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The Second Sino-Japanese War (July 7, 1937 – September 9, 1945) was a military conflict fought between the Republic of Chinamarker and the Empire of Japanmarker. From 1937 to 1941, China fought Japan with some economic help from Germany (until 1938) and the Soviet Union (1937-1940). After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbormarker, the war merged into the greater conflict of World War II as a major front in the Pacific Theatre. The Second Sino-Japanese War was the largest Asian war in the twentieth century. It also makes up more than 50% of casualties in the Pacific War.

Although the two countries had fought intermittently since 1931, full-scale war started in earnest in 1937 and ended only with the surrender of Japan in 1945. The war was the result of a decades-long Japanese imperialist policy aiming to dominate China politically and militarily, and to secure its vast raw material reserves and other economic resources, particularly food and labor. At the same time, the rising tide of Chinese nationalism and notions of self determination stoked the coals of war. Before 1937, China and Japan fought in small, localized engagements in so-called "incidents". Yet the two sides, for a variety of reasons, refrained from fighting a total war. In 1931, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria by Imperial Japan's Kwantung Army followed the "Mukden Incident". The last of these incidents was the Marco Polo Bridge Incidentmarker of 1937, marking the beginning of full scale war between the two countries.


In Chinese, the war is most commonly known as the War of Resistance Against Japan ( ), and also known as the Eight Years' War of Resistance ( ), simply War of Resistance ( ), or Second Sino-Japanese War ( ).

In Japan, the name is most commonly used because of its perceived objectivity. When the war began in July 1937 near Beijing, the government of Japan used The North China Incident ( , Kahoku Jihen), and with the outbreak of the Battle of Shanghai the following month, it was changed to The China Incident ( , Shina Jihen).

The word incident ( , jihen) was used by Japan, as neither country had made a formal declaration of war. Japan wanted to avoid intervention by other countries, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States, which were her primary source of petroleum; the United States was also her biggest supplier of steel. American President Franklin D. Roosevelt would have been forced to impose an embargo on Japan in observance of the American Neutrality Acts had the fighting been formally escalated to 'general war'.

In Japanese propaganda however, the invasion of China became a "holy war" (seisen), the first step of the Hakko ichiu (eight corners of the world under one roof). In 1940, prime minister Konoe thus launched the League of Diet Members Believing the Objectives of the Holy War. When both sides formally declared war in December 1941, the name was replaced by Greater East Asia War ( , Daitōa Sensō).

Although the Japanese government still uses the term "China Incident" in formal documents, because the word Shina is considered a derogatory word by China, the media in Japan often paraphrase with other expressions like The Japan-China Incident ( [Nikka Jihen], [Nisshi Jihen], which were used by media even in the 1930s.

In addition, the name Second Sino-Japanese War is not usually used in Japan, as the First Sino-Japanese War ( , Nisshin-Sensō), between Japan and the Qing Dynastymarker in 1894 is not regarded to have obvious direct linkage to the second, between Japan and the Republic of Chinamarker.


The origin of the Second Sino-Japanese War can be traced to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, in which China, then under the Qing Dynastymarker, was defeated by Japan and was forced to cede Taiwanmarker to her, and to recognize the 'independence' of Korea in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Qing Dynasty was on the brink of collapse from internal revolts and foreign imperialism, while Japan had emerged as a great power through its effective measures of modernization. The Republic of Chinamarker was founded in 1912, following the Xinhai Revolution which overthrew the Qing Dynasty. However, the nascent Republic was even weaker than its predecessor due to the predominance of Chinese warlord. Unifying the nation and repelling imperialism seemed a very remote possibility. Some warlords even aligned themselves with various foreign powers in an effort to wipe each other out. For example, warlord Zhang Zuolin (張作霖) of Manchuria openly cooperated with the Japanese for military and economic assistance.

In 1915, Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands to extort further political and commercial privilege from China. Following World War I, Japan acquired the German sphere of influence in Shandongmarker(Shantung), leading to nationwide anti-Japanese protests and mass demonstrations in China, but China under the Beiyang government remained fragmented and unable to resist foreign incursions. In order to unite China and eradicate regional warlords, the Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) in Cantonmarker launched the Northern Expedition of 1926-28. The Kuomintang's National Revolutionary Army (NRA) swept through China until it was checked in Shandongmarker, where Beiyang warlord Zhang Zongchang, backed by the Japanese, attempted to stop the NRA's advance. This battle culminated in the Jinan Incident of 1928 in which the National Revolutionary Army and the Imperial Japanese Army were engaged in a short conflict that resulted in Kuomintang's withdrawal from Jinan. In the same year, Zhang Zuolin was assassinated when he became less willing to cooperate with Japan. . Afterwards Zhang's son Zhang Xueliang quickly took over control of Manchuria, and despite strong Japanese lobbying efforts to continue the resistance against the KMT, he shortly declared his allegiance to the Kuomintang government under Chiang Kai-shek, which resulted in the nominal unification of China at the end of 1928.

However in 1930, a large scale civil war broke out between warlords who fought in alliance with Kuomintang during the Northern Expedition and central government under Chiang. In addition, the Chinese Communist (CCP, or Communist Party of China) revolted against the central government following a purge of its members from the KMT in 1927. Therefore the Chinese central government diverted much attention into fighting these civil wars and followed a policy of "first internal pacification before external resistance"( : ).

Invasion of Manchuria, interventions in China

The situation in China provided an easy opportunity for Japan to further its goals. Japan saw Manchuria as a limitless supply of raw materials, a market for her manufactured goods (now excluded from many Western countries by Depression era tariffs), and as a protective buffer state against the Soviet Unionmarker in Siberia. Japan invaded Manchuria outright after the Mukden Incident (九一八事變) in September 1931. After five months of fighting, the puppet state of Manchukuo was established in 1932, with the last emperor of China, Puyi, installed as a Japanese puppet. Militarily too weak to directly challenge Japan, China appealed to the League of Nations for help. The League's investigation was published as the Lytton Report, condemning Japan for its incursion into Manchuria, and causing Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations entirely. Appeasement being the predominant policy of the day, no country was willing to take action against Japan beyond tepid censure.

