
Pocket badge of the UNPROFOR.
The
United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR), was the first UN peacekeeping force in Croatia
and in
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
during the Yugoslav
wars. It existed between the beginning of UN involvement
in February 1992, and its restructuring into other forces in March
1995. In French, its name was FORPRONU (
Force de Protection des
Nations Unies).
Personnel
The UNPROFOR was composed of nearly 39,000 personnel, 320 of whom
were killed on duty.
It was composed of troops from Argentina
, Bangladesh
, Belgium
, Brazil
, Canada
, Colombia
, Czech Republic
, Denmark
, Egypt
, Finland
, France
, Ghana
, India
, Indonesia
, Ireland
, Italy, Jordan
, Kenya
, Lithuania
, Malaysia
, Nepal
, Netherlands
, New
Zealand
, Nigeria
, Norway
, Pakistan
, Poland
, Portugal
, the Russian Federation
, Slovak
Republic
, Spain
, Sweden
, Switzerland
, Tunisia
, Turkey
, Ukraine
, the
United
Kingdom
and the United States
.
The commanders of the UNPROFOR were:
Prominent officers :
Mandate
UNPROFOR was created by
UN Security Council
Resolution 743 (21 February 1992).
The initial mandate of the UNPROFOR was to ensure conditions for
peace talks, and security in three demilitarised "safe-haven"
enclaves designated as
United Nations
Protected Areas (UNPAs) located in the former Yugoslav republic
of Croatia: Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina. They
were places with strong Serb populations that had organised into
the self-styled
Republic of
Serbian Krajina, which had led to tensions and fighting.
In 1992,
the mandate was extended to so-called "pink zones" controlling
access to the UNPAs, some border control and monitoring of civilian
access to the Pink Zones, and control of the demilitarisation of
the Prevlaka
peninsula near Dubrovnik
.

The only airplane visible on Sarajevo
airport, beyond repair since the beginning of the war.
The airport was on the frontline between the Serbs and the
Bosnians.
Other
extensions of the mandate included protection for Sarajevo
airport
from June 1992 (Resolution 758 [76184]), and, from September 1992, protection
for humanitarian aid in the whole Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
protection of civilian refugees when required by the ICRC (Resolution
770 [76185]).
UNPROFOR
was in charge of air interdiction for military aircraft in the
Bosnia and Herzegovina airspace (as ordered by the UN Security
Council), in coordination with NATO
forces (air
interdiction missions were the first use of force by
NATO).
It also
monitored Bihać
, Sarajevo,
Goražde
, Žepa
, Srebrenica
and Tuzla
, which were
defined as "security zones" by the UN Security Council.
UNPROFOR was authorised to use force to protect these zones if
necessary, in coordination with NATO air forces. This was later
extended to parts of Croat territories.
Eventually, UNPROFOR monitored cease-fires in Bosnia in February
1994 and January 1995.
On 31 March 1995, UNPROFOR was restructured into three coordinated
peace operations.
On 20 December 1995 the forces of the UNPROFOR were reflagged under
the NATO led Implementation Force (
IFOR) whose
task was to implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP — otherwise known as the Dayton
Accords or
Dayton Agreement).
Achievements
February 1992 – March 1993
Cedric Thornberry was Director of
UNPROFOR Civil Affairs at the beginning of the mission in February
1992. By the end of its first mandate in March 1993, UNPROFOR had
had some success in restoring peace in Croatia, notably obtaining a
removal of the
Yugoslav People's
Army (JNA) in May 1992. However, civil unrest was such that
terror, discrimination and "
ethnic
cleansing" were still present. Local Serb forces managed to
complete their cleansing of the UNPA areas, started in 1991, that
left only 279 Croats there out of a pre-war population of
102,000.
The situation was problematic mostly because of the non-cooperation
of local Serb authorities, and because of later major Croat
military offensives. Additionally, the situation for which the
UNPROFOR had been designed had significantly changed. The Croat
part now refused to negotiate its sovereignty on the UNPAs and Pink
Zones, which the Serb part would not accept. Apparition of the
so-called "
Republic of
Serbian Krajina" further complicated the situation.
The Opening of the Sarajevo Airport was conducted by the Canadian
Operational Force, which moved within the Theater of Operations
from Croatia (Surac) to the combat zone of Sarajevo. The Canadian
Force included the French-speaking
Royal 22e Régiment, with
the attachment of N Company of the English-speaking
3rd Battalion,
The Royal Canadian Regiment.
