The
Suez Crisis, also referred to as the
Tripartite Aggression, ( ; ; Kadesh
Campaign, or מלחמת סיני Sinai War) was a military attack on
Egypt
by Britain
, France, and Israel
beginning on
29 October 1956.
The attack
followed Egypt's decision of 26 July 1956 to nationalize the
Suez
Canal
, after the withdrawal of an offer by Britain and
the United
States
to fund the building of the Aswan Dam
, which was in response to Egypt recognizing the
People's
Republic of China
during the height of tensions between China and
Taiwan.
Background
The
Suez
Canal was opened in 1869, after ten years of work
financed by the French and Egyptian governments. The canal
was operated by the
Universal Company
of the Suez Maritime Canal, an Egyptian-chartered company; the
area surrounding the canal remained sovereign Egyptian territory
and the only land-bridge between Africa and Asia.
The canal
instantly became strategically important; it provided the shortest
ocean link between the Mediterranean
and the Indian Ocean
. The canal eased commerce for trading
nations and particularly helped European colonial powers to gain
and govern their colonies.
In 1875, as a result of debt and financial crisis, the Egyptian
ruler was forced to sell his shares in the canal operating company
to the British government of
Benjamin
Disraeli. They were willing buyers and obtained a 44% share in
the canal's operations for less than £4 million; this maintained
the majority shareholdings of the mostly French private investors.
With the 1882
invasion and
occupation of Egypt, the United Kingdom took
de facto control of the country as well as the
canal proper, and its finances and operations. The 1888
Convention of Constantinople
declared the canal a neutral zone under British protection. In
ratifying it, the
Ottoman Empire
agreed to permit international
shipping to
pass freely through the canal, in time of war and peace. The
Convention came into force in 1904, the same year as the
Entente cordiale, between
Britain and France.
Despite this convention, the strategic importance of the Suez Canal
and its control were proven during the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904—1905, after
Japan and Britain entered into a separate bilateral agreement.
Following
the Japanese surprise attack on the Russian Pacific Fleet based at
Port
Arthur
the Russians sent reinforcements from their fleet
in the Baltic
Sea
. The British denied the Russian fleet use of
the canal and forced it to steam around the entire continent of
Africa, giving the Japanese forces time to solidify their position
in the Far East.
The importance of the canal as a strategic intersection was again
apparent during the
First World War,
when Britain and France closed the canal to non-
Allied shipping.
The canal continued to be strategically important after the
Second World War as a conduit for
the shipment of
oil. Petroleum business
historian
Daniel Yergin wrote of the
period:
- [I]n 1948, the canal abruptly lost its traditional
rationale.... [British] control over the canal could no longer be
preserved on grounds that it was critical to the defense either of
India or of an empire that was being liquidated. And yet, at
exactly the same moment, the canal was gaining a new role — as the
highway not of empire, but of oil.... By
1955, petroleum accounted for half of the canal's traffic, and, in
turn, two thirds of Europe's oil passed through it.
See also
History of
Israel,
History of
Egypt
Events leading to the Suez Crisis
Post-war years
In the aftermath of
Second World
War, Great Britain was reassessing its role in the region in
light of the severe economic constraints and its
colonial history. The economic potential of the Middle East,
with its vast oil reserves, as well as the Suez Canal's
geo-strategic importance against the background of the Cold War,
prompted Britain to consolidate and strengthen its position there.
The
kingdoms of Egypt and Iraq
were seen as
vital to maintaining strong British influence in the
region.
Britain's military strength was spread throughout the region,
including the vast military complex at Suez with a garrison of some
80,000, making it one of the largest military installations in the
world. The Suez base was considered an important part of Britain's
strategic position in the Middle East, but it increasingly became a
source of growing tension in Anglo-Egyptian relations.Egypt's
post-war domestic politics were experiencing a radical change,
prompted in no small part by economic instability, inflation, and
unemployment. Unrest began to manifest itself in the growth of
radical political groups, such as the
Communist Party of Great
Britain and the
Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, and an increasingly hostile attitude
towards Britain and her presence in the country. Added to this
anti-British fervour was the perceived role Britain had held in the
creation of Israel. As
such, the actions of the Egyptian government began to mirror those
of its populace and an anti-British policy began to permeate
Egypt's relations with Britain.