Incessant fighting followed the Mukden Incident. In 1932, Chinese and Japanese troops fought a short war in the January 28 Incident. This battle resulted in the demilitarization of Shanghai, which forbade the Chinese from deploying troops in their own city. In Manchukuo there was an ongoing campaign to defeat the anti-Japanese volunteer armies that arose from widespread outrage over the policy of nonresistance to Japan.

In 1933, the Japanese attacked the Great Wall region, the Tanggu Truce taking place in its aftermath, giving Japan control of Rehe province as well as a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Beiping-Tianjin region. Here the Japanese aim was to create another buffer region, this time between Manchukuo and the Chinese Nationalist government in Nankingmarker.

Japan increasingly used internal conflict in China to reduce the strength of her fractious opponents. This was precipitated by the fact that even years after the Northern Expedition, the political power of the Nationalist government was limited to just the area of the Yangtze River Delta. Other sections of China were essentially in the hands of local Chinese warlords. Japan sought various Chinese collaborators and helped them establish governments friendly to Japan. This policy was called the Specialization of North China ( ), more commonly known as the North China Autonomous Movement. The northern provinces affected by this policy were Chaharmarker, Suiyuan, Hebeimarker, Shanximarker, and Shandongmarker.

This Japanese policy was most effective in the area of what is now Inner Mongolia and Hebei. In 1935, under Japanese pressure, China signed the He-Umezu Agreement, which forbad the KMT from conducting party operations in Hebei. In the same year, the Ching-Doihara Agreement was signed expelling the KMT from Chahar. Thus, by the end of 1935 the Chinese government had essentially abandoned northern China. In its place, the Japanese-backed East Hebei Autonomous Council and the Hebei-Chahar Political Council were established. There in the empty space of Chahar the Mongol Military Government (蒙古軍政府) was formed on May 12, 1936, Japan providing all necessary military and economic aid. Afterwards Chinese volunteer forces continued to resist Japanese aggression in Manchuria, and Chahar and Suiyuan.

Japan's invasion of China

Most historians place the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937 at the Marco Polo Bridge Incidentmarker, when a crucial access point to Beiping was assaulted by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). Because the Chinese defenders were the poorly equipped infantry divisions of the former Northwest Army, the Japanese easily captured Beiping and Tianjin.

The Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo were initially reluctant to escalate the conflict into full scale war, being content with the victories achieved in northern China following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. However, the KMT central government determined that the "breaking point" of Japanese aggression had been reached and Chiang Kai-shek quickly mobilized the central government army and airforce under his direct command to attack the Japanese Marines in Shanghai on August 13, 1937, which led to the Battle of Shanghai. The IJA had to mobilize over 200,000 troops, coupled with numerous naval vessels and aircraft to capture Shanghai after more than three months of intense fighting, with casualties far exceeding initial expectations.

Building on the hard won victory in Shanghai, the IJA captured the KMT capital city of Nanking and Southern Shanxi by the end of 1937, in campaigns involving approximately 350,000 Japanese soldiers, and considerably more Chinese. Historians estimate up to 300,000 Chinese were mass murdered in the Nanking Massacre (also known as the 'Rape of Nanking'), after the fall of Nanking on December 13, 1937, while some Japanese deny the existence of a massacre.

At the start of 1938, the Headquarters in Tokyo still hoped to limit the scope of the conflict to occupying areas around Shanghai, Nanjing and most of northern China, in order to preserve strength for an anticipated showdown with the Soviet Unionmarker. But by now the Japanese government and GHQ had effectively lost control of the Japanese army in China. With many victories achieved, Japanese field generals escalated the war and finally met with defeat at Taierzhuangmarker. Afterwards the IJA had to change its strategy and deploy almost all of its armies in the attack on the city of Wuhanmarker, which by now was the political, economic and military center of China, in hopes of destroying the fighting strength of the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) and forcing the KMT government to negotiate for peace. But after the Japanese capture of the city of Wuhan on October 27, 1938, the KMT was forced to retreat to Chongqingmarker (Chungking) to set up a provisional capital, with Chiang Kai-shek still refusing to negotiate unless Japan agreed to withdraw to her pre-1937 borders.

With Japanese casualties and costs mounting, the deeply frustrated Imperial General Headquarters decided to retaliate by ordering the Imperial air force of the Navy and the Army to launch the war's first massive air raids on civilian targets in the provisional capital of Chongqing and nearly every major city in unoccupied China, leaving millions dead, injured and homeless.

From the beginning of 1939 the war entered a new phase with the unprecedented defeat of the IJA at Changsha and Guangxi. These favorable outcomes encouraged the NRA to launch its first large-scale counter-offensive against the IJA in early 1940. However, due to her low military-industrial capacity and limited experience in modern warfare, the NRA was defeated in this offensive. Afterwards Chiang could not risk any more all-out offensive campaigns given the poorly-trained, under-equipped, and disorganized state of his armies and opposition to his leadership both within the Kuomintang and in China in general. He had lost a substantial portion of his best trained and equipped men defending Shanghai and was at times at the mercy of his generals, who maintained a high degree of autonomy from the central KMT government.

From 1940 on the Japanese encountered tremendous difficulties in administering and garrisoning the seized territories, and tried to solve its occupation problems by implementing a strategy of creating friendly puppet governments favorable to Japanese interests in the territories conquered, the most prominent being the Nanjing Nationalist Government headed by former KMT premier Wang Jingwei. However, the atrocities committed by the Japanese army, as well as Japanese refusal to delegate any real power, left them very unpopular and largely ineffective. The only success the Japanese had was the ability to recruit a large Collaborationist Chinese Army to maintain public security in the occupied areas.

By 1941 Japan held most of the eastern coastal areas of China and Vietnammarker, but guerrilla fighting continued in these occupied areas. Japan had suffered tremendous casualties from unexpectedly stubborn Chinese resistance, and neither side could make any swift progress in a manner resembling the fall of France and Western Europe to Nazi Germany.

