Israeli troops examine destroyed Arab aircraft
The
Six-Day War of June 5-10, 1967 was a war between
the Israeli army and the armies of the
neighboring states of Egypt
, Jordan
, and
Syria
. The Arab states of Iraq
, Saudi Arabia
, Sudan
, Tunisia
, Morocco
and Algeria
also
contributed troops and arms. At the war's end, Israel had gained
control of the Sinai
Peninsula
, the
Gaza
Strip
, the West
Bank
, East Jerusalem, and
the Golan
Heights
. The results of the war affect the
geopolitics of the region to this day.
Following
numerous border clashes between Israel and its Arab neighbours,
particularly Syria, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser expelled the United Nations Emergency
Force (UNEF) from the Sinai Peninsula
in May 1967. The peacekeeping force had been
stationed there since 1957, following a British-French-Israeli
invasion of Egypt which was launched during the
Suez Crisis.
Egypt amassed 1,000 tanks and nearly 100,000
soldiers on the Israeli border and closed the Straits of
Tiran
to all ships flying Israeli
flags or carrying strategic materials, receiving strong support
from other Arab countries. Israel responded with a similar
mobilization that included the call up of 70,000 reservists to
augment the regular
IDF
forces.
On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a surprise attack on Egypt. Israel
has always considered this a
preemptive attack. This is, however, disputed
by Arab countries, who assert that Israel's strike was an
unwarranted and illegal act of aggression.
Jordan, which had
signed a mutual defence treaty with Egypt on May 30, then attacked
western Jerusalem
and Netanya
.
In Arabic, the war is called ( ,
Ḥarb al‑Ayyam as‑Sitta or
more commonly ,
Ḥarb 1967. In ,
Milhemet Sheshet
Ha‑Yamim). It is also known as the
1967 Arab-Israeli
War, the
Third Arab-Israeli War,
Six Days' War,
an‑Naksah
(
The Setback), or the
June
War.
Background
Suez Crisis aftermath
The
Suez Crisis of 1956 represented a
military defeat but a political victory for Egypt. It was a pivotal
event in the days up to the Six-Day War.
In a victory speech
delivered to the Knesset
, David Ben-Gurion said that the 1949
armistice agreement with Egypt was dead and buried, and that the
armistice lines were no longer valid and could not be
restored. Under no circumstances would Israel agree to the
stationing of UN forces on its territory or in any area it
occupied.
Heavy diplomatic pressure from both the
United
States
and the Soviet Union
forced Israel into a conditional withdrawal of its
military from the Sinai
Peninsula
, only after
satisfactory arrangements had been made with the international
force that was about to enter the canal zone.
After the 1956 war, Egypt agreed to the stationing of a UN
peacekeeping force in the Sinai, the
United Nations Emergency
Force, to keep that border region demilitarized, and prevent
Palestinian fedayeen guerrillas
from crossing the border into Israel.
Egypt also
agreed to reopen the Straits of Tiran
to Israeli shipping, whose closure had been a
significant catalyst in precipitating the Suez Crisis. As a
result, the border between Egypt and Israel remained quiet for a
while.
After the 1956 war, the region returned to an uneasy balance
without the resolution of any of the underlying issues. At the
time, no Arab state had
recognized Israel. Syria, aligned
with the
Soviet bloc, began sponsoring
guerrilla raids on Israel in the early 1960s as part of its
"people's war of liberation", designed to deflect domestic
opposition to the
Ba'ath Party. Even
after nearly two decades of its existence, no neighboring Arab
country of Israel was willing to negotiate a peace agreement with
Israel or accept its existence.
Tunisian
President Habib
Bourgiba suggested in a speech in Jericho
in 1965 that the Arab world should face reality and
negotiate with Israel, but this was rejected by the other Arab
countries.
Water dispute
In 1964,
Israel began withdrawing water from the Jordan River
for its National Water Carrier
. The following year, the Arab states began
construction of the Headwater
Diversion Plan, which, once completed, would divert the waters
of the Banias
Stream
before the water entered Israel and the Sea of Galilee
, to flow instead into a dam at Mukhaiba for use by
Jordan and Syria, and divert the waters of the Hasbani
into the Litani River,
in Lebanon
.Oren, Michael. "The
Six-Day War", in Bar-On, Mordechai. Never-Ending Conflict:
Israeli Military History, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006,
ISBN 0275981584, p. 135. The diversion works would have
reduced the installed capacity of Israel's carrier by about 35%,
and Israel's overall water supply by about 11%.
The
Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) attacked the diversion works in Syria in March, May, and
August 1965, perpetuating a prolonged chain of border violence that
linked directly to the events leading to war.
Israel and Jordan
The long
border between Jordan
and Israel
was tense since the beginning of Fatah's
guerrilla operations in January 1965. While Syria was the
main supporter of such operations, Israel viewed the state from
which the raids were perpetrated as responsible. King
Hussein, the
Hashemite ruler, was in a bind: he did not want to
appear as cooperating with Israel in light of the delicate
relationship of his government with the majority Palestinian
population in his kingdom, and his success in preventing such raids
was only partial. In the summer and autumn of 1966 several
incidents occurred, involving Israeli civilians and military
personnel. This culminated on11 November 1966, when an
Israeli border patrol hit a
land mine, killing three soldiers and injuring six
others.
Israel believed the mine had been planted by
militants from Es
Samu
, a village in the southern West Bank
, close to where the incident took place, which was
a Fatah stronghold. This led the Israeli cabinet to approve
a large scale operation called `Shredder'. On November 12, King
Hussein of Jordan, fearing Israeli retaliation, issued a condolence
letter to Israel via the U.S. Embassy, but the U.S ambassador to
Israel,
Walworth Barbour, did not
deliver it in a timely manner.
On the morning of November 13, the
Israel Defense Force mobilized,
crossed the border into the West Bank and attacked Es Samu. The
attacking force consisted of 3,000-4,000 soldiers backed by tanks
and aircraft. They were divided into a reserve force, which
remained on the Israeli side of the border, and two raiding
parties, which crossed into the Jordanian-occupied West Bank.
The larger force of eight
Centurion
Tanks, followed by 400 paratroopers mounted in 40 open-topped
half-tracks and 60 engineers in 10 more
half-tracks, headed for Samu; while a smaller force of three tanks
and 100 paratroopers and engineers in 10 half-tracks headed towards
two smaller villages: Kirbet El-Markas and Kirbet Jimba. According
to Terrence Prittie's
Eshkol: The Man and the Nation, 50
houses were destroyed, but the inhabitants had been evacuated hours
before.
To Israel's surprise, the Jordanian military intervened. The 48th
Infantry Battalion of the Jordanian Army ran into the Israeli
forces northwest of Samu; and two companies approaching from the
northeast were intercepted by the Israelis, while a platoon of
Jordanians armed with two 106 mm recoilless guns entered Samu.
The Jordanian Air Force intervened as well and a Jordanian
Hunter fighter was shot down in the action. In
the ensuing battles, three Jordanian civilians and 15 soldiers were
killed; 54 other soldiers and 96 civilians were wounded. The
commander of the Israeli paratroop battalion, Colonel Yoav Shaham,
was killed and 10 other Israeli soldiers were wounded.
According to the Israeli government, 50 Jordanians were killed, but
the true number was never disclosed by the Jordanians, in order to
keep up morale and confidence in King Hussein's regime. The whole
battle was short: the Israeli forces crossed the border at 6:00
A.M. and returned by 10:00 A.M.
Hussein felt betrayed by the operation. He had been having secret
meetings with Israeli foreign ministers
Abba
Eban and
Golda Meir for three years.
According to him he was doing everything he could to stop guerrilla
attacks from Jordan. "I told them I could not absorb a serious
retaliatory raid, and they accepted the logic of this and promised
there would never be one".
Two days later, in a memo to
U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson, his Special Assistant
Walt Rostow wrote: "retaliation is not
the point in this case. This 3000-man raid with tanks and planes
was out of all proportion to the provocation and was aimed at the
wrong target," and went on to describe the damage done to US and
Israeli interests: "They've wrecked a good system of tacit
cooperation between Hussein and the Israelis... They've undercut
Hussein. We've spent $500 million to shore him up as a stabilizing
factor on Israel's longest border and vis-Ă -vis Syria and Iraq.
Israel's attack increases the pressure on him to counterattack not
only from the more radical Arab governments and from the
Palestinians in Jordan but also from the Army, which is his main
source of support and may now press for a chance to recoup its
Sunday losses... They've set back progress toward a long term
accommodation with the Arabs... They may have persuaded the Syrians
that Israel didn't dare attack Soviet-protected Syria but could
attack US-backed Jordan with impunity."
The
United Nations
Security Council adopted
Resolution
228 unanimously deploring "the loss of life and heavy damage to
property resulting from the action of the Government of Israel on
13 November 1966", censuring "Israel for this large-scale military
action in violation of the United Nations Charter and of the
General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan" and
emphasizing "to Israel that actions of military reprisal cannot be
tolerated and that, if they are repeated, the Security Council will
have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in
the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts."
Facing a storm of criticism from Jordanians, Palestinians, and his
Arab neighbors for failing to protect Samu, Hussein ordered a
nation-wide mobilization on 20 November. Hussein complained that
Egypt had failed to protect the West Bank, while "hiding behind
UNEF skirts"; this accusation may have been a factor in Nasser's
decision to rid his country of the UNEF force on the eve of the six
day war..
The operation was the largest scale one that Israel was involved
with since the Suez Crisis. While the diplomatic and political
developments were not as Israel expected, following the operation
Hussein worked hard to avoid any further clashes by preventing
guerrilla operations from being launched from within Jordan.
Some view the Samu raid as the beginning of the escalation in
tensions that led to the war. According to Moshe Shemesh, a
historian and former senior intelligence officer in the IDF,
Jordan's military and civilian leaders estimated that Israel's main
objective was conquest of the West Bank. They felt that Israel was
striving to drag all of the Arab countries into a war. After the
Samu raid, these apprehensions became the deciding factor in
Jordan's decision to participate in the war. King Hussein was
convinced Israel would try to occupy the West Bank whether Jordan
went to war, or not.
