Zablocki v.
Redhail,
434
U.S. 374 (1978), was
a U.S.
Supreme Court
decision that held that Wisconsin
Statutes §§ 245.10 (1), (4), (5) (1973) violated
the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection
clause. § 245.10 required noncustodial parents who were
Wisconsin residents attempting to marry inside or outside of
Wisconsin to seek a court order prior to receiving a marriage
license. In order to receive such a court order, the noncustodial
parent could not be in arrears on his or her child support, and the
court had to believe that the child(ren) would not become dependent
on the State.The text of the statute was:
245.10 Permission of court required for certain marriages
(1) No Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and
which he is under obligation to support by any court order or
judgment, may marry in this state or elsewhere, without the order
of either the court of this state which granted such judgment or
support order, or the court having divorce jurisdiction in the
county of this state where such minor issue resides or where the
marriage license application is made. No marriage license shall be
issued to any such person except upon court order. The court,
within 5 days after such permission is sought by verified petition
in a special proceeding, shall direct a court hearing to be held in
the matter to allow said person to submit proof of his compliance
with such prior court obligation. No such order shall be granted,
or hearing held, unless both parties to the intended marriage
appear, and unless the person, agency, institution, welfare
department or other entity having the legal or actual custody of
such minor issue is given notice of such proceeding by personal
service of a copy of the petition at least 5 days prior to the
hearing, except that such appearance or notice may be waived by the
court upon good cause shown, and, if the minor issue were of a
prior marriage, unless a 5-day notice thereof is given to the
family court commissioner of the county where such permission is
sought, who shall attend such hearing, and to the family court
commissioner of the court which granted such divorce judgment. If
the divorce judgment was granted in a foreign court, service shall
be made on the clerk of that court. Upon the hearing, if said
person submits such proof and makes a showing that such children
are not then and are not likely thereafter to become public
charges, the court shall grant such order, a copy of which shall be
filed in any prior proceeding under s. 52.37 or divorce action of
such person in this state affected thereby; otherwise permission
for a license shall be withheld until such proof is submitted and
such showing is made, but any court order withholding such
permission is an appealable order. Any hearing under this section
may be waived by the court if the court is satisfied from an
examination of the court records in the case and the family support
records in the office of the clerk of court as well as from
disclosure by said person of his financial resources that the
latter has complied with prior court orders or judgments affecting
his minor children, and also has shown that such children are not
then and are not likely thereafter to become public charges. No
county clerk in this state shall issue such license to any person
required to comply with this section unless a certified copy of a
court order permitting such marriage is filed with said county
clerk.
(4) If a Wisconsin resident having such support obligations of a
minor, as stated in sub. (1), wishes to marry in another state, he
must, prior to such marriage, obtain permission of the court under
sub. (1), except that in a hearing ordered or held by the court,
the other party to the proposed marriage, if domiciled in another
state, need not be present at the hearing. If such other party is
not present at the hearing, the judge shall within 5 days send a
copy of the order of permission to marry, stating the obligations
of support, to such party not present.
(5) This section shall have extraterritorial effect outside the
state; and s. 245.04(1) and (2) are applicable hereto. Any marriage
contracted without compliance with this section, where such
compliance is required, shall be void, whether entered into in this
state or elsewhere.
Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061, 1063, f.
1 (E.D. Wis. 1976)
History
In 1972,
Roger Redhail, then in high school, was sued in a paternity action
in Milwaukee
County, Wisconsin
. Admitting that he was the father, the court
ordered him to pay child support in the amount of $109 per month
until the child reached eighteen years of age, plus court costs.
Since Redhail was in high school at the time, he had no way to pay
the court costs or child support. It went in arrears, reaching a
total of $3,732 by the end of 1974. Meanwhile, Redhail's
noncustodial child was a public charge, and received $109 per month
as support from the State of Wisconsin.
In 1974, Redhail attempted to obtain a marriage license in
Milwaukee County. Due to the aforementioned § 245.10(1), one of the
agents of the county clerk denied his application because he did
not have a court order allowing him to marry. Redhail proceeded to
file a class action suit against Thomas Zablocki, who was the
county clerk of Milwaukee County (and whose official capacity was
to issue such licenses) under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and since the action sought
a permanent
injunction against the
statute, required a three-judge court.
Judge John Reynolds wrote for the three-judge court. After
disposing with issues regarding interactions with State court
actions and class action procedure, he reached the substantive
matter under which Redhail filed suit. Finding that the Wisconsin
statute created two separate classes of individuals, Reynolds then
proceeded to observe that under a number of Supreme Court
decisions, marriage was held to be a
fundamental right. Accordingly, the judge
applied
strict scrutiny to determine
whether the Wisconsin statute could survive constitutional
review.