Use of chemical and bacteriological weapons

Imperial Japanese soldiers wearing gas masks and rubber gloves during a chemical attack in China.
Despite Article 23 of the Hague Conventions , article V of the Treaty in Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare [10864], article 171 of the Versailles Peace Treatyand a resolution adopted by the League of Nations on May 14, 1938, condemning the use of poison gas by the Empire of Japanmarker, the Imperial Japanese Army frequently used chemical weapons during the war.
Japanese troops stage a poison gas attack in China.
According to historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, the chemical weapons were authorized by specific orders given by emperor Hirohito himself, transmitted by the chief of staff of the army. For example, the Emperor authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions during the battle of Wuhan from August to October 1938. They were also used during the invasion of Changde. Those orders were transmitted either by prince Kotohito Kan'in or general Hajime Sugiyama.

Bacteriological weapons provided by Shirō Ishii's units were also profusely used. For example, in 1940, the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service bombed Ningbomarker with fleas carrying the bubonic plague. During the Khabarovsk War Crime Trials the accused, such as Major General Kiyashi Kawashima, testified that, in 1941, some 40 members of Unit 731 air-dropped plague-contaminated fleas on Changdemarker. These attacks caused epidemic plague outbreaks.

Chinese resistance strategy

The basis of Chinese strategy before the entrance of Western Allies can be divided into two periods:

First Period: 7 July 1937 (Battle of Lugou Bridgemarker) – 25 October 1938 (Fall of Wuhan).

Unlike Japan, China was unprepared for total war and had little military-industrial strength, no mechanized divisions, and few armored forces. Up until the mid-1930s China had hoped that the League of Nations would provide countermeasures to Japan's aggression. In addition, the Kuomintang government was mired in a civil war against the Communists, as Chiang Kai-shek was famously quoted: "the Japanese are a disease of the skin, the Communists are a disease of the heart". The United Front between KMT and CCP was never truly unified, as each side was preparing for a showdown with the other once the Japanese were driven out.

Even under these extremely unfavorable circumstances, Chiang realized that in order to win the support from the United States and other foreign nations, China must prove that it was indeed capable of fighting. A fast retreat would discourage foreign aid so Chiang decided to make a stand in the Battle of Shanghai. Chiang sent the best of his German-trained divisions to defend China's largest and most industrialized city from the Japanese. The battle lasted over three months, saw heavy casualties on both sides and ended with a Chinese retreat towards Nanjing. While this was a military defeat for the Chinese, it proved that China would not be defeated easily and showed China's determination to the world, which became an enormous morale booster for the Chinese people as it ended the Japanese taunt that Japan could conquer Shanghai in three days and China in three months.

Afterwards the Chinese began to adopt the strategy of "trading space for time" ( : ). The Chinese army would put up fights to delay Japanese advance to northern and eastern cities, to allow the home front, along with its professionals and key industries, to retreat west into Chongqingmarker. As a result of Chinese troops' scorched earth strategies, where dams and levees were intentionally sabotaged to create massive flooding, the consecutive Japanese advancements and conquests began to stall in late-1938.

Second Period: 25 October 1938 (Fall of Wuhan) - December 1941 (before the Allies' declaration of war on Japan).

During this period, the Chinese main objective was to prolong the war as long as possible, exhausting the Japanese resources and building up the Chinese military capacity. American general Joseph Stilwell called this strategy "winning by outlasting". Therefore, the National Revolutionary Army adopted the concept of "magnetic warfare" to attract advancing Japanese troops to definite points where they were subjected to ambush, flanking attack, and encirclements in major engagements. The most prominent example of this tactic is the successful defense of Changshamarker in 1939 and again in 1941 while inflicting heavy casualties on the IJA.

Also, CCP and other local Chinese guerrillas forces continued their resistance in occupied areas to pester the enemy and make their administration over the vast lands of China difficult. In 1940 the Chinese Red Army launched a major offensive in north China, destroyed railways and blew up a major coal mine. These constant harassment and sabotage operations deeply frustrated the Japanese army and led them to employ the "Three Alls Policy" (kill all, loot all, burn all) ( , Hanyu Pinyin: Sānguāng Zhèngcè, Japanese On: Sankō Seisaku). It was during this time period that the bulk of Japanese atrocities were committed.

By 1941, Japan had occupied much of north and coastal China, but the Kuomintang central government and military had successfully retreated to the western interior to continue their stubborn resistance, while the Chinese communists remained in control of base areas in Shaanximarker. Furthermore, in the occupied areas Japanese control was limited to just railroads and major cities ("points and lines"), but they did not have a major military or administrative presence in the vast Chinese countryside, which was a hotbed of Chinese partisan activities. This stalemate situation made a decisive victory seem impossible to the Japanese.

Relationship between the Nationalists and Communists

After the Mukden Incident, Chinese public opinion strongly criticized the leader of Manchuria, the "young marshal" Zhang Xueliang, for his nonresistance to the Japanese invasion, even though the Kuomintang central government was indirectly responsible for this policy. Afterwards Chiang Kai-shek assigned Zhang and his Northeast Army the duty of suppressing the Red Army of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Shaanximarker after their Long March. This resulted in great casualties for his Northeast Army, and Chiang Kai-shek did not give him any support in manpower and weaponry.

On 12 December 1936 a deeply disgruntled Zhang Xueliang decided to conspire with the CCP and kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek in Xi'anmarker to force an end to the conflict between KMT and CCP. In order to secure the release of Chiang, the KMT was forced to agree to a temporary end to the Chinese Civil War and the forming of a United Front between the CCP and KMT against Japan on 24 December 1936. The cooperation took place with salutary effects for the beleaguered CCP, and they agreed to form the New Fourth Army and the 8th Route Army which were nominally under the command of the National Revolutionary Army. The Red Army of CCP fought in alliance with the KMT forces during the Battle of Taiyuan, and the high point of their cooperation came in 1938 during the Battle of Wuhan.

However, despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich Yangtze Rivermarker Valley in central China, the distrust between the two antagonists was scarcely veiled. The uneasy alliance began to break down by late 1938 as a result of the Communists efforts to aggressively expand their military strength through absorbing Chinese guerrilla forces behind enemy lines. For Chinese militia who refuse to switch their allegiance, the CCP would call them "collaborators" and then attack to eliminate their forces. For example, the Red Army led by He Long attacked and wiped out a brigade of Chinese militia led by Zhang Yin-wu in Hebeimarker in June, 1939. Starting in 1940, open conflicts between the Nationalists and Communists became more frequent in the occupied areas outside of Japanese control, culminating in the New Fourth Army Incident in January 1941.