Israel and Syria
In
addition to sponsoring attacks against Israel (often through
Jordanian territory, much to King
Hussein's chagrin), Syria repeatedly shelled Israeli civilian
communities in north-eastern Galilee from
positions on the Golan
Heights
, as part of the dispute over control of the
Demilitarized Zones (DMZs), small
parcels of land claimed by both Israel and Syria. Concerning
attacks on Israel's territory, Syria maintained that it could not
be held responsible for the activities of El-Fatah and El-Asefa,
nor for the rise of Palestinian organizations whose stated goal was
to liberate their conquered and occupied territory.
For its part, Israel was harassing Syrian farmers in the
Demilitarized Zone, planting mines, erecting fortifications and
opening fire on Syrian military positions, while Israeli armored
tractors were cultivating land in the Demilitarized Zone in
violation of Article 5 of the Armistice Agreement, backed by
Israeli armed forces illegally placed there. Nine years later,
Moshe Dayan, the Israeli defense
minister at the time of the war, stated in an interview not
published until 1997 that Israeli policy on the Syrian border
between 1949 and 1967 consisted of "snatching bits of territory and
holding on to it until the enemy despairs and gives it to us."
About events on the Israeli-Syrian border he said:
After all, I know how at least 80 percent of the
clashes there started.
In my opinion, more than 80 percent, but let's talk
about 80 percent.
It went this way: We would send a tractor to plow some
area where it wasn't possible to do anything, in the demilitarized
area, and knew in advance that the Syrians would start to
shoot.
If they didn't shoot, we would tell the tractor to
advance farther, until in the end the Syrians would get annoyed and
shoot.
And then we would use artillery and later the air force
also, and that's how it was.
I did that, and Laskov and Czera did that, and Yitzhak
did that, but it seemed to me that the person who most enjoyed
these games was Dado.
We thought that we could change the lines of the
ceasefire accords by military actions that were less than
war.
That is, to seize some territory and hold it until the
enemy despairs and gives it to us.
Historian and Israeli ambassador to the United States,
Michael Oren admitted that "There is an element
of truth to Dayan's claim", though he considers the ceasefire
violations justified as "Israel regarded the de-militarized zones
in the north as part of their sovereign territory"
In 1966, Egypt and Syria signed a defense pact whereby each country
would support the other if it were attacked.
According to Indar Jit Rikhye, Egyptian Foreign Minister
Mahmoud Riad told him that the Soviet Union
had persuaded Egypt to enter the pact with two
ideas in mind: to reduce the chances of a punitive attack on Syria
by Israel and to bring the Syrians under Egyptian President
Gamal Abdel Nasser's moderating
influence.
During a
visit to London in February 1967, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban briefed journalists on Israel's "hopes
and anxieties" explaining to those present that, although the
governments of Lebanon
, Jordan and the United Arab Republic (Egypt's official
name until 1971) seemed to have decided against active
confrontation with Israel, it remained to be seen whether Syria
could maintain a minimal level of restraint at which hostility was
confined to rhetoric.
On April
7, 1967, a minor border incident escalated into a full-scale aerial
battle over the Golan Heights, resulting in the loss of six Syrian
MiG-21s to Israeli Air Force (IAF) Dassault Mirage IIIs, and the latter's
flight over Damascus
. Tanks, heavy mortars, and artillery were
used in various sections along the 47 mile (76 km) border in
what was described as "a dispute over cultivation rights in the
demilitarized zone south-east of
Lake Tiberias." Earlier in the week,
Syria had twice attacked an Israeli tractor working in the area and
when it returned on the morning of 7 April the Syrians opened fire
again. The Israelis responded by sending in armor-plated tractors
to continue ploughing, resulting in further exchanges of fire.
Israeli aircraft dive-bombed Syrian positions with 250 and
500 kg bombs. The Syrians responded by shelling Israeli border
settlements heavily, and Israeli jets retaliated by bombing the
village of Sqoufiye, destroying around 40 houses in the process.
At 15:19
Syrian shells started falling on Kibbutz Gadot
; over 300 landed within the kibbutz compound in 40
minutes. The
United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) attempted to arrange a
ceasefire, but Syria declined to co-operate unless Israeli
agricultural work was halted.
Speaking
to a Mapai party meeting in Jerusalem
on 11 May Prime
Minister of Israel Levi Eshkol
warned that Israel would not hesitate to use air power on the scale
of 7 April in response to continued border terrorism and on the
same day Israeli envoy Gideon Rafael presented a letter to the
president of the Security Council
warning that Israel would "act in self-defense as circumstances
warrant". Writing from Tel Aviv on 12 May, James Feron
reported that some Israeli leaders had decided to use force against
Syria "of considerable strength but of short duration and limited
in area" and quoted "one qualified observer" who "said it was
highly unlikely that Egypt (then officially called
United Arab Republic), Syria's closest
ally in the Arab world, would enter the hostilities unless the
Israeli attack were extensive". In early May the Israeli cabinet
authorized a limited strike against Syria, but Rabin's renewed
demand for a large-scale strike to discredit or topple the Ba'ath
regime was opposed by Eshkol. BBC journalist Jeremy Bowen reports:
The toughest threat was reported by the news agency
United Press International (UPI) on 12 May: 'A high Israeli source
said today that Israel would take limited military action designed
to topple the Damascus army regime if Syrian terrorists continue
sabotage raids inside Israel. Military observers said such an
offensive would fall short of all-out war but would be mounted to
deliver a telling blow against the Syrian government.' In the West
as well as the Arab world the immediate assumption was that the
unnamed source was Rabin and that he was serious. In fact, it was
Brigadier-General Aharon Yariv, the
head of military intelligence, and the story was overwritten. Yariv
mentioned 'an all-out invasion of Syria and conquest of Damascus'
but only as the most extreme of a range of possibilities. But the
damage had been done. Tension was so high that most people, and not
just the Arabs, assumed that something much bigger than usual was
being planned against Syria.
Border incidents multiplied and numerous Arab leaders, both
political and military, called for an end to Israeli reprisals.
Egypt, then already trying to seize a central position in the Arab
world under Nasser, accompanied these declarations with plans to
re-militarize the Sinai. Syria shared these views, although it
didn't prepare for an immediate invasion.
The Soviet Union
actively backed the military needs of the Arab states. It was later revealed that
on 13 May a Soviet intelligence report given by Soviet President
Nikolai Podgorny to Egyptian Vice
President
Anwar Sadat claimed falsely
that Israeli troops were massing along the Syrian border. In May
1967,
Hafez al-Assad, then Syria's
Defense Minister declared: "Our forces are now entirely ready not
only to repulse the aggression, but to initiate the act of
liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the Arab
homeland. The Syrian Army, with its finger on the trigger, is
united... I, as a military man, believe that the time has come to
enter into a battle of annihilation."
Removal of U.N. peacekeepers from Egypt
At 10:00 p.m. on 16 May, the commander of
United Nations Emergency
Force, General
Indar Jit
Rikhye, was handed a letter from General Mohammed Fawzy, Chief
of Staff of the
United Arab
Republic, reading: "To your information, I gave my instructions
to all U.A.R. armed forces to be ready for action against Israel,
the moment it might carry out any aggressive action against any
Arab country. Due to these instructions our troops are already
concentrated in Sinai on our eastern border. For the sake of
complete security of all U.N. troops which install
OPs along our borders, I request that you
issue your orders to withdraw all these troops immediately." Rikhye
said he would report to the Secretary-General for
instructions.
The
UN Secretary-General
U Thant attempted to negotiate with the
Egyptian government, but on May 18 the Egyptian Foreign Minister
informed nations with troops in UNEF that the UNEF mission in Egypt
and the Gaza Strip had been terminated and that they must leave
immediately, and Egyptian forces prevented UNEF troops from
entering their posts.
The Governments of India
and Yugoslavia decided to withdraw their troops from
UNEF, regardless of the decision of U Thant. While this was
taking place, U Thant suggested that UNEF be redeployed to the
Israeli side of the border, but Israel refused, arguing that UNEF
contingents from countries hostile to Israel would be more likely
to impede an Israeli response to Egyptian aggression than to stop
that aggression in the first place. The
Permanent Representative of Egypt
then informed U Thant that the Egyptian government had decided to
terminate UNEF's presence in the Sinai and the Gaza Strip, and
requested steps that the force withdraw as soon as possible. On May
19 the UNEF commander was given the order to withdraw. Egyptian
president
Gamal Abdel Nasser then
began the re-militarization of the Sinai, and concentrated tanks
and troops on the border with Israel.
The withdrawal of UNEF was to be spaced over a period of some
weeks. The troops were to be withdrawn by air and by sea from Port
Said. The withdrawal plan envisaged that the last personnel of UNEF
would leave the area on 30 June 1967.On the morning of 27 May,
Egypt demanded that the Canadian contingent be evacuated within 48
hours "on grounds of the attitude adopted by the Government of
Canada in connection with UNEF and the United Arab Republic
Government's request for its withdrawal, and "to prevent any
probable reaction from the people of the United Arab Republic
against the Canadian Forces in UNEF."" The withdrawal of the
Canadian contingent was accelerated and completed on 31 May, with
the effect that UNEF was left without its logistics and air support
components.In the war itself 15 members of the remaining force were
killed and the rest evacuated through Israel
Yitzhak Rabin, who served as the Chief
of the General Staff for Israel during the war stated: "I do not
believe that Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent into
Sinai on May 14 would not have been enough to unleash an offensive
against Israel. He knew it and we knew it."
Menachem Begin stated that "The Egyptian army
concentrations in the Sinai approaches did not prove that Nasser
was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We
decided to attack him." Former Chief of Staff of the armed forces,
Haim Bar-Lev (a deputy chief during the
war) had stated: "the entrance of the Egyptians into Sinai was not
a casus belli." Major General
Mattityahu Peled, the Chief of Logistics
for the Armed Forces during the war, said the survival argument was
"a bluff which was born and developed only after the war...
..."When we spoke of the war in the General Staff, we talked of the
political ramifications if we didn't go to war —what would happen
to Israel in the next 25 years. Never of survival today." Peled
also stated that "To pretend that the Egyptian forces massed on our
frontiers were in a position to threaten the existence of Israel
constitutes an insult not only to the intelligence of anyone
capable of analyzing this sort of situation, but above all an
insult to Zahal (Israeli military)"
The Straits of Tiran
In the
spring of 1967, the Soviet
Union
fed the Syrian government false information that
Israel was planning to invade Syria; Syrian officials informed the
Egyptian government.On May 22, Egypt responded by announcing, in
addition to the UN withdrawal, that the Straits of Tiran
would be closed to "all ships flying Israeli flags
or carrying strategic materials", with effect from May
23.
