War is a reciprocated, armed conflict between two
or more non-congruous entities, aimed at reorganising a
subjectively designed, geo-politically desired result. In his book
On War,
Prussian military theoretician
Carl Von Clausewitz calls war the
"continuation of
political intercourse,
carried on with other means." War is an interaction in which two or
more opposing forces have a “struggle of wills”. The term is also
used as a metaphor for non-military conflict, such as in the
example of
Class war.
War is not necessarily considered to be the same as
occupation,
murder, or
genocide because of the reciprocal nature
of the violent struggle, and the
organized nature of the units
involved.
A
civil war is a war between factions of
citizens of one country (such as in the
American Civil War), or else a dispute
between two nations that were created out of one formerly-united
country. A
proxy war is a war that results
when two powers use third parties as substitutes for fighting each
other directly.
War is also a cultural entity, and its practice is not linked to
any single type of political organization or society. Rather, as
discussed by
John Keegan in his
History Of Warfare, war is a universal phenomenon whose
form and scope is defined by the society that wages it. The conduct
of war extends along a continuum, from the almost universal
tribal warfare that began well before
recorded human history, to wars between
city
states,
nations, or
empires.
In the organised military sense, a group of combatants and their
support is called an
army on land, a
navy at sea, and an
air force
in the air. Wars may be conducted simultaneously in one or more
different
theatres. Within each
theatre, there may be one or more consecutive
military campaigns. A military campaign
includes not only fighting but also
intelligence, troop
movements, supplies,
propaganda, and
other components. A period of continuous intense conflict is
traditionally called a
battle, although this
terminology is not always applied to conflicts involving aircraft,
missiles or bombs alone, in the absence of ground troops or naval
forces. Also many other actions may be undertaken by military
forces during a war, this could include weapons research, prison
internment,
assassination, occupation,
and in some cases
genocide may occur.
As the strategic and tactical aspects of warfare are always
changing, theories and doctrines relating to warfare are often
reformulated before, during, and after every major war. Carl Von
Clausewitz said, 'Every age had its own kind of war, its own
limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.'.
War is not limited to the
human species;
Ants engage in massive intra-species conflicts
which might be termed warfare, and
chimpanzee packs will engage each other in tribe
like warfare. It is theorized that other species also engage in
similar behavior, although this is not well documented.
Etymology
From late
Old English (c.1050), wyrre,
werre, from
Old North French werre "war"
(Fr. guerre), from
Frankish *werra, from
Proto-Germanic *werso (Compare with
Old Saxon werran,
Old
high German werran, German verwirren "to confuse, perplex").
Cognates suggest the original sense was "to bring into
confusion."
There was no common
Germanic word
for "war" at the dawn of historical times.
Spanish, Portuguese, Italian
guerra are
from the same source; Romanic peoples turned to Germanic for a word to avoid Latin "bellum" because its form tended to merge with
bello- "beautiful."
History of warfare

Army 89th Infantry Division cross the
Rhine River in assault boats, 1945.
Before the dawn of civilization, war likely consisted of
small-scale raiding. One half of the people found in a
Nubian cemetery dating to as early as 12,000 years ago
had died of
violence. Since the rise of the
state some 5,000 years ago, military activity has occurred over
much of the globe. The advent of gunpowder and the acceleration of
technological advances led to modern warfare.
In
War Before
Civilization, Lawrence H.
Keeley, a professor at the University of Illinois
, says that approximately 90–95% of known societies
throughout history engaged in at least occasional warfare, and many
fought constantly.
In Western Europe, since the late 18th century, more than 150
conflicts and about 600 battles had taken place.
The
Human Security Report
2005 documented a significant decline in the number and
severity of armed conflicts since the end of the
Cold War in the early 1990s. However, the evidence
examined in the 2008 edition of the Center for International
Development and Conflict Management's "Peace and Conflict" study
indicated that the overall decline in conflicts had stalled.
Motivations
Motivations for war may be different for those ordering the war
than for those undertaking the war. For a state to prosecute a war
it must have the support of its leadership, its military forces,
and its people.
For example, in the Third Punic War, Rome
's leaders
may have wished to make war with Carthage
for the
purpose of eliminating a resurgent rival, while the individual
soldiers may have been motivated by a wish to make money.
Since many people are involved, a war may acquire a life of its own
from the confluence of many different motivations.
Any case, the most important motivation to war is, in several ways,
the
imperialism
In
Why Nations Go to War, by
John G. Stoessinger, the author points out that
both sides will claim that morality justifies their fight. He also
states that the rationale for beginning a war depends on an overly
optimistic assessment of the outcome of hostilities (casualties and
costs), and on
misperceptions of the enemy's
intentions.
The Jewish
Talmud derives in his commentary
to the fight between
Cain and Abel
(BeReshit Rabba XXII:7 to ) three universal reasons for wars: They
are i) economic, ii) power/pride/love (personal) reasons and iii)
ideology/religion.
Economic theories
One school of thought argues that war can be seen as a growth of
economic competition in a competitive
international system. In this view wars begin as a pursuit of
markets for
natural resources and for wealth. While
this theory has been applied to many conflicts, such counter
arguments become less valid as the increasing mobility of capital
and information level the distributions of wealth worldwide, or
when considering that it is relative, not absolute, wealth
differences that may fuel wars. There are those on the extreme
right of the political spectrum who
provide support,
fascists in particular, by
asserting a natural right of the strong to whatever the weak cannot
hold by force. Some centrist,
capitalist,
world leaders, including
Presidents of the United
States and US
Generals, expressed
support for an economic view of war.
"Is there any man, is there any woman, let me say
any child here that does not know that the seed of war in the
modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry?" - Woodrow Wilson, September 11, 1919, St.
Louis.
"For the corporation executives, the military
metaphysic often coincides with their interest in a stable and
planned flow of profit; it enables them to have their risk
underwritten by public money; it enables them reasonably to expect
that they can exploit for private profit now and later, the risky
research developments paid for by public money. It is, in
brief, a mask of the subsidized capitalism from which they extract
profit and upon which their power is based."C. Wright
Mills, Causes of world war 3,1960
"In the councils of government, we must guard
against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
unsought, by the military-industrial
complex. The potential for disastrous rise of
misplaced power exists and will persist." - Dwight Eisenhower, Farewell Address, Jan.
17, 1961.
Government funded war programs have historically produced some of
the most innovative products we know today. The PhDs at the
Universities that created things like the transistor were funded by
war programs. The Internet (originally called ARPAnet) was an ARPA
funded program, a way to communicate over long distances in the
case of nuclear destruction. War funded programs created the cell
phone as a way for soldiers to communicate easily from within their
tanks over long distances.