Afterwards, the Second United Front completely broke down and the CCP began to build up their sphere of influence wherever opportunities were presented, mainly through rural mass organizations, administrative, land and tax reform measures favoring poor peasants; while the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Communist influence by military blockade of areas controlled by CCP and fighting the Japanese at the same time

Foreign support for China

See also: Motives of the Second Sino-Japanese War

At the outbreak of full scale war, many global powers were reluctant to provide support to China; because in their opinion the Chinese would eventually lose the war, and they did not wish to antagonize the Japanese who might, in turn, eye their colonial possessions in the region. They expected any support given to Kuomintang might worsen their own relationship with the Japanese, who taunted the Kuomintang with the prospect of conquest within three months. However, Germany and the Soviet Unionmarker did provide support to the Chinese before the war escalated to the Asian theatre of World War II, with USA and other allies lending support to China afterwards.

German support

Prior to the outbreak of the war, Germany and China had close economic and military cooperation, with Germany helping China modernize its industry and military in exchange for raw materials. More than half of the German arms exports during its rearmament period were to China. Nevertheless the proposed 30 new divisions equipped and trained with German assistance did not materialize when Germany withdrew its support in 1938, because Adolf Hitler wanted to form an alliance with Japan against the Soviet Union.

Soviet support

With the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan, the Soviet Union wished to keep China in the war to hinder the Japanese from invading Siberiamarker, thus saving itself from the threat of a two front war. In September 1937, the Soviet leadership signed the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, began aiding China, and approved Operation Zet, a Soviet volunteer air force. As part of the secret operation, Soviet technicians upgraded and handled some of the Chinese war-supply transport. Bombers, fighters, military supplies and advisors arrived, including Soviet general Vasily Chuikov, later to become victor at the Battle of Stalingradmarker. Prior to the entrance of Western allies, the Soviet Union provided the largest amount of foreign aid to China, totalling some $250 million of credits in munitions and supplies. In 1941, Soviet aid ended as a result of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. This pact enabled the Soviet Union to avoid fighting against Germany and Japan at the same time. 3,665 Soviet advisors and pilots fought for the Chinese side In total, 227 Soviets died fighting for China.

Allies' support

Flying Tigers Commander Claire Chennault

From December 1937 events such as the Japanese attack on the USS Panay and the Nanking Massacre swung public opinion in the West sharply against Japan and increased their fear of Japanese expansion, which prompted the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to provide loan assistance for war supply contracts to Republic of Chinamarker. Furthermore, Australia prevented a Japanese Government-owned company from taking over an iron mine in Australia, and banned iron ore exports in 1938. Japan retaliated by invading and occupying French Indochina in 1940, and successfully blockaded China from the import of arms, fuel and 10,000 tons/month of materials supplied by the Western Allies through the Haiphong-Yunnan Fou railway line.

In mid-1941, the United States government financed the creation of the American Volunteer Group (AVG), or Flying Tigers, to replace the withdrawal of Soviet volunteers and aircraft. Led by Claire Chennault, their early combat success of 300 kills against a loss of 12 of their shark painted P-40 fighters earned them wide recognition at the time when Allies were suffering heavy losses, and soon afterwards their dogfighting tactics would be adopted by US Air Force. Furthermore, in order to pressure the Japanese to end all hostilities in China, the United States, Britain and the Netherlands East Indiesmarker began oil and/or steel embargos against Japan. The loss of oil imports made it impossible for Japan to continue operations in China. This set the stage for Japan to launch a series of military attacks against the western Allies when the Imperial Navy raided Pearl Harbormarker on December 7, 1941.

Entrance of Western Allies

Within a few days of the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the United States and China officially declared war against Japan, and right afterwards the National Revolutionary Army achieved another decisive victory against the Japanese army in Changsha, which earned the Chinese government much prestige from the Allies. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt referred to the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China as the world's "Four Policemen", elevating the international status of China to an unprecedented height after a century of humiliation at the hands of various imperialist powers.

Chiang Kai-shek continued to receive supplies from the United States as the Chinese conflict was merged into the Asian theatre of World War II. However, in contrast to the Arctic supply route to the Soviet Union that stayed open most of the war, sea routes to China and the Sino-Vietnamese Railway had been closed since 1940. Therefore between the closing of the Burma Road in 1942 and its re-opening as the Ledo Roadmarker in 1945, foreign aid was largely limited to what could be flown in over The Hump. Most of China's own industry had already been captured or destroyed by Japan, and the Soviet Union refused to allow the U.S. to supply China through Kazakhstanmarker into Xinjiang because Xinjiang warlord Sheng Shicai turned anti-Soviet in 1942 with Chiang's approval. For these reasons, the Chinese government never had the supplies and equipment needed to mount any major counter-offensive. But despite the severe shortage of materiel, in 1943 the Chinese was successful in repelling major Japanese offensives in Hubei and Changde.

Chiang was appointed Allied Commander-in-Chief in the China theater in 1942, while U.S. General Joseph Stilwell served for a time as Chiang's Chief of Staff, and at the same time commanding US forces in the China Burma India Theater. However, relations between Stilwell and Chiang soon broke down for many reasons. Many historians (such as Barbara Tuchman) suggested it was largely due to the corruption and inefficiency of the KMT government. However, other historians (such as Ray Huang) found that it was a more complicated situation. Stilwell had a strong desire to assume total control of Chinese troops, which Chiang vehemently opposed. Stilwell also did not appreciate the complexity of the situation, including the buildup of the Chinese Communists during the war (essentially Chiang had to fight a multi-front war - the Japanese on one side, the Communists on the other). Stilwell openly criticized the Chinese government's conduct of the war in the American media, and to President Roosevelt. Chiang continued to maintain a defensive posture despite pleads from the other Allies to actively break the Japanese blockade, because China had already suffered tens of millions of war casualties and believed that Japan would eventually capitulate to America's overwhelming industrial output. Due to these reasons the other Allies gradually began to lose confidence in the Chinese ability to conduct offensive operations from the Asian mainland, and instead concentrated their efforts against the Japanese in the Pacific Ocean Areas and South West Pacific Area, employing an island hopping strategy.