The
Canadian Contingent was deployed by train from Canadian
Forces Base Baden-Soellingen
and CFB Lahr
, Germany.
In spite
of hostile actions, Sarajevo
international airport had successfully been
maintained open. In the period from 3 July 1992 to 31
January 1993, the humanitarian airlift organised by
UNHCR under UNPROFOR protection brought in 2,476
aircraft carrying 27,460 tons of food, medicines and other relief
goods.
Distribution of humanitarian aid was disrupted due to
non-cooperation and even hostile actions (mines, small arms fire,
RPG) of the parties on the field, especially from the Bosnian Serb
forces. Nonetheless, from November 1992 to January 1993, a total of
some 34,600 tons of relief supplies had been delivered to an
estimated 800,000 beneficiaries in 110 locations throughout Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
March 1993 – February 1994
Croat incursions
On the 6
July 1993, new tensions arose following the Croatian government's
decision to re-open the strategic Maslenica
bridge on 18 July - Croatia
was cut in half while the bridge was in Serb hands. The
UNPROFOR mandated to monitor the withdrawal of Croatian forces from
the area had been able to deploy, due to the refusal of access by
Croat authorities. The Serbs shelled the bridge which was partially
destroyed on
2 August. On
12 August, negotiations for a cease-fire began in
Geneva, but were unsuccessful. Eventually, Croat forces retreated
to their positions of before the incursion.
Operation "Deny Flight"
In mid-March, unidentified airplanes dropped bombs onto villages in
the vicinity of Srebrenica violating the "No-Flight zones" for the
first time. The Bosnian Serbs were blamed for the bombing but
denied it. On
31 March, a resolution was
voted authorising the nations contributing to the UNPROFOR to take
"all necessary measures" to prevent military flights from the
belligerents in the no-flight zones ("
Operation Deny Flight"). French, Dutch
and American airplanes were deployed to enforce the resolution. In
total, until 1 December 1994, 3317 violations were observed. On 28
February 1994, four military aircraft were shot down by NATO
fighters over Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Safe areas
From March 1993, Serb para-military units on a systematic campaign
of terror killed a great number of civilians, destroyed
habitations, prevented the UNHCR from delivering humanitarian aid,
and forced thousands of Bosniak refugees to flee to Srebrenica. 30
or 40 persons were dying daily from military action, starvation,
exposure to cold or lack of medical treatment. Resolution 819
attempted to address this issue by declaring Srebrenica a "Safe
Area" which should be free from any armed attack or any other
hostile act. Resolution 836 expanded the mandate to the UNPROFOR to
defending the Safe Area if necessary. To implement the deterrence,
around 7600 reinforcements were sent and air support was organised
in coordination with NATO.
Unfortunately, the UN force were so poorly equipped and
restrictively mandated that they could not even deter Bosnian
forces within the "Safe Areas" themselves. Bosnian forces
increasingly used the Safe Areas as bases to launch attacks against
the Serbs, which infuriated the Serbs, and explains the obstruction
by General Mladić against protective measures for the "Safe Areas"
[76186].
War in Bosnia
In May 1993, intense fighting broke out in Central Bosnia between
Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. Croat para-military forces, whose tie
to the authorities was unclear, committed exactions against Serbs
and Bosniaks. The massacre in the village of
Ahmići, on 16 April 1993, is an example of the
savagery of the terror
[76187] [76188].
Tihomir
Blaškić was the officer of the Croat HVO army formation who was
tried and convicted at the ICTY
over his
responsibility for this massacre. Blaškić served almost nine
years in prison before the appeals panel acquitted him of most of
the charges in July 2004, as the defence proved that he did not
command all the HVO units in the area or any paramilitary units
[76189].
On
24 September, the Security Council
was informed by the Croatian Government that if the mandate of
UNPROFOR was not amended to promote energetic implementation of the
relevant resolutions of the Security Council, Croatia would be
forced to request UNPROFOR to leave the country not later than 30
November 1993. Subsequent redefinition of the mandate
occurred.