In October 1951, the Egyptian government unilaterally abrogated the
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of
1936, the terms of which granted Britain a lease on the Suez
base for 20 more years. Britain refused to withdraw from Suez
relying upon its impinged treaty rights, as well as the sheer
presence of the Suez garrison. The price of such a course of action
was a steady escalation in increasingly violent hostility towards
Britain, and British troops in Egypt, which the Egyptian
authorities did little to curb.
On 25
January 1952, British attempts to disarm a troublesome auxiliary
police force barracks in Ismailia
resulted in the deaths of 41 Egyptians.
This in
turn led to anti-Western riots in Cairo
resulting in
heavy damage to property and the deaths of several foreigners,
including 11 British citizens. This proved to be a catalyst
for the removal of the Egyptian monarchy. On 23 July 1952 a
military coup by the
'
Free Officers Movement'—led
by
Muhammad Neguib and future
Egyptian President
Gamal Abdul
Nasser—overthrew King
Farouk and
established an Egyptian republic.
Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, cargo shipments to and
from Israel were intercepted, removed, or destroyed by the
Egyptians while attempting to pass through the Suez Canal. On 1
September 1951, the UN Security Council called upon Egypt: "... to
terminate the restrictions on the passage of international
commercial ships and goods through the Suez Canal, wherever bound,
and to cease all interference with such shipping." This
interference and confiscation, contrary to the laws of the canal
(Article 1 of the 1888 Suez Canal Convention), increased following
the coup.
Post-revolution period
Britain's desire to mend Anglo-Egyptian relations in the wake of
the coup saw her strive for rapprochement throughout 1953 and 1954.
Part of
this process was the agreement, in 1953, to terminate British rule
in Sudan
by 1956 in
return for Cairo's abandoning of its claim to suzerainty over the Nile Valley region.In
October 1954, Britain and Egypt concluded an agreement on the
phased evacuation of British troops from the Suez base, the terms
of which agreed to withdrawal of all troops within 20 months,
maintenance of the base to be continued, and for Britain to hold
the right to return for seven years.
Despite the establishment of such an agreement with the British,
Nasser's position remained tenuous. The loss of Egypt's claim to
Sudan, coupled with the continued presence of Britain at Suez for a
further two years, led to domestic unrest including an
assassination attempt against him in October 1954. The tenuous
nature of Nasser's rule caused him to believe that neither his
regime, nor Egypt's independence would be safe until Egypt had
established itself as head of the Arab world. This would manifest
itself in the challenging of British Middle Eastern interests
throughout 1955.
Britain's
close relationship with the two Hashemite
kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan
were of
particular concern to Nasser. In particular, Iraq's
increasingly amicable relations with Britain were a threat to
Nasser's desire to see Egypt as head of the Arab world. The
creation of the
Baghdad
Pact in 1955 seemed to confirm Nasser's fears that Britain was
attempting to draw the Eastern Arab World into a bloc centred upon
Iraq, and sympathetic to Britain. Nasser's response was a series of
challenges to British influence in the region that would culminate
in the Suez Crisis.
Frustration of British aims
Throughout 1955 and 1956 Nasser pursued a number of policies that
would frustrate British aims throughout the Middle East, and result
in increasing hostility between Britain and Egypt. Nasser "...
played on the widespread suspicion that any Western defence pact
was merely veiled colonialism and that Arab disunity and
weakness—especially in the struggle with Israel—was a consequence
of British machinations."
He also began to align Egypt with the
kingdom of Saudi
Arabia
—whose rulers were
hereditary enemies of the Hashemites—in an effort to frustrate
British efforts to draw Syria
, Jordan and Lebanon
into the orbit of the Baghdad Pact.
Nasser
frustrated British attempts to draw Jordan into the pact by
sponsoring demonstrations in Amman
, leading
King Hussein to dismiss the British commander of the Arab Legion
Glubb Pasha in March 1956 and
throwing Britain's Middle Eastern security policy into
chaos.
Nasser
struck a further blow against Britain by negotiating an arms deal
with communist Czechoslovakia
in September 1955 thereby ending Egypt's reliance
on Western arms. Later, other members of the
Warsaw Pact also sold arms to Egypt and Syria.
In
practice, all sales from the Eastern
Bloc were authorized by the Soviet Union
, as an attempt to increase Soviet influence over
the Middle East. This caused tensions in the United States
because
Warsaw Pact nations now had a
strong presence in the region.
