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The sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse was a World War II naval engagement which illustrated the effectiveness of aerial attacks against naval forces that were not protected by air cover and the resulting importance of including an aircraft carrier in any major fleet action.

The action took place east of Malaya, near Kuantanmarker, Pahangmarker where the British battleship HMS Prince of Wales and battlecruiser HMS Repulse were attacked by land-based bombers and torpedo bombers of the Imperial Japanese Navy on 10 December 1941.

The objective of Force Z, which consisted of one battleship, one battlecruiser and four destroyers, was to intercept the Japanese invasion fleet north of Malaya. The fleet, however, was without any air support, having been turned down by Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. Although the British had close encounters with a few combatant vessels, they failed to find and destroy the main convoy. They were then heavily attacked and sunk by long-range medium bombers while attempting to return to Singapore.

The sinking of the two ships virtually annhilated the Eastern Fleet in Singapore. The remaining ships played no further part in the campaign as they were withdrawn to Javamarker soon after. The Japanese convoy was never confronted again in any major action following the sinkings until Singapore fell.

Background

Both ships were sent to Singaporemarker in December 1941, to serve as a deterrent to Japanmarker aggression, which had been demonstrated in the invasion of French Indochina. First Sea Lord Sir Dudley Pound felt Singapore could not be adequately defended, unless the Royal Navy sent the majority of its capital ships there, to achieve parity with the estimated nine Japanese battleships. That was unacceptable as the British were at war with Germany and Italy. However, Prime Minister Winston Churchill was optimistic about the improving situation in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean and allocating three ships (including a carrier) to the colony's defence was seen as a vital compromise given the British need to protect its various colonial territories in Malaya, Borneomarker and the Straits Settlementsmarker. Churchill's "considerable ignorance" and "exaggerated belief in the power of the battleship", along with "a tendency to interfere in naval matters", led him to propose a squadron of three modern ships: one battleship (such as King George V or Prince of Wales) and one carrier (such as Formidable), in addition to Repulse, already bound for the Indian Ocean. His belief this small number could act as a variety of "fleet in being" and deterrent on Japanese action, as Tirpitzmarker was in the North Sea; there was, however, no firm plan for such a task. The original British proposal had called for including the new Illustrious-class aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable for air cover, although the plan had to be revised when Indomitable was damaged working up in the Caribbean Sea.

While Churchill may be seen as making a futile and costly gesture, the dispatch of capital ships to Singapore had been part of the Admiralty's strategic planning since the naval base was established. The scale of this deployment had been reduced during the 1930s, as Germany and Italy presented new threats to British interests in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Nevertheless, it was still assumed that a significant force of capital ships would deter Japanese aggression. It must also be noted Churchill's thinking presumed (wrongly) the U.S. Navy would agree to send its Pacific Fleet, including eight battleships, to Singapore in the event that hostilities with Japan broke out, or that the British contribution would add to the U.S. fleet's deterrent value, should it stay at Pearl Harbor. The governments of Australia and New Zealand, who had sent the bulk of their armed forces to the North African campaign, also stressed the importance of Singapore in deterring Japanese aggression. Australian commitment to war in Europe had wavered in 1939 and 1940, and would be severely tested following the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbormarker, Hong Kong, Darwin, and the Kokoda Track, so Churchill's effort, while militarily foolish, may have made good grand strategic (political) sense.

Deployment



What was designated Force G, consisting of the modern battleship Prince of Wales, the World War I era battlecruiser Repulse, and the four destroyers HMS Electra, HMS Express, HMS Encounter, and HMS Jupiter, arrived at Singapore on 2 December 1941. They were then re-designated Force Z. The new carrier, Indomitable was allocated to Force G, but whilst working up off Jamaicamarker she had run aground in the entrance to Kingston harbourmarker on 3 November 1941. Indomitable required 12 days of dry dock repairs in Norfolk, Virginiamarker and was able to take no further part in the action. Indomitable carried only one squadron each of Fairey Fulmar and Hawker Sea Hurricane, which were no match technically for A6M, flown by aircrews whose training and experience (with their misplaced confidence in their ability to dogfight with the Zero) were no match for the Japanese, either; it is probable Indomitable would "have been added to the butcher's bill." On 1 December, it was announced Sir Tom Phillips had been promoted to full Admiral, and appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Fleet. A few days later, Repulse started on a trip to Australia with HMS Vampire, and HMS Tenedos, but the force was recalled to Singapore to assemble for possible operations against the Japanese.

