killed by Israeli security forces "did not take part in the hostilities," or 46.4%. There were 870 (18.5%) who B'Tselem defines as "Palestinians who were killed by Israeli security forces and it is not known if they were taking part in the hostilities."

The Israeli International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (IPICT), on the other hand, in a "Statistical Report Summary" for September 27, 2000 through January 1, 2005 indicates that 56% (1542) of the 2773 Palestinians killed by Israelis were combatants. According to their data, an additional 406 Palestinians were killed by actions of their own side. 22% (215) of the 988 Israelis killed by Palestinians were combatants. An additional 22 Israelis were killed by actions of their own side.

IPICT counts "probable combatants" in its total of combatants. From their full report in September 2002:

"A 'probable combatant' is someone killed at a location and at a time during which an armed confrontation was going on, who appears most likely – but not certain – to have been an active participant in the fighting. For example, in many cases where an incident has resulted in a large number of Palestinian casualties, the only information available is that an individual was killed when Israeli soldiers returned fire in response to shots fired from a particular location. While it is possible that the person killed had not been active in the fighting and just happened to be in the vicinity of people who were, it is reasonable to assume that the number of such coincidental deaths is not particularly high. Where the accounts of an incident appear to support such a coincidence, the individual casualty has been given the benefit of the doubt, and assigned a non-combatant status."

In the same 2002 IPICT full report there is a pie chart (Graph 2.9) that lists the IPICT combatant breakdown for Palestinian deaths through September 2002. Here follow the statistics in that pie chart used to come up with the total combatant percentage through September 2002:

Combatants	Percent of all Palestinian deaths
Full Combatants	44.8%
Probable Combatants	8.3%
Violent Protesters	1.6%
Total Combatants	54.7%

On August 24, 2004, Haaretz reporter Zeev Schiff published casualty figures based on Shin Bet data. The Haaretz article reported: "There is a discrepancy of two or three casualties with the figures tabulated by the Israel Defense Forces."

Here is a summary of the figures presented in the article:

• Over 1,000 Israelis were killed by Palestinian attacks in the al-Aqsa Intifada.
• Palestinians sources claim 2,736 Palestinians killed in the Intifada.
• The Shin Bet has the names of 2,124 Palestinian dead.
• Out of the figure of 2,124 dead, Shin Bet assigned them to these organizations:
  • 466 Hamas members
  • 408 Fatah's Tanzim and al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades
  • 205 Palestinian Islamic Jihad
  • 334 of "Palestinian security forces - for example, Force 17, the Palestinian police, General Intelligence, and the counter security apparatus"

The article does not say whether those killed were combatants or not. Here is a quote:

"The Palestinian security forces - for example, Force 17, the Palestinian police, General Intelligence, and the counter security apparatus - have lost 334 of its members during the current conflict, the Shin Bet figures show."

As a response to IDF statistics about Palestinian casualties in the West Bank, the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem reported that two thirds of the Palestinians killed in 2004 did not participate in the fighting.

Prior to 2003, B'Tselem's methodology differentiated between civilians and members of Palestinian military groups, rather than between combatants and non-combatants, leading to criticism from some pro-Israel sources. B'Tselem no longer uses the term "civilian" and instead describes those killed as "participating" or "not participating in fighting at the time of death",

Others argue that Palestinian National Authority has, throughout the Intifada, placed unarmed men, women, children and the elderly in the line of fire, and that announcing the time and place of anti-occupation demonstrations via television, radio, sermons, and calls from mosque loudspeaker systems is done for this purpose.

In 2009, historian Benny Morris' stated in his retrospective book One States, Two States that about one third of the Palestinian deaths up to 2004 had been civilians.

Deaths in 2006

The violence continued on both sides throughout 2006. On December 27 the Israeli Human Rights Organization B'Tselem released its annual report on the Intifada. According to which, 660 Palestinians, a figure more than three times the number of Palestinians killed in 2005, and 23 Israelis, have been killed in 2006. From a December 28 Haaretz article: "According to the report, about half of the Palestinians killed, 322, did not take part in the hostilities at the time they were killed. 22 of those killed were targets of assassinations, and 141 were minors." 405 of 660 Palestinians were killed in the 2006 Israel-Gaza conflict, which lasted from 28 June till 26 November.