Conflicts among China, the United States, and the United Kingdom also emerged in the Pacific war. Winston Churchill was reluctant to devote British troops, the majority of whom were defeated by the Japanese in earlier campaigns, to reopen the Burma Road. On the other hand, Stilwell believed that the reopening of the Burma Road was vital to China as all the ports on mainland China were under Japanese control. Churchill's "Europe First" policy obviously did not sit well with Chiang, while the later British insistence that China send in more and more troops into Indochina in the Burma Campaign was suspected by Chiang as an attempt by Great Britain to use Chinese manpower to defend Britain's colonial holdings and prevent the gate to India from falling to Japan. Chiang also believed that China should divert their crack army divisions from Burma to eastern China to defend the airbases of the American bombers and defeat the IJA through bombing, a strategy that U.S. General Claire Chennault supported but Stilwell strongly opposed. In addition, Chiang voiced his support of Indian independence in a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi in 1942, which further soured the relationship between China and the United Kingdom.

The United States saw the Chinese theater as a means to tie up a large number of Japanese troops, as well as being a location for American airbases from which to strike the Japanese home islands. In 1944, as the Japanese position in the Pacific was deteriorating fast, the Imperial Japanese Army mobilized over 400,000 men and launched their largest offensive in World War II to attack the U.S. airbases in China and link up the railway between Manchuria and Vietnam. This brought major cities in Hunanmarker, Henanmarker, and Guangxi under Japanese occupation. The failure of the Chinese forces to defend these areas encouraged Stilwell to attempt to gain command of the entire Chinese army, and his subsequent showdown with Chiang that led to his replacement by Major General Albert Wedemeyer.

However, by the end of 1944 Chinese troops under the command of Sun Li-jen attacking from India and those under the command of Wei Lihuang attacking from Yunnanmarker joined forces in Mong-Yu, which succeeded in driving out the Japanese in North Burma to secure the Ledo Roadmarker, a supply route to China. In Spring 1945 the Chinese launched offensives and retook Hunan and Guangxi. With the Chinese army well in progress training and equipping, Wedemeyer planned to launch Operation Carbonado in summer 1945 to retake Guangdongmarker, obtaining a coastal port, and from there drive northwards toward Shanghai. But the dropping of the atomic bombs hastened Japanese surrender and these plans were not put into action.

Conclusion and aftermath

End of Pacific War and surrender of Japanese troops in China

On August 6, an American B-29 bomber dropped the first atomic bomb used in combat on Hiroshima. On August 9, the Soviet Union renounced its non-aggression pact with Japan and attacked the Japanese in Manchuria, fulfilling its Yalta Conferencemarker pledge to attack the Japanese within three months after the end of the war in Europe. The attack was made by three Soviet army groups.

Japanese soldiers giving themselves up to the Soviet Red Army.

In less than two weeks the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, consisting of over a million men but lacking in adequate armor, artillery, or air support, and depleted of many of its best soldiers by the demands of the Allies' Pacific drive, had been destroyed by the Soviets. On August 9, a second atomic bomb was dropped by the United States on Nagasaki. Emperor Hirohito officially capitulated to the Allies on August 15, 1945, and the official surrender was signed aboard the battleship USS Missourimarker on September 2.

Japanese troops surrendering to the Chinese.

After Allied victory in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur ordered all Japanese forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French Indo-China north of 16° north latitude to surrender to Chiang Kai-shek, and the Japanese troops in China formally surrendered on September 9, 1945.

Post war struggle and resumption of civil war

In 1945 the nation of China emerged from the war nominally a great military power but economically weak and on the verge of all-out civil war. The economy was sapped by the military demands of a long costly war and internal strife, by spiraling inflation, and by corruption in the Nationalist government that included profiteering, speculation, and hoarding. Large swathes of the prime farming areas had been ravaged by the fighting and there was starvation in the wake of the war. Many towns and cities were destroyed, and millions were rendered homeless by floods.

The problems of rehbailitation and reconstruction from the ravages of a protracted war were staggering, and the war left the Nationalists severely weakened and their policies left them unpopular. Meanwhile the war strengthened the Communists, both in popularity and as a viable fighting force. At Yan'anmarker and elsewhere in the liberated areas, Mao Zedong was able to adapt Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by living and working with them, eating their food, and thinking their thoughts. However, when this failed, more repressive forms of coercion, indoctrination and ostracization were also employed. The Red Army fostered an image of conducting guerrilla warfare in defense of the people. Communist troops adapted to changing wartime conditions and became a seasoned fighting force. Mao also began preparing for the establishment of a new China, well away from the front at his base in Yan'an.

In 1940 Mao outlined the program of the Chinese Communists for an eventual seizure of power and began his final push for consolidation of CCP power under his authority. His teachings became the central tenets of the CCP doctrine that came to be formalized as "Mao Zedong Thought". With skillful organizational and propaganda work, the Communists increased party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945.

Although ROC representatives had not been present at Yalta, they had been consulted, and had agreed to have the Soviets enter the war in the belief that the Soviet Union would deal only with the Nationalist government. After the war, the Soviet Union, as part of the Yalta agreement allowing a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria, dismantled and removed more than half of the industrial equipment left there by the Japanese before handing over Manchuria to ROC. The Soviet occupation of Manchuria was long enough to allow the Communists to move in and arm themselves with the equipment surrendered by the withdrawing Japanese army. The Soviet occupation also allowed the Communists to quickly establish control in the countryside and moved into position to encircle the ROC government army in major cities of northeast China. Soon, all out war broke out between the KMT and CCP, a war that would leave the Nationalists banished to Taiwanmarker and the Communists victorious in mainland China.

Peace Treaty and Taiwan

The Taiwan Strait and the Island of Taiwan.
Taiwanmarker and Penghu Islands were sovereign territories of Japan put under the administrative control of the Republic of China government in 1945 by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration . But due to the unresolved Chinese Civil War neither the newly established People's Republic of China in the mainland nor Republic of China that retreated to Taiwan was invited to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, as neither had shown full and complete legal capacity in entering into an international legally binding agreement.. Since China was not present, the Japanese only formally renounced the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan and Penghu islands without specifying to which country Japan relinquished the sovereignty, and the treaty was signed in 1951 and came into force in 1952.