At the end of the year, the warring parties attempted to come to a
cease-fire. The truce was implemented between Croat and Serb
forces, but fighting went on in Bosnia between Bosniaks and Croats,
and the humanitarian situations continued to deteriorate. Notably,
Sarajevo continued to be bombarded by Bosnian Serb forces. It was
also reported that units of the regular Croat army were supporting
Bosnian Croat forces with heavy equipment and men, removing their
insignias. This led to further protests from the UN. Use of force
began to be discussed at a NATO summit held in Brussels on 10 and
11 January 1994.
Following the elevation of tone of the UN,
the Bosnian Serbs, following talks with high-ranking officials of
the Russian Federation in Moscow, agreed to open the Tuzla
airport for
humanitarian purposes. At the same time, the relieving of UN
troops in Srebrenica was allowed and the Canadian contingent was
replaced by a Dutch contingent.
The situation in Sarajevo, however, remained extremely tense, with
Bosnian Serb sniper fire deliberately aimed at civilians, and
artillery and heavy mortar fire aimed at population areas. This
strongly shaped Western public opinion, since a number of
journalists were operating in Sarajevo, and murdered civilians were
seen in the evening news on a regular basis. On 4 February 1994, a
mortar shell fired at a suburb of Sarajevo killed 10 people and
wounded 18. The next day, a 120-mm mortar round fired at the
central market killed at least 58 civilians and wounded 142 others
in the worst single incident of the 22-month war.
Exasperation at these
provocations grew to the point where an ultimatum was sent,
requiring the removal or surrender to the UNPROFOR of all heavy
guns 20 km from Sarajevo (Bosnian and Bosnian Serb, with an
exception for Pale
) within 10
days. The ultimatum was satisfied on
17 February, with the heavy weapons not removed
being regrouped in seven UNPROFOR-controlled spots.
In another positive development, on 23 February 1994, a cease-fire
was decided between Croat and Bosnian forces - the Washington
Agreement - which ended their one-year long war and united the
sides as
Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
March 1994 – November 1994
Positive developments and extension of mandate
On 24
March 1994, a plan for the re-opening of the Tuzla
airport,
for UNPROFOR and humanitarian use only, was published.
On 29 March 1994, in Zagreb, representatives of the Government of
Croatia and the local Serb authorities in UNPAs concluded a
cease-fire agreement aiming to achieve a lasting cessation of
hostilities.
Parallelly, the mandate of the UNPROFOR was extended for another
six months, and reinforcements were sent, amounting to 10,000
troops and a few hundred policemen and observers.
During 1994, UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia came under increased
military attacks, resulting in several battle engagements (
Operation Bøllebank,
Operation Amanda), with Bosnian Serb
forces.
Assault against safe areas
Shortly
after the cease-fire between Croat and Serb forces, the Bosnian
Serbs launched an assault against the Safe area of Goražde
, heavily shelling the town and surrounding
villages. Protests and exhortations from the UN Security
Council turned out to be ineffective, and on 10 and 11 April 1994,
NATO launched air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions. In
retaliation, Bosnian Serb forces captured many UN personnel, using
them as human shields at sites expected to be bombed. The bombings
turned out to be much less effective than the recent
Gulf War, which had conditioned the public
understanding of air strikes. In spite of the demonstration of
power of the NATO, and protests of good faith from the Serbs, the
shelling continued. In a similar situation as what had happened in
Sarajevo, an ultimatum was issued, and by the 24th, most of the
Serb troops had complied. These incidents led to another reflection
about the status of the Safe Areas.
Attempts at designing a peace plan
Several Peace Plans had been rejected (the Carrington-Cutiliero
plan, the Vance-Owen plan, the "HMS Invincible" package, the
European Union Action Plan). At the end of July, a blueprint was
designed by the Contact Group, which was accepted by the Croat, the
Serb and the Bosnian parties. The Bosnian Serbs, however, refused
the plan. In early August, in an attempt to coerce the Bosnian
Serbs into accepting the plan, the Serbian government cut political
and economic relationships with the Bosnian Serb leaders. This
decision was welcomed by the UN Security Council. On
23 September, the UN Security Council
officially welcomed the agreement of the warring parties to the
peace plan, condemned the Bosnian Serb refusal, and strengthened
the sanctions against the Bosnian Serb entity.
Bosnian Serb isolation
On 23 September 1994, in retaliation to the Bosnian Serb
obstruction to the Peace Plan, the Security Council, by its
resolution 942, basically severed all commercial and monetary links
to the Bosnian Serb entity. Notably, this cut the flow of fuel to
the Bosnian Serbs, a hard strategic blow.