Increasingly Nasser came to be viewed in British circles — and in
particular by Prime Minister
Anthony
Eden — as a dictator, akin to
Benito Mussolini. Anglo-Egyptian relations
would continue on their downward spiral.
Nationalization of the Suez Canal and the road to crisis
Britain
was eager to tame Nasser and looked towards the United States
for support. However, President
Eisenhower remained unresponsive;
America's closest ally in the region, Saudi Arabia, was just as
fundamentally opposed to the Hashemite-dominated Baghdad Pact as
Egypt, and the U.S. was keen to increase its own influence in the
region. The failure of the Baghdad Pact aided such a goal by
reducing Britain's dominance over the region. "Great Britain would
have preferred to overthrow Nasser; America, however uncomfortable
with the "Czech arms deal", thought it wiser to propitiate
him."
The events that brought the crisis to a head occurred in the spring
and summer of 1956.
On 16 May, Nasser officially recognized the
People's Republic of China, a move that angered the U.S. and its
secretary of state, John Foster
Dulles, a keen sponsor of Taiwan
.
This
move, coupled with the impression that the project was beyond
Egypt's economic capabilities, caused Eisenhower to withdraw all
American financial aid for the Aswan Dam project on 19 July.Nasser's response was
the nationalization of the Suez Canal. On 26 July, in a speech in Alexandria
, Nasser gave a riposte to Dulles. During his
speech he deliberately pronounced the name of
Ferdinand de Lesseps, the builder of
the canal, a code-word for Egyptian forces to seize control of the
canal and implement its nationalization.
In his 26
July speech in Alexandria, Nasser announced that the Nationalization Law had
been published, that all assets of the Suez Canal Company had been
frozen, and that stockholders would be paid the price of their
shares according to the day's closing price on the Paris Stock
Exchange
.
The
nationalization of the Suez
Canal hit British economic and military interests in the
region. Britain was under immense domestic pressure from
Conservative MPs who drew direct comparisons between the events of
1956 and those of the
Munich
Agreement in 1938. Since the US government did not support the
British protests, the British government decided in favour of
military intervention against Egypt to avoid the complete collapse
of British prestige in the region.
Direct military intervention, however, ran the risk of angering
Washington and damaging Anglo-Arab relations. As a result, the
British government concluded a secret military pact with France and
Israel that was aimed at regaining control over the Suez
Canal.
Anglo-Franco-American diplomacy
On 1
August 1956, a tripartite meeting was opened at 10 Downing
Street
between British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, U.S. Ambassador
Robert D. Murphy and French Foreign Affairs
Minister
Christian Pineau.
An alliance was soon formed between Eden and
Guy Mollet,
French Prime Minister, with
headquarters based in London.
General Stockwell and
Admiral Barjot were appointed as
Chief of Staff. Britain sought co-operation
with the United States throughout 1956 to deal with what it
maintained was a threat of an Israeli attack against Egypt, yet to
little effect.Between July and October 1956, unsuccessful
initiatives encouraged by the United States were made to reduce the
tension that would ultimately lead to war. International
conferences were organized to secure agreement on Suez Canal
operations but all turned out to be ultimately fruitless.
Protocol of Sèvres
Three months after Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal
company, a secret meeting took place at
Sèvres, outside Paris. Britain and France
enlisted Israeli support for an alliance against Egypt. The parties
agreed that Israel would invade the Sinai. Britain and France would
then intervene, purportedly to separate the warring Israeli and
Egyptian forces, instructing both to withdraw to a distance of 16
kilometres from either side of the canal.
The British and French would then argue that Egypt's control of
such an important route was too tenuous, and that it needed be
placed under Anglo-French management.
The interests of the parties were various. Britain was anxious lest
it lose efficient access to the remains of its empire. France was
nervous about the growing influence that Nasser exerted on its
North African colonies and protectorates. Both Britain and France
were eager that the canal should remain open as an important
conduit of oil. Israel wanted to reopen the canal to Israeli
shipping, and saw the opportunity to strengthen its southern border
and to weaken a dangerous and hostile state.
Prior to the operation, Britain deliberately neglected to take
counsel with the Americans, trusting instead that Nasser's
engagement with communist states would persuade the Americans to
accept British and French actions if they were presented as a fait
accompli. This proved to be a fatal miscalculation.