Palestinians killed by Palestinians

B'Tselem reports that through April 30, 2008 there were 577 Palestinians killed by Palestinians. Of those, 120 were "Palestinians killed by Palestinians for suspected collaboration with Israel." B'Tselem maintains a list of deaths of Palestinians killed by Palestinians with details about the circumstances of the deaths. Some of the many causes of death are crossfire, factional fighting, kidnappings, collaboration, etc..

Concerning the killing of Palestinians by other Palestinians a January 2003 Humanist magazine article reports:

For over a decade the PA has violated Palestinian human rights and civil liberties by routinely killing civilians—including collaborators, demonstrators, journalists, and others—without charge or fair trial.

Of the total number of Palestinian civilians killed during this period by both Israeli and Palestinian security forces, 16 percent were the victims of Palestinian security forces.

...According to Freedom House's annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, Freedom in the World 2001-2002, the chaotic nature of the Intifada along with strong Israeli reprisals has resulted in a deterioration of living conditions for Palestinians in Israeli-administered areas. The survey states:

"Civil liberties declined due to: shooting deaths of Palestinian civilians by Palestinian security personnel; the summary trial and executions of alleged collaborators by the Palestinian Authority (PA); extra-judicial killings of suspected collaborators by militias; and the apparent official encouragement of Palestinian youth to confront Israeli soldiers, thus placing them directly in harm's way."

The Humanist article also states:

"It isn't, however, surprising that such conditions should prevail.

Subject, oppressed, or embattled peoples throughout history have commonly turned on themselves.

The occupation and war conditions under which Palestinians currently live readily foster internal hostility and the loss of civil liberties."

Internal Palestinian violence has been called an ‘Intra’fada during this Intifada and the previous one.

Economic costs

The Israeli commerce has experienced much hardship, in particular because of the sharp drop in tourism. A representative of Israel's Chamber of Commerce has estimated the cumulative economic damage caused by the crisis at 150 to 200 billion Shekels, or 35 to 45 billion US $ - against an annual GDP of 122 billion dollars in 2002. Since the end of 2003 however, Israel has experienced a strong economic recovery.

Sixteen square kilometers of land in the Gaza Strip, most of it agricultural, was razed by Israeli military forces and more than 601 houses were completely destroyed. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO) estimates the damage done to the Palestinian economy at over 1.1 billion dollars in the first quarter of 2002, compared to an annual GDP of 4.5 billion dollars.

See also

• Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an overview
• Taba Summit
• First Intifada
• Third Intifada
• Oslo Accords
• Israel's unilateral disengagement plan
• Israeli West Bank barrier
• Unconventional warfare
• House demolition in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Violence during the Second Intifada

• Violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006
• Civilian casualties in the Second Intifada
• List of Palestinian suicide attacks
• Child suicide bombers in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
• 2000 Ramallah lynching
• The shooting on Gilo neighborhood
• Palestinian factional violence
• List of Qassam rocket attacks