Due to the extreme position taken by the Bosnian Serb government,
the Yugoslav Federation (Serbia and Montenegro) itself had to take
a strong stance against the Bosnian Serb entity. This led to the
quasi-complete diplomatic isolation of the Bosnian Serb
entity.
Deterioration in security
In August 1994, the situation deteriorated again, particularly due
to sniper activity, and despite the anti-sniper agreements. In
Sarajevo, the bloody "
Sniper Alley"
became famous and infamous
[76190]. Deliberate attacks against UNPROFOR personnel
or aircraft became frequent.
In October, the Bosnian Muslim forces, trapped in the Bihać pocket,
attacked the Bosnian Serb forces in an attempt to end the siege of
the city. The attack and the ensuing counter-attack by the Bosnian
Serbs induced terror in the local population and another massive
exodus of refugees. In deliberate contradiction with the "Safe
Area" status of Bihać and the "No-flight" zones, Bosnian Serb
airplanes made repeated attacks in the Bihać area, using cluster
bombs and napalm.
In reaction to this threat, on
21
November, NATO airplanes destroyed the Udbina airstrip, located
in the UNPA Sector South in Croatia. The following days, NATO
airplanes again had to intervene, against Bosnian Serb anti-air
missiles sites which had opened fire upon British jets, and against
artillery sites which shelled Bihać. Instead of lowering their
profile, the Bosnian Serbs retaliated by taking UN personnel
hostage and restraining humanitarian aid transit.
On the diplomatic scene, all efforts to come to a cease-fire turned
out to be to no avail, here again mostly because of Bosnian Serb
obstruction—Dr.
Karadžić
declined the invitation of the UN Secretary-General.
UN hostages and the Vrbanja bridge
On the 26
May 1995 following NATO air raids on Pale
as the Bosnian Serbs defied another UN ultimatum on
heavy weapons, around 400 Blue Helmets
were taken hostage, brought to strategic points as human shields, and shown in chains on Serbian
TV..
On the 27 May 1995, General
Mladić
launched an assault against the UN observation point of the Vrbanja
bridge. At 5 in the morning, the French captain commanding the
position lost contact with the 12 men and went to investigate. A
Serb dressed with a blue helmet and French body armour and uniform
attempted to take him hostage, but was deterred by the escort, and
the officer managed to escape. In the following hours, after
intense shelling by
ERC 90 Sagaie
armoured vehicles, the French stormed the post, killing four Serbs
and capturing four others. Two French soldiers were killed..
At 12 o'clock, the Bosnian Serb radio broadcast that General Mladić
had ordered to
- "deploy the captured members of the UNPROFOR, and the other
foreign citizens who had acted as enemies of the Serbian people, at
command posts, depots and other important facilities."
- "The United Nations in this particular situation have decided
to hire a murderer, it is called the NATO alliance. It is a hired
killer. If NATO wishes to continue with its air strikes then it
will have to kill the UN troops here on the ground, because we have
positioned UN troops and observers around potential targets that
NATO might decide to go for. The international community therefore
will have to pay a very heavy price. And it will not stop at that.
The Serbs are determined to make a point to the whole world."
(Jovan Zametica, Karadžić's spokesman)
On the
30 May, Ratko Mladić phoned
Rupert Smith and agreed not to put hostage Blue
Helmets in chains, but to merely "bring" them on strategic sites.
He also
demanded "excuses" for the death of the four Serbian soldiers
killed by the French at Vrbanja bridge, threatening to "be unable
to guarantee the safety" of the UN forces in Goražde
.
The fall of Srebrenica (7 July 1995)
The
United Nations failed to deter the Serb attack on Srebrenica
because they were not able to sufficiently reinforce the Dutch
battalion in place. When the dual key
practices effectively prevented any serious air support from
materialising all the Dutch could do was evacuate the women and
children. The Serbs held the men and massacred them.
The events in
Srebrenica
led to the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU)
report
The massacre was not followed by any particular military reaction
from the UN force, which later led NATO to abandon dual-key
arrangements and initiate "
Operation Deliberate Force" in
response to further provocations by Serb forces.