Invasion
Israeli conquest of Sinai
Operation Kadesh: The Israeli operation in the Sinai
Peninsula
Operation
Kadesh received its name from ancient Kadesh, located in the northern Sinai
and
mentioned several times in the Hebrew Pentateuch. Israeli military
planning for this operation in the Sinai hinged on four main
military objectives; Sharm el-Sheikh
, al-Arish
, Abu
Uwayulah
, and the
Gaza
Strip
. The Egyptian blockade of the Tiran Straits
was based at Sharm el-Sheikh and, by capturing the town, Israel would have
access to the Red Sea for the first time since 1953, which would
allow it to restore the trade benefits of secure passage to the
Indian Ocean.
The
Gaza
Strip was chosen as another military objective because
Israel wished to remove the training grounds for Fedayeen groups, and because Israel recognised that
Egypt could use the territory as a staging ground for attacks
against the advancing Israeli troops. Israel advocated
rapid advances, for which a potential Egyptian flanking attack would present even more
of a risk. al-Arish and Abu
Uwayulah were
important hubs for soldiers, equipment, and centres of command and
control of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai. Capturing them
would deal a deathblow to the Egyptian's strategic operation in the
entire Peninsula. The capture of these four objectives were hoped
to be the means by which the entire Egyptian Army would rout and
fall back into Egypt proper, which British and French forces would
then be able to push up against an Israeli advance, and crush in a
decisive encounter.
On the
first day of the war, because Israel's intelligence service
expected Jordan to enter the war on Egypt's side,
soldiers were stationed along the Israeli-Jordanian
frontier. The Israel
Border Police militarized the Israel-Jordan border, including
the Green
Line
with the West Bank
, during the first few hours of the war. This
resulted in the killing of 48 Arab civilians by the
Israel Border Police, and is known as
the
Kafr Qasim massacre. This
event and the resulting trials of officers had major effects on
Israeli law relating to the ethics in war and more subtle effects
on the legal status of
Arab
citizens of Israel.
Early actions in Southern Sinai
The
Israeli chief-of-staff, Major General Moshe
Dayan, first planned to take the vital Mitla Pass
. Dayan planned for the 1st Battalion, 890
Paratroop Brigade, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel
Rafael Eitan, a veteran of the Israel War of
Independence, and future head of the IDF, to drop at Parker's
Memorial, near one of the
defile
of the pass, Jebel Heitan. The rest of the brigade, under the
command of Colonel
Ariel Sharon would
then advance to meet with the battalion, and consolidate their
holdings.
On
29 October 1956,
Operation Kadesh - the conquest of
the Sinai, began when Israel air-dropped a battalion into the Sinai
Peninsula. The landing had not gone as planned, however, and the
forces were now several miles from their target, and wasted
valuable time and energy moving into their positions opposite the
Egyptian positions in the pass.
Early actions along the Gulf of Aqaba, and the central
front
Meanwhile, the 9th Infantry Brigade captured
Ras an-Naqb, an important staging ground
for that brigade's later attack against Sharm el-Sheikh. Instead of attacking the town by a frontal
attack, they enveloped the town, and negotiated their way through
some of the natural chokepoints into the rear of the town, and
surprised the Egyptians before they could ready themselves to
defend. The Egyptians surrendered, with no Israeli casualties
sustained.
The 4th
Infantry Brigade, under the command of Colonel Josef Harpaz, captured al-Qusaymah, which would be used as a jumping
off point for the assault against Abu Uwayulah.
Battle of Jebel Heitan, 890 Paratroop Brigade under attack
The portion of the 890 under Sharon's command continued to advance
to meet with the 1st Brigade. En route, Sharon assaulted
Themed, and was able to storm the town through the
Themed Gap, and was able to capture the
settlement.
On the 30th, Sharon linked up with Eytan
near Nakla
.
Dayan had no more plans for further advances beyond the passes, but
Sharon decided to attack the Egyptian positions at Jebel Heitan.
Sharon would send his lightly armed paratroopers against dug-in
Egyptians supported by air and heavy artillery, as well as tanks.
Although the Israelis succeeded in forcing the Egyptians to
retreat, the heavy casualties sustained would surround Sharon with
a lot of controversy. Most of the deaths sustained by the Israelis
in the entire operation, were sustained at Jebel Heitan.