Notes

1. The First Intifada was from 1987 to 1993
2. The verb here has the same meaning as 'An animal shaking off fleas from its body', for example.
3. B'Tselem - Statistics - Fatalities, B'Tselem.
4. *"We describe the epidemiologic features of injuries sustained by Israeli soldiers in the first 19 weeks of the events that occurred in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and northern Israel and started September 27, 2000. This conflict, referred to by the Palestinians as the "Al-Aqsa Intifada," combined riots of the civilian population with low-intensity military conflict between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Palestinian Armed Forces." Lakstein, Dror, Blumenfeld, Amir. "Israeli Army Casualties in the Second Palestinian Uprising", Military medicine, May 2005. *"The Tisha B'Av service -- one of a number organized nationally by the American Zionist Movement in conjunction with Schindler's Ark -- focused on the 470 victims of Palestinian terrorism who have died in Israel since September 27, 2000, the resurgence of the intifada." Caplane, Ronnie. "Christians, Jews 'stand for Israel' at Tisha B'Av service", j., July 26, 2002. *"IDF soldier David Biri, was murdered on September 27, when a convoy of settlers on the way to Netzarim in the Gaza Strip, accompanied by a IDF escort vehicle, was attacked." "Israeli Victims of El Aksa Intifada ", Global Jewish Agenda, Vol. 1, No. 40, November 9, 2000. *"Some reasons for inconsistency of the official numbers are eg the date which is counted as the start of the intifada (September 27th or 28th 2000), the regional restrictions of counting areas [...] and differing definitions." Hans-Jörg Albrecht. Conflicts and Conflict Resolution in Middle Eastern Societies-between Tradition and Modernity, Duncker & Humblot, 2006, p. 81. *"The eruption of the second Palestinian intifada on September 27, 200, was influenced by the Lebanese example." Najib Ghadbian, "Political Islam: Inclusion or Violence?", in Kent Worcester, Sally A. Bermanzohn, Mark Ungar. Violence and Politics: Globalization's Paradox, Routledge, 2002, p. 103. *"The eruption of the second uprising known as al-Aqsa intifada, on September 27, 2000, attests to this view." Najib Ghadbian, "Political Islam: Inclusion or Violence?", in Kent Worcester, Sally A. Bermanzohn, Mark Ungar. Violence and Politics: Globalization's Paradox, Routledge, 2002, p. 105. *"Since the beginning of the war, the Tanzim employed two main tactics in its attacks against Israel—shootings and car/roadside bombings. From September 27, 2000, to January 1, 2004, the ICT counted 54 separate shooting incidents in which Tanzim militants attempted to injure or kill Israeli soldiers or settlers." Anthony H. Cordesman. Arab-Israeli Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006, p. 316. *"This figure is based on a total of 800 Israeli fatalities from September 27, 2000 (the beginning of the second intifada) through August 12, 2003, Middleastern Conflict Statistics Project, Statistical Report Summary (2003), and an Israeli population of about 6.1 million." Neal Feigenson, Daniel Bailis, and William Klein. ,Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Issue 4, Fall 2004, p. 1000. *"That war began on September 27, 2000 when a Palestinian security officer on a joint patrol with Israeli forces turned his firearm on his Israeli counterpart and murdered him." Caroline B. Glick. [ ], Oxford Journal on Good Governance, Volume 2 ~ Number 2, August 2005, p. 32.
5. BBC News: "Al-Aqsa Intifada timeline".
6. Dark Times, Dire Decisions: Jews and Communism, Dan Diner, Jonathan Frankel, Oxford University Press, p.311
7. "Mr. Sharon made the visit on September 28 accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli police officers. Although Israelis viewed the visit in an internal political context, Palestinians saw it as highly provocative to them. On the following day, in the same place, a large number of unarmed Palestinian demonstrators and a large Israeli police contingent confronted each other." "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report" (Mitchell Report), April 30, 2001.
8. "The following day, the 29th, a Friday and hence the Muslim day of prayer, the young Palestinians flared up." Cypel, Sylvain. Walled: Israeli Society at an Impasse, Other Press, 2006, p. 6. ISBN 1590512103
9. "Then in late September Ariel Sharon [...] visited the Temple Mount [...] The next day, massive violence erupted in Jerusalem and Palestinian-controlled areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip." Alan Mittleman, Robert A. Licht, Jonathan D. Sarna, Jewish Polity and American Civil Society: Communal Agencies and Religious Movements in the American Public Sphere, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, p. 161. ISBN 0742521222
10. What America wants - Noam Chomsky
11. The Second Intifada: Backgrounds and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict by Jeremy Pressman
12. "Fallen soldier's father: I never thought this would happen". September 29, 2000. Jerusalem Post.
13. . "This morning, both sides started out tense, after clashes on Thursday [Sept 28, 2000] provoked by Mr. Sharon's visit."
14. . "A visit by Likud Party leader Ariel Sharon to the site known as the Temple Mount by Jews sparked a clash on Thursday [Sept 28, 2000] between stone-throwing Palestinians and Israeli troops, who fired tear gas and rubber bullets into the crowd. ... Also Thursday [Sept 28, 2000], an Israeli soldier critically injured in a bomb attack on an army convoy in the Gaza Strip died of his wounds."
15. "Palestinian Parliament Expected to Not Declare an Independent Palestinian State". September 10, 2000. CNN.
16. Schulz and Hammer, 2003, pp. 134-136.
17. The Second Intifada: Backgrounds and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict by Jeremy Pressman
18. Israel, the Conflict and Peace: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions - What caused the current wave of Palestinian terrorism? by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
19. Itamar Rabinovich (2004): Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1948-2003 p.306
20. Devin Sper (2004) The Future of Israel p.335
21. Binyamin Elon (2005): God's Covenant With Israel: Establishing Biblical Boundaries in Today's World p.45
22. HUSSEIN DAKROUB, Associated Press Writer. Associated Press. New York: March 26, 2002. pg. 1
23. "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report". The George J. Mitchell (et al.) report. April 30, 2001.