In 1952, the Treaty of Taipei was signed separately between the Republic of China and Japan that basically followed the same guideline of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, not specifying which country has sovereignty over Taiwan and made the sovereign status of Taiwan unresolved. However, Article 10 of the treaty states that the Taiwanese people and the juridical person should be the people and the juridical person of the ROC.Academica Sinica research associate Huang Tzu-Chin believes that the treaty allowed the ROC government to implement effective administrative control of Taiwan even without the sovereignty issue being settled. Huang further argues that Japan has consistently regarded Taiwan sovereignty as having passed to the ROC government and thus constitutes the legitimacy of the transfer of Taiwanese sovereignty by the Treaty of Taipei.. Huang's view is in contrast to the comment made by Makoto Saito, Japanese envoy to Taipei, who referred to Taiwan's international status as "unresolved" in May 2009. Saito later retracted his statement claiming it is different than the official position of Japanese government, which is to avoid commenting on Taiwan's status, maintains that Japan renounced all claims to sovereignty over its former colonial possessions after World War II, including Taiwan.


The question as to which political group directed the Chinese war effort and exerted most of the effort to resist the Japanese remains a controversial issue.

In the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan Memorial near the Marco Polo Bridge and in mainland Chinese textbooks, the People's Republic of China (PRC) claims that the Nationalists mostly avoided fighting the Japanese in order to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Communists, while the CCP was the main military force in the Chinese resistance efforts against the Japanese invasion. Recently, however, with a change in the political climate, the CCP has admitted that certain Nationalist generals made important contributions in resisting the Japanese. The official history in mainland China now states that the KMT fought a bloody, yet indecisive, frontal war against Japan, while the CCP engaged the Japanese forces in far greater numbers behind enemy lines. For the sake of Chinese reunification and appeasing the ROC on Taiwan, the PRC has begun to "acknowledge" the Nationalists and the Communists as "equal" contributors, because the victory over Japan belonged to the Chinese people, rather than to any political party.

Leaving aside Nationalists sources, scholars researching third party Japanese and Soviet sources have documented quite a different view. Such studies claim that the Communists actually played a minuscule involvement in the war against the Japanese compared to the Nationalists, and used guerrilla warfare as well as opium sales to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Kuomintang. This is congruent with the Nationalist viewpoint, as demonstrated by history textbooks published in Taiwan, which gives the KMT credit for the brunt of the fighting. According to these third-party scholars, the Communists were not the main participants in any of the 22 major battles between China and Japan, most involving more than 100,000 troops on both sides. Peter Vladimirov, the Soviet liaison to the Chinese Communists documented that he never once found the Chinese Communists and Japanese engaged in battle during the period from 1942 to 1945. He also expressed frustration at not being allowed by the Chinese Communists to visit the frontline, although as a foreign diplomat Vladimirov may have been overly optimistic to expect to be allowed to join Chinese guerrilla sorties. The Communists usually avoided open warfare (the Hundred Regiments Campaign and the Battle of Pingxingguan are notable exceptions), preferring to fight in small squads to harass the Japanese supply lines. In comparison, right from the beginning of the war the Nationalists committed their best troops (including the 36th, 87th, 88th divisions, the crack divisions of Chiang's Central Army) to defend Shanghai from the Japanese. The Japanese considered the Kuomintang rather than the Communists as their main enemy and bombed the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing to the point that it was the most heavily bombed city in the world to date. The KMT army suffered some 3.2 million casualties while the CCP increased its military strength from minimally significant numbers to 1.7 million men. This change in strength was a direct result of Japanese forces fighting mainly in Central and Southern China, away from major Communist strongholds such as those in Shaanxi

Mao Zedong quotations

After the breakdown of the united front with KMT, Mao issued this order to all party members of CCP:

In 1972, when PRCmarker and Japan established formal diplomatic relationship, Mao Zedong met the then Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei. When Tanaka personally apologized to Mao for invading China, Mao responded:

CCP Central Commitee 1931.9.20 Manifesto

On 20 September 1931, two days after Imperial Japanese Army invaded Manchuria, CCP Central Commitee issued a manifesto:

  • This KMT warlord regime, acting as the protector of Imperilist who is suppressing and slaughtering Chinese people, we should all begin to take action, to put dowm KMT, to destroy their deceptive Peacefull Reform.

CCP Central Commitee 1931.9.31 Manifesto

On 31 September 1931, two weeks after Imperial Japanese Army invaded Manchuria, CCP Central Commitee issued a manifesto, one of the sentence:

  • This incident, that the Japan had invaded Manchuria, would not slow down the Chinese Communist Party's attack towards KMT regime, on the contrary, just because of it(Japan invaded Mancuria), Chinese Communist Party would double it's effort, would work harder to overthrow this KMT China regime, which is the tool of imperilism. s:zh:中国共产党为日帝国主义强占东三省第二次宣言

While the PRC government has been accused of greatly exaggerating the CCP's role in fighting the Japanese, the legacy of the war is more complicated in the Republic of Chinamarker on Taiwan. Traditionally, the government has held celebrations marking the Victory Day on September 9 (now known as Armed Forces Day), and Taiwan's Retrocession Day on October 25. However, with the power transfer from KMT to the pro-Taiwan independence Democratic Progressive Party in 2000 and the rise of desinicization, events commemorating the war have become less commonplace. Many supporters of Taiwan independence see no relevance in preserving the memory of the war of resistance that happened primarily on mainland China. Some 120,000 Taiwanese even volunteered for or were drafted into the IJA. Still, many KMT supporters, particularly veterans who retreated with the government in 1949, still have an emotional interest in the war. For example, in celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the end of war in 2005, the cultural bureau of KMT stronghold Taipeimarker held a series of talks in the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hallmarker regarding the war and post-war developments, while the KMT held its own exhibit in the KMT headquarters. In 2008 KMT won the presidential election, which will impact the government position once more.