Also at Singapore were the light cruisers HMS Durbanmarker, HMS Danae, HMS Dragon, and HMS Mauritius, and the destroyers HMS Stronghold, Encounter, and Jupiter. The heavy cruiser HMS Exeter, Dutch light cruiser Java, two more British destroyers (Scout and Thanet), and four United States destroyers (Whipple, John D. Edwards, Edsall, and Alden) would be there within three days.

Though Durban and Stronghold were available, Admiral Philips decided to leave them at Singapore because they were not as fast as the other units. Additionally, Danae, Dragon, Mauritius, Encounter, and Jupiter were also at Singapore, but were under repair and not ready to sail.

Japanese preparations

Churchill publicly announced Prince Of Wales and Repulse were to be sent to Singapore as a deterrent to the Japanese. In response, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto sent 36 G4M bombers to reinforce the existing Kanoya Naval Force and Genzan Air Group, whose pilots began training vigorously for an attack on the two capital ships.

Hostilities commence

Early in the morning of 8 December 1941 (local time), Singapore came under attack by Japanese aircraft. Prince Of Wales and Repulse shot back with anti-aircraft fire; no planes were shot down, and the ships sustained no damage. The Japanese made their landings on Malaya on 8 December (local time), and the British land forces were hard pressed.

Around that time, news came in Pearl Harbor had been attacked and eight U.S. battleships had been sunk or disabled. Pre-war planning had presumed (wrongly) the U.S. Pacific Fleet would have moved to Singapore to reinforce the British when war broke out. That was now impossible. Philips had concluded in an earlier discussion with U.S. General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Thomas C. Hart that his two capital ships were of insufficient strength to confront the Japanese. However, with the Japanese threatening to overrun Malaya, Philips was pressed to use his ships in an offensive role and he assembled his flotilla to intercept and destroy Japanese invasion convoys in the South China Seamarker.

Admiral Philips knew the local Royal Air Force unit could not guarantee air cover for his ships as they were equipped with limited numbers of aging fighters (although there was one squadron, RAAF 453 Squadron with Brewster F2A, standing by at Sembawang to provide close cover; given how poor the F2A's performance was, their value is in doubt) and their airfields were threatened by the Japanese land attacks. He elected to proceed anyway because he thought that Japanese forces could not operate so far from land. He also thought that his ships were relatively immune from fatal damage via air attack, since, up to that point, no capital ship at sea had ever been sunk by air attack (the largest vessel sunk to date by aircraft alone was a heavy cruiser); thus, "he was probably half-right in his assessment". Moreover, he was unaware of the quality of Japanese bombing and torpedo aircraft, both vastly superior to RN examples. In addition, like the majority of RN officers, Phillips did not believe Japanese forces were any good.
No. 453 Squadron RAAF was to provide air cover to Force Z, but they were not aware of the position of Force Z, and a radio signal was only sent out (by Repulse) an hour after the Japanese planes attacked. The plan of Flt Lt Vigors to keep six aircraft over him during daylight had been turned down by Phillips. Vigors commented I reckon this must have been the last battle in which the Navy reckoned they could get along without the RAF. A pretty damned costly way of learning. ..... Phillips had known that he was being shadowed the night before, and also at dawn that day. He did not call for air support. He was attacked and still did not call for help. Daytime air cover off the coast was also offered by Clouston of 488 Squadron, but his plan "Operation Mobile" was rejected.

Departure

HMS Prince of Wales leaving Singapore on 8 December 1941


After receiving word of a Japanese convoy bound for Malaya, Force Z, consisting of Prince of Wales, Repulse, Electra, Express, Vampire, and Tenedos, sailed from Singapore at 1710 on 8 December. Phillips hoped to attack off Singoramarker 10 December; had he departed one day sooner, he might have achieved his objective without coming under Japanese air attack at all, for the squadrons responsible had not yet arrived.