It can also be argued that if you decrease the population of the
losing country, you may get an increased supply of food, increased
supply of raw materials, decreased multinational corporate
competition, control over their natural resources (including a
cheap labor market, oilfields, agricultural land and more). The
weakening of these countries creates an opportunity for
multinational corporations to enter and develop their markets when
the country is no longer able (financially or by lack of human
resources) to develop them itself. That is, obviously, an
imperialistic reasoning.
By some beliefs, war may also create increased economic activity in
a country in the form of new jobs. When the unemployment rate is
high, people may be making less purchases than they were a year or
two ago, and overall output is flat. But when the country decides
to prepare for war, the government needs to equip its soldiers with
the extra gear and munitions needed in order to win the war.
Corporations win contracts to supply boots, bombs and vehicles to
the army. Many of these companies will have to hire extra workers
in order to meet this increased production. If the preparations for
war are large enough, large numbers of workers will be hired
reducing the unemployment rate. Other workers may need to be hired
to cover reservists in private sector jobs who get sent overseas.
With the unemployment rate down we have more people spending again
and people who had jobs before will be less worried about losing
their job in the future so they'll spend more than they did. This
extra spending will help the retail sector, who will need to hire
extra employees causing unemployment to drop even further. The
Broken Window Fallacy
is an economic theory that argues that this increased economic
activity could have happened even without government intervention,
because you cannot prove how the money spent on war programs could
have been invested otherwise.
War is also very lucrative for central banks in the sense that
governments have to borrow large amounts of money from their
central bank, to be repayed with interest which the government
collects through income tax. Several conspiracy theories claim that
central banking systems like the Federal
Reserve are secretly owned by international bankers who
understand the economic benefits of war and thus manipulate the
public to believe on an imaginary national enemy, whether that is
terrorism or climate change in order to initiate the war
process.
Evolutionary psychology
A distinct branch of the psychological theories of war are the
arguments based on evolutionary
psychology. This school tends to see war as an extension of
animal behaviour, such as territoriality and competition. Animals are naturally aggressive,
and in humans this aggression manifests itself as warfare. However,
while war has a natural cause, the development of technology has
accelerated human destructiveness to a level that is irrational and
damaging to the species. The earliest advocate of this theory was
Konrad Lorenz.
These theories have been criticized by scholars such as John G.
Kennedy, who argue that the organized, sustained war of humans
differs more than just technologically from the territorial fights
between animals. Ashley Montagu strongly denies such universalistic
instinctual arguments, pointing out that social factors and
childhood socialization are important in determining the nature and
presence of warfare. Thus while human aggression may be a universal
occurrence, warfare is not and would appear to have been a
historical invention, associated with certain types of human
societies.
Behavioral theories
Some psychologist such as E.F.M. Durban
and John Bowlby have argued that human
beings are inherently violent. This
aggressiveness is fueled by displacement and projection where a person transfers
their grievances into bias and hatred against other races, religions,
nations or ideologies. By this theory the
nation state preserves order in the local society while creating an
outlet for aggression through warfare. If war is innate to human
nature, as is presupposed and predetermined by many psychological
theories, then there is little hope of ever escaping it.
The Italian psychoanalyst Franco Fornari, a follower of Melanie Klein, thought that war was the
paranoid or projective “elaboration” of mourning. Fornari thought
that war and violence develop out of our “love need”: our wish to
preserve and defend the sacred object to which we are attached,
namely our early mother and our fusion with her. For the adult,
nations are the sacred objects that generate warfare. Fornari
focused upon sacrifice as the essence of war: the astonishing
willingness of human beings to die for their country, to give over
their bodies to their nation.
While these theories may have some general explanatory value about
why war exists, they do not explain when or how they occur. Nor do
they explain the existence of certain human cultures completely
devoid of war. If the innate psychology of the human mind is
unchanging, these variations are inconsistent. A solution adapted
to this problem by militarists such as Franz Alexander is that peace does not
really exist. Periods that are seen as peaceful are actually
periods of preparation for a later war or when war is suppressed by
a state of great power, such as the Pax
Britannica.
An additional problem with theories that rest on the will of the
general population, is that in history only a tiny fraction of wars
have originated from a desire for war from the general populace.
Far more often the general population has been reluctantly drawn
into war by its rulers. One psychological theory that looks at the
leaders is advanced by Maurice Walsh. He argues that the general
populace is more neutral towards war and that wars only occur when
leaders with a psychologically abnormal disregard for human life
are placed into power. War is caused by leaders that seek war such
as Napoleon, Hitler,
and Stalin. Such leaders most often come to
power in times of crisis when the populace opts for a decisive
leader, who then leads the nation to war.
Sociological theories
Sociology has long been very concerned
with the origins of war, and many thousands of theories have been
advanced, many of them contradictory. Sociology has thus divided
into a number of schools. One, the Primat der Innenpolitik
(Primacy of Domestic Politics) school based on the works of
Eckart Kehr and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, sees war as the
product of domestic conditions, with only the target of aggression
being determined by international realities. Thus World War I was not a product of international
disputes, secret treaties, or the balance of
power but a product of the economic, social, and political
situation within each of the states involved.
This differs from the traditional Primat der Außenpolitik
(Primacy of Foreign Politics) approach of Carl von Clausewitz and Leopold von Ranke that argues it is the
decisions of statesmen and the geopolitical situation that leads to
peace.
Demographic theories
Demographic theories can be grouped into two classes, Malthusian
theories and youth bulge theories.
Malthusian theories
Malthusian theories see expanding population and scarce resources
as a source of violent conflict.
Pope Urban II in 1095, on the eve of
the First Crusade, wrote, "For this
land which you now inhabit, shut in on all sides by the sea and the
mountain peaks, is too narrow for your large population; it
scarcely furnishes food enough for its cultivators. Hence it is
that you murder and devour one another, that you wage wars, and
that many among you perish in civil strife. Let hatred, therefore,
depart from among you; let your quarrels end. Enter upon the road
to the Holy Sepulchre; wrest that land from a wicked race, and
subject it to yourselves."
This is one of the earliest expressions of what has come to be
called the Malthusian theory of war, in which wars are caused by
expanding populations and limited resources. Thomas Malthus (1766–1834) wrote that
populations always increase until they are limited by war, disease, or famine.
This theory is thought by Malthusians to account for the relative
decrease in wars during the past fifty years, especially in the
developed world, where advances in
agriculture have made it possible to support a much larger
population than was formerly the case, and where birth control has dramatically slowed the
increase in population.
Youth bulge theory
Youth bulge theory differs significantly
from Malthusian theories. Its adherents see a combination of large
male youth cohorts - as graphically represented as a "youth bulge"
in a population pyramid - with a
lack of regular, peaceful employment
opportunities as a risk pool for violence.
While Malthusian theories focus on a disparity between a growing
population and available natural resources, youth bulge theory
focuses on a disparity between non-inheriting, 'excess' young males
and available social positions within the existing social system of
division of labour.