The rights of Egypt regarding the Straits of Tiran had been debated
at the General Assembly pursuant to Israel's withdrawal from the
Sinai following the
Suez Crisis.
A number
of states, including Australia, Canada
, Denmark
, the Netherlands
, New
Zealand
, the United Kingdom
and the United States
argued that the Straits were international waters,
and, as such, all vessels had the right of "free and unhampered
passage" through them. India
, however,
argued that Egypt was entitled to require foreign ships to obtain
its consent before seeking access to the gulf because its
territorial sea covered the Strait of Tiran. It too
recognized the right of "innocent passage" through such waters, but
argued it was up to the coastal State to decide which passage was
"innocent".
[5067] Nasser stated, "Under no circumstances
can we permit the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba."
Most of Israel's commerce used Mediterranean ports, and, according
to
John Quigley, no
Israeli-flag vessel had used the port of Eilat for the two years
preceding June 1967. There were ambiguities, however, about how
rigorous the blockade would be, particularly whether it would apply
to non-Israeli flag vessels.
Citing international law, Israel
considered
the closure of the straits to be illegal, and it had stated it
would consider such a blockade a casus
belli in 1957 when it withdrew from the Sinai
and Gaza
.
Egypt stated that the Gulf of Aqaba had always been a national
inland waterway subject to the sovereignty of the only three
legitimate littoral States — Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt — who
had the right to bar enemy vessels. The representative of the
United Arab Republic further stated that "Israel's claim to have a
port on the Gulf was considered invalid, as Israel was alleged to
have occupied several miles of coastline on the Gulfline, including
Umm Rashrash, in violation of Security Council resolutions of 1948
and the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement."
The Arab states disputed Israel's right of passage through the
Straits, noting they had not signed the
Convention
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone specifically because
of article 16(4) which provided Israel with that right. To note,
state practice and customary international law that ships of all
states have a right of innocent passage through territorial
seas.O'Brien, John, 2001,
International Law, p. 407. That
Egypt had consistently granted passage as a matter of state
practice until then suggests that its
opinio juris in that regard was consistent with
practice.
As well, during the Egyptian occupation of
the Saudi islands of Sanafir
and Tiran in 1950, it provided assurances to the US
that the military occupation would not be used to prevent free
passage, and that Egypt recognizes that such free passage is "in
conformity with the international practice and the recognized
principles of international law.". In 1949 the International Court of
Justice
held in the
Corfu Channel Case that where a strait was overlapped by a
territorial sea foreign ships, including warships, had
unsuspendable right of innocent passage through such straits used
for international navigation between parts of the high seas, but
express provision for innocent passage through straits within the
territorial sea of a foreign state was not codified until the 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone.
In the
UN General Assembly
debates after the war, the Arab states and their supporters argued
that even if international law gave Israel the right of passage,
Israel was not entitled to attack Egypt to assert it because the
closure was not an "armed attack" as defined by Article 51 of the
UN Charter. Pursuant to this point,
international law professor
John
Quigley argues that under the doctrine of proportionality,
Israel would only be entitled to use such force as would be
necessary to secure its right of passage. Others disagreed: after
the
1956 campaign in which Israel
conquered Sharm el-Sheike and opened the blocked Straits, it was
forced to withdraw and return the territory to Egypt. At the time,
members of the international community pledged that Israel would
never again be denied use of the Straits of Tiran. The French
representative to the UN, for example, announced that an attempt to
interfere with free shipping in the Straits would be against
international law, and American President
Dwight Eisenhower went so far as publicly
to recognize that reimposing a blockade in the Straits of Tiran
would be seen as an aggressive act which would oblige Israel to
protect its maritime rights in accordance with Article 51 of the UN
Charter. United Nations Secretary-General U Thant also went to
Cairo to help negotiate an agreement to avoid conflict, but after
the closing of the Straits of Tiran, Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba
Eban, contended this was enough to start the war. Eban said, "From
May the 24th onward, the question who started the war or who fired
the first shot became momentously irrelevant. There is no
difference in civil law between murdering a man by slow
strangulation or killing him by a shot in the head... From the
moment at which the blockade was posed, active hostilities had
commenced, and Israel owed Egypt nothing of her charger rights."
Contrary to this view in a letter written to the
New York
Times in June 1967 lawyer
Roger
Fisher argued that
The United Arab Republic had a good legal case for
restricting traffic through the Strait of Tiran. First it is
debatable whether international law confers any right of innocent
passage through such a waterway.... {Secondly]... a right of
innocent passage is not a right of free passage for any cargo at
any time. In the words of the Convention on the Territorial Sea:
'Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace,
good order, or security of the coastal state... taking the facts as
they were I, as an international lawyer, would rather defend before
the International Court of Justice the legality of the U.A.R's
action in closing the Strait of Tiran than to argue the other side
of the case...
Israel
viewed the closure of the straits with some alarm and the U.S. and
UK were asked to open the Straits of Tiran
, as they guaranteed they would in 1957.
Harold Wilson's proposal of an
international maritime force to quell the crisis was adopted by
President Johnson, but received little support, with only Britain
and the Netherlands offering to contribute ships.
Yitzhak Rabin reported that the cabinet was deadlocked over the
issue of the blockade. Interior Minister Moshe Haim Shapira in
particular had pointed out that the Straits had been closed from
1951 to 1956 without the situation endangering Israel's
security.
In a 30 March 1968 Ma’ariv interview Defense Minister Moshe Dayan
explained: "What do you mean, [the war was] unavoidable? It was, of
course, possible to avoid the war if the Straits [of Tiran] had
stayed closed to Israeli shipping.
Egypt and Jordan
During May and June the Israeli government had worked hard to keep
Jordan out of any war; it was concerned about being attacked on
multiple fronts, and did not want to have to deal with the
Palestinian population of the West Bank. However, Jordan's King
Hussein got caught up in the wave of pan-Arab nationalism preceding
the war; and so, on May 30, Jordan signed a mutual defense treaty
with Egypt, thereby joining the military alliance already in place
between Egypt and Syria. The move surprised both Egyptians and
foreign observers, because President Nasser had generally been at
odds with Hussein, calling him an "imperialist lackey" just days
earlier. Nasser said that any differences between him and Hussein
were erased "in one moment" and declared: "Our basic objective will
be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight."
At the end of May 1967, Jordanian forces were given to the command
of an Egyptian general,
Abdul Munim
Riad.
On the same day, Nasser proclaimed: "The
armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria are poised on the borders of
Israel ... to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the
armies of Iraq
, Algeria
, Kuwait
, Sudan
and the
whole Arab nation. This act will astound the world. Today
they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical
hour has arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action and
not of more declarations." Israel called upon Jordan numerous times
to refrain from hostilities. According to Mutawi, Hussein was
caught on the horns of a galling dilemma: allow Jordan to be
dragged into war and face the brunt of the Israeli response, or
remain neutral and risk full-scale insurrection among his own
people. Army Commander-in-Chief General
Sharif Zaid Ben Shaker warned in a
press conference that "If Jordan does not join the war a civil war
will erupt in Jordan". However, according to
Avi Shlaim, Hussein's actions were prompted by
his feelings of Arab nationalism.
On June 3, days before the war, Egypt flew to Amman two battalions
of commandos tasked with infiltrating Israel's borders and engaging
in attacks and bombings so as to draw IDF into a Jordanian front
and ease the pressure on the Egyptians. Soviet-made artillery and
Egyptian military supplies and crews were also flown to
Jordan.
Nasser, backed by Arab states, kicks Israel into the Gulf of
Aqaba.
Al-Jarida newspaper, Lebanon.
Israel's
own sense of concern regarding Jordan's future role originated in
Jordanian control of the West Bank
. This put Arab forces just 17 kilometers
from Israel's coast, a jump-off point from which a well-coordinated
tank assault would likely cut Israel in two within half an hour.
Hussein had doubled the size of Jordan's army in the last decade
and had US training and arms delivered as recently as early 1967,
and it was feared that it could be used by other Arab states as
staging grounds for operations against
Israel; thus, attack from the West Bank was always viewed by the
Israeli leadership as a threat to Israel's existence. At the same
time several other Arab states not bordering Israel, including
Iraq, Sudan, Kuwait and Algeria, began mobilizing their armed
forces.
The drift to war
In his speech to Arab
trade
unionists on May 26, Nasser announced: "If Israel embarks on an
aggression against Syria or Egypt, the battle against Israel will
be a general one and not confined to one spot on the Syrian or
Egyptian borders. The battle will be a general one and our basic
objective will be to destroy Israel."
Israeli
Foreign Minister Abba Eban wrote in his autobiography that he found
"Nasser's assurance that he did not plan an armed attack"
convincing, adding that "Nasser did not want war; he wanted victory
without war". Writing from Egypt on 4 June 1967
New York Times journalist
James Reston observed: "Cairo does not want war
and it is certainly not ready for war. But it has already accepted
the possibility, even the likelihood, of war, as if it had lost
control of the situation."
Writing
in 2002, American
National Public
Radio journalist Mike Shuster
expressed a view that was prevalent in Israel before the war that
the country "was surrounded by Arab states dedicated to its
eradication. Egypt was ruled by Gamal Abdel Nasser, a
firebrand nationalist whose army was the strongest in the Arab
Middle East. Syria was governed by the radical
Baathist Party, constantly issuing threats to
push Israel into the sea."
With what Israel saw as provocative acts by
Nasser, including the blockade of the Straits and the mobilization
of forces in the Sinai, creating military and economic pressure,
and the United States temporizing because of its entanglement in
the Vietnam
War
, Israel's political and military elite came to feel
that preemption was not merely militarily preferable, but
transformative.
Diplomacy and intelligence assessments
The Israeli cabinet met on 23 May and decided to launch an attack
if the Straits of Tiran were not re-opened by 25 May. Following an
approach from United States
Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs Eugene
Rostow to allow time for the negotiation of a nonviolent
solution Israel agreed to a delay of ten days to two weeks. UN
Secretary General, U Thant, visited Cairo for mediation and
recommended a moratorium in the Straits of Tiran and a renewed
diplomatic effort to solve the crisis. Egypt agreed and Israel
rejected these proposals. Nasser's concessions did not necessarily
suggest that he was making a concerted effort to avoid war. The
decision benefited him both politically and strategically. Agreeing
to diplomacy helped garner international political support.