Examining the State's interest in the matter, Reynolds found that
while Wisconsin surely had a legitimate interest in counseling, but
that interest was not perceived as a compelling interest. While he
found that the State's interest in child welfare was potentially
compelling, that interest was insufficient because the Wisconsin
statute was not connected to the restriction imposed by the
statute. As the Wisconsin law could not withstand strict scrutiny,
Reynolds declared the law unconstitutional.
Opinion of the Court
When federal suits proceed in three-judge courts, allows parties to
appeal directly to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court noted probable
jurisdiction, 429
U.S. 1089 (1977). The case was argued early in the October term of
1977, and the judgment was issued in January 1978.
Justice Marshall wrote for the majority in a 5-3-1 court holding.
Affirming the judgment of the District Court, Marshall concurred
with the District Court's reading of marriage being a fundamental
right, relying on
Loving
v. Virginia
(1967) and
Griswold
v. Connecticut (1965). Marshall,
however, diverged from the District Court's analysis by refusing to
apply strict scrutiny. Instead, he determined if Wisconsin's law
was "supported by sufficiently important state interests and is
closely tailored to effectuate only those interests". Marshall's
standard is similar to strict scrutiny as his "closely tailored" is
similar to the strict scrutiny standard of requiring a statute to
be narrowly tailored to the interest, but it requires only an
"important state interest", which is akin to
intermediate scrutiny.
Applying this standard, Marshall examined the same two
justifications that the District Court confronted—child welfare and
counseling noncustodial parents about their obligations. These
justifications are defeated because as Marshall explained,
Wisconsin could find other ways to achieve the interest without
resorting to infringement of a fundamental right, and that the
latter reason is defective because it fails to achieve the
objectives it sets out to meet (which is one of the necessities of
being narrowly tailored). Accordingly Marshall affirmed the
District Court by focusing the lack of connection and efficacy of
the measures Wisconsin advances, rather than confronting the
importance of Wisconsin's interests.
Concurring Opinions
Burger's Concurrence
Chief Justice Burger joined with Justice Marshall's opinion, and
concurred separately to note that the Wisconsin statute was an
"intentional and substantial interference with the right to marry",
distinguishing this case and
Califano
v. Jobst (1977).
Stewart's Concurrence in the Judgment
Justice Stewart reaches a conclusion nearly identical to the
Court's conclusion, but wholly rejects the Court's equal protection
analysis, likening it to be the improper analysis for the denial of
a right. Stewart disagrees with the majority's contention that
there is a fundamental right to marry, or even an explicit right to
marry at all. Rather, he grounds his analysis in the
liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause. Reasoning that
lacking money is not an acceptable reason to restrict a person's
liberty, he concludes that the traditions of the United States
forbid such a restriction, and that the proper justification for
holding the law to be unconstitutional is substantive due
process.
Powell's Concurrence in the Judgment
Justice Powell concurs in the judgment in a similar manner to
Justice Stewart. Powell's primary concern is that the
near-application of strict scrutiny and the use of the equal
protection clause is too strong and interferes with the legitimate
regulation of the State on marriage. Similar to Justice Stewart,
Powell would use the due process clause, but invoke it in a way
that would be flexible enough to allow the State to pass reasonable
regulations (regulations that probably would not be upheld under
Marshall's standard).
Stevens's Concurrence in the Judgment
Justice Stevens's concurrence in the judgment is different from the
other two because he wishes to distinguish between different kinds
of classifications. Stevens states that "[a] classification based
on marital status is fundamentally different from a classification
which determines who may lawfully enter into the marriage
relationship." In making this distinction, Stevens wishes to
separate
Zablocki and
Loving from
Califano
v. Jobst. The intent of his opinion is to illustrate
that distinctions between married and unmarried people are largely
acceptable, whereas bars to marriage itself should be treated with
skepticism. Further, he too concludes that the methods of
Wisconsin's law fall far short of achieving its objectives
(reasoning through multiple claims that Wisconsin's desired outcome
does not comport with the reality of the situation).
Rehnquist's Dissent
Justice Rehnquist was the only justice to dissent completely from
the ruling of the court. Agreeing with Justice Powell, Rehnquist
concludes that there is no fundamental right to marriage. Further
he would conclude that the appropriate measure for this case is the
rational basis test—that the
law need be only rationally related to a legitimate State interest.
Rehnquist's contends that the appropriate frame of analysis for the
Court should be one that is deferential to the concerns of the
legislature. The key to this viewpoint is the realization that
Wisconsin "'adopted this rule in the course of constructing a
complex social welfare system that necessarily deals with the
intimacies of family life'"—that Wisconsin made a "permissible
exercise of [its] power" even though its results may not be as
intended.
Rehnquist also disagreed that Redhail had
standing to bring his claim. Examining the
record of the District Court and of oral arguments, he finds that
it was never verified that Redhail could not pay for his child
support obligations. With this argument, the Justice notes that
Redhail may not be an acceptable member of his class and thus might
not have been able to bring the challenge that he brought. However
Rehnquist notes that because he finds the law to be valid, there is
no need to reach the question of standing.
See also
External links
Notes