Anglo-French Task Force
To
support the invasion, large air forces had been deployed to
Cyprus
and
Malta
by Britain and France and many aircraft carriers were deployed. The
two airbases on Cyprus were so congested that a third field which
was in dubious condition had to be brought into use for French
aircraft.
Even RAF Luqa
on Malta was extremely crowded with RAF Bomber Command aircraft. The
British deployed the aircraft carriers HMS
Eagle,
Albion and
Bulwark and France had the
Arromanches and
La Fayette on station. In
addition, HMS
Ocean and
Theseus acted as
jumping-off points for Britain's
helicopter-borne assault (the world's
first).
On 30 October, in the morning, Britain and France sent an ultimatum
to Egypt. They initiated
Operation Musketeer on 31
October, with a bombing campaign.
On 3 November F4U-7 Corsairs from the 14.F and 15.F
Aéronavale taking off from the French carriers
Arromanches and La Fayette, attacked the Cairo
aerodrome. Nasser responded by sinking all 40 ships present
in the canal, closing it to further shipping until early
1957.
On late 5
November, the 3rd
Battalion of the British Parachute Regiment dropped at El Gamil
Airfield, clearing the area and establishing a
secure base for incoming support aircraft and
reinforcements. At first light on 6 November, Commandos of Nos 42
Commando and 40
Commando
Royal Marines stormed the beaches, using
landing craft of World War II vintage (Landing Craft Assault and Landing Vehicle Tracked). The
battlegroup standing offshore opened fire, giving
covering fire for the landings and causing
considerable damage to the Egyptian batteries and gun emplacements.
The town
of Port
Said
sustained great damage and was seen to be
alight.
Acting in concert with British forces, 500 heavily-armed
paratroopers of the French
2nd Colonial Parachute
Regiment (
2ème RPC), hastily redeployed from combat in
Algeria, jumped over the al-Raswa bridges from
Noratlas Nord 2501 transports of the
Escadrille de Transport (ET) 1/61 and ET 3/61, together
with some combat engineers of the
Guards Independent
Parachute Company. Despite the loss of two soldiers, the
western bridge was swiftly secured by the paras, and
F4U Corsairs of the
Aéronavale 14.F and 15.F flew a series of
close-air-support missions, destroying several
SU-100 tank destroyers.
F-84Fs
also hit two large oil storage tanks in Port Said, which went up in
flames and covered most of the city in a thick cloud of smoke for
the next several days. Egyptian resistance varied, with some
positions fighting back until destroyed, while others were
abandoned with little resistance.
In the
afternoon, 522 additional French paras of the 1er REP (Régiment
Étranger Parachutiste, 1st Foreign Parachute
Regiment) were dropped near Port Fouad
. These were also constantly supported by the
Corsairs of the French Aéronavale, which flew very intensive
operations: for example, although the French carrier
La
Fayette developed catapult problems, no less than 40 combat
sorties were completed. In total, 10 French soldiers were killed
and 30 injured during the landing and the subsequent battles.
British commandos of No.
45 Commando
assaulted by helicopter, meeting stiff resistance,
with shore batteries striking several helicopters, while friendly fire from British carrier-borne
aircraft caused casualties to 45 Commando and HQ. Street
fighting and house clearing, with strong opposition from
well-entrenched Egyptian
sniper positions,
caused further casualties.
Total British dead were 16, with 96 wounded. Total French dead was
ten and the Israelis lost 189. The number of Egyptians killed was
"never reliably established" . It is estimated 650 were killed by
the Anglo-French operation and 1,000 killed by Israel.
Introduction of UN peacekeepers
Despite having no commercial or military interest in the area, many
countries were concerned with what might be a growing rift between
Western allied nations. Canadian
Lester B. Pearson, who would later become the
Prime Minister of Canada,
went to the
United Nations and
suggested creating a
United Nations Emergency
Force (UNEF) in the Suez to "keep the borders at peace while a
political settlement is being worked out." Both Britain and France
rejected the idea, so Canada turned to the United States.
After several days of tense diplomacy, the United Nations accepted
the suggestion, and a neutral force not involving the major
alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact—though Canadian troops
participated since Canada spearheaded the idea of a neutral force)
was sent with the consent of Nasser, stabilizing conditions in the
area. By April 24 of 1957 the canal was fully reopened to shipping.
The Israelis refused to host any UN force on Israeli controlled
territory. Pearson was awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his efforts.