Moreover every delay gave Egypt time to complete its own military
preparations and coordinate with the other Arabs forces. Also,
Israel's rejection did not necessarily demonstrate a desire for war
so much as it demonstrated the urgency it felt the situation
warranted. Israel felt it could not afford to sustain total
mobilization for long.
The U.S. also tried to mediate, and Nasser agreed to send his
vice-president to Washington to explore a diplomatic settlement.
The meeting did not happen because Israel launched its offensive.
Some analysts suggest that Nasser took actions aimed at reaping
political gains, which he knew carried a high risk of precipitating
military hostilities. Nasser's willingness to take such risks was
based on his fundamental underestimation of Israel's capacity for
independent and effective military action.
On 25 May 1967, Israeli Foreign Minister
Abba
Eban landed in Washington “with instructions to discuss
American plans to re-open the Strait of Tiran” As soon as he
arrived, he was given new instructions in a cable from the Israeli
government. The cable said that Israel had learned of an imminent
Egyptian attack, which overshadowed the blockade. No longer was he
to emphasize the strait issue; he was instructed to â€inform the
highest authorities of this new threat and to request an official
statement from the United States that an attack on Israel would be
viewed as an attack on the United States.” Despite his own
skepticism, Eban followed his instructions during his first meeting
with Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Rostow, and Assistant
Secretary
Lucius Battle. American
intelligence experts spent the night analyzing each of the Israeli
claims. On May 26, Eban met with
United States Secretary of
State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara, and finally with
President
Lyndon B. Johnson. The Americans said their
intelligence sources could not corroborate the Israeli claim; the
Egyptian positions in the Sinai remained defensive. Eban left the
White House distraught. According to most sources, including those
involved, the new instructions were sent at the instigation of
Chief of Staff
Yitzhak Rabin, who was
eager to force an American decision; either Johnson would have to
commit to specific American action then, or Israel would be free to
act on its own.
Historian
Michael Oren explains his
reaction: "Eban was livid. Unconvinced that Nasser was either
determined or even able to attack, he now saw Israelis inflating
the Egyptian threat - and flaunting their weakness - in order to
extract a pledge that the President, Congress-bound, could never
make. 'An act of momentous irresponsibility... eccentric...' were
his words for the cable, which, he wrote, 'lacked wisdom, veracity
and tactical understanding. Nothing was right about it'." In a
lecture given in 2002, Oren said, "Johnson sat around with his
advisors and said, â€What if their intelligence sources are better
than ours?’ Johnson decided to fire off a
Hotline message to his counterpart
in the Kremlin,
Alexey Kosygin, in
which he said, â€We've heard from the Israelis, but we can't
corroborate it, that your proxies in the Middle East, the
Egyptians, plan to launch an attack against Israel in the next 48
hours. If you don't want to start a global crisis, prevent them
from doing that.’ At 2:30 a.m. on 27 May, Soviet Ambassador to
Egypt
Dimitri Pojidaev knocked on
Nasser's door and read him a personal letter from Kosygin in which
he said, â€We don't want Egypt to be blamed for starting a war in
the Middle East. If you launch that attack, we cannot support you.’
`Amer consulted his sources in the
Kremlin, and they corroborated the substance of Kosygin's message.
Despondent, Amer told the commander of Egypt's air force, Major
General
Mahmud Sidqi, that the
operation was cancelled." According to then Egyptian Vice-President
Hussein el-Shafei, as soon as
Nasser knew what Amer planned, he cancelled the operation.

CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War.
The first page of the draft of the "special estimate" that
predicted the outcome of the war
On 30
May, Nasser responded to Johnson's request of 11 days earlier and
agreed to send his Vice President, Zakkariya Muhieddin, to Washington on 7
June to explore a diplomatic settlement in "precisely the opening
the White
House
had sought". Secretary of State Rusk was
bitterly disappointed that Israel attacked on 5 June, as he thought
he might have been able to find a diplomatic solution if the
meeting had gone ahead. Historian
Michael
Oren writes that Rusk was "mad as hell" and that Johnson later
wrote "I have never concealed my regret that Israel decided to move
when it did".
Within Israel's political leadership, it was decided that if the US
would not act, and if the UN could not act, then Israel would have
to act. On 1 June,
Moshe Dayan was made
Israeli Defense Minister, and on 3 June the
Johnson administration gave an ambiguous
statement; Israel continued to prepare for war. Israel's attack
against Egypt on June 5 began what would later be dubbed the
Six-Day War. According to
Martin van
Creveld, the IDF pressed for war: "...the concept of
'defensible borders' was not even part of the IDFs own vocabulary.
Anyone who will look for it in the military literature of the time
will do so in vain. Instead, Israel's commanders based their
thought on the 1948 war and, especially, their 1956 triumph over
the Egyptians in which, from then Chief of Staff Dayan down, they
had gained their spurs. When the 1967 crisis broke they felt
certain of their ability to win a 'decisive, quick and elegant'
victory, as one of their number, General
Haim Bar Lev, put it, and pressed the
government to start the war as soon as possible". Some of Israel's
political leaders, however, hoped for a diplomatic solution.
The combatant armies
On the eve of the war, Egypt massed approximately 100,000 of its
160,000 troops in the Sinai, including all of its seven divisions
(four infantry, two armored and one mechanized), as well as four
independent infantry and four independent armored brigades. No less
than a third of them were veterans of Egypt's intervention into the
Yemen Civil War and another third
were reservists. These forces had 950 tanks, 1,100 APCs and more
than 1,000 artillery pieces. At the same time some Egyptian troops
(15,000 - 20,000) were still fighting in Yemen. Nasser's
ambivalence about his goals and objectives was reflected in his
orders to the military. The general staff changed the operational
plan four times in May 1967, each change requiring the redeployment
of troops, with the inevitable toll on both men and vehicles.
Towards the end of May, Nasser finally forbade the general staff
from proceeding with the
Qahir ("Victory") plan, which
called for a light infantry screen in the forward fortifications
with the bulk of the forces held back to conduct a massive
counterattack against the main Israeli advance when identified, and
ordered a forward defense of the Sinai. In the meantime, he
continued to take actions intended to increase the level of
mobilization of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, in order to bring pressure
on Israel.
Syria's army had a total strength of 75,000. Jordan's army had
55,000 troops, including 300 tanks, 250 of which were US
M48 Patton, sizable amounts of
M113 APCs, a new battalion of
mechanized infantry, and a
paratrooper battalion trained in the new
US-built school. They also had 12 battalions of artillery and six
batteries of 81 mm and 120 mm mortars.
Documents captured by the Israelis from various Jordanian command
posts record orders from the end of May for the Hashemite Brigade
to capture Ramot Burj Bir Mai'in in a night raid, codenamed
"Operation Khaled".
The aim was to establish a bridgehead
together with positions in Latrun
for an
armored capture of Lod
and
Ramle
. The "go" codeword was
Sa'ek and
end was
Nasser.
The Jordanians also planned for the capture
of Motza
and
Sha'alvim
in the strategic Jerusalem Corridor. Motza was tasked to
Infantry Brigade 27 camped near Ma'ale Adummim
: "The reserve brigade will commence a nighttime
infiltration onto Motza, will destroy it to the foundation, and
won't leave a remnant or refugee from among its 800
residents".
100 Iraqi tanks and an infantry division were readied near the
Jordanian border. Two squadrons of fighter-aircraft,
Hawker Hunters and
MiG 21 respectively, were rebased
adjacent to the Jordanian border.
The Israeli army had a total strength, including reservists, of
264,000, though this number could not be sustained, as the
reservists were vital to civilian life. James Reston, writing in
the
New York Times on 23 May 1967 noted, "In discipline,
training, morale, equipment and general competence his [Nasser's]
army and the other Arab forces, without the direct assistance of
the Soviet Union, are no match for the Israelis... Even with 50,000
troops and the best of his generals and air force in Yemen, he has
not been able to work his way in that small and primitive country,
and even his effort to help the Congo rebels was a flop."
On the evening of June 1, Israeli minister of defense
Moshe Dayan called Chief of Staff
Yitzhak Rabin and the
GOC, Southern Command Brigadier
General Yeshayahu Gavish to present plans against Egypt. Rabin had
formulated a plan in which Southern Command would fight its way to
the Gaza Strip and then hold the territory and its people hostage
until Egypt agreed to reopen the Straits of Tiran; while Gavish had
a more comprehensive plan that called for the destruction of
Egyptian forces in the Sinai. Rabin favored Gavish's plan, which
was then endorsed by Dayan with the caution that a simultaneous
offensive against Syria should be avoided.
On 2 June, Jordan called up all reserve officers, and the West Bank
commander met with community leaders in Ramallah to request
assistance and cooperation for his troops during the war, assuring
them that "in 3 days we'll be in Tel-Aviv".
The fighting fronts
Preliminary air attack
Israel's first and most critical move was a surprise attack on the
Egyptian Air Force. Egypt had by
far the largest and the most modern of all the Arab air forces,
consisting of about 450 combat aircraft, all of them Soviet-built
and with a heavy quota of top-of-the line MiG-21 capable of
attaining Mach 2 speed. Initially, both Egypt and Israel announced
that they had been attacked by the other country.
Of particular concern to the Israelis were the 30
Tu-16 “Badger” medium
bombers, capable of inflicting heavy damage on Israeli military
and civilian centers. On 5 June at 7:45 Israeli time, as
civil defense sirens sounded all over
Israel, the
Israeli Air Force
(
IAF) launched
Operation Focus (
Moked). All but 12
of its nearly 200 operational jets left the skies of Israel in a
mass attack against Egypt's airfields. The Egyptian defensive
infrastructure was extremely poor, and no airfields were yet
equipped with armoured bunkers capable of protecting Egypt's
warplanes.