To this day the war is a major point of contention between China and Japan. The war remains a major roadblock for Sino-Japanese relations, and many people, particularly in China, harbour grudges over the war and related issues. A small but vocal group of Japanese nationalists and/or right-wingers deny a variety of crimes attributed to Japan. The Japanese invasion of its neighbours is often glorified or whitewashed, and wartime atrocities, most notably the Nanjing Massacre, comfort women, and Unit 731, are frequently denied by such individuals. The Japanese government has also been accused of historical revisionism by allowing the approval of school textbooks omitting or glossing over Japan's militant past. In response to criticism of Japanese textbook revisionism, the PRC government has been accused of using the war to stir up already growing anti-Japanese feelings in order to whip up nationalistic sentiments and divert its citizens' minds from internal matters.

Casualties assessment

The conflict lasted for 8 years, 1 month, and 3 days (measured from 1937 to 1945).

Chinese casualties

  • The Kuomintang fought in 22 major engagements, most of which involved more than 100,000 troops on both sides, 1,171 minor engagements most of which involved more than 50,000 troops on both sides, and 38,931 skirmishes.
  • The Chinese casualties were 3.22 million soldiers, 9.13 million civilians who were collateral damage, and another 8.4 million were non-military casualties. According to historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta, at least 2.7 million civilians died during the "kill all, loot all, burn all" operation (Three Alls Policy, or sanko sakusen) implemented in May 1942 in North China by general Yasuji Okamura and authorized on 3 December 1941 by Imperial Headquarter Order number 575.
Chinese sources list the total number of military and non-military casualties, both dead and wounded, at 35 million. Most Western historians believed that the total number of casualties was at least 20 million. The property loss suffered by the Chinese was valued at 383 billion US dollars according to the currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times the GDP of Japan at that time (US$7.7 billion).
  • In addition, the war created 95 million refugees.

Japanese casualties

The Japanese recorded around 1.1 to 1.9 million military casualties (which include killed, wounded and missing). The official death-toll according to the Japan Defense Ministry is 480,000 men, which some historians claim, is an understatement, due to the length of the war. The combined Chinese forces claimed to have killed at least 1.77 million Japanese soldiers during the eight-year war.

Number of troops involved

National Revolutionary Army

The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) throughout its lifespan employed approximately 4,300,000 regulars, in 370 Standard Divisions ( ), 46 New Divisions ( ), 12 Cavalry Divisions ( ), 8 New Cavalry Divisions ( ), 66 Temporary Divisions ( ), and 13 Reserve Divisions ( ), for a grand total of 515 divisions. However, many divisions were formed from two or more other divisions, and many were not active at the same time. The number of active divisions, at the start of the war in 1937, was about 170 NRA divisions. The average NRA division had 4,000–5,000 troops. A Chinese army was roughly the equivalent to a Japanese division in terms of manpower but the Chinese forces largely lacked artillery, heavy weapons, and motorized transport. The shortage of military hardware meant that three to four Chinese armies had the firepower of only one Japanese division. Because of these material constraints, available artillery and heavy weapons were usually assigned to specialist brigades rather than to the general division, which caused more problems as the Chinese command structure lacked precise coordination. The relative fighting strength of a Chinese division was even weaker when relative capacity in aspects of warfare, such as intelligence, logistics, communications, and medical services, are taken into account.The National Revolutionary Army can be divided roughly into two groups. The first one is the so-called dixi ( , "direct descent") group, which comprised divisions trained by the Whampoa Military Academymarker and loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, and can be considered the Central Army ( ) of the NRA. The second group is known as the zapai ( , "miscellaneous units"), and comprised all divisions led by non-Whampoa commanders, and is more often known as the Regional Army or the Provincial Army ( ). Even though both military groups were part of the National Revolutionary Army, their distinction lies much in their allegiance to the central government of Chiang Kai-shek. Many former warlords and regional militarists were incorporated into the NRA under the flag of the Kuomintang, but in reality they retained much independence from the central government. They also controlled much of the military strength of China, the most notable of them being the Guangxi, Shanxi, Yunnan and Ma Cliques.

Communist Chinese Forces

Although during the war the Chinese Communist forces fought as a nominal part of the NRA, the number of those on the CCP side, due to their guerrilla status, is difficult to determine, though estimates place the total number of the Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, and irregulars in the Communist armies at 1,300,000.

For more information of combat effectiveness of communist armies and other units of Chinese forces see Chinese armies in the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Imperial Japanese Army

  • The IJA had approximately 3,200,000 regulars. More Japanese troops were quartered in China than deployed elsewhere in the Pacific Theater during the war. Japanese divisions ranged from 20,000 men in its divisions numbered less than 100, to 10,000 men in divisions numbered greater than 100. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attackmarker, the IJA had 51 divisions of which 35 were in China, and 39 independent brigades of which all but one were in China. This represented roughly 80% of the IJA's manpower.

Chinese and Japanese equipment

National Revolutionary Army

The Central Army possessed 80 Army infantry divisions with approximately 8,000 men each, nine independent brigades, nine cavalry divisions, two artillery brigades, 16 artillery regiments and three armored battalions. The Chinese Navy displaced only 59,000 tonnes and the Chinese Air Force comprised only about 700 obsolete aircraft.

Chinese weapons were mainly produced in the Hanyang and Guangdongmarker arsenals. However, for most of the German-trained divisions, the standard firearms were German-made 7.92 mm Gewehr 98 and Karabiner 98k. A local variant of the 98k style rifles were often called the "Chiang Kai-shek rifle" a Chinese copy from the Mauser Standard Modell. Another rifle they used was Hanyang 88. The standard light machine gun was a local copy of the Czechmarker 7.92 mm Brno ZB26. There were also Belgian and French LMGs. Surprisingly, the NRA did not purchase any of the famous Maschinengewehr 34s from Germany, but did produce their own copies of them. On average in these divisions, there was one machine gun set for each platoon. Heavy machine guns were mainly locally-made Type 1924 water-cooled Maxim guns, from German blueprints. On average every battalion would get one HMG. The standard sidearm was the 7.63 mm Mauser M1932 semi-automatic pistol

Some divisions were equipped with 37 mm PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns, and/or mortar from Oerlikon, Madsen, and Solothurnmarker. Each infantry division had 6 French Brandt 81 mm mortars and 6 Solothurn 20 mm autocannons. Some independent brigades and artillery regiments were equipped with Bofors 72 mm L/14, or Krupp 72 mm L/29 mountain guns. They were 24 Rheinmetall 150 mm L/32 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1934) and 24 Krupp 150 mm L/30 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1936).