24. (Bard, Mitchell Geoffrey) The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict, Ch. 28, pg. 395
25. BBC ON THIS DAY | 28 | 2000: 'Provocative' mosque visit sparks riots. September 28, 2000. BBC. "Palestinians and Israeli police have clashed in the worst violence for several years at Jerusalem's holiest site, the compound around Al-Aqsa mosque. The violence began after a highly controversial tour of the mosque compound early this morning by hardline Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon. ... Soon after Mr Sharon left the site, the angry demonstrations outside erupted into violence. Israeli police fired tear gas and rubber-coated metal bullets, while protesters hurled stones and other missiles. Police said 25 of their men were hurt by missiles thrown by Palestinians, but only one was taken to hospital. Israel Radio reported at least three Palestinians were wounded by rubber bullets. ... Following Friday [Sept 29, 2000] prayers the next day violence again broke out throughout Jerusalem and the West Bank."
26. Menachem Klein, The Jerusalem Problem: The Struggle for Permanent Status, University Press of Florida, 2003 p.98
27. Yossef Bodansky, The High Cost of Peace (Prima Publishing, 2002) ISBN 0-7615-3579-9 pp.353-354
28. Interview with Acting FM Ben-Ami on Newshour with Jim Lehrer- PBS TV - 1-Nov-2000 on MFA
29. Menachem Klein,The Jerusalem Problem: The Struggle for Permanent Status, University Press of Florida, 2003 pp.97-98
30. Menachem Klein,The Jerusalem Problem: The Struggle for Permanent Status, University Press of Florida, 2003 p.97
31. Israel and the Occupied Territories: Excessive use of lethal force | Amnesty International
32. Menachem Klein,The Jerusalem Problem: The Struggle for Permanent Status, University Press of Florida, 2003 p.98
33. Earlier estimates gave a million bullets and projectiles shot by Israeli forces in the first few days, 700,000 in the West Bank and 300,000 in the Gaza strip. See Ben Kaspit, 'Jewish New Year 2002 – the Second Anniversary of the Intifada,' Ma’ariv 6 Sept 2002 (Heb), in Cheryl Rubenberg, The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace,'Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003 p.324, p.361 n.5. The figure was revealed by Amos Malka, then-director of Military Intelligence. Moshe Ya'alon, who later became the Israeli Chief of Staff, denied the 1.3 million figure, claiming that the number reflected the demand of the command units for supplemental ammunition. [ ]
34. MacFarquhar, Neil. " Few Kind Words for Sharon in the Arab World", January 5, 2006. New York Times.
35. "The Telegraph: Lynch mob suspects held by Israelis"
36. Feldman, Shai. The October Violence: An Interim Assessment, Jaffes Center for Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment, Vol. 3 No. 3, November 2000.
37. DEATH ON THE CAMPUS: JENIN; U.N. Report Rejects Claims Of a Massacre Of Refugees, By James Bennet, New York Times, August 2, 2002
38. Jenin "massacre" reduced to death toll of 56 by Paul Martin, Washington Times, May 1, 2002
39. Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/10 by the United Nations
40. http://www.un.org/peace/jenin/index.html
41. "Hamas leader says Israel's existence is a reality". By Sean Maguire and Khaled Oweis. Reuters. Jan. 10, 2007.
42. "Hamas slammed the silent and still Arab position on Gaza massacre" -
43. "it's impossible to contain the Arab and Islamic world after the Gaza massacre" -
44. "Diplomatic race to stop the Gazza massacre" -
45. Libya calling the operation a "horrible massacre" -
46. http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1060562.html
47. http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1067547.html
48. http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3558676,00.html
49. http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=384&issue=116
50. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/1482803/Palestinian-ceasefire-ends-four-year-intifada.html
51. http://www.zionism-israel.com/his/Israel_timeline_1993_present.htm
52. http://www.jewishjournal.com/community_briefs/article/uc_to_reopen_study_in_israel_brandeis_offers_summer_prep_program_20081203/
53. ZNet - Israel Resistance
54. http://72.14.221.104/search?q=cache:lp_oquSksboJ:www.afsc.org/israel-palestine/documents/PalestinianNonviolentResistancetooccupaltion.pdf
55. Sharing the Land of Canaan - Palestinian nonviolent resistance
56. Peace Magazine v20n4p22: A Glimpse of Palestinian Nonviolence
57. Protest, Grief as Barrier Segregates Palestinian Village from Farms - The NewStandard
58. Nonviolent Resistance in Palestine
59. http://www.ramallahonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1902
60. ZNet - Budrus Demo
61. The Third Intifada - by Ran HaCohen
62. http://web.archive.org/web/20060527050519/http://www.palestinemonitor.org/nueva_web/updates_news/updates/beit_sira_experience.htm
63. The Hindu : Opinion / Leader Page Articles : The great divide
64. Al-Ahram Weekly | Region | Palestine is not for sale!
65. Palestinian Christians Call for Non-Violent Resistance
66. Israel and the Occupied Territories and the Palestinian Authority: Act Now to Stop the Killing of Children! | Amnesty International
67. UN envoy condemns Israel's extra-judicial assassinations
68. Sela, Avraham. "Arab Summit Conferences." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002. pp. 158-160
69. The Peace Index Project conducted at the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace
70. JMCC / Public Opinion Polls
71. http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2006/no57.pdf
72. "ICT Middleastern Conflict Statistics Project". Short summary page with "Breakdown of Fatalities: 27 September 2000 through 1 January 2005." International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism. Full report: "An Engineered Tragedy". Statistical Analysis of Casualties in the Palestinian - Israeli Conflict, September 2000 - September 2002. International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism. Article is here [1] also.
73. Article
74. "B'Tselem: Israeli security forces killed 660 Palestinians during 2006". Haaretz. Dec. 28, 2006.
75. "B'Tselem - Statistics - Fatalities. Palestinians killed by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories". Detailed B'Tselem list.
76. "Violence among the Palestinians". By Erika Waak. Humanist. Jan-Feb 2003.
77. "The ‘Intra’fada. An Analysis of Internal Palestinian Violence". By Leonie Schultens. April 2004. The Palestinian Human Rights Monitor. A bi-monthly publication of the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group.