Contributors to the development of youth
bulge theory include French sociologist Gaston Bouthoul, U.S.
sociologist Jack A. Goldstone, U.S. political scientist Gary
Fuller, and German sociologist Gunnar
Heinsohn. Samuel Huntington
has modified his Clash of
Civilizations theory by using youth bulge theory as its
foundation:
I don't think Islam is any more violent than any
other religions, and I suspect if you added it all up, more people
have been slaughtered by Christians over the centuries than by
Muslims. But the key factor is the demographic
factor. Generally speaking, the people who go out and kill
other people are males between the ages of 16 and 30.
During the 1960s, 70s and 80s there were high birth rates in
the Muslim world, and this has given rise to a huge youth
bulge. But the bulge will fade. Muslim birth
rates are going down; in fact, they have dropped dramatically in
some countries. Islam did spread by the sword originally,
but I don't think there is anything inherently violent in Muslim
theology."
Youth Bulge theories represent a
relatively recent development but seem to have become more
influential in guiding U.S. foreign policy and military strategy as
both Goldstone and Fuller have acted as consultants to the U.S.
Government. CIA Inspector General John
L. Helgerson referred to youth
bulge theory in his 2002 report "The National Security Implications
of Global Demographic Change".
According to Heinsohn, who has proposed youth bulge theory in its
most generalized form, a youth bulge occurs when 30 to 40 percent
of the males of a nation belong to the "fighting age" cohorts from
15 to 29 years of age. It will follow periods with total fertility rates as high as 4-8
children per woman with a 15-29 year delay.
A total fertility rate of 2.1 children born by a woman during her
lifetime represents a situation of in which the son will replace
the father, and the daughter will replace the mother. Thus, a total
fertility rate of 2.1 represents replacement level, while anything
below represents a sub-replacement fertility rate
leading to population
decline.
Total fertility rates above 2.1 will lead to population growth and to a youth bulge. A total fertility rate of 4-8
children per mother implies 2-4 sons per mother. Consequently, one
father has to leave not 1, but 2 to 4 social positions (jobs) to
give all his sons a perspective for life, which is usually hard to
achieve. Since respectable positions cannot be increased at the
same speed as food, textbooks and vaccines, many "angry young men"
find themselves in a situation that tends to escalate their
adolescent anger into violence: they are
- Demographically superfluous,
- Might be out of work or stuck in a menial job, and
- Often have no access to a legal sex life before a career can
earn them enough to provide for a family. See: Hypergamy, Waithood.
The combination of these stress
factors according to Heinsohn usually heads for one of six
different exits:
- Violent Crime
- Emigration ("non violent colonization")
- Rebellion or putsch
- Civil war and/or revolution
- Genocide (to take over the positions of the slaughtered)
- Conquest (violent colonization, frequently including genocide
abroad).
Religions and ideologies are seen as secondary factors that are
being used to legitimate violence, but will not lead to violence by
themselves if no youth bulge is present. Consequently, youth bulge
theorists see both past "Christianist" European colonialism and
imperialism and today's "Islamist" civil unrest and terrorism as
results of high birth rates producing youth bulges. With the Gaza Strip
now being seen as another example of
youth-bulge-driven violence, especially if compared to Lebanon
which is
geographically close, yet remarkably more peaceful.
Among prominent historical events that have been linked to the
existence of youth bulges is the role played by the historically
large youth cohorts in the rebellion and revolution waves of early
modern Europe, including French
Revolution of 1789, and the importance of economic depression
hitting the largest German youth cohorts ever in explaining the
rise of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s. The
1994 Rwandan Genocide has also been
analyzed as following a massive youth bulge.
While the implications of population growth have been known since
the completion of the National Security Study
Memorandum 200 in 1974, neither the U.S. nor the WHO have
implemented the recommended measures to control population growth
to avert the terrorist threat. Prominent demographer Stephen D. Mumford attributes this to the influence
of the Catholic Church.
Youth Bulge theory has been subjected to statistical analysis by
the World Bank, Population Action
International, and the Berlin Institute
for Population and Development. Detailed demographic data for
most countries is available at the international database of the
United States Census
Bureau.
Youth bulge theories have been criticized as leading to racial,
gender and age "discrimination".
Rationalist theories
Rationalist theories of war assume that both sides to a potential
war are rational, which is to say that each side wants to get the
best possible outcome for itself for the least possible loss of
life and property to its own side. Given this assumption, if both
countries knew in advance how the war would turn out, it would be
better for both of them to just accept the post-war outcome without
having to actually pay the costs of fighting the war. This is based
on the notion, generally agreed to by almost all scholars of war
since Carl von Clausewitz, that
wars are reciprocal, that all wars require both a decision to
attack and also a decision to resist attack.Rationalist theory
offers three reasons why some countries cannot find a bargain and
instead resort to war: issue indivisibility, information asymmetry with incentive
to deceive, and the inability to make credible commitments.
Issue indivisibility occurs when the two parties cannot avoid war
by bargaining because the thing over which they are fighting cannot
be shared between them, only owned entirely by one side or the
other. Religious issues, such as control over the
Temple
Mount
in Jerusalem, are more likely to be indivisible
than economic issues.
A bigger branch of the theory, advanced by scholars of
international relations such as Geoffrey Blainey, is that both sides decide
to go to war and one side may have miscalculated.
Some go further and say that there is a problem of information
asymmetry with incentives to misrepresent. The two countries may
not agree on who would win a war between them, or whether victory
would be overwhelming or merely eked out, because each side has
military secrets about its own capabilities. They will not avoid
the bargaining failure by sharing their
secrets, since they cannot trust each other not to lie and
exaggerate their strength to extract more concessions. For example,
Sweden made efforts to deceive Nazi Germany that it would resist an
attack fiercely, partly by playing on the myth of Aryan superiority
and by making sure that Hermann
Göring only saw elite troops in action, often dressed up as
regular soldiers, when he came to visit.
The American decision to enter the Vietnam
War was made with the full knowledge that the communist forces
would resist them, but did not believe that the guerrillas had the
capability to long oppose American
forces.
Thirdly, bargaining may fail due to the states' inability to make
credible commitments. In this scenario, the two countries might be
able to come to a bargain that would avert war if they could stick
to it, but the benefits of the bargain will make one side more
powerful and lead it to demand even more in the future, so that the
weaker side has an incentive to make a stand now.
Rationalist explanations of war can be critiqued on a number of
grounds. The assumptions of cost-benefit calculations become
dubious in the most extreme genocidal cases of World War II, where
the only bargain offered in some cases was infinitely bad.
Rationalist theories typically assume that the state acts as a
unitary individual, doing what is best for the state as a whole;
this is problematic when, for example, the country's leader is
beholden to a very small number of people, as in a personalistic
dictatorship. Rationalist theory also assumes that the actors are
rational, able to accurately assess their likelihood of success or
failure, but the proponents of the psychological theories above
would disagree.