At 0713 on 9 December, Force Z passed the Anamba Islands to the east, and turned to a new course of 330 degrees, later changing to 345 degrees. Force Z was overflown by two Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, but not reported, before being spotted by Japanese submarine I-65 at 1400 on 9 December, which shadowed the British ships for five hours, radioing their positions. Phillips was unaware he was being shadowed by the submarine. After this report, Vice Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa, in command of the invasion force, ordered most of his warships to escort the empty transports back to Cam Ranh Baymarker in southern Vietnam.

HMS Repulse leaving Singapore on 8 December 1941


I-65's amplifying report, confirming the presence of British battleships, reached [[Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service|22nd Air Flotilla]] headquarters two hours later. At that time, their aircraft were in the process of loading bombs for an attack on Singapore Harbour, but they immediately switched to torpedoes. The bombers were not ready until 1800 hours. About 1730, just a half hour before sunset, the force was spotted by 3 [[Aichi E13A]] (Jake) seaplanes , which had been catapulted off the Japanese cruisers [[Japanese cruiser Yura|Yura]], [[Japanese cruiser Kinu|Kinu]] and [[Japanese cruiser Kumano|Kumano]] escorting the transports. These aircraft continued shadowing. At about 1830, ''Tenedos'' was detached to return to Singapore, because she was running low on fuel, with instructions to contact Rear Admiral A. F. E. Palliser, detailed to act as liaison to RAF in Malaya,Stephen, p.106. Phillips' intention no longer to attack Singora, while Phillips himself changed course at 1900 toward Singora, to deceive the shadowing aircraft, then south toward Singapore at 1015, when darkness covered him.Stephen, p.106. ''Tenedos'' dutifully reported at 0800, thereby preserving the secrecy of Phillips' position. A night attack was attempted by the Flotilla because they feared that the British battleships would find their invasion force, but bad weather prevented them from finding the ships and they returned to their airfields at [[Thủ Dầu Một]] and [[Saigon]] about midnight. ===Return to Singapore=== That night, one of the Japanese seaplanes dropped a flare over the Japanese heavy cruiser ''[[Japanese cruiser Chōkai|Chōkai]]'', having mistaken her for ''Prince of Wales''. After this, the Japanese force of six cruisers and several destroyers turned away to the northeast. The flare was also seen by the British force, which feared they had been identified and then turned away to the southeast. At this point, the forces were approximately 5 miles (9 km) apart, but did not sight each other, and the Japanese force was not picked up on the radar of the ''Prince Of Wales''. At 2055, Admiral Philips cancelled the operation, saying that they had lost the element of surprise, and ordered the force to return to Singapore. On the way back, they were spotted and reported by the Japanese submarine [[Japanese submarine I-58|''I-58'']]. ''I-58'' reported that it had fired 5 torpedoes and missed, and then lost sight of the force 3 hours later. The British force did not see the torpedoes, and never knew they had been attacked. The report from the ''I-58'' reached the 22nd Air Flotilla Headquarters at 0315, and ten bombers of the Genzan Air Corps were dispatched at 0600 to conduct a sector search for the ships. The Flotilla left their airfields about an hour later, and were ordered to proceed to the best estimated position of the ships. ===The Japanese air attack=== [[Image:H60566.jpg|thumb|top|Japanese aerial photo of the initial attack on ''Prince of Wales'' (top) and ''Repulse''. A short, thick plume of black smoke can be seen emanating from ''Repulse'', which has just been hit by a bomb and surrounded by at least six near misses. ''Prince of Wales'' can be seen to be maneuvering. The white smoke is from the funnels as the ships attempt to increase speed.]] At 0050 next morning, 10 December, Phillips received a report from Palliser of