The Israeli warplanes headed out over the
Mediterranean
before turning toward Egypt. Meanwhile, the
Egyptians hindered their own defense by effectively shutting down
their entire air defense system: they were worried that rebel
Egyptian forces would shoot down the plane carrying Field Marshal
Amer and Lt-Gen. Sidqi Mahmoud, who were en route from al Maza to
Bir Tamada in the Sinai to meet the commanders of the troops
stationed there. In any event, it did not make a great deal of
difference as the Israeli pilots came in below Egyptian radar cover
and well below the lowest point at which its
SA-2 surface-to-air missile batteries could bring
down an aircraft. The Israelis employed a mixed attack strategy:
bombing and
strafing runs against the
planes themselves, and
tarmac-shredding penetration
bombs dropped on the runways that rendered them unusable,
leaving any undamaged planes unable to take off and therefore
helpless targets for later Israeli waves. The attack was more
successful than expected, catching the Egyptians by surprise and
destroying virtually all of the
Egyptian Air Force on the ground, with
few Israeli casualties. Over 300 Egyptian aircraft were destroyed
and 100 Egyptian pilots were killed. Among the Egyptian planes lost
were all 30 Tu-16 bombers, as well as 27 out of 40
Il-28 bombers, 12
Su-7
fighter-bombers, over 90
MiG-21s, 20
MiG-19s, 25
MiG-17 fighters and
around 32 assorted transport planes and helicopters. The Israelis
lost 19 planes, mostly operational losses (mechanical failure,
accidents, etc). The attack guaranteed Israeli
air superiority for the rest of the
war.
Before the war, Israeli pilots and ground crews had trained
extensively in rapid refitting of aircraft returning from
sorties, enabling a single aircraft to sortie up to
four times a day (as opposed to the norm in Arab air forces of one
or two sorties per day). This enabled the IAF to send several
attack waves against Egyptian airfields on the first day of the
war, overwhelming the Egyptian Air Force. This also has contributed
to the Arab belief that the IAF was helped by foreign air forces
(see
below).
The Arab
air forces themselves were aided by pilots from the Pakistan Air Force, as well as some
aircraft from Libya
, Algeria
, Morocco
, Kuwait
, and
Saudi
Arabia
to make up for the massive losses suffered on the
first day of the war.
Following the success of the initial attack waves against the major
Egyptian airfields and subsequent air raids, attacks were carried
out that afternoon against Israel by the Jordanian, Syrian, and
Iraqi air forces. Subsequent attacks against secondary Egyptian
airfields as well as Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi fields wiped out
most of those nations' air forces. By the evening of the first day,
the Jordanian air force was wiped out, losing over 20
Hawker Hunter fighters, as well as six
transport aircraft and two helicopters. The Syrian Air Force lost
some 32
MiG 21s, and 23
MiG-15 and
MiG-17 fighters, and
two
Ilyushin Il-28 bombers. A number
of Iraqi Air Force aircraft were destroyed at H3 base in western
Iraq by an Israeli airstrike which included 12 out of 20 MiG-21s,
two MiG-17s, five Hunter F6s, and three Il-28 bombers. A lone Iraqi
Tu-16 bomber was shot down later that day by Israeli anti-aircraft
fire while attempting to bomb Tel Aviv. On the morning of June 6,
1967, a Lebanese Hunter, one of 12 Lebanon owned, was shot down
over the Lebanon/Israel border by an
Israeli Mirage IIIJC piloted by Uri
Even-Nir.
By nightfall, Israel said it destroyed 416 Arab aircraft, while
losing 26 of their own in the first two days of the war. Israeli
aircraft shot down included six out of 72 of its
Mirage IIIC/J fighters, four out of its
24
Super Mystère
fighters, eight out of 60
Mystère IVA ground attack aircraft,
four out of 40
Ouragan ground
attack aircraft, and five out of 25 of its
Vautour II medium bombers. The numbers
of Arab aircraft claimed destroyed by Israel were at first regarded
as "greatly exaggerated" by the Western press. However, the fact
that the Egyptian, Jordanian, and other Arab air forces made
practically no appearance for the remaining days of the conflict
proved that the numbers were most likely authentic. Throughout the
war, Israeli aircraft continued strafing Arab airfield runways to
prevent their return to usability. Meanwhile, Egyptian state-run
radio had reported an Egyptian victory, falsely claiming that 70
Israeli planes had been forced down the first day of
fighting.
Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula
The Egyptian forces consisted of seven
division: four
armored, two
infantry, and one
mechanized infantry. Overall, Egypt had
around 100,000 troops and 900-950
tanks in the
Sinai, backed by 1,100
APC
and 1,000
artillery pieces. This
arrangement was thought to be based on the Soviet doctrine, where
mobile armor units at
strategic
depth provide a dynamic defense while infantry units engage in
defensive battles.
Israeli forces concentrated on the border with Egypt included six
armored
brigades, one infantry brigade, one
mechanized infantry brigade, three
paratrooper brigades and 700 tanks, giving a
total of around 70,000 men, who were organized in three armored
divisions. The Israeli plan was to surprise the Egyptian forces in
both timing (the attack exactly coinciding with the IAF strike on
Egyptian airfields), location (attacking via northern and central
Sinai routes, as opposed to the Egyptian expectations of a repeat
of the 1956 war, when the IDF attacked via the central and southern
routes) and method (using a combined-force flanking approach,
rather than direct tank assaults).
The
northernmost Israeli division, consisting of three brigades and
commanded by Major General Israel Tal,
one of Israel's most prominent armor commanders, advanced slowly
through the Gaza
Strip
and El-Arish
, which were not heavily protected.
The central division (Maj. Gen.
Avraham
Yoffe) and the southern division (Maj. Gen.
Ariel Sharon), however, entered the heavily
defended Abu-Ageila-Kusseima region, leading to what is known as
the
Battle of
Abu-Ageila. Egyptian forces there included one infantry
division (the 2nd), a
battalion of
tank destroyers and a tank
regiment, formed of Soviet WW2 armor, which
included 90
T-34-85 tanks (with 85 mm
guns), 22
SU-100 tank destroyers (with
100 mm guns), and about 16,000 men, while the Israelis had a
man-power of about 14,000, and 150 post-WW2 tanks including the
AMX-13 with 90 mm guns,
Centurions, and Super
Sherman (both types with 105 mm
guns).
Sharon initiated an attack, precisely planned, coordinated and
carried out.
He sent two of his brigades to the north of
Um-Katef
, the first one to break through the defenses at
Abu-Ageila
to the south, and the second to block the road to
El-Arish
and to encircle Abu-Ageila from the east. At
the same time, a paratrooper force was heliborne to the rear of the
defensive positions and attacked the Egyptian artillery positions.
Although the paratrooper force's plan quickly fell apart, the
confusion sown among the artillery crews helped to slow but not
quite stop artillery fire. Combined forces of armor, paratroopers,
infantry, artillery and combat engineers then attacked the Egyptian
position from the front, flanks and rear, cutting the enemy off.
The breakthrough battles, which were in sandy areas and minefields,
continued for three and a half days until Abu-Ageila fell.
Many of
the Egyptian units remained intact and could have tried to prevent
the Israelis from reaching the Suez Canal
or engaged in combat in the attempt to reach the
canal. However, when the Egyptian Minister of
Defense, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim
Amer heard about the fall of Abu-Ageila
, he panicked and ordered all units in the Sinai to
retreat. This order effectively meant the defeat of
Egypt.
Due to the Egyptians' retreat, the Israeli High Command decided not
to pursue the Egyptian units but rather to bypass and destroy them
in the mountainous passes of West Sinai. Therefore, in the
following two days (June 6 and 7), all three Israeli divisions
(Sharon and Tal were reinforced by an armored brigade each) rushed
westwards and reached the passes.
Sharon's division first went southward
then westward to Mitla
Pass
. It was joined there by parts of Yoffe's
division, while its other units blocked the Gidi Pass
. Tal's units stopped at various points to
the length of the Suez Canal.
Israel's blocking action was only partially successful. Only the
Gidi pass was captured before the Egyptians approached it, but at
other places, Egyptian units managed to pass through and cross the
canal to safety. Nevertheless, in four days of operations, Israel
defeated the largest and most heavily equipped Arab army, leaving
numerous points in the Sinai littered with hundreds of burning or
abandoned Egyptian vehicles and military equipment.
On June
8, Israel had completed the capture of the Sinai by sending
infantry units to Ras-Sudar
on the western coast of the peninsula.
Sharm
El-Sheikh
, at its
southern tip, had already been taken a day earlier by units of the
Israeli Navy.
Several tactical elements made the swift Israeli advance possible:
first, the complete air superiority of the
Israeli Air Force over its Egyptian
counterpart; second, the determined implementation of an innovative
battle plan; and third, the lack of coordination among Egyptian
troops. These would prove to be decisive elements on Israel's other
fronts as well.
West Bank
Jordan
was
reluctant to enter the war. Some say that Nasser used the obscurity of the first hours of the conflict to
convince Hussein that he was
victorious; he claimed as evidence a radar sighting of a squadron
of Israeli aircraft returning from bombing raids in Egypt
which he
said was an Egyptian aircraft en route to attacking Israel.
One of
the Jordanian brigades stationed in the West Bank
was sent to the Hebron
area in
order to link with the Egyptians. Hussein decided to
attack.
Prior to the war,
Jordanian
forces included 11 brigades totaling some 55,000 troops,
equipped with some 300 modern Western tanks.
Of these, nine
brigades (45,000 troops, 270 tanks, 200 artillery pieces) were
deployed in the West
Bank
, including elite armored 40th, and 2 in the
Jordan Valley.
The
Arab Legion was a long-term-service,
professional army relatively well-equipped and well-trained.
Furthermore, Israeli post-war briefings said that the Jordanian
staff acted professionally as well, but was always left "half a
step" behind by the Israeli moves. The tiny
Royal Jordanian Air Force
consisted of only 24 UK
Hawker Hunter
fighters. According to the Israelis, the British-made
Hawker Hunter was essentially on par with the
French-built
Dassault Mirage III
- the IAF's best plane.
Against Jordan's forces on the West Bank, Israel deployed about
40,000 troops and 200 tanks (8 brigades). Israeli Central Command
forces consisted of five brigades.
The first two were permanently stationed
near Jerusalem
and were called the Jerusalem Brigade and the
mechanized Harel Brigade. Mordechai
Gur's 55th
paratrooper brigade was
summoned from the Sinai front.
An armored brigade was allocated from the
General Staff reserve and advanced toward Ramallah
, capturing Latrun
in the
process. The 10th armored brigade was stationed north
of the West Bank
Region
. The Israeli Northern Command provided a
division (3 brigades) led by Maj. Gen.
Elad Peled, which was stationed to the north of
the West Bank, in the Jezreel Valley
.