In retaliation for the NATO bombings, the Serbs proceeded to
retrieve their confiscated heavy weapons from the UN-controlled
concentration points by force. The peace-keepers, massively
out-numbered, had to surrender after brief symbolic fights. In
several instances, Blue Helmets were surrounded in weapon storage
areas by massively superior Serbian forces. General
Hervé Gobillard, commanding officer for
UN troops in Sarajevo, stated that the peacekeepers were "merely
limited in their movements, yet [had] arms, ammunition food for
many days and strict orders to defend their positions", but in the
light of the hostage-takings, concerns were raised and the UN-led
bombing stopped.
Also, Serbian retaliations against civilians
because of the bombings caused 70 dead and 150 wounded in Tuzla
, and 5 dead
in Goražde
.
Operation Storm and Dayton
The above actions and the operations by Croat Forces in the
Krajinas in
Operation Storm in
August 1995 altered the political geography of BiH. Collectively
these ultimately led to the
Dayton
Agreement and the deployment of the NATO led IFOR on 20
December 1995 to ensure the adherence of the Former Warring
Factions (FWF) to the Military Annexes of The General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Perception in participating countries
The situation of the field was complex, notably due to the fact
that there were three warring parties, and numerous para-military
units, responsible for the most atrocious exations, and outside of
the regular chain of command. Also, most of the parties would use
ambiguous tactics. For instance (and not exhaustively) :
- the Bosnian Serbs would use massive shelling of villages for
their "ethnic cleansing", while
alleging their good faith.
- General Mladić had ordered the shelling of a sector near the
Sarajevo airport, while he was on official visit, on the express
purpose of appearing heroic in front of the French Blue helmets and
to cast doubts as to who was responsible for the bombardment.
- The Bosnian party would use the Safe Areas to the best of the
tactical situation to storm Serb positions or villages.
- In numerous occasions, small groups of one of the warring
parties would progress between enemy positions and UN positions and
open fire on the Blue helmets in the hope of triggering a response
from the UN troops.
- In the event of the Srebrenica
massacre, which triggered a number of investigations to
determine the reasons for the failure of the UN to deter Serbian
forces to storm the town, accusations have been made, notably by
General Morillon, that the Serbs actually fell in a propaganda trap
used by the Bosnians to reinforce their image of victims and blur
their use of Safe Areas as bases. Morillon said that he thought the
hatred of the Serbs toward the population of Srebrenica had been
largely underestimated by all parties, and the massacre could be
explained as a loss of control of the Serbian hierarchy upon some
of its troops.
A great deal of resentment and frustration arose in the
participating countries, especially in those whose troops had been
in contact with the most outrageous situations; for instance (and
not exclusively)
- The involvement of the British battalion, especially concerning
the Ahmići massacre, has inspired the
film Warriors by the
BBC.
- The
involvement of the Dutch battalion (DutchBat) in Srebrenica
inspired The
Enclave.
- The involvement of the Canadian battalian (CanBat) in Krajina inspired Peacekeepers.
- The general situation in Sarajevo inspired the (somewhat
Manichean and simplistic) comic Sarajevo Tango, by Hermann. (See samples [76191] [76192], [76193])
- The
attack against French Blue Helmets by Serb forces disguised as
French UN Troops on the bridge of Vrbanja
[76194].
- The taking of hostages amongst UN peace-keeping personnel when
Bosnian Serb forces proceeded to retrieve their heavy weapons from
UN controlled regroupement points by force.
- Particularly moving episodes, such as the "Sarajevo's Romeo and
Juliet" [76195], inevitable in any conflict, but
abundantly mediatised. The "Sarajevo's Romeo and Juliet" incident
inspired the documentary Romeo and Juliet in
Sarajevo.
- In French, the word "sniper" entered the common vocabulary
after "Sniper Alley" became famous, and it quite supplanted the
usual words tireur d'élite, tireur embusqué or
franc-tireur.
References
- Jerry Blaskovich, Anatomy of Deceit: An American
Physician's First-hand Encounter With The Realities Of The War In
Croatia
- L´Humanité, 30 May 1995
- 29 May 1995
- L'Humanité, 30 May 1995
See also
External links
- General Philippe Morillon, Paroles de soldat, Balland,
1996
- General Philippe Morillon, Croire et oser, chronique de
Sarajevo, Grasset, 1993
- Chief Logistics Officer UNPROFOR 1995 Abbas Ali Khan