Japanese landings at Kuantan, a town on the east coast of Malaya, halfway between Singapore and [[Kota Bharu]]. Force Z headed in that general direction, without signalling Palliser his intentions (which would have revealed his position).Stephen, p.108. Palliser failed to anticipate this and request air cover from Semabang's F2As.Stephen, p.108. Not until a radio message was sent by ''Repulse'' an hour after the first Japanese attack were RAF aircraft dispatched. At 0515, objects were spotted on the horizon; thinking they were the invasion force, Force Z turned towards them. It turned out to be a trawler towing barges. At 0630, ''Repulse'' reported seeing an aircraft shadowing the ships. At 0718, ''Prince Of Wales'' catapulted off a [[Supermarine Walrus]] reconnaissance aircraft; it flew to Kuantan, saw nothing, reported back to ''Prince of Wales'', and flew to Singapore. ''Express'' was sent to investigate the area, finding nothing. At 1005, ''Tenedos'' reported she was being attacked by Japanese aircraft, about 140 miles southeast of Force Z. The attack was by nine [[Mitsubishi G3M]] 'Nell' twin-engined medium bombers from the [[Genzan Air Corps]], 22nd Air Flotilla, based at [[Saigon]], each armed with one 500 kg (1,100 lb) armor-piercing bomb. They mistook the destroyer for a battleship and wasted their ordnance with no bombs scoring hits. At 1015, more Japanese aircraft spotted the ships, after Force Z failed to find any Japanese invasion forces and was heading back south. At 1113, the fleet was attacked by three waves of Japanese planes, the first being 17 Nell bombers from [[Bihoro Air Corps]], armed with 500 kg (1,100 lb) bombs, as well as eight Nells with two 250 kg (550 lb) bombs. Beside eight near misses by 250 kg (550 lb) bombs,Stephen, p.109. they scored just one hit on the hangar deck area of the ''Repulse'', which started a small fire. She was making 25 kt (46 km/h, 29 mph) again within minutes.Stephen, p.109. Around 1140, the first of 16 Nell torpedo bombers (two squadrons from Genzan Air Corps) arrived and attacked, sending at least six torpedoes into ''Prince of Wales''. The first wave of attackers delivered one catastrophic torpedo hit on her outer port propeller shaft - turning at maximum revolutions, the shaft twisted and breached several compartments as well as rupturing the glands that prevented sea water entering the ship via the broad shaft tunnel. She promptly took in 2,400 tons of water and her speed dropped to 16 kt (30 km/h, 18 mph).Stephen, p.109. Testimony from Lt Wildish,Middlebrook, ''Battleship'', p201 in command of the'B' engine room, indicated the shaft was stopped successfully, but upon restarting the shaft, water rushed in through the damaged shaft passage, flooding the engine room. Also flooded from this hit, and the subsequent shaft passage flooding, was 'Y' boiler room, the central auxiliary machinery room, 'Y' action machinery room, the port diesel dynamo room, and a number of compartments aft. [[Image:Escaping_from_Prince_of_Wales.jpg|thumb|left|The crew of the sinking ''Prince of Wales'' abandoning ship to the destroyer ''Express''. Moments later the list on ''Prince of Wales'' suddenly increased and ''Express'' had to withdraw. Observe the barrels of the 5.25 in guns, which were unable to depress low enough to engage attackers due to the list.]] This single torpedo hit had three crippling effects. First, it caused a 11.5 degree list to port,Stephen, p.109. meaning starboard 5.25-inch [[Anti-aircraft warfare|anti-aircraft]] turrets were unable to depress low enough to engage the attackers. Furthermore, power to ''Prince of Wales''' aftStephen, p.109. 