The United Nations Peacekeeping Force was Pearson's creation and he
is considered the father of the modern concept of "
peacekeeping".
End of hostilities
The operation, aimed at taking the Suez Canal, was highly
successful from a military point of view but was a political
disaster due to external forces. Along with the Suez crisis, the
United States was also dealing with the near-simultaneous
Hungarian revolution, and faced
the
public relations embarrassment
of criticizing Hungary's suppression of the revolutionaries there
while at the same time avoiding criticism of its two principal
European allies' actions.
Perhaps more significantly, the United
States also feared a wider war after the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw
Pact nations threatened to intervene on the Egyptian side and
make rocket attacks on London, Paris, and Tel Aviv
.
Thus, the
Eisenhower
administration forced a cease-fire on Britain, Israel, and
France. The U.S. demanded that the invasion stop and supported
Canada in sponsoring resolutions in the UN Security Council calling
for a cease-fire. Britain and France, as permanent members of the
Council, vetoed these draft resolutions. Canada and the U.S. then
appealed to the
United
Nations General Assembly and proposed a resolution calling for
a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces.
The General Assembly consequently held an 'emergency special
session' under the terms of
Uniting
for Peace resolution, and adopted Assembly resolution 1001,
which established the first
United Nations Emergency
Force (UNEF), and called for "an immediate cease-fire".
Portugal
and Iceland went so far as to suggest ejecting Britain and France
from the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO)
defense pact if they didn't withdraw from Egypt. Britain and
France withdrew from Egypt within a week.
The United States also put financial pressure on Great Britain to
end the invasion. Eisenhower in fact ordered his Secretary of the
Treasury,
George M. Humphrey to prepare to sell part of the
US Government's Sterling Bond holdings. The Government held these
bonds in part to aid post war Britain’s economy (during the
Cold War), and as partial payment of
Britain’s enormous
World War II debt to
the US Government, American corporations, and individuals. It was
also part of the overall effort of
Marshall Plan aid, in the rebuilding of the
Western European economies.
Britain's then
Chancellor of
the Exchequer,
Harold
Macmillan, advised his Prime Minister
Anthony Eden that the United States was fully
prepared to carry out this threat. He also warned his Prime
Minister that Britain's foreign exchange reserves simply could not
sustain a devaluation of the pound that would come after the United
States' actions; and that within weeks of such a move, the country
would be unable to import the food and energy supplies needed
simply to sustain the population on the islands.
Furthermore, in concert with US actions
Saudi
Arabia started an oil embargo
against Britain and France. The U.S. refused to fill the gap
until Britain and France agreed to a rapid withdrawal. The other
NATO members refused to sell oil they received from Arab nations to
Britain or France. There was also a measure of discouragement for
Britain in the rebuke by the
Commonwealth Prime Minister St. Laurent of Canada .
The British government and the
pound
thus both came under pressure.
Sir
Anthony Eden, the
British Prime Minister,
announced a cease fire on 6 November, warning neither France nor
Israel beforehand. Troops were still in Port Said and on
operational manoeuvres when the order came from London.
Without
further guarantee, the Anglo-French Task
Force had to finish withdrawing by 22 December 1956, to be
replaced by Danish and Colombian
units of UNEF. The Israelis left the Sinai
in March, 1957.
The crisis broke the health of Eden and he was forced into
retirement shortly afterwards.
Aftermath
The political and psychological impact of the crisis's denouement
had a fundamental impact on British politics. Anthony Eden, widely
admired across the globe for his stand against appeasement of the
fascists in the 1930s and then for his seemingly selfless toil as
Winston Churchill's understudy,
suffered a mental breakdown and was quickly bundled out of office.
His successor,
Harold Macmillan,
won office after convincing Conservative MPs he would defend
Britain's imperialist heritage but greatly accelerated
decolonisation. Increasingly British foreign policy thinking turned
towards European co-operation as opposed to acting as a great
imperial power.
Eden's resignation marked the last significant attempt Britain made
to impose its military will abroad without U.S. support. Macmillan
was every bit as determined as Eden had been to stop Nasser,
although he was more willing to enlist American support in future,
for that end. Some argue that the crisis also marked the final
transfer of power to the new
superpowers,
the United States and the Soviet Union.