Rationalist theories are usually explicated with game theory, for example, the Peace War Game, not a wargame as such, rather a simulation of economic
decisions underlying war.
Political science theories
The statistical analysis of war was
pioneered by Lewis Fry
Richardson following World War I.
More recent databases of wars and armed conflict have been
assembled by the Correlates of War Project, Peter Brecke and the
Uppsala Conflict Data
Program.
There are several different international relations
theory schools. Supporters of realism in international
relations argue that the motivation of states is the quest for
security.Which sometimes is argued to contradict the realist view,
that there is much empirical evidence to support the claim that
states that are democracies do not go to
war with each other, an idea that has come to be known as the
democratic peace theory.
Other factors included are difference in moral and religious
beliefs, economical and trade disagreements, declaring
independence, and others.
Another major theory relating to power in international
relations and machtpolitik
is the Power Transition
theory, which distributes the world into a hierarchy and
explains major wars as part of a cycle of hegemons being destabilized by a great power which does not support the hegemons'
control.
Conduct of wars
The war, to become known as one, must entail some degree of
confrontation using weapons and other
military technology
and equipment by armed forces
employing military tactics and
Operational art within the broad
military strategy subject to
military logistics. War Studies by military theorists throughout
military history have sought to
identify the Philosophy of war,
and to reduce it to a Military
science.
In general, modern military science considers several factors
before a National defence
policy is created to allow a war to commence: the environment
in the area(s) of combat operations, the posture national forces
will adopt on the commencement of a war, and the type of warfare
troops will be engaged in.
Behaviour & conduct in war
The behaviour of troops in warfare varies considerably, both
individually and as units or armies. In some circumstances, troops
may engage in genocide, war rape and ethnic
cleansing. Commonly, however, the conduct of troops may be
limited to posturing and sham attacks, leading to highly rule-bound
and often largely symbolic combat in which casualties are much
reduced from that which would be expected if soldiers were
genuinely violent towards the enemy.. Situations of deliberate
dampening of hostilities occurred in World
War I by some accounts, e.g., a volley of gunfire
being exchanged after a misplaced mortar hit the British line,
after which a German soldier shouted an apology to British forces,
effectively stopping a hostile exchange of gunfire. Other examples
of non-aggression, also from World War
I, are detailed in Goodbye to
all that. These include spontaneous ceasefires to rebuild
defences and retrieve casualties, alongside behaviour such as
refusing to shoot at enemy during ablutions and the taking of great
risks (described as 1 in 20) to retrieve enemy wounded from the
battlefield. The most notable spontaneous ceasefire of World War I was the Christmas truce.
It has been postulated that sport serves as an
direct alternative to war, and may be regarded as having an
equivalent social function. Sipes found war and sporting
alternatives to be positively correlated.
The psychological separation between combatants, and the
destructive power of modern weaponry, may act to override this
effect and facilitate participation by combatants in the mass
slaughter of combatants or civilians, such as in the bombing of
Dresden in World War
II. The unusual circumstances of warfare can incite apparently
normal individuals to commit atrocities.
Types of warfare
Conventional warfare is an
attempt to reduce an opponent's military capability through open
battle. It is a declared war between existing states in which
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons are not used or only see
limited deployment in support of conventional military goals and
maneuvers.
The opposite of conventional warfare, unconventional warfare, is an attempt
to achieve military victory through acquiescence, capitulation, or
clandestine support for one side of an existing conflict.
Nuclear warfare is a war in which
nuclear weapons are the primary
method of coercing the capitulation of the other side, as opposed
to a supporting tactical or strategic role in a conventional
conflict.
Civil war is a war where the forces in
conflict belong to the same nation or political entity and are
vying for control of or independence from that nation or political
entity.
Asymmetric warfare is a conflict
between two populations of drastically different levels of military
capability or size. Asymmetric conflicts often result in guerrilla tactics being used to overcome
the sometimes vast gaps in technology and force size.
Intentional air pollution in combat is one of a collection of
techniques collectively called chemical
warfare. Poison gas as a chemical
weapon was principally used during World
War I, and resulted in an estimated 91,198 deaths and 1,205,655
injuries. Various treaties have sought to ban its further use.
Non-lethal chemical weapons, such as tear
gas and pepper spray, are widely
used, sometimes with deadly effect.
Military posture
Historian Victor Davis Hanson
has claimed there exists a unique "Western Way of War", in an
attempt to explain the military successes of Western
Europe.citation needed It originated in Ancient Greece, where, in an effort to reduce
the damage that warfare has on society, the city-states developed
the concept of a decisive pitched battle between heavy infantry.
This would be preceded by formal declarations of war and followed
by peace negotiations. In this system constant low-level
skirmishing and guerrilla warfare were phased out in favour of a
single, decisive contest, which in the end cost both sides less in
casualties and property damage. Although it was later perverted by
Alexander the Great?,
this style of war initially allowed neighbours with limited
resources to coexist and prosper.
He argues that Western-style armies are characterised by an
emphasis on discipline and teamwork above individual bravado.
Examples
of Western victories over non-Western armies include the Battle of
Marathon
, the Battle of
Gaugamela, the Siege of
Tenochtitlan, the Battle of
Plassey and the defence of Rorke's Drift
.
Warfare environment
The environment in which a war is fought has a significant impact
on the type of combat which takes place, and can include within its
area different types of terrain. This in turn means that soldiers
have to be trained to fight in a specific types of environments and
terrains that generally reflects troops' mobility limitations or
enablers.These include:
Conventional warfare
Unconventional warfare
Effects of war
[[Image:War world map - DALY - WHO2004.svg|thumb|Disability-adjusted life year
for war per 100,000 inhabitants in 2004.
]]
On soldiers
Based on 1860 census figures, 8% of all white males aged 13 to 43
died in the American Civil War,
including 6% in the North and 18% in the South. Of the 60 million
European soldiers who were mobilized in World War I, 8 million were killed, 7 million
were permanently disabled, and 15 million were seriously injured.
During
Napoleon's retreat from Moscow
, more French
soldiers died of typhus than were killed by
the Russians. Felix Markham thinks that 450,000 crossed the
Neman
on 25 June
1812, of whom less than 40,000 recrossed in anything like a
recognizable military formation. More soldiers were killed
from 1500-1914 by typhus than from all military action during that
time combined. In addition, if it were not for the modern medical
advances there would be thousands of more dead from disease and
infection.
On civilians
Many wars have been accompanied by significant depopulations.
During the Thirty Years' War in
Europe, for example, the population of the German states was reduced by about 30%.
The Swedish armies alone may have
destroyed up to 2,000 castles, 18,000 villages and 1,500 towns in
Germany, one-third of all German towns.