The IDF's strategic plan was to remain on the defensive along the
Jordanian front, to enable focus in the expected campaign against
Egypt.
However, on the morning of 5 June, Jordan
began shelling targets in west Jerusalem, Netanya
, and the outskirts of Tel Aviv
. The
Royal Jordanian Air Force attacked
Israeli airfields. Despite this, both air and artillery attacks
caused little damage, and Israel sent a message promising not to
initiate any action against Jordan if it stayed out of the war.
Hussein replied that it was too late, "
the die was cast".
On the evening of
June 5, the Israeli cabinet convened to decide what to do; Yigal Allon and Menahem
Begin argued that this was an opportunity to take the Old City of
Jerusalem
, but Eshkol decided to defer any decision until
Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin could be consulted.
Uzi Narkis made a number of proposals for
military action, including the capture of Latrun
, but the
cabinet turned him down. The Israeli military only commenced
action after Jordanian forces made thrusts in the area of
Jerusalem, occupying
Government
House, used as the headquarters for the
UN observers
and a
Demilitarized zone since
the
1949 Armistice
Agreements, which was seen as a threat to the security of
Jerusalem.
On June 6, Israeli units were scrambled to attack Jordanian forces
in the West Bank. In the afternoon of that same day, Israeli Air
Force (IAF) strikes destroyed the Royal Jordanian Air Force. By the
evening of that day, the Jerusalem infantry brigade moved south of
Jerusalem, while the mechanized Harel and Gur's paratroopers
encircled it from the north.
The reserve paratroop brigade completed the
Jerusalem encirclement in the bloody Battle of
Ammunition Hill
. Fearing damage to holy places and having to
fight in built-up areas, Dayan ordered his troops not to go into
the city itself.
On June 7, heavy fighting ensued.
The infantry brigade attacked the
fortress at Latrun, capturing it at daybreak, and advanced through
Beit Horon towards Ramallah
. The Harel brigade continued its push to the
mountainous area of northwest Jerusalem, linking the Mount Scopus
campus of Hebrew University
with the city of Jerusalem. By the evening,
the brigade arrived in Ramallah.
The IAF detected and destroyed the 60th
Jordanian Brigade en route from Jericho
to reinforce Jerusalem.
In the north, one battalion from Peled's division was sent to check
Jordanian defenses in the Jordan Valley.
A brigade belonging
to Peled's division captured the western part of the West Bank,
another captured Jenin
and the
third (equipped with light French AMX-13s)
engaged Jordanian M48 Patton main battle
tanks to the east.
Dayan had ordered his troops not to enter Jerusalem; however, upon
hearing that the UN was about to declare a ceasefire, he changed
his mind, and without cabinet clearance, decided to take the city.
Gur's
paratroopers entered the Old City
of Jerusalem
via the Lion's Gate, and
captured the Western
Wall
and the Temple Mount
. The intense battle for the Old City was
fought mostly by paratroopers, who had to engage in heavy street
fighting. The Israeli high command had ordered the IDF not to use
heavy armor in the Old City - since this was an area holy to
Judaism, the Israeli government wanted to leave it intact.
The
Jerusalem brigade then reinforced the paratroops, and continued to
the south, capturing Judea
, Gush Etzion
and Hebron
.
The Harel
brigade proceeded eastward, descending to the Jordan River
.
In the
West Bank, one of Peled's brigades seized Nablus
; then it
joined one of Central Command's armored brigades to fight the
Jordanian forces; as the Jordanians held the advantage of superior
equipment and were equal in numbers to the Israelis.
Again, the air superiority of the IAF proved paramount as it
immobilized the enemy, leading to its defeat. One of Peled's
brigades joined with its Central Command counterparts coming from
Ramallah, and the remaining two blocked the Jordan river crossings
together with the Central Command's 10th (the latter crossed the
Jordan river into the East Bank to provide cover for
Israeli combat engineers while
they blew the Abdullah and Hussein bridges, but was quickly pulled
back because of American pressure).
No specific decision had been made to capture any other territories
controlled by Jordan. After the Old City was captured, Dayan told
his troops to dig in to hold it.
When an armored brigade commander entered
the West Bank on his own initiative, and stated that he could see
Jericho
, Dayan ordered him back. It was only after
intelligence reports indicated that Hussein had withdrawn his
forces across the Jordan River that Dayan ordered his troops to
capture the West Bank. According to Narkis:
First, the Israeli government had no intention of
capturing the West Bank.
On the contrary, it was opposed to it.
Second, there was not any provocation on the part of
the IDF.
Third, the rein was only loosened when a real threat to
Jerusalem's security emerged.
This is truly how things happened on June 5, although
it is difficult to believe.
The end result was something that no one had
planned.
Golan Heights
False Egyptian reports of a crushing victory against the Israeli
army and forecasts that Egyptian artillery would soon be in
Tel-Aviv influenced Syria's willingness to enter the war. Syrian
leadership, however, adopted a more cautious approach, and instead
began shelling and conducting air raids on northern Israel. When
the Israeli Air Force had completed its mission in Egypt, and
turned around to destroy the surprised Syrian Air Force, Syria
understood that the news it had heard from Egypt of the near-total
destruction of the Israeli military could not have been true.
During the evening of June 5, Israeli air strikes destroyed
two-thirds of the
Syrian Air Force,
and forced the remaining third to retreat to distant bases, without
playing any further role in the ensuing warfare.
A minor Syrian force
tried to capture the water plant at Tel Dan
(the subject of a fierce escalation two years
earlier), Kibbutz
Dan
, and She'ar Yashuv
. Several Syrian tanks are reported to have
sunk in the Jordan River. In any case, the Syrian command abandoned
hopes of a ground attack, and began a massive shelling of Israeli
towns in the Hula Valley instead.
On June 7
and June 8, a debate had been going on in the Israeli leadership
whether the Golan
Heights
should be assailed as well. Military advice
was that the attack would be extremely costly, as it would be an
uphill battle against a strongly fortified enemy.
The western side of
the Golan Heights consists of a rock escarpment that rises 500
metres (1700 ft) from the Sea of Galilee
and the Jordan River
, and flows down to a more gently sloping
plateau. Moshe Dayan believed
such an operation would yield losses of 30,000 and opposed it
bitterly.
Levi Eshkol, on the other
hand, was more open to the possibility of an operation in the Golan
Heights, as was the head of the Northern Command,
David Elazar, whose unbridled enthusiasm for
and confidence in the operation may have eroded Dayan's reluctance.
Eventually, as the situation on the Southern and Central fronts
cleared up, Moshe Dayan became more enthusiastic about the idea,
and he authorized the operation.
The Syrian army consisted of about 75,000 men grouped in nine
brigades, supported by an adequate amount of artillery and armor.
Israeli
forces used in combat consisted of two brigades (one armored led by
Albert Mandler and the Golani Brigade) in the northern part of the
front at Givat
HaEm
, and another two (infantry and one of Peled's
brigades summoned from Jenin) in the center. The Golan
Heights' unique terrain (mountainous slopes crossed by parallel
streams every several kilometres running east to west), and the
general lack of roads in the area channeled both forces along
east-west axes of movement and restricted the ability of units to
support those on either flank. Thus the Syrians could move
north-south on the plateau itself, and the Israelis could move
north-south at the base of the Golan escarpment. An advantage
Israel possessed was the excellent intelligence collected by
Mossad operative
Eli
Cohen (who was captured and executed in Syria in 1965)
regarding the Syrian battle positions. Syria had built extensive
defensive fortifications in depths up to 15 kilometers, comparable
to the
Maginot Line.
As opposed to all the other campaigns, IAF was only partially
effective in the Golan because the fixed fortifications were so
effective. However, the Syrian forces proved unable to put up an
effective defense largely because the officers were poor military
leaders and treated their soldiers poorly; often officers would
retreat to escape danger leaving their men confused and
ineffective. By the evening of 9 June, the four Israeli brigades
had broken through to the plateau, where they could be reinforced
and replaced.
On the next day, June 10, the central and northern groups joined in
a
pincer movement on the plateau,
but that fell mainly on empty territory as the Syrian forces fled.
Several units joined by Elad Peled climbed to the Golan from the
south, only to find the positions mostly empty as well. During the
day, the Israeli units stopped after obtaining manoeuvre room
between their positions and a line of volcanic hills to the west.
To the east, the ground terrain is an open gently sloping plain.
This position later became the cease-fire line known as the
"
Purple Line".
Time magazine reported: "In an
effort to pressure the United Nations into enforcing a ceasefire,
Damascus Radio undercut its own army by broadcasting the fall of
the city of Quneitra
three hours before it actually capitulated.
That premature report of the surrender of their headquarters
destroyed the morale of the Syrian troops left in the Golan
area."
War in the air
During the Six-Day War, the IAF demonstrated the importance of
air superiority during the course of
a modern conflict, especially in a desert theatre. Following the
IAF's
preliminary air
attack, in which the IAF achieved near total tactical surprise
(only four unarmed Egyptian training flights were in the air when
the strike began ), it was able to thwart and harass what remained
of the Arab air forces and to grant itself air superiority over all
fronts; it then complemented the strategic effect of its initial
strike by carrying out tactical support operations.
In contrast, the Arab air forces never managed to mount an
effective attack. Attacks of Jordanian fighters and Iraqi
Tu-16 bombers into the Israeli rear during the first
two days of the war were not successful and led to the destruction
of the aircraft (several Iraqi and Jordanian aircraft were shot
down, while Jordan's air arm was crippled in strikes against its
air bases).
In 1966, Iraqi Captain
Munir Redfa flew
his
MiG-21F-13 to Israel.
Israel capitalized on this defection by test flying the defecting
aircraft to the maximum, thus giving Israeli pilots great advantage
over their opponents.
On June 6, the second day of the war, King Hussein and Nasser
declared that American and British aircraft took part in the
Israeli attacks. (See
False allegations
of U.S. and British combat support below).
War at sea
War at sea was extremely limited. Movements of both Israeli and
Egyptian vessels are known to have been used to intimidate the
other side, but neither side directly engaged the other at sea.
The only
moves that yielded any result were the use of six Israeli frogmen in Alexandria
harbor (they were captured, having sunk a minesweeper), and the Israeli light boat
crews that captured the abandoned town of Sharm
el-Sheikh
on the
southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula on June 7.
An Egyptian mine sweeper was sunk in Hurgahda harbour. The sunken
vessel is known as
El Mina, which translates as
"harbour".