Bibliography

Sergio Catignani, Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the two Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army (London: Routledge, 2008), ISBN 978-0-415-43388-4.

External links

Non-characterized

• Palestinian Military Performance and the 2000 Intifada
• Has Israel beaten the suicide bombers? The Telegraph
• "There must be peace between symbols" and "Monsters in the shadows of a Palestinian plebiscite" - Thinking-East analyses
• Or Commission report
• Harvest-time Killing Fuels Hatred Between Palestinians and Jewish Settlers
• BBC News: Analysis: Palestinian suicide attacks
• The Palestinian Red Crescent Society - Includes weekly reports of injuries, deaths, military detention of ambulances, and many other statistics.
• Ariel Sharon's Visit to the Temple Mount - From Ariel Sharon's Life Story, a biography
• Lessons from the Palestinian 'War' against Israel, by Lt. Gen. (ret.) Moshe Yaalon, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 2007
• Boy vs Tank: Faris Odeh - famous picture stoning a tank
• The Second Intifada: Background and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Dr. Jeremy Pressman, 2003.

Pro-Palestinian

• Palestinian National Authority State Information Service
• Palestinian Center For Human Rights
• Palestinian casualties of the Intifada up to 2004
• The Electronic Intifada
• Intifada.com
• Jewish Settlers Receive Hundreds of Thousands in Compensation for Leaving Gaza While Palestinians Working for Them Get Nothing
• Israel must end the hatred now
• Israeli Settler Violence Exposes Jewish Fundamentalism
• "Helplessness, deprivation and hatred"
• Committee on economic, social, and cultural rights hears from NGOs on conditions in Israel and Brazil
• Palestine Since the Intifada began video

Pro-Israel

• Jerusalem Newswire
• Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000
• Jewish Virtual Library: Myths & Facts Online
• Israel War against Terror
• Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
• Who shot Mohammed al-Dura?
• The Second Draft
• Special: Gaza kidnapping Israeli News - Ynetnews English version of Yedioth Ahronoth