Estimates for the total casualties of World War II vary, but
most suggest that some 60 million people died in the war, including
about 20 million soldiers and 40 million civilians. The Soviet Union
lost around 27 million
people during the war, about half of all World War II
casualties. The largest number of civilian deaths in a
single city was 1.2 million citizens dead during the 872-day
Siege of Leningrad.
On the economy
Once a war has ended, losing nations are sometimes required to pay
war reparations to the victorious
nations. In certain cases, land is ceded to the victorious nations.
For
example, the territory of Alsace-Lorraine
has been traded between France and Germany on three
different occasions.
Typically speaking, war becomes very intertwined with the economy
and many wars are partially or entirely based on economic reasons
such as the American Civil War.
In some cases war has stimulated a country's economy (World War II
is often credited with bringing America out of the Great Depression) but in many cases, such
as the wars of Louis XIV, the Franco-Prussian War, and World War I, warfare serves only to damage the
economy of the countries involved. For example, Russia's
involvement in World War I took such a toll on the Russian economy
that it almost collapsed and greatly contributed to the start of
the Russian Revolution of
1917.
World War II
One of the starkest illustrations of the effect of war upon
economies is the Second World War.
The Great Depression of the
1930s ended as nations increased their
production of war materials to serve the war
effort. The financial cost of the World War II is estimated at
about a trillion 1944 U.S. dollars worldwide, making it the most
costly war in capital as well as lives.
Property damage in the Soviet Union inflicted by the Axis invasion was estimated to
a value of 679 billion rubles. The combined damage consisted of
complete or partial destruction of 1,710 cities and towns, 70,000
villages/hamlets, 2,508 church buildings, 31,850 industrial
establishments, 40,000 miles of railroad, 4100 railroad stations,
40,000 hospitals, 84,000 schools, and 43,000 public
libraries.
Morality of war
Throughout history war has been the source of serious moral questions. Although many ancient nations and
some modern ones have viewed war as noble, over the sweep of
history, concerns about the morality of war have gradually
increased. Today, war is seen by some as undesirable and morally
problematic. At the same time, many view war, or at least the
preparation and readiness and willingness to engage in war, as
necessary for the defense of their country and therefore a just war. Pacifists
believe that war is inherently immoral and that no war should ever
be fought.
The negative view of war has not always been held as widely as it
is today. Heinrich von
Treitschke saw war as humanity's highest activity where
courage, honour, and
ability were more necessary than in any other endeavour. Friedrich Nietzsche also saw war as an
opportunity for the Übermensch to
display heroism, honour, and other virtues.
Another supporter of war, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,
favoured it as part of the necessary process required for history
to unfold and allow society to progress. At the outbreak of
World War I, the writer Thomas Mann wrote, "Is not peace an element of
civil corruption and war a purification, a liberation, an enormous
hope?" This attitude has been embraced by societies
from Sparta
and Rome in the ancient world to the fascist states of the 1930s.
International law recognizes only
two cases for a legitimate war:
- Wars of defense: when one nation is attacked by an aggressor,
it is considered legitimate for a nation along with its allies to
defend itself against the aggressor.
- Wars sanctioned by the UN
Security Council: when the United Nations as a whole acts as a
body against a certain nation. Examples include various peacekeeping operations around the world.
The subset of international law known as the law of war or international humanitarian
law also recognises regulations for the conduct of war,
including the Geneva Conventions
governing the legitimacy of certain kinds of weapons, and the
treatment of prisoners of war.
Cases
where these conventions are broken are considered war crimes, and since the Nuremberg
Trials
at the end of World War
II the international community has established a number of
tribunals to try such cases.
A nation's economy is often stimulated by
government war-spending. When countries wage war, more weapons,
armor, ammunition, and the like are needed to be created and sold
to the armies, thus their economies can enter a boom (or war economy) reducing unemployment. However war
is often followed by a recession.
Factors ending a war
The political and economic circumstances in the peace that follows
war usually depends on the "facts on
the ground". Where evenly matched adversaries decide that the
conflict has resulted in a stalemate, they
may cease hostilities to avoid further loss of life and property.
They may decide to restore the antebellum
territorial boundaries, redraw boundaries at the line of military
control, or negotiate to keep or exchange captured territory.
Negotiations between parties involved at the end of a war often
result in a treaty, such as the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, which
ended the First World War.
A warring party that surrenders
or capitulates may have
little negotiating power, with the victorious side either imposing
a settlement or dictating most of the terms of any treaty. A common
result is that conquered territory is brought under the dominion of
the stronger military power. An unconditional surrender is made in
the face of overwhelming military force as an attempt to prevent
further harm to life and property. For example, the Empire of
Japan
gave an unconditional surrender to the Allies of World War II after the
atomic
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (see Surrender of Japan), the preceding
massive strategic bombardment of Japan and declaration of war and
the immediate invasion of Manchuria by the Soviet Union. A
settlement or surrender may also be obtained through deception or bluffing.
Many
other wars, however, have ended in complete destruction of the
opposing territory, such as the Battle of Carthage of the
Third Punic War between the Phoenician
city of Carthage
and Ancient Rome in 149 BC. In 146 BC the
Romans burned the city, enslaved its citizens, and razed the
buildings.
Some wars or aggressive actions end when the military objective of
the victorious side has been achieved. Others do not, especially in
cases where the state structures do not exist, or have collapsed
prior to the victory of the conqueror. In such cases, disorganised
guerilla warfare may continue for a
considerable period. In cases of complete surrender conquered
territories may be brought under the permanent dominion of the
victorious side. A raid for the purposes of looting may be completed with the successful capture
of goods. In other cases an aggressor may decide to end hostilities
to avoid continued losses and cease hostilities without obtaining
the original objective, such as happened in the Iran–Iraq War.
Some hostilities, such as insurgency or
civil war, may persist for long periods of
time with only a low level of military activity. In some cases
there is no negotiation of any official treaty, but fighting may
trail off and eventually stop after the political demands of the
belligerent groups have been reconciled, a political settlement has
been negotiated, or combatants are gradually killed or decide the
conflict is futile.
List of wars by death toll
These figures include deaths of civilians from diseases, famine,
atrocities etc. as well as deaths of
soldiers in battle.
This is an 'incomplete list of
wars.