5.25 inch dual-purpose turrets was cut, leaving her unable to counter further attacks. Power loss to her pumps meant an inability to pump flood water faster than it was entering the breached hull. Second, it denied her much of her auxiliary electrical power, vital for internal communications, ventilation, steering gear, and pumps, and for training and elevation of the 5.25-inch and 2-pounder gun mounts. All but S1 and S2 5.25 inch turrets were almost unmanageable, a factor compounded by the list, rendering their crews unable even to drag them round manually using chains. The crews also had difficulty bringing the heavy 2-pounder mountings into manual operation. Third, the extensive internal flooding and shaft damage left the ship under power of only the starboard engines and able to make only 15 knots at best, and with her electric steering unresponsive the ship was virtually unmanageable. ''Prince of Wales'' was still able to fire at a high level bombing attack with S1 and S2 turrets at 1241 hours, the bombs straddling her but not penetrating the deck armour. One bomb fell amongst the wounded gathered in her hangar causing extensive casualties. HMS ''Express'' came alongside to take off wounded and non-fighting crew. The order to abandon ship was then given and ''Prince of Wales'' rolled over to port and sank at 1318; she scraped ''Express'', lying close alongside taking off survivors, and very nearly took the destroyer with her.Stephen, p.114. [[File:Prince of Wales sinking.jpg|thumb|''Prince of Wales'' listing heavily after the attack.]] Another high-altitude attack by bombers aimed at the ''Repulse'' passed without damage. Then a second attack by eight torpedo bombers from the Mihoro Air Corps attacked ''Repulse'' from two directions, but she avoided all the torpedoes "brilliantly"Stephen, p.109. and continued to steam. The third and final attack by 26 Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' torpedo bombers from the [[Kanoya Air Corps]], a detachment from the 21st Air Flotilla also based near Saigon, struck from several directions. ''Repulse'', which had dodged 19 torpedoes so far, was caught between two Japanese torpedo attacks and hit by at least two (and possibly four) torpedoes, the first jamming her rudderSurvey report compiled after Expedition 'Job 74', May 2007 p5. However, the ''Repulse'' did not have the [[Anti-torpedo bulge|anti-torpedo blisters]] her sister [[HMS Renown (1916)|''Renown'']] had received, and also did not have a modern battleship's internal waterproof compartmentalisation and subdivision. She was hit heavily and suddenly and Captain Tennant ordered the crew overboard; ''Repulse'' listed heavily to port over a period of about six minutes and finally rolled over and sank at 1223 with heavy casualties. The Japanese had achieved 6, possibly 8 hits Survey report compiled after Expedition 'Job 74', May 2007, pages 5 - 7out of 49 torpedoes launched, while losing three aircraft during the attack itself (one Nell torpedo bomber from the Genzan Air Group and two Betty torpedo bombers from the Kanoya Air Group) and a fourth plane was so badly damaged it crashed on landing. A recent survey of the two wrecks confirmed that there were only four hits on the ''Prince of Wales'', and 2 confirmed and two possible hits on ''Repulse''. The Explorer's Club "Job 74" underwater survey was completed on June 11, 2007 (see external link section). The air cover assigned to Force Z, four F2AsStephen, p.114. of the Australian [[No. 453 Squadron RAAF|No. 453 Squadron]], arrived over the battlefield at 1318,Stephen, p.114. just as ''Prince of Wales'' sank. They caught a Japanese bomber which stayed behind to observe the sinking, but it managed to escape as they gave chase.[http://www.forcez-survivors.org.uk/pilot.html Pilots eye view] ===After the action=== Destroyers ''Electra'' and ''Vampire'' moved in to rescue survivors of ''Repulse'', while ''Express'' rescued survivors of the ''Prince Of Wales''. 840 sailors were lost, 513 in ''Repulse'' and 327 in ''Prince Of Wales''. After they were rescued, some survivors of the ''Repulse'' manned [[action stations]] in ''Electra'', to free ''Electra'' sailors to rescue more survivors. In particular, ''Repulse'' gunners manned 'X' and 'Y' 4.7-inch (120 mm) mounts, and ''Repulse'''s dentist assisted ''Electra'''s medical teams with the wounded. In total, nearly 1,000 survivors of Repulse were rescued, of which Electra saved 571. Vampire picked up 9 officers, 213 ratings, and 1 civilian war correspondent from Repulse, and 2 sailors from Prince Of Wales.