Infantry uniforms were basically redesigned Zhongshan suits. Leg wrappings are standard for soldiers and officers alike since the primary mode of movement for NRA troops was by foot. The helmets were the most distinguishing characteristic of these divisions. From the moment German M35 helmets (standard issue for the Wehrmacht until late in the European theatre) rolled off the production lines in 1935, and until 1936, the NRA imported 315,000 of these helmets, each with the 12-ray sun emblem of the ROC on the sides. Other equipment included cloth shoes for soldiers, leather shoes for officers and leather boots for high-ranking officers. Every soldier was issued ammunition, ammunition pouch/harness, a water flask, combat knives, food bag, and a gas mask.

On the other hand, warlord forces varied greatly in terms of equipment and training. Some warlord troops were notoriously under-equipped, such as Shanxi's Dadao (大刀, a one-bladed sword type close combat weapon) Team and the Yunnanese army.Some however were highly professional forces with their own air force and navies. The quality of Guangxi army was almost on par with the Central Army, as the Guangzhoumarker region was wealthy and the local army could afford foreign instructors and arms. The Muslim Ma clique to the Northwest was famed for its well-trained cavalry divisions.

Imperial Japanese Army

Although Imperial Japan possessed significant mobile operational capacity, it did not possess capability for maintaining a long sustained war. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War the Japanese Army comprised 17 divisions, each composed of approximately 22,000 men, 5,800 horses, 9,500 rifles and submachine guns, 600 heavy machine guns of assorted types, 108 artillery pieces, and 600 plus of light armor 2-men tanks. Special forces were also available. The Japanese Navy displaced a total of 1,900,000 tonnes, ranking third in the world, and possessed 2,700 aircraft at the time. Each Japanese division was the equivalent in fighting strength of four Chinese regular divisions (at the beginning of Battle of Shanghai ).

Major figures

China: Nationalist

China: Communist

Foreign personnel on Chinese side

Japan: Imperial Japanese Army

Japan: Puppet governments

Military engagements of the Second Sino-Japanese War


Battles with articles. Flag shows victorious side in each engagement. Date shows beginning date except for the 1942 battle of Changsha, which began in Dec. 1941.

Aerial engagements

Japanese invasions and operations

Japanese political and military incidents

See List of Japanese political and military incidents

Internet video

See also


  1. Bix, Herbert P. "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and the Problem of War Responsibility", Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2. (Summer, 1992), pp. 295–363.
  2. China didn't declare a war on Japan de jure until December 1941, for fear of alienating the Western powers in Asia. Once Japan broadened the conflict, China was released of this binding, and was free to officially declare war on Japan.
  3. Wilson, Dick, When Tigers Fight: The story of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945, p.5
  4. Wilson, Dick, p.4
  5. Hoyt, Edwin P., Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict, p.45
  6. Palmer and Colton, A History of Modern World, p.725
  7. Taylor, Jay, p.33
  8. Taylor, Jay, p.57
  9. Taylor, Jay, p.79, p.82
  10. Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, vol.1, p.121
  11. Taylor, Jay, p.83
  12. Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the making of modern Japan, 2001, p.364
  13. Fu Jing-hui, An Introduction of Chinese and Foreign History of War, 2003, p.109 - 111
  14. Ray Huang, Chiang Kai-shek Diary from a Macro History Perspective, 1994, p.168
  15. Y. Yoshimi and S. Matsuno, Dokugasusen Kankei Shiryō II (Materials on poison gas warfare), Kaisetsu, Hōkan 2, Jugonen Sensō Gokuhi Shiryōshu, 1997, p.27-29
  16. Yoshimi and Matsuno, idem, Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 2001, p.360-364
  17. Japan triggered bubonic plague outbreak, doctor claims, [1],, A time-line of World War II, Scaruffi Piero. Prince Tsuneyoshi Takeda and Prince Mikasa received a special screening by Shirō Ishii of a film showing imperial planes loading germ bombs for bubonic dissemination over Ningbo in 1940. (Daniel Barenblatt, A Plague upon Humanity, 2004, p.32.) All these weapons were experimented with on humans before being used in the field.
  18. Daniel Barenblatt, A Plague upon Humanity, 2004, pages 220–221.
  19. Ray Huang, 1994, p.259
  20. Taylor, Jay, The Generalissimo, p.156.
  22. "Memorandum by Mr J. McEwen, Minister for External Affairs 10 May 1940"
  23. Ray Huang, 1994, p.300
  24. Ray Huang, 1994, p.299
  25. Ray Huang, 1994, p.420
  26. [2]UNHCR
  27. name="" [3]Disputes over Taiwan Sovereignty and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty Since World War II
  28. [4] Disputes over Taiwan Sovereignty and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty Since World War II
  29. [5] FOCUS: Taiwan-Japan ties back on shaky ground as Taipei snubs Tokyo envoy
  31. Chang and Ming, July 12, 2005, pg. 8; and Chang and Halliday, pg. 233, 246, 286–287
  32. Chang and Ming, July 12, 2005
  33. Chang and Halliday, pg. 231
  34. Chang and Halliday, pg. 232
  35. Himeta, Sankô sakusen towa nan dataka-Chûgokujin no mita Nihon no sensô, Iwanami Bukuretto 1996, p.43.
  36. Remember role in ending fascist war
  37. Nuclear Power: The End of the War Against Japan
  38. Ho Ying-chin, Who Actually Fought the Sino-Japanese War 1937–1945? 1978
  39. Jowett, Phillip, Rays of the Rising Sun, pg.130-133.


  • - Book about the Chinese and Mongolians who fought for the Japanese during the war.

  • Zarrow, Peter. "The War of Resistance, 1937-45". China in war and revolution 1895-1949. London: Routledge, 2005.

External links

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