- 60,000,000–72,000,000 - World War
II (1939–1945), (see World
War II casualties)
- 36,000,000 - An Shi Rebellion
(China, 755–763)
- 30,000,000–60,000,000 - Mongol
Conquests (13th century) (see Mongol invasions and Tatar invasions)
- 25,000,000 - Qing dynasty
conquest of Ming dynasty
(1616–1662)
- 20,000,000 - World War I (1914–1918)
(see World War I
casualties)
- 20,000,000 - Taiping Rebellion
(China, 1851–1864) (see Dungan
revolt)
- 20,000,000 - Second
Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945)
- 10,000,000 - Warring States
Era (China, 475 BC–221 BC)
- 7,000,000 - 20,000,000 Conquests of Tamerlane (1360-1405)
- 5,000,000–9,000,000 - Russian
Civil War and Foreign Intervention (1917–1921)
- 5,000,000 - Conquests of Menelik II of Ethiopia (1882-
1898)
- 3,800,000 - 5,400,000 - Second
Congo War (1998–2007)
- 3,500,000–6,000,000 - Napoleonic
Wars (1804–1815) (see Napoleonic Wars casualties)
- 3,000,000–11,500,000 - Thirty
Years' War (1618–1648)
- 3,000,000–7,000,000 - Yellow
Turban Rebellion (China, 184–205)
- 2,500,000–3,500,000 - Korean War
(1950–1953) (see Cold War)
- 2,300,000–3,800,000 - Vietnam War
(entire war 1945–1975)
- 300,000–1,300,000 - First
Indochina War (1945–1954)
- 100,000–300,000 - Vietnamese
Civil War (1954–1960)
- 1,750,000–2,100,000 - American phase
(1960–1973)
- 170,000 - Final phase (1973–1975)
- 175,000–1,150,000 - Secret War
(1962–1975)
- 2,000,000–4,000,000 - Huguenot
Wars
- 2,000,000 - Shaka's conquests
(1816-1828)
- 2,000,000 - Mahmud of Ghazni's
invasions of India (1000-1027)
- 300,000–3,000,000 - Bangladesh Liberation War
(1971)
- 1,500,000–2,000,000 - Afghan Civil
War (1979-)
- 1,300,000–6,100,000 - Chinese
Civil War (1928–1949) note that this figure excludes World
War II casualties
- 300,000–3,100,000 before 1937
- 1,000,000–3,000,000 after World War II
- 1,000,000–2,000,000 - Mexican
Revolution (1910–1920)
- 1,000,000 - Iran–Iraq War
(1980–1988)
- 1,000,000 - Japanese invasions of
Korea (1592-1598)
- 1,000,000 - Second
Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005)
- 1,000,000 - Nigerian Civil
War (1967–1970)
- 618,000 - 970,000 - American
Civil War (including 350,000 from disease) (1861–1865)
- 900,000–1,000,000 - Mozambique
Civil War (1976–1993)
- 868,000 - 1,400,000 - Seven Years'
War (1756-1763)
- 800,000 - 1,000,000 - Rwandan
Civil War (1990-1994)
- 800,000 - Congo Civil War
(1991–1997)
- 600,000 to 1,300,000 - First
Jewish-Roman War (see List of
Roman wars)
- 580,000 - Bar Kokhba’s
revolt (132–135CE)
- 570,000 - Eritrean War
of Independence (1961-1991)
- 550,000 - Somali Civil War
(1988- )
- 500,000 - 1,000,000 - Spanish
Civil War (1936–1939)
- 500,000 - Angolan Civil War
(1975–2002)
- 500,000 - Ugandan Civil War
(1979–1986)
- 400,000–1,000,000 - War of the Triple Alliance in
Paraguay
(1864–1870)
- 400,000 - War of the
Spanish Succession (1701-1714)
- 371,000 - Continuation War
(1941-1944)
- 350,000 - Great Northern War
(1700-1721)
- 315,000 - 735,000 - Wars
of the Three Kingdoms (1639-1651) English campaign ~40,000,
Scottish 73,000, Irish 200,000-620,000
- 300,000 - Russian-Circassian
War (1763-1864) (see Caucasian
War)
- 300,000 - First Burundi Civil
War (1972)
- 300,000 - Darfur conflict
(2003-)
- 270,000–300,000 - Crimean War
(1854–1856)
- 234,000 Philippine-American
War (1898-1913)
- 230,000–1,400,000 - Ethiopian
Civil War (1974–1991)
- 224,000 - Balkan Wars, includes both
wars (1912-1913)
- 220,000 - Liberian Civil
War (1989 - )
- 217,000 - 1,124,303 - War on
Terror (9/11/2001-Present)
- 200,000 - 1,000,000 - Albigensian Crusade (1208-1259)
- 200,000–800,000 - Warlord era in China
(1917–1928)
- 200,000 - Second Punic War
(BC218-BC204) (see List of Roman
battles)
- 200,000 - Sierra Leone Civil
War (1991–2000)
- 200,000 - Algerian Civil War
(1991- )
- 200,000 - Guatemalan Civil
War (1960–1996)
- 190,000 - Franco-Prussian
War (1870–1871)
- 180,000 - 300,000 - La Violencia
(1948-1958)
- 170,000 - Greek War of
Independence (1821-1829)
- 150,000 - Lebanese Civil War
(1975–1990)
- 150,000 - North Yemen Civil
War (1962–1970)
- 150,000 - Russo-Japanese War
(1904–1905)
- 148,000-1,000,000 - Winter War
(1939)
- 125,000 - Eritrean-Ethiopian War
(1998–2000)
- 120,000 - 384,000 Great Turkish
War (1683-1699) (see Ottoman-Habsburg wars)
- 120,000 - Third Servile War
(BC73-BC71)
- 117,000 - 500,000 - Revolt
in the Vendée (1793-1796)
- 103,359+ - 1,136,920+ - Invasion and Occupation of
Iraq (2003-Present)
- 101,000 - 115,000 - Arab-Israeli conflict
(1929- )
- 100,500 - Chaco War (1932–1935)
- 100,000 - 1,000,000 - War of
the two brothers (1531–1532)
- 100,000 - 400,000 - Western New
Guinea
(1984 - ) (see Genocide in
West Papua)
- 100,000 - 200,000 - Indonesian invasion of East
Timor (1975-1978)
- 100,000 - Persian Gulf War (1991)
- 100,000–1,000,000 - Algerian War of Independence
(1954–1962)
- 100,000 - Thousand Days War
(1899–1901)
- 100,000 - Peasants' War
(1524-1525)
- 97,207 - Bosnian War
(1992-1995)
- 80,000 - Third Punic War
(BC149-BC146)
- 75,000 - 200,000? - Conquests of Alexander the Great (BC336-BC323)
- 75,000 - El Salvador
Civil War (1980–1992)
- 75,000 - Second Boer War
(1898–1902)
- 70,000 - Boudica's uprising
(AD60-AD61)
- 69,000 - Internal conflict
in Peru (1980- )
- 60,000 - Sri
Lanka/Tamil conflict (1983-2009)
- 60,000 - Nicaraguan Rebellion
(1972-91)
- 55,000 - War of the Pacific
(1879-1885)
- 50,000 - 200,000 - First Chechen
War (1994–1996)
- 50,000 - 100,000 - Tajikistan
Civil War (1992–1997)
- 50,000 - Wars of the Roses
(1455-1485) (see Wars involving
England)
- 45,000 - Greek Civil War
(1945-1949)
- 41,000–100,000 - Kashmiri
insurgency (1989- )
- 36,000 - Finnish Civil War
(1918)
- 35,000 - 40,000 - War of the
Pacific (1879–1884)
- 35,000 - 45,000 - Siege of
Malta (1565) (see Ottoman
wars in Europe)
- 30,000 - Turkey
/PKK conflict (1984- )
- 30,000 - Sino-Vietnamese War
(1979)
- ~28,000 - 1982 Lebanon War
(1982)
- 25,000 - Second Chechen War
(1999 - present)
- 25,000 - American
Revolutionary War (1775-1783)
- 23,384 - Indo-Pakistani
War of 1971 (December 1971)
- 23,000 - Nagorno-Karabakh
War (1988-1994)
- 20,000 - 49,600 U.S. Invasion of
Afghanistan (2001–2002)
- 19,000+ - Mexican–American War
(1846-1848)