On June
8, USS Liberty, a
United States Navy electronic intelligence vessel sailing off Arish
(just
outside Egypt's territorial
waters), was attacked by Israeli air and sea forces, nearly
sinking the ship and causing heavy casualties. Israel said
the attack was a case of mistaken identity, apologized for the
mistake, and paid restitution to the victims or their families.
After an investigation, the US accepted the explanation that the
incident was friendly fire and the issue was closed by the exchange
of diplomatic notes in 1987 (see
USS Liberty incident).
Conclusion of conflict and post-war situation
By the 10th of June, Israel had completed its final offensive in
the Golan Heights, and a
ceasefire was
signed the day after.
Israel had seized the Gaza Strip
, the Sinai Peninsula
, the West
Bank
of the Jordan River (including East Jerusalem), and
the Golan
Heights
. Overall, Israel's territory grew by a
factor of three, including about one million Arabs placed under
Israel's direct control in the newly captured territories. Israel's
strategic depth grew to at least 300 kilometers in the south, 60
kilometers in the east and 20 kilometers of extremely rugged
terrain in the north, a security asset that would prove useful in
the
1973 Arab-Israeli War six
years later.
The political importance of the 1967 War was immense; Israel
demonstrated that it was not only able, but also willing, to
initiate strategic strikes that could change the regional balance.
Egypt and Syria learned tactical lessons and would launch an
attack in 1973 in an attempt to
reclaim their lost territory.Brams, Steven J. and Jeffrey M.
Togman.
Camp David: Was the agreement fair? In Paul F.
Diehl (Ed.),
A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of
International Conflict. (p. 243) Nashville: Vanderbilt
University Press (ISBN 0826513298)
Young, Tim.
Developments in the Middle East Peace Process
1991–2000 London: International Affairs and Defence
Section, House of Commons Library (p. 12)
Speaking three weeks after the war ended, as he accepted an
honorary degree from Hebrew University,
Yitzhak Rabin gave his reasoning behind the
success of Israel:
- Our airmen, who struck the enemies' planes so accurately that
no one in the world understands how it was done and people seek
technological explanations or secret weapons; our armored troops
who beat the enemy even when their equipment was inferior to his;
our soldiers in all other branches...who overcame our enemies
everywhere, despite the latter's superior numbers and
fortifications-all these revealed not only coolness and courage in
the battle but...an understanding that only their personal stand
against the greatest dangers would achieve victory for their
country and for their families, and that if victory was not theirs
the alternative was annihilation.
According to
Chaim Herzog:
- On June 19, 1967, the National Unity Government [of Israel]
voted unanimously to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan
Heights to Syria in return for peace agreements. The Golans would
have to be demilitarized and special arrangement would be
negotiated for the Straits of Tiran. The government also resolved
to open negotiations with King Hussein of Jordan regarding the
Eastern border.
The Israeli decision was to be conveyed to the Arab nations by the
United States. The US was informed of the decision, but not that it
was to transmit it. There is no evidence of receipt from Egypt or
Syria, and some historians claim that they may have never received
the offer.
Later, the
Khartoum Arab Summit
resolved that there would be "no peace, no recognition and no
negotiation with Israel." However, as
Avraham Sela notes, the Khartoum conference
effectively marked a shift in the perception of the conflict by the
Arab states away from one centered on the question of Israel's
legitimacy toward one focusing on territories and boundaries and
this was underpinned on November 22 when Egypt and Jordan accepted
United Nations Security Council
Resolution 242.
The June
19 Israeli cabinet decision did not include the Gaza Strip
, and left open the possibility of Israel
permanently acquiring parts of the West Bank
. On June 25-27, Israel incorporated
East Jerusalem together with areas of the
West Bank to the north and south into Jerusalem's new municipal
boundaries.
Yet
another aspect of the war touches on the population of the captured
territories: of about one million Palestinians in the West Bank,
300,000 (according to the United
States Department of State
) fled to Jordan, where they contributed to the
growing unrest. The other 600,000 remained. In the Golan
Heights, an estimated 80,000 Syrians fled. Only the inhabitants of
East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights became entitled to receive
full Israeli citizenship, as Israel applied its law, administration
and jurisdiction to these territories in 1967 and 1981
respectively, and the vast majority in both territories declined to
do so.
See also Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and Golan
Heights
.Both Jordan and Egypt eventually withdrew
their claims to the West Bank and Gaza (the Sinai was returned on
the basis of
Camp David Accords
of 1978 and the question of the Golan Heights is still being
negotiated with Syria). After Israeli conquest of these newly
acquired 'territories,' a large settlement effort was launched to
secure Israel's permanent foothold. There are now hundreds of
thousands of Israeli settlers in these territories, though the
Israeli settlements in Gaza were evacuated and destroyed in August
2005 as a part of
Israel's unilateral
disengagement plan.
The 1967 War also laid the foundation for future discord in the
region - as on November 22, 1967, the
UN Security Council adopted
Resolution 242, the
"
land for peace" formula, which
called for Israeli withdrawal "from territories occupied" in 1967
in return for "the termination of all claims or states of
belligerency."
The framers of Resolution 242 recognized that some territorial
adjustments were likely, and therefore deliberately did not include
words
all or
the in the official English language
version of the text when referring to "territories occupied" during
the war, although it is present in other, notably French, Spanish
and Russian versions. It recognized the right of "every state in
the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries
free from threats or acts of force." Israel returned the Sinai to
Egypt in 1978, after the
Camp David
Accords, and disengaged from the Gaza Strip in the summer of
2005, though its army frequently re-enters Gaza for military
operations and still retains control of border crossings, seaports
and airports.
The aftermath of the war is also of religious significance.
Under
Jordanian
rule, Jews were effectively barred from visiting the Western Wall
(even thoughArticle VIII of the
1949 Armistice
Agreement provided for Israeli Jewish access to the Western
Wall). Jewish holy sites were not maintained, and their cemeteries
had been desecrated. After the annexation to Israel, each religious
group was granted administration over its holy sites.
Despite the Temple Mount
's importance in Jewish tradition, the al-Aqsa
Mosque
is under sole administration of a Muslim Waqf, and Jews are barred from conducting services
there.
Casualties
The Israeli casualties of the war, far from Israel's heavy pre-war
estimates, were actually quite low. Israeli killed were 983, and
4,517 were wounded. 46 Israeli aircraft were also destroyed. 15
Israeli soldiers were captured. Over 9,800 Egyptian soldiers were
listed as killed, wounded or missing in action. Jordan lost 700
soldiers killed, with around 2,500 wounded. Syrian losses are
unknown, but are lower than Jordanian casualties.
Allegations that the IDF killed Egyptian prisoners
After the war, a national debate ensued in Israel regarding
allegations that soldiers killed unarmed Egyptians. A few soldiers
said that they had witnessed the execution of unarmed prisoners.
Gabby Bron, a journalist for
Yedioth Ahronoth, said he had
witnessed the execution of five Egyptian prisoners.
Michael Bar-Zohar said that he had
witnessed the murder of three Egyptian POWs by a cook, and Meir
Pa'il said that he knew of many instances in which soldiers had
killed PoWs or Arab civilians.
Uri
Milstein, a controversial military historian, was reported as
claiming that there were many incidents in the 1967 war in which
Egyptian soldiers were killed by Israeli troops after they had
raised their hands in surrender. "It was not an official policy,
but there was an atmosphere that it was okay to do it," Milstein
said. "Some commanders decided to do it; others refused. But
everyone knew about it." Allegations that Egyptian soldiers fleeing
into the desert were shot were confirmed in reports written after
the war. Israeli historian and journalist Tom Segev, in his book
"1967", quotes one soldier who wrote, "our soldiers were sent to
scout out groups of men fleeing and shoot them. That was the order,
and it was done while they were really trying to escape".
According to a
New York
Times report of 21 September 1995, the Egyptian government
announced that it had discovered two shallow mass graves in the
Sinai at El Arish containing the remains of 30 to 60 Egyptian
prisoners shot by Israeli soldiers during the 1967 war. Israel
responded by sending
Eli Dayan, a Deputy
Foreign Minister, to Egypt to discuss the matter. During his visit,
Dayan offered compensation to the families of victims, but
explained that Israel was unable to pursue those responsible owing
to its 20-year
statute of
limitations. The Israeli Ambassador to Cairo, David Sultan,
asked to be relieved of his post after the Egyptian daily
Al
Shaab said he was personally responsible for the killing of
100 Egyptian prisoners, although both the Israeli Embassy and
Foreign Ministry denied the charge and said that it was not even
clear that Sultan had served in the military.
Capt. Milovan Zorc and Miobor Stosic, a military liaison official,
who were members of the Yugoslav Reconnaissance Battalion that
formed part of the 3,400-strong UNEF deployed as a buffer between
Egypt and Israel and witnessed the war, have cast doubt on claims
that Israel executed Egyptian prisoners of war in the area where
they were stationed. They said that if an Israeli unit had killed
some 250 POWs near the Egyptian town of el-Arish, they would likely
have come to know about it.
Declassified IDF documents show that on 11 June 1967, the
operations branch of the general staff felt it necessary to issue
new orders concerning the treatment of prisoners. The order read:
"Since existing orders are contradictory, here are binding
instructions. a) Soldiers and civilians who give themselves up are
not to be hurt in any way. b) Soldiers and civilians who carry a
weapon and do not surrender will be killed... Soldiers who are
caught disobeying this order by killing prisoners will be punished
severely. Make sure this order is brought to the attention of all
IDF soldiers".
According to Israeli sources, 4,338 Egyptian soldiers were taken
captive by IDF. 11 Israeli soldiers were taken captive by Egyptian
forces. POW exchanges were completed on 23 January 1968.
Combat support
On the second day of the war, Arab state-run media reported that
American and British troops were fighting on Israel's side.
Radio
Cairo and the government newspaper Al-Ahram made a number of claims, among them:
that U.S. and British carrier-based aircraft flew sorties against
the Egyptians; that U.S. aircraft based in Wheelus Air
Base
-Libya
attacked
Egypt; and that American spy satellites provided imagery to
Israel. Mohamed
Hassanein Heikal, the chief of “Al-Ahram” in the Nasserite
period, repeated similar claims at
Al
Jazeera channel. Later, Muammar al-Gaddafi's Libyan government
confirmed these claims also only to get a pretext for the coup that
took place on 1 September 1969.