The
incident demonstrated the weakness of the NATO alliance in
its lack of planning and co-operation beyond the European
stage. From the point of view of General
de Gaulle, the Suez events demonstrated
that France could not rely on allies any more. Britain withdrew its
troops in the midst of the battle without warning its allies. In
1957, following these events, the French government launched an
autonomous nuclear programme conducted in the Sahara, known as
Force de frappe, as a deterrent not
only against the USSR but vis-à-vis every potential threat around
the globe. By 1966 de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated
NATO military command.
According to the protocol of Sèvres
agreements, France secretly transmitted parts of its own atomic
technology
to Israel,
including a detonator.
The imposed end to the crisis signalled the definitive weakening of
the United Kingdom and France as
global
powers. Nasser's standing in the
Arab
world was greatly improved, with his stance helping to promote
pan-Arabism. The crisis also arguably
hastened the process of
decolonization, as the remaining colonies of
both Britain and France gained independence over the next several
years.
In Canada, the Suez Crisis contributed to the adoption of a new
national flag without references to that country's past as a colony
of France and Britain. The Egyptian government had objected to
Canadian peacekeeping troops on the grounds that their flag at that
time included a British ensign. This further encouraged Prime
Minister Lester B. Pearson to advocate the simple Maple Leaf that
was eventually adopted. The French government never quite forgave
Canada for its role in the crisis, and de Gaulle's infamous visit
to French-speaking Quebec, encouraging radical separatist feelings
by uttering the infamous
Vive
le Québec libre call that eventually lead to the
October Crisis, would sour the two countries'
relations.
After
Suez, Aden
and
Iraq became the main bases for the British in the region
while the French concentrated their forces at Bizerte
and Beirut
.
UNEF was placed in the Sinai (on Egyptian territory only) with the
express purpose of maintaining the cease-fire. While effective in
preventing the small-scale warfare that prevailed before 1956 and
after 1967, budgetary cutbacks and changing needs had seen the
force shrink to 3,378 by 1967.
After border disputes led to a series of military clashes between
Israel and Syria, the Egyptian government, warned by a false Soviet
intelligence report of an imminent Israeli invasion of Syria, began
to
remilitarize the Sinai in support
of its ally, and demanded that UNEF withdraw.
This action, along
with the blockade of the Straits of Tiran
, was the final step in a series of escalations
between the two sides that led to the Six
Day War of June 1967. During the war, Israeli armed
forces captured the east bank of the canal, which subsequently
became a de facto boundary between Egypt and Israel and the canal
was therefore closed until June, 1975.
See also
Notes
References
- . Chapter 24 is devoted entirely to the Suez Crisis.
External links
Media links
- "The Suez canal and the nationalization by Colonel
Nasser" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, 1
August 1956 Fr.
(views of Nasser EG, Pineau FR, Lloyd UK, Murphy US, Downing
street, comment on international tension)
- "The new pilots engaged for the Suez canal"
French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, 3 October 1956
French
(views of Port Said, the canal and Ferdinand de Lesseps' statue few
weeks before the Suez Crisis, incl. a significant comment on
Nasser)
- "French paratroopers in Cyprus" French news
from the National Audiovisual Institute, 6 November 1956
French
(details on the French-British settings and material, views of
Amiral Barjot, General Keightley, camp and scenes in Cyprus)
- "Dropping over Port Said" French news from the
National Audiovisual Institute, 6 November 1956
French
(views of British paratroopers dropping over Port Said, comment on
respective mission for the French and British during Operation
Amilcar)
- "Suez: French-British landing in Port Fouad &
Port Said" French news from the National Audiovisual Institute,
9 November 1956 mute
(views of French-British in Cyprus, landing in Port Fouad, landing
Port Said, Gal Massu, Gal Bauffre, convoy)
- "The French in Port Said" French news from the
National Audiovisual Institute, 9 November 1956
mute
(views of prisoners and captured material, Gal Massu, para
commandos, Egyptian cops surrender, Gal Beauffre, landing craft on
the canal)
- "Dropping of Anglo-French over the canal zone"
French news from the National Audiovisual Institute, 14 November
1956 French
(views of 2 Nordatlas, paratroopers, dropping of para and material
circa Port Said, comment on no bombing to secure the
population)
- "Canal obstructed by sunken ships" French news
from the National Audiovisual Institute, 14 November 1956
French
(views of troops in Port Said, Ferdinand de Lesseps' statue,
comment on the 21 ships sunken by the "dictator")
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