- 14,000+ - Six-Day War (1967)
- 15,000–20,000 - Croatian War of Independence
(1991–1995)
- 11,053 - Malayan Emergency
(1948-1960)
- 11,000 - Spanish-American
War (1898)
- 10,000 - Amadu's Jihad
(1810-1818)
- 10,000 - Halabja
poison gas attack
(1988)
- 7,264–10,000 - Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
(August-September 1965)
- 7,000–24,000 - American War of
1812 (1812-1815)
- 7,000 - Kosovo War (1996–1999)
(disputed)
- 5,000 - Turkish invasion
of Cyprus (1974)
- 4,588 - Sino-Indian War
(1962)
- 4,000 - Waziristan War
(2004-2006)
- 4,000 - Irish Civil War
(1922-23)
- 3,500 - The Troubles
(1969-1998)
- 3,000 - Civil war in
Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2007)
- 2,899 - New Zealand Land
Wars (1845-1872)
- 2,604–7,000 - Indo-Pakistani War of 1947
(October 1947-December 1948)
- 2,000 - Football War (1969)
- 2,000 - Irish War of
Independence (1919-21)
- 1,975–4,500+ - violence in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2000 -)
- 1,724 - War of Lapland
(1945)
- 1,500 - Romanian Revolution
(December 1989)
- ~1,500 - 2006 Lebanon War
- 1,000
- Zapatista
uprising in Chiapas
(1994)
- 907 - Falklands War (1982)
- 62 - Slovenian
Independence War (1991)
See also
- General reference
- War related lists
References
- Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976), On War (Princeton University
Press) p.87
- Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976) p.77
- Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976), On War (Princeton University
Press) p.77 "war is the collision of two living forces" and "total
nonresstance would be no war at all"
- Keegan, John, (1994) "A History Of Warfare", (Pimlico)
- Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976), On War (Princeton University
Press) p.593
- [1]
- [2]
- [3]
- Keeley: War before civilization: The myth of the peaceful
savage
- Diamond, Jared, Guns, Germs and Steel
- Review: War Before Civilization
- World War One --- A New Kind of War | Part II,
From 14 - 18 Understanding the Great War, by Stéphane
Audoin-Rouzeau, Annette Becker
- Hewitt, Joseph, J. Wilkenfield and T. nevertheless the concept
war is more than just a word but a signification to the meaning
Death. Gurr Peace and Conflict 2008, Paradigm Publishers,
2007
- Punic Wars
- The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Arthur S. Link, ed.
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), vol.
63, pp. 45–46.
- Report from the Iron Mountain, section "The environmental
pollution model" (page 6), section "Environmentalism as a
substitute for war" (page 9), [4]
- Lorenz, Konrad On Aggression 1966
- Montagu, Ashley (1976), "The Nature of Human Aggression"
(Oxford University Press)
- Durbin, E.F.L. and John Bowlby .Personal Aggressiveness and
War 1939.
- (Fornari 1975)
- Turnbull, Colin (1987), "The Forest People" (Touchstonbe
Books)
- Alexander, Franz. "The Psychiatric Aspects of War and Peace."
1941
- Blanning, T.C.W. "The Origin of Great Wars." The Origins of
the French Revolutionary Wars. pg. 5
- Walsh, Maurice N. War and the Human Race. 1971.
- Bouthoul, Gaston: "L`infanticide différé" (deferred
infanticide), Paris 1970
- Goldstone, Jack A.: "Revolution and Rebellion in the Early
Modern World", Berkeley 1991; Goldstone, Jack A.: "Population and
Security: How Demographic Change can Lead to Violent Conflict",
[5]
- Fuller, Gary: "The Demographic Backdrop to Ethnic Conflict: A
Geographic Overwiew", in: CIA (Ed.): "The Challenge of Ethnic
Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990s",
Washington 1995, 151-154
- Fuller, Gary (2004): "The Youth Crisis in Middle
Eastern Society"
- Fuller, Gary (2003): "The Youth Factor: The New Demographics of
the Middle East and the Implications for U.S. Policy"[6]
- Gunnar Heinsohn (2003): "Söhne und Weltmacht: Terror im
Aufstieg und Fall der Nationen" ("Sons and Imperial Power: Terror
and the Rise and Fall of Nations"), Zurich 2003), available online
as free download (in German) [7]; see also the review of this book by Göran
Therborn: "Nato´s Demographer", New Left Review 56, March/April
2009, 136-144[8]
- ‘So, are civilizations at war?’, Interview with Samuel P.
Huntington by Michael Steinberger, The Observer, Sunday October 21,
2001.[9]
- Helgerson, John L. (2002): "The National Security Implications
of Global Demographic Trends"[10]
- Heinsohn, G.(2006): "Demography and War."
- Heinsohn, G.(2005): "Population, Conquest and Terror in the
21st Century." [11]
- G. Heinsohn: "Why Gaza is Fertile Ground for Angry Young Men."
Financial Times Online, June 14, 2007[12], retrieved on December 23, 2007; compare
demographic data for Gaza Strip ([13],[14])and Lebanon ([15], [16]) provided by the U.S. Census Bureau; see also
David Bau: "History is Demographics"[17], retrieved on December 23, 2007
- Goldstone, Jack A.: "Revolution and Rebellion in the Early
Modern World", Berkeley 1991
- Moller, Herbert (1968): ‘Youth as a Force in the Modern World’,
Comparative Studies in Society and History 10: 238–260;
240–244
- Diessenbacher, Hartmut (1994): Kriege der Zukunft. Die
Bevölkerungsexplosion gefährdet den Frieden. Muenchen: Hanser 1998;
see also (criticizing youth bulge theory) Marc Sommers (2006):
"Fearing Africa´s Young Men: The Case of Rwanda." The World Bank:
Social Development Papers - Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction,
Paper No. 32, January 2006[18]
- National Security Study Memorandum 200 (NSSM
200) - April 1974
- Stephen D. Mumford: Life and Death of NSSM 200: How the Destruction of
Political Will Doomed a U.S. Population Policy
- Urdal, Henrik (2004): "The Devil in the Demographics: The
Effect of Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict," [19],
- Population Action International: "The Security Demographic:
Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold "[20]
- Kröhnert, Steffen (2004): "Jugend und Kriegsgefahr: Welchen
Einfluss haben demografische Veränderungen auf die Entstehung von
Konflikten?" [21]
- United States Census Bureau: International
Database
- Hendrixson, Anne: "Angry Young Men, Veiled Young Women:
Constructing a New Population Threat" [22]
- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War."