Admiral Phillips and Captain John Leach, commanding Prince Of Wales, were among the lost. Captain William G. Tennant of Repulse was rescued by Vampire. The senior survivor of Prince Of Wales was Lt Cdr A. G. Skipwith, the ship's First Lieutenant, who was rescued by Express.

London Gazette report by Flt Lt Vigors:

The next day, Lt Haruki Iki flew to the site of the battle again. He dropped two wreaths of flowers into the sea. One was for the fellow members of his Kanoya Air Corps who perished at the hands of British gunfire and the other for the British sailors who died in the battle. This was because their display of bravery in defence of the ships had gained them the utmost admiration from all pilots in his squadron.

On the way back to Singapore with the survivors, Express passed Stronghold and the 4 American destroyers heading north. Express signalled the action was over, but the ships proceeded to search the area for more survivors. None were found. While returning to Singapore from this search, Edsall boarded the fishing trawler sighted by Force Z that morning. The trawler was identified as Shofu Fu Maru, and was taken to Singapore where the crew was interned.

Effects of the sinking

The next morning after the battle, Prime Minister Churchill received a phone call at his bedside from Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord.

Singapore had essentially been reduced to a land base after both capital ships were lost. Combined with the earlier attack on Pearl Harbor, this left the Allies with only three operational capital ships in the Pacific Theatre.

The two ships were the first capital ships actively defending themselves to be sunk solely by airpower while steaming on the open sea. This incident demonstrated the vulnerability of even the most modern surface ships to the potency of air attack and drove home the necessity of air cover to protect against such an incident. The Genzan Air Corps would attempt a torpedo attack on USS Lexington in early 1942, but they lost seventeen aircraft to the carrier's combat air patrol and anti-aircraft guns.

The ships today

The bell raised from Prince of Wales
The wrecks of the two ships were found after the war, Repulse in 183 feet (56 m) of water, and Prince of Wales in 223 feet (68 m). Both are in a nearly upside-down position. Buoys were attached to the propeller shafts, and flags of the Royal Navy are attached to the lines and are regularly changed by divers. The Royal Navy considers the wrecks to be Crown property. The Prince of Wales' bell was removed from the wreck in 2002 by an authorised team of Royal Navy and British civilian divers in response to fears it would be stolen by unauthorised divers. The bell is now on display at the Merseyside Maritime Museummarker in Liverpoolmarker.

References

Notes

  1. Stephen, p.102.
  2. Stephen, p.104.
  3. Stephen, p.104.
  4. [1]
  5. Stephen, p.107.
  6. Willmott, H. P. Barrier and the Javelin (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1983).
  7. Alan Matthews, 2006, "The sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse" (Force Z Survivors Association). Access date: October 13, 2007.
  8. Stephen, p.102.
  9. Willmott, H. P. Barrier and the Javelin (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1983).
  10. Stephen, p.102.
  11. Martin Middlebrook & Patrick Mahoney, Battleship; The Loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, Penguin History, 1979, ISBN 0-14-02-3469-1
  12. Caidin, Martin. Ragged, Rugged Warrirors,
  13. Willmott, H. P. Barrier and the Javelin (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1983).
  14. Stephen, p.107.
  15. The sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse - page 1
  16. [2]
  17. Stephen, p.108.
  18. Stephen, p.107.
  19. Stephen, p.108.
  20. Stephen, pp.31-8 passim & 102; Fitzsimons, Bernard, ed. Illustrated Encyclopedia of 20th Century Weapons & Warfare (London: Phoebus, 1977), Volume 3, pp.242-3, "B5N Nakajima".
  21. Stephen, p.102.
  22. ‘’Bloody Shambles’’ Volume One, page 125; by Christopher Shores & Brian Cull with Yasuho Izawa (Grub Street, London, 1992) ISBN 0 948817 50 X
  23. Clayton, Graham. Last Stand in Singapore ( Auckland: Random House, 2008).
  24. Willmott, H. P. Barrier and the Javelin (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1983).
  25. Stephen, p.102.
  26. The Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse - page 2


Books

  • Richard Hough, The Hunting of Force Z: the brief, controversial life of the modern battleship and its tragic close with the destruction of the "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse".
  • Martin Middlebrook and Patrick Mahoney, Battleship: The Sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979. Contains details of the attack and damage sustained, and tables of survivors and losses.
  • Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume III, "The Rising Sun in the Pacific".
  • Horodyski, Joseph M. “British Gamble In Asian Waters.” Military Heritage. December 2001. Volume 3, No. 3: 68-77 (sinking of the British battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse by Japanese on 10 December 1941 upon U.S. entry into World War Two).
  • Jack Greene, War at Sea, Pearl Harbor to Midway, 1988. (The Malayan Campaign). Combined Books. ISBN 0-8317-1257-0.
  • V. E. Tarrant, King George V class Battleships, Arms and Armour Press, 1991, ISBN 1-85409-524-2
  • Alan Matthews, Sailors' Tales: Life Onboard HMS Repulse During World War Two ISBN 0-9531217-0-4
  • Survey report compiled after Expedition 'Job 74', May 2007
  • Stephen, Martin. Sea Battles in Close-up, p.99-114. Shepperton, Surrey: Ian Allan, 1988.


External links




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