Unfortunately, the governments of United States
and Britain
made too little efforts either to confirm or deny
these claims. Similar reports were aired by Radio Damascus
and Radio Amman. Egyptian media even said that King Hussein had
personally seen radar observations showing British aircraft taking
off from aircraft carriers.
Outside of the Arab world claims of American and British military
intervention were not taken seriously. Britain, the U.S. and Israel
denied these allegations. On 8 June, Egyptian credibility was
further damaged when Israel released an audio recording to the
press, which they said was a radio-telephone conversation
intercepted two days earlier between Nasser and King Hussein of
Jordan.
In the immediate aftermath of the war, as the extent of the Arab
military defeat became apparent, Arab leaders differed on whether
to continue to assert that the American military had assisted the
Israeli victory. On 9 June 1967, Nasser stated in his resignation
speech (his resignation was not accepted):
King Hussein, however, later denied the allegations of American
military support. On 30 June, he announced in New York that he was
"perfectly satisfied" that "no American planes took part, or any
British planes either". In September,
The New York Times reported that
Nasser had privately assured Arab leaders, gathered in Sudan to
discuss the
Khartoum Resolution,
that his earlier claims were false.
Nonetheless, these allegations, that the Arabs were fighting the
Americans and British rather than Israel alone, took hold in the
Arab world.
As reported by the British Representative in
Jeddah
, Saudi
Arabia, a country at odds with Egypt as a result of the Yemen
war:
President Abdel Nasser's allegation ... is firmly
believed by almost the whole Arab population here who listen to the
radio or read the press ...
Our broadcast denials are little heard and just not
believed.
The denials we have issued to the broadcasting service
and press have not been published.
Even highly educated persons basically friendly to us
seem convinced that the allegations are true.
Senior foreign ministry officials who received my
formal written and oral denials profess to believe them but
nevertheless appear skeptical.
I consider that this allegation has seriously damaged
our reputation in the Arab world more than anything else and has
caused a wave of suspicion or feeling against us which will persist
in some underlying form for the foreseeable future ...
Further denials or attempts at local publicity by us
will not dispel this belief and may now only exacerbate local
feeling since the Arabs are understandably sensitive to their
defeat with a sense of humiliation and resent self-justification by
us who in their eyes helped their enemy to bring this
about.
Well after the end of the war, the Egyptian government and its
newspapers continued to make claims of collusion between Israel,
the United Kingdom and the United States. These included a series
of weekly articles in
Al-Ahram, simultaneously broadcast
on Radio Cairo by
Mohamed
Heikal. Heikal attempted to uncover the "secrets" of the war.
He presented a blend of facts, documents, and interpretations.
Heikal's conclusion was clear-cut: there was a secret U.S.-Israeli
collusion against Syria and Egypt.
According to Israeli historian Elie Podeh: "All post-1967
[Egyptian] history textbooks repeated the claim that Israel
launched the war with the support of Britain and the United States.
The narrative also established a direct link between the 1967 war
and former imperialist attempts to control the Arab world, thus
portraying Israel as an imperialist stooge. The repetition of this
fabricated story, with only minor variations, in all history school
textbooks means that all Egyptian schoolchildren have been exposed
to, and indoctrinated with, the collusion story." The following
example comes from the textbook
Abdallah Ahmad Hamid al-Qusi,
Al-Wisam fi at-Ta'rikh:
The United States' role: Israel was not (fighting) on
its own in the (1967) war.
Hundreds of volunteers, pilots, and military officers
with American scientific spying equipment of the most advanced type
photographed the Egyptian posts for it (Israel), jammed the
Egyptian defense equipment, and transmitted to it the orders of the
Egyptian command.
In
Six Days of War,
historian
Michael Oren argues that the
Arab leadership spread false claims about American involvement in
order to secure Soviet support for the Arab side. After the war, as
the extent of the Israeli victory became apparent to the Arab
public, these claims helped deflect blame for the defeat away from
Nasser and other Arab leaders. In reaction to these claims, Arab
oil-producing countries announced either an oil embargo on the
United States and Britain or suspended oil exports altogether. Six
Arab countries broke off diplomatic relations with the United
States, and Lebanon withdrew its Ambassador.
A British guidance telegram to Middle East posts concluded: "The
Arabs' reluctance to disbelieve all versions of the big lie springs
in part from a need to believe that the Israelis could not have
defeated them so thoroughly without outside assistance."
Non-combat support
In a 1993
interview for the Johnson
Presidential Library
oral history archives, U.S. Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara revealed that a
carrier battle group, the
U.S. 6th Fleet,
on a training exercise near Gibraltar
was re-positioned towards the eastern Mediterranean
to be able to defend Israel. The
administration "thought the situation was so tense in Israel that
perhaps the Syrians, fearing Israel would attack them, or the
Russians supporting the Syrians might wish to redress the balance
of power and might attack Israel". The Soviets learned of this
deployment, which they regarded as offensive in nature, and in a
hotline message from Soviet Premier
Alexei Kosygin threatened the United States
with war.
The Soviet Union supported its Arab allies. In May 1967, the
Soviets started a surge deployment of their naval forces into the
East Mediterranean. Early in the crisis they began to shadow the US
and British carriers with destroyers and intelligence collecting
vessels. The Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean was
sufficiently strong to act as a major restraint on the U.S. Navy.
In a 1983 interview with the
Boston
Globe, McNamara said that "We damn near had war". He said
Kosygin was angry that "we had turned around a carrier in the
Mediterranean".
In his
book Six Days, veteran BBC journalist Jeremy Bowen claims that on 4 June 1967, the
Israeli ship Miryam left Felixstowe
with cases of machine guns, 105 mm tank
shells, and armored vehicles in "the latest of many consignments of
arms that had been sent secretly to Israel from British and
American reserves since the crisis started" and that "Israeli
transport planes had been running a 'shuttle service' in and out of
RAF
Waddington
in
Lincolnshire
". Bowen claims that
Harold Wilson had written to Eshkol saying
that he was glad to help as long as the utmost secrecy was
maintained.
Displaced populations
Arab
In his book
Righteous Victims, Israeli "
New Historian"
Benny
Morris writes:
In three villages southwest of Jerusalem and at
Qalqilya, houses were destroyed "not in battle, but as punishment
... and in order to chase away the inhabitants ...
---contrary to government...policy," Dayan wrote in his
memoirs.
In Qalqilya, about a third of the homes were razed and
about 12,000 inhabitants were evicted, though many then camped out
in the environs.
The evictees in both areas were allowed to stay and
later were given cement and tools by the Israeli authorities to
rebuild at least some of their dwellings.
But many thousands of other Palestinians now took to the roads.
Perhaps as many as seventy thousand, mostly from the Jericho area,
fled during the fighting; tens of thousands more left over the
following months. Altogether, about one-quarter of the population
of the West Bank, about 200-250,000 people, went into exile. ...
They simply walked to the Jordan River crossings and made their way
on foot to the East Bank. It is unclear how many were intimidated
or forced out by the Israeli troops and how many left voluntarily,
in panic and fear. There is some evidence of IDF soldiers going
around with loudspeakers ordering West Bankers to leave their homes
and cross the Jordan. Some left because they had relatives or
sources of livelihood on the East Bank and feared being permanently
cut off.
Thousands of Arabs were taken by bus from East Jerusalem to the
Allenby bridge, though there is no evidence of coercion. The free
Israeli-organized transportation, which began on June 11, 1967,
went on for about a month. At the bridge they had to sign a
document stating that they were leaving of their own free will.
Perhaps as many as seventy thousand people emigrated from the Gaza
Strip to Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world.
On July 2 the Israeli government announced that it would allow the
return of those 1967 refugees who desired to do so, but no later
than August 10, later extended to September 13. The Jordanian
authorities probably pressured many of the refugees, who
constituted an enormous burden, to sign up to return. In practice
only 14,000 of the 120,000 who applied were actually allowed by
Israel back into the West Bank by the beginning of September. After
that, only a trickle of "special cases" were allowed back, perhaps
3,000 in all.(328-9)
In addition, between 80,000 and 110,000 Syrians fled the Golan
Heights, of which about 20,000 were from the city of
Quneitra.
Jewish
Immediately after Israel's victory, Jews living in the Arab world
faced persecution and expulsion. According to historian Michael B.
Oren,
mobs attacked Jewish neighborhoods in Egypt, Yemen,
Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco, burning synagogues and assaulting
residents.
A pogrom in Tripoli, Libya
, left 18 Jews dead and 25 injured; the survivors
were herded into detention centers.
Of Egypt's 4,000 Jews, 800 were arrested, including the
chief rabbis of both Cairo and Alexandria, and their property
sequestered by the government.
The ancient communities of Damascus and Baghdad were
placed under house arrest, their leaders imprisoned and
fined.
A total of 7,000 Jews were expelled, many with merely a
satchel.
See also
Key people involved
References
Further reading
- Aloni, Shlomo (2001). Arab-Israeli Air Wars 1947–1982.
Osprey Aviation. ISBN 1-84176-294-6
- Bar-On, Mordechai, Morris, Benny and Golani, Motti (2002).
Reassessing Israel's Road to Sinai/Suez, 1956: A "Trialogue". In
Gary A. Olson (Ed.). Traditions and Transitions in
Israel Studies: Books on Israel, Volume VI (pp. 3–42).
SUNY Press. ISBN 0-7914-5585-8
- Bar-On, Mordechai, Never-Ending Conflict: Israeli Military
History, ISBN 0275981584
- Barzilai, Gad (1996). Wars, Internal Conflicts, and
Political Order: A Jewish Democracy in the Middle East. New
York University Press. ISBN 0-7914-2943
- Bard, Mitchell G. (2002). The Complete Idiot's Guide to
Middle East Conflict. Alpha books. ISBN 0028644107
- Black, Ian (1992). Israel's Secret Wars: A History of
Israel's Intelligence Services. Grove Press. ISBN
0-8021-3286-3
- Boczek, Boleslaw Adam (2005). International Law: A
Dictionary. Scarecrow Press. ISBN 0810850788
- Bowen, Jeremy (2003). Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the
Middle East. London: Simon & Schuster. ISBN
0-7432-3095-7
- Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since
1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-28716-2
- Christie, Hazel (1999). Law of the Sea. Manchester:
Manchester University Press. ISBN 0-7190-4382-4
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