International Organization 49, 3: 379-414. [23]
- Powell, Robert. 2002. "Bargaining Theory and International
Conflict." Annual Review of Political Science 5: 1-30.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation.
New York: Basic Books.
- Kitchen, Martin (2000), The Treaty of Versailles and its
Consequences, New York: Longman
- The Historical Impact of Epidemic Typhus.
Joseph M. Conlon.
- See a large copy of the chart here:
http://www.adept-plm.com/Newsletter/NapoleonsMarch.htm, but
discussed at length in Edward Tufte, The Visual Display of
Quantitative Information (London: Graphics Press, 1992)
- War and Pestilence. TIME.
- The Thirty Years War (1618–48), Alan McFarlane,
The Savage Wars of Peace: England, Japan and the Malthusian Trap
(2003)
- History of Europe – Demographics. Encyclopædia
Britannica.
- Great Depression and World War II. The
Library of Congress.
- Mayer, E. (2000) "World War
II" course lecture notes on Emayzine.com (Victorville,
California: Victor Valley College)
- Coleman, P. (1999) "Cost of the War," World War II Resource
Guide (Gardena, California: The American War Library)
- The New York Times, 9 February 1946,
Volume 95, Number 32158.
- Wallinsky, David: David Wallechinsky's Twentieth Century :
History With the Boring Parts Left Out, Little Brown &
Co., 1996, ISBN 0316920568, ISBN 978-0316920568 - cited by White
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew: Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the
Eve of the Twenty-first Century, Prentice Hall & IBD,
1994, ASIN B000O8PVJI - cited by White
- Ping-ti Ho, "An Estimate of the Total Population of Sung-Chin
China", in Études Song, Series 1, No 1, (1970) pp.
33-53.
- Mongol Conquests
- The world's worst massacres Whole Earth
Review
- Battuta's Travels: Part Three - Persia and
Iraq
- McFarlane, Alan: The Savage Wars of Peace: England, Japan
and the Malthusian Trap, Blackwell 2003, ISBN 0631181172, ISBN
978-0631181170 - cited by White
- "Military Casualties of World War One"
- Taiping Rebellion - Britannica Concise
- Nuclear Power: The End of the War Against
Japan
- Timur Lenk (1369-1405)
- Matthew's White's website (a compilation of scholarly
estimates) - Miscellaneous Oriental Atrocities
- Russian Civil War
- Oromo Identity
- Glories and Agonies of the Ethiopian past
- Inside Congo, An Unspeakable Toll
- Conflict in Congo has killed 4.7m, charity
says
- Come Back, Colonialism, All is Forgiven
- The Thirty Years War (1618-48)
- Cease-fire agreement marks the end of the Korean War on
July 27, 1953.
- Huguenot Religious Wars, Catholic vs. Huguenot
(1562-1598)
- Shaka: Zulu Chieftain
- K. S. Lal: Growth of Muslim
Population in Medieval India, 1973
- Matthew White's Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the
Twentieth Century
- Missing Millions: The human cost of the Mexican
Revolution, 1910-1921
- Timeline: Iraq
- Jones, Geo H., Vol. 23 No. 5, pp. 254
- The Deadliest War
- Clodfelter, cited by White
- Urlanis, cited by White
- Northern War (1700-21)
- The curse of Cromwell
- John M. Gates, “War-Related Deaths in the
Philippines”, Pacific Historical Review , v. 53, No. 3
(August, 1984), 367-378.
- Albigensian Crusade (1208-49)
- Massacre of the Pure, Time, April 28,
1961
- Attacks raise spectre of civil war
- Journalists in Algeria are caught in middle
- Peasants' War, Germany (1524-25)
- Confirmed deaths beyond dispute
- Russian Federation: What justice for Chechnya's
disappeared? - Amnesty International
Bibliography
- Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seabury, War:
Ends and Means (Potomac Books, Revised second edition by
Angelo Codevilla, 2006) ISBN-X
- Angelo M. Codevilla, No Victory, No Peace (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005) ISBN
- Barzilai Gad, Wars, Internal Conflicts and Political Order:
A Jewish Democracy in the Middle East (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1996).
- Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976), On War (Princeton and New Jersey:
Princeton University Press)
- Fry, Douglas P., 2005, The Human Potential for Peace: An
Anthropological Challenge to Assumptions about War and
Violence, Oxford University Press.
- Gat, Azar 2006 War in Human Civilization, Oxford
University Press.
- Gunnar Heinsohn, Söhne und Weltmacht: Terror im Aufstieg
und Fall der Nationen ("Sons and Imperial Power: Terror and
the Rise and Fall of Nations"), Orell Füssli (September 2003),
ISBN, available online as free download (in German)
- Keegan, John, (1994) "A History Of Warfare", (Pimlico)
- Kelly, Raymond C., 2000, Warless Societies and the Origin
of War, University of Michigan Press.
- Otterbein, Keith, 2004, How War Began.
- Turchin, P. 2005. War and Peace and
War: Life Cycles of Imperial Nations. New York, NY: Pi Press.
ISBN
- Van Creveld, Martin The Art of War: War and Military
Thought London: Cassell, Wellington House
- Fornari, Franco (1974). The Psychoanalysis of War. Tr.
Alenka Pfeifer. Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Press.
ISBN: . Reprinted (1975) Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
ISBN
- Walzer, Michael (1977) Just and
Unjust Wars (Basic Books)
- Keeley, Lawrence. War Before Civilization, Oxford
University Press, 1996.
- Zimmerman, L. The Crow Creek Site Massacre: A Preliminary
Report, US Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha District, 1981.
- Chagnon, N. The Yanomamo, Holt, Rinehart &
Winston,1983.
- Pauketat, Timothy. North American Archaeology 2005.
Blackwell Publishing.
- Wade, Nicholas. Before the Dawn, Penguin: New York
2006.
- Rafael Karsten, Blood revenge, war, and victory feasts
among the Jibaro Indians of eastern Ecuador (1923).
- S. A. LeBlanc, Prehistoric Warfare in the American
Southwest, University of Utah Press (1999).
- Duane M. Capulla, War Wolf, University of Pili
(2008)
External links